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
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**EFFICIENCY AND
CREDIBILITY
INTERVIEW WITH
THE CHIEF OF THE
ITALIAN DEFENCE STAFF**

**INTERVIEW WITH
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE
IRISH DEFENCE FORCES**


**AUSTRAL AMERICA
ON THE ROAD TO UNITY**



ENGLISH EDITION




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Rivista Militare aims at broadening and updating the technical and vocational training of Officers and NCOs. It is thus a means of propagating the military way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at informing the general public on the Army and on military issues.

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Women soldiers are now a reality in the Italian Army and, together with their male counterparts, will be the main pillars of the professional Armed Forces of the future.

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
EFFICIENCY AND CREDIBILITY

Professionalism in the Armed Forces, the new European vocation in the security field, the strengthening of the NATO Reaction Forces, the possibility of establishing a civil service and the importance of the military values for the social, cultural and democratic growth of the Nation.

These and other subjects are discussed by General Mario Arpino in the following interview.


**Interview with General Mario Arpino
Chief of the Defence Staff**

by Giovanni Cerbo *



One of the ambitious objectives of the Italian Defence is the construction of a professional Army, capable of safeguarding the interests of the Country wherever they are threatened, of meeting the security needs of the Atlantic Alliance and of being a protagonist in European Defence. Can you tell us about the status of the project for this reform? Are we on the finishing straight?





The realization of an entirely professional model and the contemporaneous introduction of the voluntary service for women are now established facts. This change - which was strongly desired for obvious operational reasons and for the advisability of being in line with the other Countries - was also decisively spurred by political and social considerations.

Last October, with the favourable vote of the

Senate and thanks to the commitment of all concerned (Institutions, Government and Parliament) the reform of the military service became a Law.


On the international plane, our allies were observing with great interest the transition of the Italian Army from conscription to a professional system, almost as if they wanted to measure our capability of meeting our commitments in the Defence sector as is expected of a Country of great importance, both in Europe and within the Alliance.

On the internal plane, the reform, besides meeting an ineludible operational requirement, has given a positive answer to a deep change which has occurred in the entire society, and particularly in its most dynamic component, i.e. the young.

What we have done is certainly a very important turning point, which is in accordance with our duty to provide our Country, Europe and the Alliance with modern Armed Forces, capable of carrying out the missions entrusted to them.

With the present formulation, we can assume that conscripts will be employed up to 2006 or 2007. As a consequence, in order to keep the Armed Forces at the envisaged level of 190,000 men, and to offset the only partial completion of the voluntary rolls by that time, it will be necessary to have recourse to the recruitment of one-year volunteers.

Furthermore, the professional model can become a reality only if the conditions for the recruitment of short-term volunteers are realized. In this respect, even the law just approved does not respond fully to the need of ensuring job openings for the discharged short-term volunteers, a measure which I consider indispensable. Nevertheless, I note that efforts are being made in order to meet the expectations of the Defence, through the envisaged constitution of a



specific structure for an easier employment of the honourably discharged volunteers, and I consider with confidence the possibility of reserving jobs to the volunteers, through successive laws, in the Armed Corps and in the Public Administration, also considering that the transformation under way is a structural reform, which concerns the entire Nation in all its aspects, and not only the Defence.

The efficiency and credibility of the Armed Forces, in fact, are closely connected with a great number of political and socio-cultural factors. The new role entrusted to the Armed Forces requires higher professionalism, better training and a total willingness to serve, in order to be able to compete with our European partners. Above all, the new challenges require a change in mentality: it is impossible to participate in the construction of the European Army while remaining enclosed within the

clerical norms of public employment.

A real change is necessary; it is not sufficient to talk about restructuration of High Ranks, rationalization of infrastructure or voluntary service, because today to a greater demand for professionalism does not correspond an adequate recognition of the peculiar condition of the military.

Are we then on the homestretch?

Certainly not.

We still have a long way to go. The entirely professional transformation of the Armed Forces presents important problems which cannot be solved in a laboratory or by a simple arithmetical operation.

Besides the great priorities of modernization and strengthening of the military instrument, there is another very important one from the human and social point of view, which concerns the military personnel and their families.



I am convinced that we have the right to ask of the volunteers and other servicemen commitment, professionalism, good will and mobility.

But, in today's society, duties increasingly correspond to rights and standards of living proportionate to what is requested.

What Italy needs, in order to take its place and remain on the locomotive of the European construction of Security and Defence, and to strengthen its Atlantic engagement, is to continue with consistency, but also with a little more courage, its course along the route it has undertaken.

The European Union has decided to acquire by 2003 the capability of conducting autonomous interventions for crisis management. In other words, the Union has the intention of taking a step which is indispensable for abandoning the logic of "Peace

Support" - where the Armed Forces of the individual Nations were used as the operational arm of other international organizations - and becoming a fully active political subject, with a wide range of options. This capability requires a Corps-level force, capable of carrying out all the missions envisaged by the Petersberg Declaration, from humanitarian missions to peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations. In substance, it would be a matter of setting up a Major Unit consisting of 50-60,000 men, with complete combat capabilities.

What could Italy contribute from the point of view of both quality and quantity? Would its contribution be comparable to that of the leading European Countries?

The European Union has discovered its own vocation in the field of security.

This process was significantly accelerated on the occasion of the European Council meetings held in Cologne and in Helsinki, where the Heads of State and Government of the Union undertook to improve their military capabilities. In practice, it was decided that by 2003 the EU must have the capability of projecting a Corps (between 50 and 60,000 men), for a period of at least one year, to an area close to the borders of the member Nations.

A fundamental and irrevocable principle is that the process of construction of European Security be developed in a frame of full cooperation and transparency with NATO, with the common objective of achieving a more equitable sharing of burdens and responsibilities between North Atlantic and European Allies.

At the time of the recent Balkan crises, the European Armed Forces have shown considerable

shortcomings, due to the fact that the European pillar of the Alliance suffered from a static concept of defence, based on the protection of the territory against a unilateral and well defined threat.

Besides, technological gaps and scarce interoperability, together with the protectionism and fragmentation of the Defence industries, are factors that produced a volume of force that, although the collective effort was equal to 60% of the US military expenditure, did not have, in proportion, the same capabilities of the Us.

The recent NATO initiative, known as DCI (Defence Capability Initiative) intends to improve capabilities in five specific areas:

- projectability and mobility: capability of rapidly deploying the forces also, and mainly, "out of area";
- sustainability and logistics: capability of sustaining, and supporting logistically, forces far from their garrisons, guaranteeing their replacement in case of long term operations;
- effective engagement: capability of fighting successfully in all types of operations with any intensity, from the lowest to the highest;
- survivability: capability of protecting forces and infrastructure from any type of threat.
- command and control: adoption of compatible communication systems, in order to allow the effective joint operations of forces from different Countries.

Obviously, the greatest degree of responsibility in the actual implementation of the agreed measures falls to the individual nations. Therefore, in order to establish a closer connection between the traditional planning process and the DCI, a procedure has been created, through which all national programmes



explicitly refer to one of the decisions implied by the five primary areas I just mentioned.

Precisely through this kind of NATO-Europe "convergency mechanism" the Defence Staff, fulfilling its peculiar tasks, is conducting its rationalization activity.

Clearly, this engagement implies a remarkable effort in financial terms.

What Italy has been capable of expressing in the context of its Defence Planning is a reason for satisfaction, particularly if one considers the gap with the main European Countries as regards the funds allotted to Defence. But Europe has a cost and gives us no discount as NATO sometimes did. As far as concerns Defence resources, we are still at about 50% of the amount destined by the European Countries with which we like to compare ourselves.

Therefore the problem concerns the adequacy of the evolution of the Italian military

instrument, also considering the new developments, which see the creation of new Western armies, not for waging wars but for avoiding them.

Only through a radical transformation we shall be able to offer ourselves as participants in international missions, also as leader nation, on a level with the Countries "that count".

For this reason we should avoid expensive duplications, even at the cost of losing our autonomy in some sectors.

We must therefore try to:

- increase the level of technologic know-how, possibly developing "excellency niches" in the European context, avoiding to sharpen the divergences, and always keeping the umbrella of the transatlantic link;
- find a common strategy for technologic research and system acquisition;
- select specialization areas in the logistic and operational sectors, and offer them to Europe as national contribution.



The "Headline Goal Task Force" (HTF), a working Group of the "interim Military Body" (iMB) has produced the "Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue (HHC) 2000", which lists the military capabilities that the future European force should acquire in order to conduct Petersberg operations.

The Italian contribution was determined by taking into account what was earlier made available to WEU, increased and updated by combat, support and command-and-control specialistic components.

This contribution will be 15-18% of the total requirements. It consists, as regards the land components - "Carabinieri" included - of about 20,000 men, to whom the crews of the naval and air units must be added. This puts us on a par with the other member States and preserves the political weight and role of Italy as a founding Nation of the EU.

So far, the evaluations expressed in the European Union

recognize the credible Italian commitment within the Organization. The activity carried out has been highly appreciated, and our commitments for the future are in harmony with those of France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

In the international context a new requirement is taking shape: the strengthening of the NATO Reaction Forces. This ensues from the likelihood of having to face several engagements with the simultaneous introduction in the Theatre of as many as three Corps-level structures, vis-à-vis the sole availability of the British-framework ARRC Hq.

The comparison between the requirements to be met and the present capabilities has therefore prompted the Alliance to start a planning process aimed at establishing new Command and Control structures, equivalent to the UK ARRC Hq.

In view of this, Italy offered its candidacy for the creation of a Corps-level framework Hq.

What is the military and political significance of this project? If the proposal is accepted, what will be the global engagement of the Italian Army for European security?

The establishment of a national Corps-level framework Hq is no doubt a project of great operational and political value, and we must do our best in order to have our European and Atlantic Allies receive it in a positive way.

It is a project which harmonically takes part in the process of revision of the Atlantic Alliance. The new NATO Strategic Concept, in fact, defines the capability of crisis management as one of the fundamental elements for the safeguard of common security, and considers two Theatres as possible simultaneous operational engagements. A

possible engagement for the defence of the Alliance - minor Theatre, art. 5 - should also be added, and this would absorb another Corps-level Command and Control structure.

At the present time, vis-à-vis a requirement of at least three structures, there is only one of them: the ARRC Hq.

Actually, the comparison between requirements and capabilities has led the planners of the Alliance to decide the constitution of new Command and Control structures, equivalent to the ARRC Hq. In the future, the operational requirement will probably lead to a global revision of the present organization, still based on static sub-regional Commands.

In this politico-strategic context, the Italian candidature as "lead nation" has been officially submitted to the Alliance in May 2000, for the constitution in Italy of an ARRC-equivalent Hq. The relevant projects are under way.

The acceptance of this proposal, besides confirming in practice the importance of the Southern Region, declared at the Washington Summit in April 1999, could satisfy the legitimate national ambition of seeing a recognition of the remarkable political and military effort made by Italy in the management of the Balkan crisis.

This would entail a new high-profile engagement for the Army, since it would have to guarantee right away:

- a significant number of Staff Officers and NCOs;
- structures for the installation of the Headquarters;
- robust supports: general (Hq. Command), specialistic (Communications and Intelligence), Combat Support (Artillery, Engineers, Air Cavalry).

This would be equal to a fourth **requisite** to be met in addition to the other three: "Division for



Europe" Package; staff and support resources, to enable EUROFOR to operate as a European Immediate-Reaction Force; staff resources, and possibly personnel for the higher positions, as a contribution to the Command and Control structure of the European Forces.

In a mature democracy, the citizen's constitutional duty to serve the Country in arms could be passed over (as is happening with the professionalization of the Armed Forces) provided that the feeling of belonging to the national community is not lost.

What is your opinion on the prospect of replacing conscription with a year of mandatory civil service, for men and women of conscription age, in favour of the national community?

Nobody can deny that in the last years, in our Country - as in

the other European Nations - the idea of the scarce usefulness of conscription has been prevailing, together with the ineludible necessity of having a military instrument equal to the important national and international operational commitments undertaken by Italy.

As a consequence, a new idea has started to gain ground, i.e. that it would be better to have an Armed Forces model exclusively based on long-term volunteers: more efficient, owing to their better professional training, abreast of the new technologies and readily employable in international operations.

Therefore, the recently approved reform of the military service marked the end of an epoch but, at the same time, introduced a new and important question: does the abolition of conscription mean that the young will have no more obligations to serve their Country?



I don't think so.

We are living through a season of new rights, but of new duties as well. The Country can be served in the traditional way, wearing a uniform, but also in more updated forms, i.e. by intervening in those sectors where the State, like any other public body, is unable to fully meet the needs of society: I refer to relief, culture, environment, etc..

And here a new issue opens which, like the one concerning the abolition of conscription, will have to prime a serious and lively debate.

Who pays? Who manages? Who controls? Will it have to be mandatory or voluntary? Should women participate? How long will that service last? What are the employment standards?

This is a complex package of questions, to which Government and Parliament will have to give adequate answers.

I only note that, also in Italy, the institution of a civil service could be useful to help the young

in developing their sense of belonging, together with the awareness of having to cooperate, with a modern and solidaristic vision, in the social, cultural and democratic growth of the Country.

Ernesto Galli della Loggia, the well-known political commentator, has written that the common national sentiment of the Italians was lost on September 8, 1943. Has our idea of "Motherland" - from that moment and forever - really died? Is there something of that dreadful disaster that still reflects in the unease of today's Italian society, or does this feeling have completely different origins?

I do not agree with those who maintain that September 8 marked the end of the national unity.

It is true that the State crumbled away: there were two armies fighting each other on our

soil, and any form of state authority had disappeared.

But certainly the idea of Motherland and Country did not die.

Those were not the days of the "everybody go home" as a certain cheap literature wants us to believe. This is witnessed by the valour, heroism and determination of so many Italian soldiers who, after the armistice was announced, without orders and political directives, side by side with their Commanders, fought with honour and dignity in the Balkans, in Greece, in the Dodecanese and in the struggle for the liberation of Italy from Nazi occupation.

In the Piedmontese and Waldesian valleys, in the Cuneo region - just to mention a few examples - the local peasants gave clothes and food to the soldiers of the 4th Army who were trying to escape capture by the Germans: the fugitives were Calabrian, Campanian, Sicilian and Apulian young men. This is

General Mario ARPINO was born in Tarvisio on July 20, 1937.

From 1956 to 1959 he attended the "Rostro" Normal Course at the Air Force Academy.

In 1960 he obtained the Military Pilot's Licence at the Amendola Jet-Aircraft School. He has on his credit more than 5000 flight hours on different types of propeller airplanes, jets and helicopters.

He attended the Normal and Higher Courses at the Air College, and the Centre for High Military Studies.

After 7 years at the 51st Wing (Istrana) as fighter-interceptor pilot of the 21st and 22nd Group and Commander of the 55st Squadron, in 1967 he was destined to the 53rd Wing (Cameri) as Chief, Opns Office of the 21st Group and of the 53rd Wing.

In 1973, with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, became Commander of the 71st Electronic Warfare Group and the Radiomeasures Unit of the Pratica di Mare Airport.

In 1974 he was assigned to the 3rd Division of the Air Staff, as Chief of several Sections and in 1976, after his promotion to Colonel, as Chief, Plans Office.

In 1977 he was appointed to the 46th Air Brigade (Pisa), where he held the positions of Chief, Flight Unit, Deputy Commander and Acting Commander of the Air Brigade.

In 1979, reassigned to the Air Staff, he held the position of Chief, Operations Office of the 3rd Division, in 1980 became again Chief, Plans Office, and, in 1982, Deputy Chief of the 3rd Division, with the rank of Brigadier General.

In 1986, after a period as Chief of the General Financial Programming Office at the Defence Staff, he was appointed Chief, Plans, Operations, Training and Flight Safety at the Air Staff.

In 1987 Major General Arpino became Commandant of the Air Force Academy (Pozzuoli).

In 1989 was assigned to the 2nd Air Region as Deputy Commander.

From October 1990 to March 1991, during the Gulf War, he was Chief of the Air Coordination Unit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General, in 1991 he assumed the office of Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force, which he held for more than 3 years and, from July 1994 to June 1995, that of Commander, 1st Air Region.

On June 4, 1995, Gen. Arpino was appointed Air Force Chief of Staff and on February 15, 1999, Chief of the Defence Staff.

Gen. Arpino has been awarded the following decorations: Knight, Military Order of Italy; Knight Grand Cross, Order of Merit of the Republic of Italy; "Mauriziana" Medal for 10 Lusters of Military Career; Military Medal for Long Air Navigation (Gold); Silver Medal for Long Command; Golden Cross for Long Service; Commemorative Cross for Military Operations in the Persian Gulf (with Swords) (1992); Spanish Cross for Aviation Merit (1992); "Commandeur" of the French Legion of Honour; Commander of the US Legion of Merit (2000); Third Degree Medal, awarded by the King of Saudi Arabia (1991); Saudi Commemorative Medal for the Liberation of Kuwait (1992); Grand Officer of the Brazilian Order for Aviation Merit (1997); "Gran Cruz" of the Argentine Order for Aviation Merit (1997); "Gran Cruz" of the Order for Aviation Merit of the Chilean Air Force (1998); Jordan's "al-Kawkab" Cross, First Class (1998); Commander, 1st Class, Order of the North Star (1998); Commander of the Order of Orange-Nassau (2000); "Wounded in Service" Honour Badge.

General Mario Arpino is married and has two daughters and one son.

national solidarity, a far-reaching investment.

I believe that in those tragic days hundreds of thousands of Italians refused to look helplessly at the "death of the Motherland", and chose to live on the hardest side of sacrifice in order to redeem the military honour and the dignity of the Nation. We all remember vividly the soldiers of the "Acqui" Division who in Cephalonia gave their young lives to keep their oath.

Yes, it is true, after September 8 there were, in our Country, social and political conflicts which led to many, even violent, confrontations. But all this, in my opinion, did not cause the end of the Nation; as if the Nation existed only when someone thinks for all. It means, rather, to live through the differences of ideas and thoughts, finding the best possible way to coexist.

What values should be fostered by the military world? Which ones, in your opinion, could still be useful for the Nation's social texture?

I believe that today the military world still expresses values of civil coexistence and cultural construction, as well as a moral propriety of behaviour.

But I also think that we should not close our eyes vis-à-vis the values **tout court**, but, rather, that we should have the courage to examine them in the light of the real tribunal of reason, i.e. the common good.

Values, to become public virtues, must fall within the cycle of institutions and democratic dialogue.

A moral man, endowed with a healthy and creative personality, deals with the public sphere readily giving up his interests in the name of those of others.

The great challenge is precisely that of building a constructive theory in which individualism



should not imply the impossibility of the idea of common good.

Within this framework, values become signals, which put together many potentially conflictive egoistic interests.

These are the **common** values, indispensable for the development and operation of social life. **In-common** values are something else, for they insert in a reciprocity circuit only facts connected with a well-defined social group.

Therefore the military would carry out a non-intelligent operation if they insisted on their **in-common** values in an autarchic manner, without close

bonds with the liberal and democratic institutions. In this case, we would end up by ignoring the ineluctable laws of history, and would be seen as a separate body. In this regard, the relation between this elite feeling, which existed until the recent past, and the lack of consensus and legitimation by public opinion, cannot be doubted.

I think, on the contrary, that the military should do the opposite: start from the **common** values, which are sources of stability and social cohesion, and imbue them with the force of our culture, our traditions, our military character and our discipline.

And then many constructive notions, which belong to military deontology (*loyalty, commitment, courage, altruism, honour, authority, efficiency, responsibility, solidarity, tolerance, reciprocity, subsidiarity*) can really be a great asset for all in every sector of social life, where the offer of the *prêt à porter* symbols of an unbridled hedonism can often disturb the desire of all men, especially the younger ones, of being enriched by shared and lasting values.

□

* Brigadier General,
Editor of "Rivista Militare"


THE STRATEGIC THOUGHT IN A CHANGING WORLD

by Umberto Cappuzzo *

When I read the flood of news on the asserted effects of the depleted uranium contained in rounds heedlessly employed by NATO in some intervention areas (in operations that were fully acceptable in principle, for valid humanitarian reasons) a lapidary sentence of Tacitus' came to my mind. The great historian pronounced it as a comment to the military deeds of his time, which were justified, even then (nothing new under the sun!) by the necessity of making peace prevail; and the peace vividly portrayed by the Romans in its majesty was indeed quite different (*immensa romanae pacis maiestas*).

That peace let the subjugated enemies rise to the level of citizens (*cives*), with an assimilation capability – or integration, if we want to call it so – that we should study, in order to obtain useful suggestions for the present. I looked for that sentence, because I wanted to quote it in its exact terms, and here it is: "*Ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant*". Plain translation: "They make a desert, and then call it peace".

As we can see, the peace/war relation has ancient roots recurrently revived by more or less credible moralistic reproaches, but its essence does not change.



When studying strategic problems, it is essential to start from a "working scheme" which can lead to detect the numerous variables of each phenomenon: influences, interrelations, vulnerabilities, strong points, possible evolutions.

The interventions made during the debate on depleted uranium, certainly do not go in that direction. The aim is to find scapegoats at technical and operational level while the problem involves ethic and strategic issues connected with the decision-making mechanisms of multinational coalitions.

The following article, written by a distinguished student of global strategy, introduces interesting opportunities for reflections which could hopefully pave the way for further doctrinal discussions.

Going back to depleted uranium and beyond its effects on men, still to be confirmed, the fact remains that some malicious persons could be led to put on the same plane the "ethnic cleansing" – to which we wanted and had to put an end

– and the "environmental dirtying" created through the dissemination on the ground of materials that certainly do not fall within the category of... recommended fertilizers, a group which, on the other hand, does not include the



the more scientific theses I intend to demonstrate in the course of this article. Theses presented "by flashes" and through the outline of an analysis which tends to emphasize that the present crisis is not a transient one.

It is the "crisis of the strategic thought", which is part of a wider "crisis of thought in its globality". In the stormy times we are living through, it is impossible to find a firm anchorage and a concrete philosophic reference, the so-called "strong thought". The technologic inebriation goes on – within the great mass of users of the means made available by the great scientific conquests – under the banner of the "how", without bothering to look for and define the "why". *"Homo cogitans"* is now an endangered species, arrogantly supplanted by *"homo audiens"* or, with a more advanced expression, by *"homo audiens et videns"*, completely taken by the frenzy of pressing buttons or keys. This new man is ready to let himself be involved in what Umberto Eco calls "our daily Carnival", represented by a lifestyle where only the game is important and therefore man becomes *"homo ludens"*. This dichotomy ("how"

napalm bombs and the defoliants that were used, with some abundance, in the Vietnam war, and whose effects can still be seen after several decades. One should ask at this point, in order to be untroubled by one's own conscience and irreproachable in front of public opinion, if the ethic compatibility of the means employed should correspond to the morality of the ends. This "journalistic" preamble could seem not perfectly in line with





Italian paratroopers in East Timor.

and “why”) is the origin of our confusion. Mine is just a simple underlining, which would deserve a much deeper discussion, but I don’t think this is the right forum.

THE PEACE/WAR RELATION

The problem of the peace/war relation, which I indirectly mentioned before, brings back to my mind some other interesting quotations I came across during a recent debate. They were partial, clearly dated and marked by the cultural approach typical of the environment to which their authors belonged. Their vision is free from ethical considerations, but this was the logical result of the times.

This was, for instance, the view held by Eron (Alexandrian mathematician, 1st Century B.C.) when he clearly said that *“the philosophers have long been searching for means to stay in peace, but only the technicians have been able to find those means, using applied ballistics”*.

From a different angle (from “existing force” to “potential force”) Alfred Bernhard Nobel, the great Swedish chemist, noted that his dynamite was much more effective than any international agreement, adding that *“as soon as men realize that they can destroy entire armies in an instant, they will refrain from war”*. To tell the truth, things did not work that way, and this is a demonstration, rather unnecessary, of the fact that rationality is not a characteristic widely diffused among the humans.

Along the same line, in times closer to us but with a wider outlook, Richard Nixon, President of the United States, with the solemnity deriving from his office, declared: *“Let it be clear, any type of peace that diplomacy can achieve is based on force, which must be ready and available”*.

The dual concept of peace and diplomacy introduces us into a new dimension, where a particular importance is assumed by negotiations, which should not be pursued abstractly, but rather supported by the availability of a credible coercive instrument.

This conception, marked by a realistic pragmatism, has gradually been joined – and hypocritically replaced in part – by a declared moralistic vision, which not infrequently was only

apparent. Let this be quite clear, the necessity of an ethical readaptation was and is shared by everybody, but there are many less noble factors that, in the case of peace interventions, affect the decisions, i.e. the places, times and ways, with the consequences that can be seen by all. It would be interesting to dwell upon these affecting factors, which are fully valid in a perspective of power and interests to pursue.


The most recent evolution shows that decisive factors such as solidarity and human rights have ascended the proscenium of history.

Already some decades ago, another great President of the United States, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, observed that *"in the final analysis, peace is nothing but a question of human rights"*.

THE EMERGING STRONG THOUGHT: SECURITY, STABILITY AND PEACE

Now we have reached the focal point, i.e. the definition of an "emerging strong thought". At present centred on rights – and this is something, already! – which should be considered in a dynamic perspective and enriched with new contents referring to the central importance of the human person as a whole, in a wider context taking into account many concurrent aspects, seen according to common ethical ends (shared values and relevant general and partial goals; restrictions and resulting duties).

Now it is time to mention again the "why" – whose absence I noted before – in order to introduce all the elements in a project which may guide our journey. Only in this way we can meet the requirements for security, stability and peace,



which unfortunately are still defined in an abstract manner.

Today, the employment of the military component is included in a context of this kind, with the consequent contradictions.

The use of rounds with depleted uranium is a demonstration that something does not tally, at least from the ecological viewpoint which, in peace operations, should not be disregarded. If we conduct a little deeper examination and put aside the often prevailing rhetoric, we can see that, unfortunately, there are many things which don't tally.

I had already said this, with a rather informal criticism, on the eve of NATO's involvement in Kosovo, and again on the first anniversary of the intervention. The two articles, published in a survey of the ex-servicemen's Association of which I am Vice President, are still fully topical, and it would be worth quoting them in full, but that would go beyond the limits I have imposed on myself. As a matter of fact, in the first article, which had a very significant title, an updated version of a well-known saying by Clemenceau (War is too serious... to be decided by



Armoured vehicles of the Italian contingent at a checkpoint in Kosovo.

politicians), I maintained that the latest developments in Kosovo (military operations had not started yet) were the most evident demonstration of Europe's failure. Whatever the evolution of the situation, especially if the military intervention was not going to be a limited one, the Old Continent would have been the loser, since it had renounced its function as main interlocutor and influential referent in the solution of a problem in which it was unquestionably and directly interested, relying instead – through NATO – on the great ally on the other side of the Atlantic, thus relinquishing its role and its identity.

Apart from any other consideration, it was very sad to go back to the

employment of arms for a problem with strong political connotations, under the illusion that arms could succeed where diplomacy had failed (for objective impossibility or inadequate approach?).

I then tackled the basic issue of "crisis management" in its strategical/operational dimensions, where the military component takes on the extreme form of peace enforcement with the use of arms, in a process of "growing escalation" whose limit is not clearly defined, and I noted that the intention was to realize a "strategy of coercion", whose effectiveness had still to be demonstrated. And to think that history could have taught many things in this regard and a cold evaluation of the geopolitical repercussions on the area would have been a precious guide! My thoughts obviously went to Vietnam and to its lessons, which unfortunately were put aside too soon.

I also added that the Balkans are a real powder-keg that must be approached with extreme caution.

Adopting André Glucksmann considerations (1), I quoted his harsh conclusion, which was that *"Europe cannot wait forever for the Americans to land and finish a job they started in 1944"*. The specification of the date was, in a way, the historical synthesis of a failure; the failure of the very conception of Europe: a Europe which, taken by the market euphoria, had preferred to pursue its material and economic interests – certainly very important, but not exclusive-giving little importance to values and, by doing so, forgoing, at least up to that moment, the definition of a well marked identity.

Before, in the midst of the East/West confrontation, there could have been a certain justification. But after the fall of

the Berlin Wall and the gradual attenuation of the traditional threat from the East, the changed international panorama – with the complex set of risks that had come to the forefront and the progressive enlargement of a dangerous area of instability within Europe itself – should have advised to consider a very different direct commitment with the consequent requirements regarding the political initiatives and preparations of adequate defence instruments, in order to be able, at least, to intervene in areas of primary interest.

All this could be seen in the light of the indications taken from the study of the different conceivable scenarios, if only an analysis of the possible hotbeds of conflict had been conducted, considering the conditions posed by “geopolitics”.

The “European Security and Defence Identity” should have been considered in addition to the generic expression of abstract western solidarity – a verbal, useless and pathetic manifestation – in order not to rely only, or mainly, on the great ally from across the Atlantic.

FROM “STRATEGIC DUOPOLY” TO AMERICAN “MONOPOLY”

Several events, usually not very fortunate and often endured without any European involvement, caused the US to assume an unquestioned leading function even in geographical areas where mainly – or exclusively – European interests were (and are!) at stake. Therefore, the end of the “strategic duopoly”, which was the characterizing element of the great East/West confrontation,

inevitably brought about, a *de facto* American monopoly, which minimized (and minimizes) the role of the Old Continent, condemned to be an object rather than a political subject on the international scene. In a less shortsighted perspective, it should have been clear that this evolution was not even in the interest of the US, which – despite the appearances – was (and still is) to become more and more the “gendarme of the world” with the ensuing positive and (even more) negative consequences.

Furthermore, the solitude of a hegemonic position inevitably leads to considerable discomfort and in practice increases the discontent of those who feel excluded. It would be wise, on the part of the great transatlantic ally – whose stabilizing role, from the viewpoint of the ideals of our Western civilization is out of discussion – to become aware of the convenience of increasing the participation of other international subjects in the decision-making process, pressing them for unanimous decisions,

which would enlarge the area of consensus. In substance, for each area under examination there should be a particular interlocutor, in order to distribute the tasks by regions and subregions. In this way, the desired international order would not appear as a prerogative of the great hegemonic actor and therefore coinciding with the interests of one side only, but rather as a synthesis of several contributions. Modern strategy, in its global dimension, emphasizes the importance of the psychologic elements. This must be taken into account to avoid that, even in case of success of an adopted line, the positive effects should be short-lived.

Furthermore, for our great ally, it is not convenient to lay open to the criticism of the denigrators of the present political organization on the international plane, who talk of “creeping colonialism”, referring, of course, to the undisputed success of a certain strategic thought, which excludes other possible contributions.

I also supported, in that article, a dynamic conception which had



Italian Engineers repairing a railway line in the former Yugoslavia.



Left and facing page.

NCOs of the B.O.E. Unit during a mine-clearing operation in Bosnia.

witnessing a "crisis... in crisis management", which concerned both the political vision and the forms of intervention.

To be convinced of this, it would have been enough to consider the long debate on the problem of Kosovo which, at least in a first phase, was very similar to a "babble". But, if we had listened a little further and a little better, we would have heard no "babble", but rather the resounding war cry of the great ally. We refer, just to be clear, to the interventions in the Persian Gulf, in their different "editions". About this, one could have asked whether, on the practical plane and according to the previous experiences, peace enforcement and restoration of reliable conditions of stability were achievable goals. Personally, I ventured to express my doubts.

My doubts arose mainly from a cold analysis of the military operations in the Gulf area. The last one, which still continued in a creeping way, in my opinion was the most convincing demonstration that there was another crisis in the background, the "crisis of the strategic thought" which, at that moment, was not capable of assembling all the factors that, in the global strategic vision necessary at the time, had to participate in the achievement of a positive result of stability, indispensable for an orderly development.

As mentioned some time ago by Sean Daniel (2) with reference to the events in the Gulf, *"seldom has the use of force brought about such a tangled mass of political knots"*.

It was like a parody of Clausewitz' concept, according to which war solved political problems through the use of force: in that case, the political problems

both political and military implications.

If we looked around, there was a feeling of disappointment, to say the least, and not only at European level, if only the discussion was extended from the peace interventions to the wider themes in which they should have been logically included. I refer to the strategic conception, which was not even outlined, neither on the concrete (practice and politico-military action), nor on the theoretical plane (doctrines), indispensable for shedding light upon the whole picture.

After the triumphal glorification of the panacea called "crisis

management" – which had a mainly military matrix – as the emblem of a new strategic thought whose application would create the preconditions for stability with progress, we have been called to reckon with a rather different reality, which, to be understood, had to be analyzed, in order to give a meaning to the formulation of the "possible options".


THE "CRISIS... IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT"

I was tempted to use an effective phrase, and say that we were

appeared, or became worse, through the wrong recourse to war. It was a caricature stemming from the non-perception of the incompatibility between the means employed and the desired ends, in an environment which included: space in its widest meaning, human component; public opinion; pressures of various nature; ethical and legal restraints; limits imposed by the different structures of the international architecture of security; incidence of modern technology on communications; diffusion of real time information; practical annulment of distances and borders, etc. This set heavy constraints on the application of force up to the extreme consequences, since it was necessary to limit the use of force according to an "escalation process" meant to avoid the attainment of the highest "threshold", where the enemy would be annihilated, according to the classic vision of military strategy.

This was my idea although here and there, in qualified circles, there was the inclination (perhaps a little superficial) to support, at least verbally, resolute interventions. This was said with sound arguments, with some criticism regarding only the pretension of solving the problems deriving from the use of force mainly through air interventions. Others were dazzled by the employment of the so-called "smart weapons".

As concerns the former, Glucksmann, who has already been quoted several times, felt the need to explain (still in connection with Kosovo) that *"the air forces were not sufficient, only well armed and powerful ground troops could impose the respect of democracy"*, but he added (and this is the essence of the problem!) that *"an intervention of that kind was risky and costly, but it would have been the less unpleasant among the*



possible solutions". According to him in the background there was a possible "second edition of the dirty war" with an evident reference to some historical precedent. The expression "dirty war" evoked the sinister memories of Vietnam and Afghanistan; two events which, because of the inexplicable superficiality of the so-called experts in military matters, have not been studied with proper attention. And yet it was (and still is) worth studying them in depth from every angle, in order to learn their teachings, which could be many.

As concerns "smart weapons" a strange conspiracy of silence, whose origin was unknown, produced the acritical acceptance of their absolute validity, both technical and operational. In the era of consumers' culture and of a widespread feeling that, to gain consent, it is preferable to delegate to machines what, with

some risks and some losses, should be done by men, this evolution was not very surprising. The fact is that the "smart weapons" are not always that smart but, on the contrary, show their frightful limitations... not to mention that, on the day of reckoning, only the ground forces can ensure, with the firm possession of the territory, the stability and duration of the success achieved.

This means that these weapons were not analyzed on the basis of the data that, despite the curtain of silence, had leaked out. I refer, in particular, to an excellent "Report" made for the Pentagon by the US General Accounting Office (GAO), a body more or less equivalent to the Italian Court of Accounts. The report resulted from the thorough scrutiny of a great number of documents, which were mainly reports from operational Commands and Information Services of the US.



Italian military convoy of the 19th "Cavalleggeri Guide" Regt. in Bosnia.

What came out was an enlightening appraisal: *"on the basis of their performance in Operation Desert Storm, it is inappropriate to say that the most expensive weapons are more effective than the less costly ones"*. This is a syntetic statement about a substantial reduction of expectations, if not a downright acknowledgement of the lack of success in an ambitious project, which had been presented with the significant slogan: *One target, one bomb*. The GAO report destroys a number of myths. But, in spite of everything, "smart weapons" continued to be the constant reference of an operational attitude which had the pretence to be the winner. And this was confirmed very often, since there were enormous interests at stake.

In this respect, how can we forget the warning of a great US President, and victorious military leader in WWII, Gen Dwight Eisenhower, who said that it was necessary *"to prevent the military/industrial complex from acquiring a disproportionate influence in the life of America?"*

In such a confusion of ideas, it was pleasing to see that something was moving at mass-media level, with the participation of influential journalists who, I hoped, could trigger a clarification effort with a possible spin-off at political level. In my article, for instance, I quoted Antonio Gambino, author of an excellent article published just in those days (3).

Commenting the latest developments of the negotiations on Kosovo, Gambino tried to outline the possible scenarios, asking several questions and concluding that *"the real problem was the effective possibility of setting up a planet-wide coercive*

diplomacy by a world directorate". He acutely observed that *"the Americans, especially of late, had shown a strong belief in that possibility, since their stated objective was to set up a global NATO, thanks to the transformation of the Atlantic Alliance into a planetary politico-military body. This project would have permitted"*, according to Gambino, *"the achievement of different goals (confirmation of the role of the US as Superpower: indispensable nation, to use Clinton's expression; maintenance of a reliable structure for controlling the European continent; involvement – also economic – of the allies with a multilateral effort, whose control levers would be firmly held by American hands)"*.

Gambino's was a comprehensive analysis, whose discussions and conclusions had to be taken into account if one wanted to give a real contribution to clarify the starting points of a European strategic thought that could serve



as background of an autonomous international political conception capable of evaluating the much-exalted European identity involved and of encouraging the Europeans to abandon the parochialism of their internal politics.

Kosovo was just a single case, but it pointed out a trend to be kept in mind.

Going back to Gambino's observations, it was impossible to believe that the crises could end soon, and in this prospect a situation such as the one in Kosovo caused serious concern, since it was an indication of a political and ethical vacuum. A widespread planetary "conflict situation" was already a fact that could not be ignored.

LOOKING FOR A DIFFERENT APPROACH

In agreement with this shrewd analysis, I expressed my belief

that it was about time to find a different approach, since it was politically unacceptable to live with the diffused instability caused by so many hotbeds of tensions and wars. I also felt that it was morally unacceptable to go on with oppressions and massacres, breaking the elementary rules of respect for human beings and protection of minorities. The "diplomacy" of coercion did not seem to have produced the expected fruits. When some apparent results were achieved, one should have ascertained if they weren't also due to the action of the diplomacy of the other side, which tended to obtain the most advantageous conditions, at least in economic-financial terms, in the shape of aid requested and granted for the sake of a stability which had to be achieved, also and mainly, in the social sphere. So, elements of coercion –through-blackmail were coming into play. Here, also, the

Transport by rail of "Camillino" VCC-1 personnel carriers with additional armour.

confusion of the strategic thought emerged through academic classifications which widened the spectrum of the possible interventions, emphasizing their different aspects (incidence of actual or potential force; deterrence or coercion, etc.). These are particular aspects which cannot always be outlined clearly; consequently, on the practical plane, they end up tangled and muddled.

Whatever the solution envisaged for the problem, the fact remained that a strategy based on the threatened use of force was credible if the use of force itself was credible. But – I repeat once more – up to what limit? A strategy that shuns the requisite of credibility is practically a "non strategy". And



what about the “afterwards”? This was precisely the question.

Now, we have come to the crucial point of the conceptual line that should be followed in the new international political panorama; a line that, now more than ever, should be considered as a whole: the strategy must be global, i.e. it must include all possible measures concurring in the achievement of the pre-established goals. Military measures are only a part of these.

The maintenance of peace, presented as a primary requirement of a world order which has still to be constructed, emphasizes the irenic characterization of a strategic vision which had been looming already during the bipolar confrontation.

At that time it was a strategic outlook, deriving – as a logical consequence – from the fear of a nuclear holocaust, and was justified by several initiatives, of

different cultural origin, hinged on the ethical appeal launched by the multicoloured world of the operators of peace. As I said before, after the experience of Kosovo I thought it was logical, after one year, to go back to the subject, in order to draw some conclusions. The article’s title should have been – it was changed for editorial reasons, but the quotation appeared in the text – an updated version of the first one (*peace is too serious... to think that its management could be entrusted to the Generals*). Also this time the reference was to Clemenceau, and it was meant more as a warning than an observation. My remarks were focused on the analysis of the “afterwards” in its essentially political aspects, but could not disregard the numerous creditable appraisals that meanwhile had been made about the conduct of the operations.

The war in Kosovo could

rightly be considered the starting point of a process that conformed to the evaluations of those who had long been committed to the realization of a Europe capable of acting unitedly in defence of its interests, without questioning its transatlantic bonds which, up to then, had represented so much for the security of the Western world.

Precisely because we cared (and care) for those bonds, we could not “close” the operations in Kosovo by saying that we were happy of the military results against Milosevic. Those results, at any rate, were questionable, and were actually criticized, during the operations, by qualified American experts.

Among these, Gen. Colin Powell himself, then Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, and now Secretary of State in the new Administration, observed that “when a political objective is fixed,

Right and facing page.

Italian servicemen engaged in control operations in the Balkans.

it is necessary to engage the force needed to win".

Obviously, in his opinion, this was not what was happening. And he added that *"when going to war, losses must be accepted"*. This is perhaps the sore point of a conception of the use of force which had frightfully shown its limits.

This was echoed, in the same period, by a well-known writer (Mario Vargas Llosa) who asked: *"what kind of war is this, where the suffering and violence it causes don't seem to be destined to destroy the enemy Army, but basically aim at avoiding that the allied troops suffer even a single loss?"*

And, even more heavily, Edward Luttwak, in an article on an Italian paper, did not hesitate to point out the basic mistake made by NATO, which was *"improvising without a strategic vision"*.

The most complete picture was then provided by London's International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a real authority on this subject, which, in its *"Strategic Survey 1998-99"* asserted that *"the war in Kosovo had been a sequence of Western errors and incompetence"*, to the point of *"making one wonder as to whether NATO was capable of conceiving and carrying out complex politico-military operations"*.

In particular, according to IISS, NATO *"limited itself from the beginning, restricting the number of targets that it deemed it could strike"*, (for fear of losing pilots). Not only that but, and this was even more serious, *"NATO, by announcing the graduality of the campaign, had disregarded the first principle of the art of war, i.e. the surprise effect, and by excluding a priori the option of a*

ground attack, had infringed the second principle, that of leaving the enemy uncertain about the future moves".

All this had taken place through a rather muddled decision-making process, which tried to find a common denominator capable of keeping the members' cohesion without considering that it was necessary to aim at *"success as quickly as possible"* since this – among other things – would increment the cohesion of the system and the support of public opinion.

In short, the IISS' report showed, and this has been explicitly stated, *"a NATO handicapped by a kind of strategic correctness, i.e., a philosophy where the use of force is threatened, without an equal willingness of accepting the human losses inevitably connected with a serious military effort"*.

Along the same lines was the German General Klaus Naumann, an important military

representative who at the time held one of the most important NATO jobs. A statement he made during the days of the conflict is worth quoting. He mentioned three points:

- 1) *We have failed in the employment of the surprise element and of our military superiority, which are the keys to success in every conflict.*
- 2) *We must find a way to reconcile the principles of the coalition with those of strategy.*
- 3) *Never in history air power alone has been able to ensure victory.*

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

So far, I have made some critical observations on the most recent politico-military experiences, which should give us the cue for an organic strategic/operational study; a





East Timor: patrolling a built-up area.

thing that I intend to do on another occasion.

For the moment, I deem it sufficient to underline, once more, that we have reached an epochal "turning point" whose effects – as I noted in an essay published in "International Relations" in 1992 – will mark the destiny of more than a generation.

In a study such as the one I have proposed, it is necessary to proceed with a rigorous method. The question is to point out tendencies, probable scenarios and possible outcomes of an evolution destined to weigh heavily on our fate.

The question will be to reinterpret the "power factors", which were easily defined in the recent past, with reference, for

instance, to "Hartmann's classification" (resulting from the interaction of a whole set of demographic, geographic, economic, scientific/technologic, organizational, administrative and military factors). These factors cannot be so easily defined at the present time. It will be a question of assessing the potential vulnerabilities of the modern national or supranational structures and also of the new political systems, keeping in mind, moreover, that these vulnerabilities, in the evaluation of the strategic relation, are paradoxically "strong points" for the Countries that suffer from them, since the others are compelled to go to their help, with an often burdensome assistance, in order to avoid dangerous processes of deterioration and instability. This is the only way through which one can proceed to a

systematic examination of security in today's international context, starting from the "new security concept" (global security; enlarged security; specular security: one is secure as far as the opponent feels secure; dynamic security) and gradually developing a relation between security and defence (collective security; common defence).

The starting point for such an analysis is the "collapse of the Berlin Wall", an emblematic element marking the end of the Cold War. The approach just described should permit to emphasize the substantial differences between "before" and "after" (from the "certainties" of "before" to the doubts of "after"; end of the bipolar world; easy interpretations, "before"; areas of interest, margins of freedom of action, "conflicts by proxy", "strategies of action"/"strategies of non-action", essence of the


threat, nuclear deterrence as a regulator of the system, rationalization of the strategic relation: "indirect or improper ethicality"; extreme difficulty of interpretation, "after", i.e. today: the only possible "reading key" is the one referring to the analysis of the geopolitical conditionings from the perspective of conflicts").

As regards this kind of analysis, I reviewed the outline of a method I applied, when I was a lecturer at Civitavecchia's War College in distant 1970, in the examination of a concrete case ("The Mediterranean") with the determinant contribution of the students of the Senior Staff Course. The study enabled us to make interesting forecasts, still valid after 30 years (it would suffice to see the conclusions concerning the Balkan area) (4).

This shows that, in the study of strategic problems, the essential part is the approach, i.e. the "working scheme", which must be defined beforehand; a working scheme which, with reference to the area considered, brings to the determination – through a process by stages – of the "problems of the moment" (influences, interrelations, constants, variables; tendencies; vulnerabilities; strong points; possible evolutions) in order to point out the areas of confrontation, contrast, friction and possible conflicts.

It is a wide-ranging strategical approach, markedly political, which should logically lead to the strategic/operational approach referring to the military component, with a clear delimitation of tasks and responsibility within different sectors and levels (politico-institutional and military).

In a vision projected towards the future, at this points one



asks whether it would be possible to find "new potential strategic subjects". The "European Security and Defence Identity" should be the object of a specific and detailed study.

A thorough and scientific examination should always be preceded by some terminological clarifications as regards threats (vanished or diminished?), challenges (demographic unbalance; conflicting tendencies; integration/disintegration; economic and social globalization); return of geopolitics: Europe and Russia in the prospects of the 21st Century; evolution of China;

international role of Japan; the Caucasian region and Central Asia ("a strategic epicentre in the making?"); shifting of the axes of strategic gravitation; globalization of information: new centres of power (what about politics?); energy factor; environment: across-the-border pollution; technological factor; food; new vulnerabilities: permeability of the systems and electronic vulnerabilities; ageing of the population, especially in the North of the world: crisis of social welfare; frailty of the States: weak or worn-out civic identity; possible rise of "rogue States": crime in power) and, finally, the risks



An AB205 helicopter of the Italian Army on patrol over Bosnia.

(proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; explosion of often aggressive nationalisms; terrorism; fundamentalism; social unrest due to contrasts among national or international ethnic groups, drug trafficking; organized crime with dangerous international

connections; mass migrations). The challenges and the risks summarily expressed above lead us to the conclusion that today's security is indivisible and no Country is capable of confronting by itself the dreadful dangers affecting our security. Hence the need of a close cooperation with others. All this discussion must be projected in the existing security framework, at European and

world level, in order to point out possibilities and limits, restraints and prospects. This framework will have undoubtedly to be seen under a different light as a consequence of the recent "changing of the guard" in the United States after the Presidential election, which heralds important developments in security and defence matters.

These developments will certainly affect the proposed study,

"Centauro" armoured car during the mission in Somalia.

within the context of a reaffirmed and indispensable transatlantic solidarity which must not mortify – but rather exalt – the concrete contribution of Europe, determined to assert its identity as regards security and defence.

In a picture of this kind, the so-called "Petersberg missions" cannot be a final goal, but are just the beginning of a process of assumption of increasing responsibilities. Common sense suggests a spiritual and professional projection towards this dimension.

This is a very gratifying engagement for those who, from the beginning, are called to give their contribution of ideas.

The military measures already adopted at national level with reference to the present situation are fully compatible with the possible future evolutions, and they must be credited to their promoters. But the Country must support their efforts, and create the conditions for their serene work.

Some improvised interventions, albeit within the certainly necessary debate on the employment of depleted-uranium rounds, do not go in that direction when – as happens often in these situations – there is a search for scapegoats, at national level and, more specifically, at technical/operational level, or when old politico-strategic arguments, ideologically oriented, are resumed.

The argument is different and concerns, in general, very delicate ethical questions and, in particular, strategic and operational issues connected with the decision-making mechanisms at the different levels of the military interventions carried out by a multinational coalition.

A few cues for a less emotional answer are indirectly offered by



some subjects that I felt I had to include in this article. They should be taken into consideration for an investigation which cannot be postponed any further.

□

** Senator, General,
former Chief of Staff
of the Army*


NOTES

(1) "Il Messaggero", February 7, 1999.

(2) "La Repubblica", January 6, 1999: "Salviamo l'America: ha perso la bussola" (Let's save America: it's lost its bearings).

(3) "Il Messaggero", February 24, 1999: "Difficile imporre la pace schierando solo bombardieri" (It's difficult to enforce peace deploying only bombers).

(4) My "Introduction to a concrete case" and "Conclusive remarks" are included in two articles published on "Alere Flammam" – Information Bulletin of the "Scuola di Guerra" (War College), no 2 – March/April 1970, and no 5 – September/October 1971.



by Giulio Fraticelli*

A NEW ROLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS



During the last decade there has been a succession of international peace missions for which the UN has encountered great difficulties that still persist. Its military structure is substantially frail: the contributions, put together at the moment of need, are inadequate especially as regards the availability of human resources. This has produced an increasingly felt and widespread demand to relaunch the role of the United Nations, in view of a new policy and a more effective strategy of intervention.

during the execution of the missions, were proof that there was a substantially scarce capability of meeting, with continuity, engagements that were taking a shape quite different from the traditional ones. The experience in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia roused the international community, drawing its attention to the hard reality. A reality made of not-well-defined settings and actors whose pledges were of uncertain credibility, of commitments not made formal, or where the deployment and modus operandi of the forces in the field did not correspond to the classical scheme (well established in UN interventions from 1948 to 1989) of the "ceasefire", typical of traditional conflicts.

The good performances in Cambodia, Mozambique, Namibia and Eastern Slavonia were of little significance vis-à-vis the occurrences of Srebrenica, Mogadishu, Kigali and the wounds inflicted to societies usually inattentive to events outside their precincts.

The following substantial reduction in UN interventions, at the beginning of 1999 led to 14 missions and only 13,000 peacekeepers, with a budget of \$600 million. At the same time, for

understandable reasons of political will and interests, together with the perception of a greater suitability of the military instrument, there was the engagement of other organizations (NATO, Community of Independent States, ECOMOG /ECOWAS) (1), which shifted the fulcrum of peacekeeping from the UN, where it had been born.

Today, after some reconsiderations, which hopefully will generate actions besides good intentions, the UN weight in the employment of force is increasing again while that of the other organizations remains substantial.

Albeit there are only 15 missions, because in 1999 three were closed (Central African Republic - Angola - Haiti), they employ about 40,000 blue berets (in a total of 110,000) for a budget of \$2.2 billion. In particular, during the past year and a half, missions with a large military and police presence were opened in East Timor, Kosovo, Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and the one in Sierra Leone has been strengthened.

Other possible peace missions are around the corner, especially in Africa (Burundi, Guinea-Bissau), certainly the most unstable, war-afflicted continent.

Even if our planet remains troubled by armed conflicts and

At the end of 1994, the UN had a little less than 80,000 men engaged in 17 peacekeeping missions around the world, for a budget of \$3.5 billion. The other supranational regional organizations had not yet entered the scene of the force-employing producers of peace.

But failures were starting to occur. Unclear mandates, forces inadequate to the task, hesitations of the political will, before and



The UN missions, aimed at reestablishing civil and institutional rights, are also centred on the humanitarian component.

the evolutionary trend of its peoples are still unequal, despite the much praised globalization, the efforts made to settle the conflicts and the culture of peace are slowly making progress. The results can be seen especially in situations of military stalemate, susceptible of creating the conditions for a peacekeeping activity, or when a number of political and charismatic leaders engage all their credibility in the process of peace.

The question is now: why is the UN "pendulum" rising again? Where are we going in relation to the politico-military characterization of these engagements or, in simpler words, in relation to the distribution of tasks in the international environment?

THE ANSWER: THE UN OR OTHER ORGANIZATIONS. WHAT OPTIONS?

There is first of all the aspect of **legitimation**. Although it may be difficult for the Security Council to reach an agreement and issue a resolution, in a broad sense the UN remains a supernational organization which enjoys therefore absolute legitimacy as regards international security. This legitimation appears indeed to be expanding, with the possible theorization of interventions which may clash with the principles of national sovereignty, when exceptional circumstances of violation of human rights require them. In this conflict between ethics and legality, the latter could be codified in different

terms and this appears difficult outside the UN and its Charter.

Legitimation is accompanied by **neutrality**, which is perhaps the most precious asset or force of the United Nations, so much so that it has become its synonym. Not everywhere have the regional or subregional organizations proved reliable in this sector. This is an aspect that weighs heavily on the attitude of the antagonists at all levels and therefore on the prospects of success of any mission.

There is moreover the **multidimensional** aspect. Just consider the character of these missions, no more and not only missions of physical interposition between the opponents, but missions with humanitarian, civil-rights, institutional and other components, which are often epitomized in the reconstruction of a State during the peacekeeping phase itself. Kosovo and East Timor are examples of this.

In this regard the UN is decidedly better prepared than other organizations, although its organizational shortcomings hinder its ability to operate on a world scale and in such a wide range of activities.

Besides, there is the aspect of **costs**. Despite their growth, within the UN the peacekeeping expense seems to be lower than outside it, even considering the quality of the interventions, as we shall see later. Clearly the UN costs (and the ensuing reimbursements, when they arrive) can only in part cover the expenses borne by the single nations, for they are related to the respective internal costs; nevertheless, even so, the comparison appears in favour of the UN.

Finally - but we could have dealt with it at the beginning -

there is the aspect of **capability**, understood as operational readiness and reliability of the peacekeeping instrument in the course of time. Here is where the UN has met with great difficulties that unfortunately still persist.

Despite the commendable initiatives in the sector of readiness, through the "Stand By Arrangements" system, and of logistics, with the "Contingent Own Equipment" system, the UN peacekeeping instrument remains substantially weak. The contributions are "packaged" at the moment of need, according to the good will of the nations that offer them, and summarily verified before the deployment. The financial-logistic structure would have appeared obsolete even to Julius Caesar, despite the considerable presence of informatics.

The heart of the UN system, the Department for Peace Operations of the New York Secretariat, which has belatedly followed the ups- and-downs of the engagements, is today inadequate, especially as regards the availability of human resources.

In short, as far as capabilities are concerned, there is something better today around the world. On the other hand, there are geographical areas where no regional capability exists, or where the available ones - apart from considerations regarding legitimation and neutrality - are not even up to the little that the UN has been able to produce so far.

Even a summary evaluation of these aspects, each of which would deserve separate considerations, shows that no organization today possesses all that is necessary for peacekeeping, especially if understood in a multidimensional sense.

In the face of a growing demand, which derives also from a more intense activity of political mediation, one is more than allowed to conclude that a spatial

or temporal cooperation between the various organizations should be pursued.

This is anything but a new idea. Chapter 8 of the UN Charter deals specifically with regional organizations, acknowledging their validity and authority as regards security, provided that their activity be consistent with the goals and principles of the United Nations. The Charter states that the Security Council can employ these organizations for peace enforcement actions, which - it stresses - will have to be authorized by the Council.

In substance, there is so much to do that there is space for everyone.

There is no preestablished model of cooperation. Kosovo and East Timor provide different examples, with presences, also contemporaneous, of components

THE CREDIBILITY OF INTERVENTIONS

In peacekeeping, deterrence functions only eighty-ninety per cent, it is never absolute like in the nuclear field. To make it absolute would be enormously expensive.

Sooner or later, the moment comes when the non-lovers of peace (who are always around) want to "see" what type of adversary they have to face, because the cost to be paid could seem acceptable to them. It is their choice, not the peacekeeper's.

It is therefore fundamental that the intervention be **credible** and **feasible** through at least four requisites:

In order to achieve an effective deterrence, interventions must be credible and feasible.



of different nature. Other combinations could occur in the future. What is important is to find the most effective solution for each situation, considering the different outlooks that the Countries concerned have on the role of the single organizations, in relation to the safeguard of their vital interests and the financial investments involved.

We have thus reached the question of the effectiveness of the intervention, about which we ought to make a few considerations.

- a sure political will, capable of keeping constant in the course of time;
- a significant, understandable and implementable mandate;
- resources (forces and other components), adequate and ready according to the times of development of the peace process;
- rules of engagement (for the forces) adequate to the mandate.

This formula may appear utopian, nevertheless the

interventions that have been made along the time have produced an increase in awareness that at least approaches it.

Today, at least within the UN, there is a widespread inclination to avoid taking engagements without ensuring that these fundamental aspects are taken into the greatest possible consideration. And, incidentally, this has led to non-interventions or delays in cases where the conditions were absent, owing to scarce negotiating activity (unrealistic accords) and unpreparedness of the structure of intervention.

On the **political will** we don't have to spend many words. Either there is or there is not; half measures are of no use or deleterious in the employment of force, even considering the restraints typical of peacekeeping. If, moreover, there are waverings during the mission, one ends with creating the preconditions of a possible disaster.

About the **mandate** many steps forward have been made and the rate of incisiveness and clearness has certainly increased. Without going into the doctrinal debate between peace-keeping and peace-enforcement, between Chapter 6 and 7 of the Charter, because this would probably take up all the space available, one can say that the resolutions of the Security Council have become reasonably clear, significant as regards the tasks to be carried out, in relation to the deterioration of the social fabric in which the mission has to be developed (for example with specific references to the protection of the civilian population) and accompanied by resources that, at least theoretically, should be sufficient.

"Theoretically" has not been said by chance, because one of the problems that require an urgent solution as regards **resources** is the difference that

normally exists between what is requested and what is offered by the nations; sometimes the difference is also between what is offered on paper and what actually materializes on the ground. These are the typical problems of the structures that have no assigned forces but only "promises" which, as serious and formal as they may be, must still be wholly verified.


The most evident example within the UN is the already mentioned "Stand By Arrangements" system, which at present involves as many as 88 Countries at various stages of perfecting the respective engagements. The overall theoretical availability is approximately 150,000 men and 2000 civilian policemen. Nevertheless, owing to the way in which it is devised, not a single man is surely employable without confirmation at the moment of the employment. As we said before, because of the

growing engagements, this confirmation often does not come, thus the Secretariat is compelled to carry out a difficult process of "force generation", precisely when these forces should be ready for deployment.

Besides the problem of quantitative availability there is that of the extreme scarcity of particular units, usually in the sectors of transmissions, Army Aviation and logistics.

The scene is completed by the problems deriving by the heterogeneity of preparation, equipment and motivation of the units, about which something more should be done as soon as possible.

The remarkable growth of the police engagements (9000 men are needed at present) has equally shown deficiencies in both number and quality, highlighting in particular the requirement of personnel autonomously capable of restoring and maintaining public



order, besides controlling what the local police is able to do. Qualitative shortcomings are present in the various specializations, particularly those connected with legal medicine.

Nevertheless, the sector more penalized in terms of resources is the civilian sector, where the pressing requests of personnel capable of putting a State back on its feet have fallen in a conceptual and organizational void which, after the experiences

in Kosovo and Timor, the Organization, with great efforts, is trying to fill.

The *coup de grace* to a system still very weak is inflicted by the financial and budget provisions. Everything moves following a mandate, i.e. with a resolution of the Security Council. What happens before, thanks to a commendable initiative of the Secretariat and the good will of some member countries, is a simple *pour parler*. The real

how to choose the right ones is a fundamental act in mission-planning, because what they prescribe is what the peacekeeper will materially do, beyond what is written in the mandate or in the tasks assigned to the unit (as important as these may be). Every mission requires some specific adjustment to a series of rules already available. In this sector the UN, like other organizations, is doing well. The problems arisen in the application phase are more related to the political will than to technical reasons and therefore the considerations made before stand good.

A LOOK AT THE FUTURE. THE ITALIAN PRESENCE

Despite the rather reductive political visions held by some Nations about the role of the United Nations, the requests of intervention are very numerous, owing to the reasons that we have tried to explain.

The scenarios of cooperation between the various organizations will not follow a preestablished pattern. It is nevertheless possible to outline some standard formulas:

- mandate of the missions: UN, through ad-hoc resolution of the Security Council;
- component of military security: UN, regional organization or multinational force, according to the geographical area and to each organization's capability, with particular attention to the times of the intervention. The coexistence of military formations of different organizations seems unadvisable for reasons of command and control;
- component of civilian police: chiefly UN, until the other organizations acquire a capability that, at the moment, is drawn from recruiting reservoirs which are limited or



For the UN intervention forces the requirement for well-trained personnel is becoming more and more pressing.

process starts only afterwards, and the times that ensue are what they are. No less than 4 months to have the first battalions deployed, 6-8 months to see a mission functioning in its various components. When this occurs, the situation in the area of the mission may have deteriorated to the point of making the intervention more difficult and increasing the risks for the security of the personnel. The mission in Sierra Leone and other missions teach us a lesson.

Finally, let us consider the **rules of engagement**. To know



depleted by other requirements or, as is the case of OSCE, is only addressed to monitoring or to training the local police, with no "enforcement" tasks;

- civilian components (institutional, humanitarian and others): UN, regional or world organizations (i.e. banks) and non-governmental organizations (NGO) according to the "package" required by the specific need, keeping into account the contents, also financial, of the interventions. We need a culture of state reconstruction and suitable data-

setting up missions rapidly, logistics and financing, structural problems of the Secretariat, to mention just a few: it is a complete compendium, with specific concrete suggestions.

As an example, it recommends that the force deployment be made within 30 days (90 in case of complex missions) from the adoption of the Security Council's resolution, and that

Italian soldiers are on a level with those from the Countries best equipped for peacekeeping and often show an operational flexibility not easily found elsewhere.



banks for the resources that can be mobilized. As is the case with civilian police, the best thing is to have a large reservoir from which to draw.

There is nevertheless the necessity to make the UN structure of intervention more efficient. A long step ahead on the formal cognitive plane has been made by a study on peace operations led by an independent group of experts, the so-called "Brahimi Panel". The product is a document which indicates the main shortcomings in both peacebuilding and peacekeeping. As regards the latter, the document deals with doctrinal issues, mandates, capability of

such resolutions be defined only after the certain engagement of the contributing countries. In view of this, the document recommends the formation of Brigade-level units capable of responding within the mentioned times, following accords with the UN, within the "Stand By Arrangements" system. The hypothesis of permanent forces under UN command is still politically impracticable

The national contingents will have to be evaluated by the Secretariat as a standard procedure. The structure of the Secretariat will have to be substantially strengthened, especially in its military component, according to the

solutions already adopted by other organizations.

Logistics should be updated by setting up at least 5 "mission start-up kits" at the Brindisi base for the materials supplied by the UN. It is also requested that the Secretary General be authorized to spend up to 50 million dollars with the sole assent of the specific budget committee (ACABQ) before adopting a resolution of the Security Council.

Many of these recommendations, especially as regards resources, were advanced also in other places in the recent past, without substantial corrective outcomes. It is to be hoped that this accordance of vision about the shortcomings, which seems to go with the report, may result in an equally concordant reparative action.

The financial obligations, not fully assessed yet, seem, at first sight, more than sustainable.

Once again it is a political choice, about which there must be lucidity, considering that in most parts of the world where there are conflicts, there is no alternative to the UN. Therefore it is necessary to lay stress on the mentioned scenarios of cooperation, increasing the efficacy of the UN interventions, supporting at the same time those organizations which rightfully propose themselves as peacekeepers.

Italy should participate with its weight in this common effort, because it is more than entitled to do it.

Our presence is in fact a first-rate presence as regards personnel and financing. Our Country is among the first contributors of personnel, with more than 8000 men, if one considers the missions carried out under the UN aegis, even if not under its military command. In terms of budget, we are similarly in the fifth place, with a little less than 5.5%, after the US, Japan, Germany and France.

There are substantially three courses to follow.

One could be that of a greater direct participation in missions under UN command.

The presence of a western nation like Italy, with one or more units in one of the peace operations of the Organization (besides the helicopter unit stationed in Southern Lebanon), would also have a remarkable effect on the credibility of the operation and could help to remove one of the most common criticisms - not always well-grounded, to tell the truth - according to which the "Westerners" are ready to intervene effectively only when something happens on their threshold.

The second course of direct engagement concerns the **training sector**, where one could conceive the creation of a peacekeeping centre in Italy, adjoined to the Staff College already existing in Turin. This would offset some national difficulties in the formation of peacekeepers and could constitute the completion of the successful initiative that led to the creation of the logistic base in Brindisi. In examining its feasibility, one should of course consider what the other European countries intend to do in this regard, avoiding useless proliferations in relation to the area of the users.

A third way is that of the **support to others**, i. e. to the countries that would like to do more but do not have the resources (especially financial) or the organization to mobilize them conveniently.

With assistance programmes well under one million dollars, one can support training activities carried out in other countries, (for example, those having a Peacekeeping Centre), within a political vision of wider cooperation.

As regards the **military preparation** of our units, fortunately there is not much to be done. The Italian soldiers are on a level with those from the Countries best equipped for peacekeeping and often show an

operational flexibility not easily found elsewhere.

Considering the **politico-military planning** of the interventions for the UN, one should try, without substantially affecting the priorities, to define a more precise engagement - as happens for the other Nations - maybe cyclical, limited in time or in the geographical area of intervention, in relation to the

The efforts made by the UN forces for the settlement of conflicts yield positive results in collaboration with political leaders.



engagement with the organizations we belong to (NATO, European Union, Eurofor, MPFSEE, SHIRBRIG) (2). This in view of achieving a greater certainty of employment. The above is valid also for the Police.

In short, it should be better if the UN, instead of the 150,000 men on whom it cannot count, could have only half of them, possibly better distributed but ready for employment, taking into account the possible restrictions agreed upon beforehand.

In conclusion, owing to the recurrence of local conflicts and the possibility to settle them peacefully, to police the world is

an activity which, besides meeting the traditional security needs, is gradually expanding. Making the peacekeeping instrument more trenchant in its different forms, in a scenario of cooperation, would simplify the successive decision to employ it.

In the subtle exercise of political wills that pursue consent, to which the UN Security Council is supreme witness, to have an unknown element less wouldn't do any harm. Finally, there is still something that can be done in the field of **national coordination**, where there is space for impro-

vement in the reactivity to the requests that come, in crisis situations, from the international organizations responsible for their management.

□

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NOTES

1) ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States. ECOMOG = ECOWAS Monitoring Group.

2) MPFSEE = Multinational Peace Force South Eastern Europe. SHIRBRIG = Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade.

THE EUROPE OF DEFENCE

by Maurizio Coccia *

The establishment of a credible common European Defence is in line with the perspective enhancement of the cooperation between Europe and the US, to be consolidated into an organized partnership. Wars cannot be won without the US, but peace cannot be built without Europe.



WHAT EUROPE?

As long as there is a gap between politics, economy and geography in Europe, this issue is to be clarified. Moreover, the concept of Europe must be enlarged as much as possible, from a strategic perspective. It is understood that the European countries, until recently defined as Western Nations, and, in the defense sector, particularly those of the Atlantic Alliance, are the hard-core of Europe, even if not its driving force for change. In

fact, innovative trends seem to have been boosted more by the dubious national initiatives taken by Balkan countries and former USSR nations, together with the troubled areas in Central Asia and Middle East, rather than by a definite European or even European-American initiative.

Taking into account the US in our presentation, another preliminary issue is to be clarified; in fact, *as regards Europe, the US supremacy over the*

present international scenario must be acknowledged, not to create false illusions. In fact, from this perspective all the pieces of the puzzle will fall in the proper place.

The enlargement of NATO and its outreach to Eastern European countries have often been judged by





the Europeans as obstacles to a desirable development of their relations with Russia, a pre-requisite for a sound peaceful cooperation at a regional level. However, from a global US-centric point of view, these strategic initiatives are aimed at containing and defusing major imbalances which could have developed into crises and conflicts, wider than those which have taken place after the collapse of the Berlin wall.

Therefore, there has been a shift from a regional to a global perspective and the inherent repercussions have particularly been felt within Europe, mainly in the defense and security sectors.

Many European initiatives are underway: the Common European Security and Defense Policy, the European Security and Defense Identity, the WEU revitalization, the Defense Capability Initiative etc.

All these projects are still to be implemented, at least within NATO, coming to terms with the US hegemonic power, to the point that, when finalized, these plans would be a joint Euro-American agreement, rather than a European effort only. There are some, however, who bluntly speak of a dominant American role, which nonetheless should be seen as positive in a peace and co-operation perspective and with a clear view of the international situation.

Conversely, as regards the US policy, there has been a common misjudgment, according to which national democratic revolutions were aimed at destroying communist regimes in the past, defeating all forces threatening national interests in the present and creating a global democratic system in the future. Undoubtedly, the establishment of

such democratic system is underway, notwithstanding the nationalistic and protectionist hurdles raised by all sides. The above mentioned system, though imperfect, would reduce most of the present security problems.

To this end, a deep knowledge of international relations and the rationale behind them is required, together with the determination to carry on this ambitious, costly and somehow dangerous plan, and the availability of a trustworthy leadership.

Therefore, the US cannot but adopt a global outreach policy in the short term. Meanwhile, especially following the Kosovo crisis, Europe and US visions have overlapped. More precisely, the former adapted to the latter, which, in turn, expanded to include other out-of-area countries and encouraged other

Left.

Bersaglieri in a firing position.

Right.

An Italian soldier engaged in counter sniping in Sarajevo.

nations to follow suit, as witnessed by the events in the former Yugoslavia. Europe has acknowledged its weakness in Kosovo, conformed to the worldwide Americanization process, and to the so-called *pax americana* ruling over this century. So much so that today, as in the years immediately after the war, Europe and NATO defense coincide. The only difference is that most countries in Continental Europe, Russia somehow included, presently follow NATO's initiatives, creating larger and larger coalitions.

Co-operation is underway, though not fully implemented yet. Under the NATO and US umbrella, different national intentions and capabilities follow well-established political and economic paths, allowing for an easy identification of those partners open to a global, regional and national outreach, as opposed to neutral, disenchanted or self-interested nations.

As regards the future of the Western World, two different lines of development are envisaged, depending on whether the international reference body entrusted with Western security is NATO or the US, and on the role played by European countries. In fact, they can have a passive or active attitude, fostering a credible and manifest European will, capable of counterbalancing American values and capabilities.

Nobody is satisfied at the moment and the risks threatening collective security are on the rise.

Presently the major obstacles to overcome are an insufficient European mobilization level and the stand taken by the US to keep its economic and military supremacy, contradicting all declarations of principle.

155/52 PZH 2000 German self-propelled gun.





"Centauro" armoured vehicle in service with the 19th "Cavalleggeri Guide" Regiment in Bosnia.

Concurrently, the US is reacting to the excessive burden of its responsibilities, while the Europeans are separated by different national sensitivities and penalized by the limited role played by the European Union.

The Russians are even more dissatisfied, as they feel isolated and threatened by what they consider as a real democratic war. Nations pretend to congratulate one another on their reciprocal success: China praises Russia and Russia China, the US compliments Europe and vice versa, all this in the name of democratic, economic and human rights ideals. But cooperative confrontation has given way to competitive cooperation. The bipolar system is deeply rooted and the fact that the two superpowers do not exist any longer seems to make things more

complicated. Diverging opinions prevent nations from accepting NATO's past, present and future role. There are no solidarity preconditions and the focus is on the hegemonic power of the US. Some think that strategic and power supremacy is an obstacle to and sometimes an attack against a further development, based on socio-cultural awareness, rather than on economic and military power. Conversely, there is an equally widespread opinion, welcoming the collapse of the power balance among nations, which has been overturned by the hegemonic role played by one of them, whose sound and widely accepted reference values have globally prevailed.

Most problems requiring a wider socio-political consensus and a stronger economic cooperation to be solved find a solution within a Europe of Nations. In this framework the type of relationship linking European countries to the lead

nation becomes particularly important.

According to US strategic concepts, when the Berlin wall collapsed, the unification of Germany would bring about the disbandment of NATO, unless it underwent a thorough overhaul. To this end, important political initiatives were tabled at the London summit in 1990, aimed at revamping NATO's roles in the eyes of European partner countries. In fact, at that time France had established new friendly relations with Germany and supported a European Security Identity concept, where the US would play a secondary role in the region. The UK, on the contrary, favored the supremacy of the US. As a consequence, the WEU gained momentum, as an organization answerable to the EU and subordinated to NATO, as in the past, for all practical matters, i.e. staff, chain of command, logistics, information system, tactical and strategic transportation.

Bersaglieri carrying out territorial surveillance and control activities.

Thus a compromise was reached, by which the EU accepted the US supremacy, to the surprise of many, as shown by the operations in Kosovo. Not only was this primacy accepted, but strongly supported as well; in fact, in 1993 the new Combined Joint Task Force concept was aimed at channeling European aspirations towards a visible Defense Identity, and also at addressing the issue of equitable cost-sharing. It can be therefore assumed that the US policy has been supported by European partners for the last 8 years. Consequently, US-led operations were to be envisaged in the past, just like WEU-led missions are in the future.

Outside Europe, many are opposed to the *pax americana*, both conceptually and practically, but the US leadership does not seem particularly inclined to change its course.

Since the end of the cold war, the US has shown its commitment to establish a new world order, capable of preventing global and regional challenges.

This power structure allows for a wide range of possibilities, such as that of influencing international organizations or managing local events through regional alliances on political, economic or security matters. Within this framework, military superiority, based on technological dominance, plays a pivotal role. From this power position, the US grants security cooperation, confident that it will not be threatened by any adequate opponents, as in the past. The only obstacles to overcome are perhaps a series of agreements and the inevitable trade-off necessary to keep them in force, as the recurring "most favoured nation" clause in trading relations with China or



the cost of the Middle East peace process.

Meanwhile Russia is reacting ambiguously to the Western lack of commitment, trying to apply bipolar-era concepts to absolutely new situations, as demonstrated by the blitz in Pristina in 1999 or by the measures adopted to put an end to the conflict in Kosovo.

This situation is to be modified in the short term. In fact, Russia cannot be marginalized within Europe for its economic situation, which is rapidly recovering. The US and the most important Western countries must support Russia along its cooperative development path, by overcoming nationalistic differences and

enhancing all forms of regional and global cooperation. Russia, like Europe, looks upon the US as its reference model, and this adds to the US's global responsibilities.

Europe and Russia should recognize each other in principle and not for practical reasons only. Meanwhile Europe could do even more and better, if the US would define the tasks of its global development strategies, together with the most important countries of the world. According to a domino effect, a democratic Russia should express a similar interest in cooperating with China and so on. As a consequence, a global effort is required to establish general cohabitation

rules. The step-by-step policy did not succeed in solving both old and new crises, like the difficult peace process between Israel and Palestine, the defensive positions taken by China, India and most Middle-East counties, together with the troublesome ethnic cohabitation in Bosnia and Kosovo. In more general terms, such situations occur wherever a local contingency can be exploited to counter any democratic wave trying to overflow national borders.

If the Euro-American partnership is formalized and a Europe of Defense reaches the same capability levels as those of the US, collective security will be enhanced, thanks to a pooling of synergies and, above all, to a commitment taken at a worldwide level.

Such an agreement, once reached, would greatly modify the international scenario and possibly lead to a widely shared acceptance of Western values.

What was only an assumption seems to be a natural development of the present scenario, where the US, first playing a leading role only, has now become a political and economic superpower. Concurrently, the UN is undergoing a declining phase, where only inter-state relations can be held at internal level, while its Decision Centre is still split up by bipolar-era opposing concepts.

NATO, instead, is seen as the main gateway to the solution of all security issues and to the accession to the club of the most democratic and advanced Western European countries, capable of effectively inter-communicating. Moreover, NATO relies on its partner nations' military and economic power and on the strength of its peoples, determined to overcome all contrasting and domineering positions.

The most important elements that an enlarged Europe will be able to commit to the establishment of a different relation with the US are the international organizations established with its support.



So much for NATO. As regards the European Union, its main goal, at an internal level, is to promote economic and social development all over an area with no barriers, by establishing economic and social cooperation ties and an economic and monetary union. At an external level, the EU's main objective is to assert its identity on the international scenario, through a common foreign and security policy, comprising a defense policy as well. This principle risks losing its true meaning within NATO, unless the original identity concept is replaced by that of "partnership".

This is why the OSCE was set up in 1995, previously called Conference on the Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). At the beginning, in 1972, it was a

forum for political consultation, comprising European, Asian and North-American countries.

The OSCE promotes peace and stability, fosters security cooperation, democratic development and human rights protection in Europe. It is particularly active in the field of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis and post-conflict or post-crisis management.

It is the only forum gathering all Continental Europe countries and is a fundamental element of the European security architecture. Lastly, there is a Europe of the willing, which has not the same political leverage as the US, but nonetheless gathers a large consensus among peoples.

It is obvious that Europe and the US have different points of views, but also good reasons for



for all living conditions. At present, human expectations and hopes are following a fast track, while things are moving at a slower pace and those at the steering wheel are increasingly clumsy.

Our learning process has proved to be too slow, compared to the tempo of the actions in the field. Also for this reason, *the lessons learned are quickly unlearned*. Western values play a leading role in the human development process, as they promote personal

Left.
Alpine troops on mountain training.

Below.
Bersaglieri on a "Camillino" VCC-1.

make Western values highly vulnerable to the threat of any other ideology.

Meanwhile, the risk of an all-out military confrontation has long disappeared, to be replaced by a cooperative security approach.

NATO's assessment of the situation is neither optimistic nor detailed. Notwithstanding the successful results obtained at strategic level, the way ahead is still uncertain, given the great number of unpredictable multidirectional risks.

Most of these risks are still lingering, being boosted and widened by the uncertainty about the steps to take to further expand Western values and life styles.

Flash-points inside and outside the Euro-Atlantic region may



establishing better relations, in view of their common globalization, interdependency and mutual security goals.

WHAT RISKS?

Our world is still imperfect and men have not been able to build an ideal environment yet, suitable

commitment and renovations.

Though imperfect and contradictory, they have always succeeded in drawing the attention and gathering the consensus of the general public, increasingly conditioning governmental decisions and choices. However, their credibility is greatly flawed by their coming to term with market laws, which

eventually degenerate into real crises or conflicts. Many countries, belonging to or bordering with Europe, have to face growing economic and social problems, as well as territorial strives, both ethnic and religious. Efforts to carry out democratic reforms and attain higher development levels were often adequate or even



Norwegian 1 A5 Leopard tank engaged in training activities.

unsuccessful. The result was the collapse of nations' credibility and authority, followed by clear human rights violations. This insidious state of conflict may become a threat for some Alliance countries, partners or nations committed to establishing a peaceful future. Its repercussions are felt by Western nations as well, which must intervene to defuse conflicts, ensure adequate security levels and restore acceptable living conditions.

Western security and stability may also be affected by the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, last generation technologies, organized crime and conflict-related uncontrolled flows of populations. The situation in Yugoslavia is a case in point. After the experiences gained in the Gulf War and

Somalia, the Alliance nations devoted all their efforts to respond to the crisis in Yugoslavia with determination, but with little reward. Both Europe and the US have made an initial evaluation error, highlighted by their actions and fears, which caused a delay in the mobilization of Western countries to face that crisis.

The Contact Group was established in early 1992 only, during the NATO conference in London, to bring conflicting parties to the negotiating table. At that point the first and most serious mistakes had already been made, such as under-evaluating the endemic unrest in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, possibly triggered by the acknowledgment of the independence of its member states. Another blunder was that of taking on a haughty and stand-off position, without considering that such an attitude would escalate the crisis, risking to re-ignite the Balkans, a tinderbox capable of

setting Europe and the whole world ablaze. Another case in point was FYROM (Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia), an acronym summarizing all national-nationalistic plans and sensitivities, spanning from the Adriatic to the Aegean and the Black sea.

Western uncertainties and ethnic violence outbursts grotesquely alternate on the international stage, where nations are ready to exploit their mutual weaknesses as they become progressively apparent. All this takes place against an already degraded backdrop. In fact, forty years of confrontation, including the race to the moon, gave rise to several conflicts outside Europe, like the Arab-Israeli and Vietnam wars, and led to the production of a huge number of mass destruction weapons. Thus, conflicting values, stereotypes and behaviours, which cannot be ruled out or even modified in



Check-point set up by the Garibaldi Brigade in Kosovo.

the short term, have taken root. This is why neither the US nor a wider European Union may confront worldwide security issues by themselves; therefore their cooperation is needed more than in the past.

New problems and non traditional risks may arise from several contingencies and the different strategies adopted to respond to them.

Notwithstanding all cooperation intentions and allotted resources, imposing democracy, even by a selective use of force, is useless, in the absence of cohesion and cooperation efforts, based on shared values and sound social-cultural principles. This course of action, if attempted, may have a disappointing outcome.

At the same time "freezing" a crisis leads nowhere.

The cohabitation issue is first priority and requires to be widely revamped by the establishment of common goals: transparent economy, effective and reliable

laws, monitorable mutual trust and the development of socially useful activities. The aim is to support young people, who usually self-destruct themselves to get out of apparently no way-out situations in a crisis, and are then disappointed by the poor initiatives taken in the reconstruction phase.

The need is felt to adopt ad-hoc strategies to safeguard them, make them live and react, as they will be the major operators of all positive changes.

From this perspective, safeguarding ethnic identities should be among first priority activities, to protect cohesive and non conflictual nationalistic feelings. Religious issues should also be reconsidered and exploited as uniting rather than dividing factors.

The internal and endemic divisions within the Western World and its ingrained values translate into a wide range of possibilities and limitations, which

have to be taken into account before making any choice in the field of international relations, both at national or Alliance level.

Within a predictable asymmetric military confrontation between the Western World and old and new dictatorships, the above mentioned limitations will heavily impact on the overall cost of the engagement.

WHAT DEFENSE?

The security policy adopted by the Euro-American partnership is presently based on three complementary pillars: dialogue, cooperation and defense capability. The aim is to prevent or peacefully settle crises which may threaten the security of Europe.

The main principles governing the military are the same as in

A patrol of Carabinieri Paratroopers on a VM-90 P in Sarajevo.



the past: the Alliance has a defensive goal mainly; security is a comprehensive concept; NATO security policy is based on collective defense and the dual use of conventional and nuclear armaments in Europe is still required in the short-term.

In 1999, many new and sometimes opposing lessons were learned from the air and then ground missions in Kosovo.

NATO, the winner of the bipolar confrontation, is determined to keep a security level consistent with the present risks and enhance peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. To this aim, it has widened its past political role, extended its political and military

partnership to other countries of the region, opened to cooperation with Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries, accepted requests for membership by new countries and cooperated with international organizations. NATO is also committed to preventing and managing all crises and staging peace support operations as in the Balkans.

The Alliance has concurrently been modified to upgrade its potentialities. These changes include a new command structure, as well as the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, the establishment of agreements and systems allowing for a rapid force deployment, to cover the whole

spectrum of Alliance tasks and missions, together with the creation of a European Defense and Security Identity. In the first phases of this process, national interests were privileged over the American ones, giving rise to suspects, particularisms and internal confrontations, detrimental to the Alliance and its external image.

NATO, though heavily affected by these problems, is now adjusting to the new scenario, owing to commonly shared values, the threats against the security of living conditions and the fact that Euro-American partnership is mutually profitable, both at regional and global level respectively.

In compliance with open market rules, this consortium is in a privileged position, compared to the private sector, as regards the sharing of costs and responsibilities and the development of new common interests, allowing for the establishment of unprecedented outreach policies.

In the light of what has been said above, the Alliance tends to be increasingly asymmetric as regards its leadership and symmetric in the distribution of positions and responsibilities.

The tasks to be performed have increased dramatically, as compared to member countries' previous territorial defense missions against a limited and visible threat.

Today the following requirements have to be met: ensuring the stability of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance by a peaceful settlement of crises in Europe, not resorting to intimidating or coercive measures; initiating a consultation, cooperation and partnership process with Central and Eastern European nations and other OSCE countries; developing tight



A battery of M-109 L self-propelled vehicles of the Italian contingent in Bosnia.

working relations with the organizations engaged in granting collective security, such as the UN, OSCE and WEU; conducting new crisis management and peace-keeping operations, together with the traditional deterrence ones; keeping an Alliance-wide collective defense capability, to peacefully settle all possible crises and prevent a conflict from over-spilling and threatening peace elsewhere; being a consultation forum for member countries on security issues; fostering security and stability through cooperation, consultation and partnership activities and, lastly, informing and training on security matters.

Within this new scenario, the Alliance intends to be a security operator at regional level.

To substantiate this development, the Alliance must be firmly Euro-Atlantic, as in the past, but change its hegemonic stance.

Europe, meanwhile, aims at enhancing its role to reduce all internal gaps, already being a sound and active platform for projecting security and spreading Western values with no caveats whatsoever, as universals cannot be limited by territorial boundaries. The result is the determination to enlarge the NATO stability area, settling all controversies by enlarging and reorganizing the Alliance, strengthening its overall capabilities and establishing more effective regional relations based on common political views, in order to establish a US-sponsored strategic partnership

for the XXI century. An enlarged NATO is now envisaged, more homogeneous, less armed but having a clear and visible general strategy enabling it to perform the same deterrence role as in the past and substantiate present and future initiatives.

PRESENT SITUATION

At present, the defense of Europe is a NATO responsibility and the expression "Euro-American defense" has now become a common concept. A historical period has come to an end, when the US was initially subordinated to Europe and then took up a leading role; now their relationship has been cemented by a mutually desired but often difficult partnership.

From this perspective, the stance taken by the United Kingdom, often accused of



A convoy of VM-90 P vehicles of the Garibaldi Brigade reconnoitring the territory.

having a stand-off position in Europe, is to be revalued for the wide scope of its vision and the effectiveness of its foreign policy. If this is the right trend to follow, there is still a long way to go.

In order not to make the US bear this huge responsibility alone, a new political agreement is required from a global perspective, taking into account both the present American leadership, the growing power of Europe and member nations' different positions. This is a necessary step to make both the EU and the US promptly fulfill the increased security and stability expectations of Eastern, Western and Mediterranean European Countries.

A new transatlantic Euro-American agreement is therefore called for, to level off all differences. It should possibly be signed outside NATO, so that the latter could effectively carry out its stability projection role.

In the absence of such an agreement, the US will remain anchored to its pragmatic and conservative model, rather than open to more ethic and moral values, to the detriment of global peace and development. Moreover, if NATO aims at establishing an equally balanced relationship between the two continents based on their armed forces only, it will become a very limited instrument with politically hegemonic ideals and ambiguities, originating great concern both internally and externally.

It should also be stressed that if NATO becomes the guarantor of developed countries' interests, it

will encroach upon the institutional mandate of the UN, aimed at fulfilling international security expectations of most countries, particularly the most underdeveloped ones.

WHAT FUTURE?

As regards our security options, the choice is between a balanced Euro-American partnership fostering a wider external cohesion process or a unilateral US supremacy, leading to a conceptual and practical escalation of the confrontation.

The first choice is more rewarding, as it will strengthen the partnership with Western countries, involve other international organizations and solve one of the most critical problems of the moment i.e. resorting to deterrence again.



A sound Euro-Atlantic partnership, inspired by new values, will allow each country to play an active role – Russia included – thus setting the preconditions for a desired quantum leap. The debate on security is still ongoing.

There are those who want NATO to be everlasting, playing a unique, live and successful role based upon absolute and stable pillars. First, it is inspired by the guiding role and the strong political will exerted by the US which has founded it, together with the UK and France. The common values shared by these three nations, clashing with different reference concepts, have eventually led to the cold war; today, instead, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the focus is put on all other dictatorial powers.

Another pillar is its homogeneity stemming from the consensus and

values shared by all its members: democracy, individual freedom and the rule of law. Lastly, it relies on universally accepted values, which proved to be valid over the entire socio-political spectrum.

The Alliance should last indefinitely, as there is no need for other organizations of the kind, mainly if founded on its same tenets. Given its great cohesion capability, it has succeeded in confining the armed confrontation between Greece and Turkey within its boundaries and will possibly unite Europe and the Americas, and eventually the whole world, in the name of Atlantic values.

There are others who think that NATO is useless or has a fixed-term mandate only. From this perspective, NATO will be useful until Russia has reached an internal democratic stability, Europe has completely defined

An M113 tracked vehicle being disembarked in Bosnia.

its common defense policy and created a military instrument tailored to its established goals and the UN has developed an effective operational asset, without resorting to external contributions to enforce its resolutions.

Whatever the future of NATO, there is no reason for concern. The present cohesion level, though imperfect, is unquestionable, as no alternative solutions are possible.

Future developments call for further changes, as the US will increasingly need the support of European allies in establishing a worldwide security framework, while NATO forces, structures and resources shall be tailored to meet future challenges.



Belgian artillerymen engaged in training activities.

The Euro-Atlantic approach is an overarching international strategy. The US will require the joint NATO-EU support in operations, such as "Desert Shield", in military operations other than war, not only in the Mediterranean, but also in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. In this framework, NATO is still incapable of adequately projecting its forces and capabilities.

Though greatly changed, the Alliance still needs resources and focused actions, as in the bipolar confrontation period. In fact, it may be shortly called upon to defend common Euro-American interests. In this respect, the key question is whether Europe will be able to become a valid partner, being politically and economically more proactive than when threatened at its borders by Warsaw Pact nations.

Conversely, there are several indicators to the fact that Europe and the US will join forces to eventually reach a partnership; NATO, in turn, will be tasked to spread Western values around the world in order to promote wider security and human rights.

This trend is confirmed by timely interventions during crises, overcoming all international vetoes in the name of humanitarian rights; compliance with the rule of law, zero-sum option as regards friendly casualties and collateral damage, presence of lawyers in operations, technological arms race, etc.


This costly self-discipline is justified only if the goal is to abide by the law and set an example to be followed worldwide, even though Europe and America have always pursued their particular interests. This course of action probably indicates a shift towards a new incremental process, as also

shown by all subsequent steps, starting from the successful results of the European mobilization.

In this complex scenario, institutionalizing the cooperation between the US and the EU is a deeply felt requirement, to be fulfilled by creating an organized partnership. The Euro-Atlantic bloc is seen as a pluralistic security community, inspired by *enlightened selfishness* to safeguard common values, such as the abolition of war as a means to settle all disputes.

On the contrary, the countervailing aspirations of the US, torn between its unilateral decisions and the fear of being isolated, put a premium on the political role played by the European Union.

From all viewpoints, Europeans, as foreign policy actors, are increasingly playing a leading role which must not and cannot coincide with that of the US.



Wars cannot be won without the US, but peace cannot be built without Europe.

As already said, a rich and sophisticated Europe must resume its original role, played in the Risorgimento, of being committed to improving the socio-economic conditions of the world. This should be done in cooperation with the US, giving

up all defensive positions to set an example to be followed by America.

Even if these goals are attained, there will still be a long way to go to obtain a credible reconciliation of all parties; suffice it to say that a Euro-American partnership has been established in the former Yugoslavia, as neither party

A Bersagliere of the Garibaldi Brigade in a fire position.

could solve all problems on the ground alone.

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
** Mayor General (ret.)*

«NETWORK-CENTRIC» WARFARE

A new system for crisis management

by Giovanni Caravelli *

Military affairs are undergoing an intense revolution which finds the main instruments for its realization in the most advanced information techniques. Concepts like "Network-Centric Warfare" (NCW) and Future Combat Systems" (FCS), based on the enormous potential of integrated information systems, are the new instruments for the management of crises. With them, the operational Commander's possibility of acquiring and evaluating information, as well as his Command, Control and intervention capabilities, will be much higher than they are at the present time.



As far as the land segment is concerned, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is based on a wide and massive recourse to the technology of information, particularly in the C4 ISTAR sector. Terms like "digitization of the battlefield", "situation awareness", "battlefield visualization", "tactical combat-platform", "integrated fighter" are now entering the military jargon. More and more human and financial resources will have to be allocated in order to give a concrete operativeness to these concepts by 2010-2015, and to acquire an unquestionable superiority in the area of conflicts and in the prevention/management of crises.

The US Armed Forces and the most advanced centres for research and analysis of the possible post-2020 scenarios have already made a further, and substantial, step forward: they are studying the "Network Centric Warfare" (NCW) in its theoretical, technical-practical and concrete aspects. The concept includes the "Future Combat Systems" (FCS) programme, and is one of the basic elements of the "Joint Vision 2020", the US joint operational concept.

The NCW is based on the enormous potential offered by an integrated information system with

different active users/sensors /elements, connected to one or more specialistic data banks. With the availability of already evaluated information, the indication of the conceivable lines of action according to the possibility of success and the targeting planned considering the highest cost/effectiveness ratio, the operational Commander's possibility of acquiring information and of evaluating situations, as well as his Command, Control and intervention capabilities, will be much higher than those prevailing at the present time, even in the most advanced armies.

In substance, we are in the presence of a kind of "global intranet", connected with

The US Stealth F-117 "Nighthawk" fighter - bomber contributed greatly to the success of the air operations in Serbia.


exploring satellites through a secure system of automatic exchanges, using advanced communication systems (e.g. the Asynchronous Transfer Mode, ATM), automatic tactical data-transmission systems (such as the Cooperative Engagement Capability and Link 16), various information systems, sensors and advanced-sensor platforms, wide-range automated weapon systems, and C2 applications which permit to determine the forces most adequate to the mission and line of action selected by the Commander.

NCW will greatly improve the reaction time of a military force. This will be possible through self-synchronization, i.e. the capability of a force to organize itself by using the "bottom-up" method. Self-synchronization, that we could also call "synchronized self-organization", depends on the force's knowledge about the



Macedonia. Formation of US helicopters, including AH-64 "Apaches".

fig. 1



"Advanced Research Project Agency" (DARPA). It applies the "network centric" concepts in order to realize an integrated and modular multimission combat-system. The FCS will have an integrated and interoperable C4 IST system with robotized precision-fire sources and systems for surveillance of the manoeuvre space and automated targeting. The whole system is strategically projectable, and can be configured according to the mission (fig.1).

All this could sound like science fiction and "futurology", but perhaps is less far-off than one could imagine: the US Army envisages to deploy the first operational FCS at Brigade and Division level by 2012!

It is important to consider the status of these two projects which, better than others, represent the RMA under way. The subject is very interesting from the military point of view, and I deem it important to spread its basic concepts, not only from the professional viewpoint. The purpose of this article is, therefore, a short *excursus* of the main sectors of application of the politico-strategic project, for the prediction and management of crises, as well as of the tactical-operational project, for the improvement of the intervention capabilities of a military force. The reader's attention will be called briefly to the areas of crisis, and to the different threats which complicate the crises and cause the urgent need of interpreting and managing them with different methods. The final aim is to underline once more the need to make this complex setting transparent to the political and military decision makers, thus increasing the capability of analysis and evaluation as well as the speed and effectiveness of the military response in the numerous different scenarios.

mission and itself, the environment /scenario, the friendly forces and the enemy. At the politico-strategic level, the investigation of NCW is now being focused only on the post-crisis phases of conflicts. Also the project for the development of the US Armed forces, known as "Joint Vision 2020", based on the Revolution in Military Affairs, is moving in that direction.

But another area where the network-centric concept, together with a better interoperability within NATO, could make the real difference, is precisely that of the "pre-crisis and crisis" phases of conflicts.

The engagement and intervention of a coalition of nations can be decisive only if there is a rapid convergence of intentions, and therefore depends on the consensus that a large - but not always homogeneous - group of Nations reaches on the perception

of the threat. The threats of the future will derive from a growing number of different sources (both national and transnational), more and more unpredictable and undefinable.

If we add these considerations to the growing probability that the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could be one of the major threats of the future, we can conclude that the wrong perception of a threat or the incorrect management of a crisis could have tragic and unmanageable consequences.

At operational and tactical level, the US Army project "Future Combat Systems" is proceeding at good speed, while the US Navy is developing its "network-centric concept", also known as "Navy after next".

The FCS, which started from Adm. Owens' famous "system of systems", is a programme developed by the US DOD's

fig. 2



THE CONTEXT AND THE CHALLENGES

As regards the threats and their prevision, a French general has directed his study to the scarcity of perception and analysis of the threat by the allies. This has affected practically all the post-cold war crises and conflicts. In his attempt to understand why the majority of these conflicts did not reach an optimal and fast solution, Gen. Faupin has worked out two possibilities: the first one considers a case where the perception of the threat is sound but the way in which it is tackled is wrong. The second considers that a partial and valid awareness of the threat exists but, all the same, remarkable difficulties are encountered in achieving success, no matter how large and how good the military resources employed are.

Faupin believes that, actually, the perception and the analysis of the threat is never complete and

correct. Owing to different political and cultural outlooks typical of a large participation, also in the future it will be difficult and complicated to achieve a consensus on the threat, both within NATO and in any other "coalition of the willing".

However, the rising of even more ambiguous threats compels NATO to search more and more for new ways to use the new information technology, in order to radically improve its capability of crisis evaluation and collaboration.

But what are the possible threats and the areas of conflict, be they present or latent?

By combining these two elements - threats and areas - we could avail ourselves of a very important prevision matrix for the elaboration of a scenario, be it "war" or "MOOTW" (Military Operations Other Than War) through a simulation very close to reality.

The conflict areas are shown at figure 2.


One can clearly see a scenario with an accumulation of violence on several geographic regions: Balkans, Caucasus, Near and Middle East, Central Asia, Kashmir-Tibet, Algeria, Libya-Chad, Sudan-Horn of Africa, Western and Central Africa.

These accumulation centres are combined by the two well-known arches of crisis, now joined by the Mafia-States, i.e. the Nations whose governments are strongly suspected of collusion with international organized crime. The reasons for instability and conflicts are shown in detail at fig.3, for a better understanding of the world scenario.

In general, the main threats to the security and interests of the Western nations can be summarized as follows:

- conflicts with nations pursuing hostile policies and strategies, particularly those which own or control nuclear forces and/or weapons;
- proliferation of WMD and/or fissionable nuclear material,

fig. 3



The AH-64D Apache "Long Bow" is a highly manoeuvrable helicopter employed in short-range missions.


pursued, and supported, at political level, also in other important sectors. Particularly interesting is the current cooperation in the field of commercial technology for the dissemination and fusion of data as well as for common planning and execution. The cooperation among US and European industries dealing with commercial information and communications could offer good opportunities to the European partners of the US, for a concrete industrial support to the collaboration effort, where the NCW would be applied in the evaluation and management of crises. The non-traditional and emerging threats, in fact, require new solutions offering rapid and well-coordinated options for the settlement of crises.

As a matter of fact the threats, because of their transnational and asymmetric nature, require multinational solutions (coalitions).

The new techniques of data extraction and the various evaluation methods provide the instruments for the preventive detection of the characteristic indicators of an emerging crisis.

The new information technology could therefore be used, for instance, for establishing specialistic action-groups which would deal with the crises within the Alliance and give the members operating in different locations a continuous access to important data and consultation processes. The new techniques for the safeguard of information, furthermore, could help to create the necessary barriers for protecting certain categories of information.

The NCW concept and the new information technology, therefore, can help in the development of enormously improved capabilities



for crisis management and cooperation, in order to stand up to the challenges of a growing number of different emerging threats (both traditional and new) to the interests of the Alliance.

ADAPTING TO THE CHANGING THREAT

The end of the cold war and the revolution in the field of information technology have transformed the threat. Smaller criminal and terroristic organizations are becoming more dangerous, making the threat more ambiguous.

These small groups are more threatening and dangerous, both *per se* and owing to the difficulty of monitoring WMDs and the growing traffic of launchers.

But the danger of these criminal organizations is getting

worse also because - knowing the structure and the activity of the information nets - they can contrive different and unexpected threats to highly vulnerable elements, not only within the national economies, but also in the fundamental institutions of the Western Countries.

The ever increasing amount of resources spent by the US for the protection of infrastructure confirms the growing attention and the importance given to this type of asymmetric threat.

The more NATO is in a position to dominate an area of crisis or of local conflicts, the more the antagonistic States, or "non-States", will try to move the threat or the action within NATO's geographical area. Unscrupulous individuals could try to establish networks with transnational organizations, in order to acquire advanced technology and weapons, their



Italian engineer NCO during a mine/ordnance clearing operation in Bosnia.

delivery/transport means, as well as the access to NATO's most vulnerable civilian and military infrastructure. Considering that in the final game the advantages increase as the threat grows, it is necessary to locate the threats and oppose them just in the crisis area, at the moment when the rising enemy net is still vulnerable, because of the frailty of its connections.


While the setting of a battle is always dominated by military and operational considerations, the sphere of a crisis is always very heterogeneous and complex, since it involves also the economic, political, religious and environmental dimensions of international security. As a matter of fact, the crises which precede or accompany wars, peace-support operations, humanitarian missions and antiterrorist activities are always a mix of all these elements.

This is even more true in case of emerging threats. The transnational criminal organizations, the cyber-terrorists, the non-national ethnic and religious groups can have non-strictly military objectives (e.g. the use of

violence as a means to increase their unlawful profits), or change as a consequence of the evolution of the net (the hackers, for example, can work today for the intelligence organizations of certain Countries and tomorrow could sell their services to drug traffickers).

The members of NATO have enough resources to map, navigate and control the crisis areas in order to safeguard not only their economies and their societies, but also international peace and stability.

To sum up, NATO must be capable of rapidly building a community of interests, able to anticipate and control the emerging crises, safeguarding the intelligence sources, and their procedures, from intrusive activities. A closer and more effective cooperation among the military-intelligence organizations of the various NATO Nations is necessary. This also applies to the national security



US Army Officers of the Intervention Forces in Bosnia.



Marder 1A3 German infantry vehicle in service with KFOR.

NEW INSTRUMENTS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT

structures of the different partners. In view of this, since the threats coming from antagonistic States and transnational criminal organizations are mixing together, forming complex networks very difficult to dismantle, NATO should reconsider its definition of "Security", permitting the free flow of vital information among the Alliance's intelligence organizations, as well as between the latter and the police forces.

This is why - considering the great deal of information available in the crisis areas, and the NATO members' remarkable data-gathering capability - the information potential must be used to the utmost in order to realize an effective collaboration in the warning and planning sector and to tackle the crises jointly and as soon as possible.

In order to confront the threats that could harm the fundamental economic and social structures of the West, NATO must develop more appropriate mechanisms for crisis management, capable of operating regularly within the environment of the crises. The need to strengthen the capability of threat evaluation stems precisely from these considerations.

There are two reasons for this. The first is that, at the present time, the evaluation of a threat takes a very long time; the second is that it is not easy to aggregate the various elements in an organic and rational manner. Therefore, if there is a political will to share more information, the new technology will permit a rapid adjustment, in order to effectively meet the challenges of the emerging threats.

The information technology, necessary for the evaluation of

the environment of the crises, can be divided into four fundamental development areas:

- "on line" analytic processing (OLAP): it is an evolution of the technology, already adopted for commercial data bases. OLAP is capable of supporting a complex analysis in multidimensional environments. This means that the analysts can "navigate" rapidly through the complex spaces of information, in order to confirm or refuse certain assumptions;
- knowledge discovery: this technology, adopted in the new-generation search engines, will give the analysts the possibility of generating precise questions on a very large number of available data - all of them with a contextual background - in a much more effective manner, since the present-time search engines are based on a keyword. The applications of this technology, based on the latent semantic elaboration and on a conceptualized type of requests, will start sophisticated



ITAF AMX fighter-bombers taking part in "Allied Force" missions.

and interactive search-processes, through which the analysts will be able to find new reticular relations, to be verified through the OLAP systems;


- structured argumentations: these instruments use a system of generalized questionnaires, and permit to evaluate real facts, with the purpose of finding out the analytic rational processes and move from evidence to conclusions. Different approaches are used for managing both the uncertainty level of evident data and the process of data interdependence;
- integrated memory: the commercial "data warehousing" technology permits a persistent storage of data, using a vertically integrated software which allows, for instance, to compare critical information by means of situations, times and organizations. The next-

generation technology will provide an automated support capable of comparing, in real time, current situations with known crises of the past, using systems for the memorization of complex data that can be used in parallel.

At present, the four abovementioned technology areas of information are integrated in an environment of crisis management by the analysts of "Progetto Genova", conducted by

DARPA. The objective of this project is to develop a virtual environment of cooperation, promoting a rapid and effective interaction between analysts and policy-makers of the different communities operating in the sector of national security in the US.

"Genova" supplies the instruments for the organization and analysis of a large number of qualitatively unstructured data, received from different and heterogeneous sources. "Genova"



Paratrooper-rangers reading a map in East Timor.

"Scimitar" armoured reconnaissance-vehicles of the Household Cavalry Regiment embarking for Egypt, where they will take part in exercise "Bright Star".

also creates the means for capturing data, actions and logistics, important for outlining options for the policy-makers and for realizing interactive "object-linked briefings" with real-time connections.


"Progetto Genova" consists of four segments:

- *Crisisnet*: a computer network employing the concepts of the internet in order to provide a set of virtual services, allowing to cooperate with a secure and integrated procedure;
- *Crisisbrowse*: a versatile navigation programme, with access to heterogeneous multimedia data. It allows to manage information through the organization of data and advanced display units;
- *Crisisbrief*: allows to organize and present information in a more rational manner realizing, at the same time, a feedback system between policy makers and analysts.

Crisisscope provides the analytic instruments for determining and monitoring evolving situations, pointing out the most similar and most evident elements, and permits to discover in advance the relations between critical data.

Crisisnet, *Crisisbrowse* and *Crisisbrief* are the supporting architecture of "Project Genova" and are essentially adaptations of the commercial information-technology. *Crisisscope*, on the contrary, concerns applied research and development of highly innovative analytic instruments.

First of all, it is necessary to single out an important piece of information in a host of data. Second, it is necessary to be able to analyze these data in order to recognize a possible crisis, and to



orient the resulting elements toward operational conclusions.

Crisisscope must be capable of singling out the signs of a crisis among an enormous number of unimportant, uncertain and often conflicting data. It must also be able to spot crises when they are at the beginning of their cycle and to point out the relevant corrective actions.

In substance, the analysts would do most of their reasoning employing the information technology which deals with the gathering, manipulation and storing of data.

Crisisscope's purpose is precisely that of providing the analysts with instruments capable of focusing attention, improving knowledge

and supporting decisions, permitting crisis discovery, monitoring and management.

It is often maintained that analysts are smothered by data but lack information. Since the quantity of information stored in unstructured data bases grows rapidly, it becomes increasingly difficult to single out important information in a humanly reasonable time. Most acquirable data are written in a clear and simple way, and only very few of them are formatted with a system permitting an easy search in the data base.

The present search technology (keywords and main lists employed on search engines such as **Alta Vista**), allows the access



British GR7 Harrier landing at Gioia del Colle airfield.

to a large number of unstructured data, but its precision is low. The analyst, therefore, must check a great quantity of data before finding the documents he needs.

"Project Genova" tackles just these problems, and provides more powerful instruments for navigation through free-text data base information.

TOWARDS A CONCRETE INTEROPERABILITY FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The most recent advances in the information technology allow the rapid spreading of information within a coalition, but its integration within NATO will have to be accompanied by the development and application of a more effective and up-to-date information policy.

The information policy of a coalition must go well beyond the traditional relations of intelligence sharing, because this information is not always precise and is often applied in a subjective manner.

A sound information policy should start with the exhaustive

analysis of information for specific missions and precise requirements for communications. The sharing criteria could be: once some mission parameters are established, which information can be given to the coalition members, and how wide should it be in order to share it with all members with the minimum possible degree of imprecision?

This basic analysis can be applied in order to realize a set of information-policy matrixes, connected with specific missions, which should already contain the information sources and the possible coalition members.

Each basic mission-matrix will also have an associated set of execution matrixes, capable of anticipating the information requirements vis-à-vis a "worst case", or the possible deviations from the basic matrix of the mission.

The technical key for the implementation of a modern and effective information policy in a coalition is the *gateway* and *data base* technology, which will allow NATO to develop "automated controllers", capable of sending and receiving data through various command levels, security systems and national borders.

Technology will never replace man's reasoning process in the management of crises and the

collaboration among agencies of different nations, but the new information technology, according to Project Genova's studies and assumptions, could offer the prospect of a significant increase and strengthening of the pre-crisis evaluation and management capabilities, without recourse to great augmentations in the human resources employed in the specific sector. But technical solutions are not a barrier anymore. What is needed now is the will to elaborate a modern information policy. In this perspective the NCW, applied at politico-strategic level, could play an important role in the evaluation and management of crises. Theoretically, the more efficient is the evaluation and management of crises by a coalition is, the lesser the need to employ force will be. As a matter of fact, the most recent crises show precisely the great potential value of a strengthened NATO collaboration in crisis management.

THE "FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS" PROJECT

Now that the scientific and technology elements on which the "Network Centric Warfare" is based have been summarily

described as regards the first level (i.e. prediction and management of crises), it is indispensable to outline the conceptual and technologic architecture of the FCS project.

As we said, FCS is the NCW's operational-military translation, with an important difference: NCW is an integrated system for collecting, processing and assessing data from all over the world, for the successive construction of crisis and conflict scenarios, and for projecting the probable evolution of these scenarios, in order to make a decision on the politico-strategic actions to be undertaken in order to safeguard national and international security. We could say, perhaps, that we are witnessing a declared evolution of the well-known *Echelon* system, integrated with a large component of expert systems and artificial intelligence.

FCS' scope is restricted to the politico-military level, with exchanges and integrations - when possible and necessary - with the intelligence aspects, in order to achieve an effective "situation awareness" in the operations theatre.

The *Future Combat System* must be capable of conducting a wide spectrum of military activities and operations, from deterrence against possible large-scale aggressions to participation in low-level actions against asymmetric threats, such as terrorism and intelligence or NBC operations.

In substance, FCS will be a multifunctional system, based on advanced technologies exalting lethality, survival, mobility, strategic projection, operational and logistic sustainability and dominance of the manoeuvre space. FCS can be ready in 36-48 hours after warning, thanks to its modularity and in relation to the mission. According to the level of the operation, FCS will be made up by a variable number of

tactical platforms, concerning eight areas: direct fire, indirect fire, air defence, reconnaissance, troop transport, non-lethal systems, mobility/countermobility, Command and Control. Some of these areas are automated, or rather robotized, i.e. they are managed at a distance from the Command and Control vehicle, connected to five key sub-areas: C2 network of direct and indirect fire robotized systems, navigation and high-velocity robotized system, "com" antijamming networks, security net for the distributed C2 systems and,

finally, control system for the robotized sensors.


The pictorial representation of the employment of a very simple FCS can be seen at figures 4 and 5.

In short, the American military analysts and researchers believe that - by connecting different types of forces, weapon systems and sensors within a centralized information network - it will be possible to realize new capabilities in the management of crises and conflicts.

The employment of "networked" forces will allow each unit not


fig. 4

Pictorial representation of the 155mm GIAT/BOFORS "BONUS" artillery system for the delivery of "indirect precision fire".



source: Jane's Defense Weekly

Deployment of an "FCS"
(pictorial representation)



source: Jane's Defense Weekly

only to share the "common picture" of the manoeuvre space and obtain data for the acquisition of the objectives but, above all, will permit the best coordination and allocation of the available resources.

But one asks if, at the basis of this project, it will be possible to develop the doctrine, strategy and tactics for the best and effective use of FCS. Perhaps it is too early to answer. As a matter of fact we cannot say, as yet, whether all this digitization will result in the simple installation of a computer on a rifle or, on the contrary, will bring about a real revolutionary concept in the management of conflicts.

CONCLUSIVE REMARKS

Undoubtedly this short journey

through two great projects, concerning not only the organization of the land instrument in the medium and long-term but also a new conception in the management of crises and conflicts, could look like a rather fanciful flight towards a distant future.

Perhaps it is not exactly so.

First of all, because the development of the NCW project confirms that a military doctrine stems from the intersection of the technological level achieved and the type of society which characterizes the historical period. The military doctrines of the 20th century derive from the intersection of the industrial era, or better, the industrial revolution, with the introduction of the *levée en masse*. *The Network Centric Warfare* stems from the interaction of a global society,

where the internet is annulling the geographic and cultural distances in the information era, with the professionalization of the Armed Forces.

Furthermore, NCW and FCS show that the linear module of conflicts is obsolete; the model that better meets today's scenarios can only be circular and continuous. This new scenario necessarily implies a highly mobile, flexible and efficient military instrument, capable of rapidly changing its configuration according to the mission changes.

And this is just one of FCS objectives.

Lastly, the FCS project shows that the Army's short and medium-term programmes are going in the right direction: I refer, in particular, to the programmes for the digitization of the battlefield,

Right.

Pec. Paratroopers of the 183rd "Nembo" Regt protecting the Patriarchate.

Below.

British "Challenger 2" tank.

with the improvement and the integration of the automated Command and Control systems with the sensors for surveillance of the area of responsibility and the acquisition of objectives, down to the integrated fighter.

These procurement programmes are the practical demonstration of the doctrinal, organizational and operational evolution of our Army, oriented towards the same objective in the medium-long term. A modular operational instrument, task organized, medium weight, with efficient C4 and ISTAR systems, integrable and interoperable with the similar capabilities of other European armies.

Obviously the evolution to NCW and FCS cannot be sustained by the Army or by Italy alone. It can become a reality only in a European context, i.e. putting

together the best capabilities in order to realize a European defence and security organization. This road will have to be followed, through the integration of the scientific/technologic resources and niches of excellence, for the achievement of a strengthened international cooperation in the area of information technology.

This is the future that will

allow us to dispel the fogs of war and to be ready to give effective responses to the changing and dynamic requirements of peace and international security.



** Lieutenant Colonel,
Office of the
Army Chief of Staff*



THE ITALIAN SOLDIER IN PEACE MISSIONS

by di Danilo Moriero *



**Interview with
Amb. Staffan De Mistura,
Director of the
UN Information Centre**



Peace Keeping operations have been successful also because the Italian soldiers have committed themselves to human and social relationships with true professionalism. Amb. Staffan De Mistura, UN-representative for Italy, Malta and the State of Vatican discusses with us these and other subjects.

Mr. De Mistura, the last ten years were of great importance to international and regional crises because new patterns for peace keeping, peace and humanitarian and military interventions were set. Would you tell us your opinion of it?

Generally speaking it is positive. The success is due to two reasons. First, newspapers only report the on-going wars or the wars that are about to start but we are never told of those that are reduced or prevented from taking place by Peace Keeping operations...

And second?

Second, we know Peace-Keeping – national and international – was creative, effective and up to today's reality.

What do you mean?

In the past peace keeping consisted of static actions as

it was at Unifil, Cyprus and the border between India and Pakistan where peace-keeping soldiers tried to prevent further fights from taking place. After the Cold War the static peace keeping evolved into a pro-active peace keeping which later became peace enforcement. But at that time Governments were not prepared to face such an effort-taking commitment and this caused problems in Somalia, Bosnia and even in Rwanda.

And then things changed ...

Yes, they did and changes are still on-going. We learned lessons from this experience. Clear-cut mandates is a must for Peace Keeping missions in order to prevent problems such as those we had in Somalia or Bosnia from arising. Moreover we realized that effective Peace Keeping need well trained and equipped troops.



You said that there was a creative and effective Peace Keeping...

Answer: I am referring to the hybrid way of Peace Keeping performed during recent operations. Usually, when there is a crisis, the Peace Keeping reaction is to be strong, fast, effective and carried out by skilled troops.

In this case a resolution from the Security Council allows troops to step in without wearing the Blue Helmet although acting under the umbrella of the United Nations. Only after this a Blue Helm intervention can take place.

Then ... where is the creativity?

The new hybrid way of Peace Keeping! In the past it took a lot

of time to collect troops and have a political clear-cut mandate and when you had it the war was over. is a good example of Creative Peace-Keeping. But in similar cases two basic requirements are to be met.

Which are they?

First, countries must will to face the crisis; second, there must be one voluntary country to lead the mission. For example: the intervention in Haiti was led by USA - obviously there were also geographical interests - and a number of countries took also part in that mission. After this first emergency step an absolutely normal peace keeping mission took place. Italy was the leading country in Albania, and

Australia led the mission in Timor. This is how an action can be carried out both multilaterally and bilaterally, nationally and under the UN-umbrella.

You just referred to Italy and its forces ...

Yes I did and I am also a little bit proud if it because I am Italian. But I am also proud of it if I consider Italy from the UN point of view. I know how often the professionalism of the Italian forces is called for.

An example: when we talk peace keeping we talk not only of military but also of organization, diplomacy, and of all you may need to face problems on the field, even at a checkpoint.

Are you saying that Italian soldiers have all these features?


Yes I am. And it is of their nature. Carabinieri, for example, have intuitive skills for being military police but they are also able to get in touch with people. And this is of basic importance today. Shooting against an enemy is not all you need and after-war problems must be faced as well. Italian soldiers proved to be natural and precious peace keepers.

Today I am working in Lebanon. Well I remember that in the early 80s the Italian soldiers proved that good relationships with native people could provide for victimless solutions to problems. Once more, in Lebanon, I also had a good experience with the Italian helicopter pilots who played an extremely important role in Unifil. So, at that time, in the month of February, I was flying over a village along with some Italian colleagues from Unifil and that village was considered to be dangerous. But on that occasion before flying over that village the Italian military had sent a political message managing to reduce tensions.

Here is what I mean when I say that peace keeping can be creative with professionalism. And this is what we need at UNO in the future.

Can the civilian administration for peace keeping be made better by means of special courses?

That is absolutely true. Look at what they have done in the USA! The Americans set a pool of experts committed to what is referred to as Civil Affairs. I saw them working in the North of Iraq and somewhere else. They are reserve personnel, actually civilian experts,






working close to the military operation.

For example, when we enter Kosovo or Sierra Leone for a military intervention the military operating a tank or running a checkpoint have their mission to fulfil but things would run easier when there was a budget for building water pipelines or for offering jobs against weapons.

In the past ten years there was something really new for International Criminal Law as decided in Rome in 1998. Is anything going to change in the future?

International criminal systems have never been stiff. On the contrary they changed depending on the situation and on the





Ambassador Staffan De Mistura graduated in Political Science at the La Sapienza University, Rome.

In 1970, when he was 22, he was appointed by the United Nations to organize the delivery of food in Sudan struck by famine. And he did the same for Chad two years later. He then worked for ten years at FAO, Rome.

In 1985 he left for Ethiopia and in 1986 he was in Sudan as Director for the World Food Program.

From 1988 to 1991 he worked in Iraq and Afghanistan for the United Nations.

After that he was in Croatia, Bosnia and Somalia for UNICEF.

In 1997 he was appointed Director of the UN Information Centre for Italy, Malta, State of Vatican and San Marino.

During the Kosovo crisis he was special advisor to the High Commissioner for Supply and then was appointed to the post of Administrator of the Mitrovica Region.

Ambassador De Mistura speaks seven languages fluently and is a teacher of Negotiation Techniques at the LUISS University, Rome.

crimes committed against human rights. In Nürnberg, for example, the court was implemented to address the horrible crimes committed in Europe.

The International Criminal Court, which was set - not by chance - in Rome, is becoming a reference point for the future. And in this respect I would also like to know the opinion of today's criminals of war.

When will that Criminal System be implemented?

This will happen when more countries join the group. But something is already happening because many judges do follow the principles at the base of the International Criminal Court when they are to judge crimes against humanity or genocide. In the future the military can be trained as - may be there is already a project - because they are on the field and can be true witnesses for the International Criminal Court.

You are an expert in Peace Keeping and you have seen how the Italian Forces have changed their status so far. Do you think relationships between the military and society have changed in Italy?

Yes they have. Something changed and I saw it in the soldiers' eyes reflecting how proud they were about their missions. I must be honest and say that the Italian military operations have always been based on noteworthy professionalism. It is obvious that Italy committed the best skilled soldiers to international missions and they were up to the situation.

Do you think the Italian society got closer to its Armed Forces also because of this professionalism?

Not only is professionalism appreciated but also the moral principles leading to military interventions have been shared

by the society. The Italians are proud of their peace keeping because the military are defending their principles. The military did what all citizens would do in Timor and Kosovo.

What is your opinion about the Italian foreign policy. Where is it leading to?

I have the feeling that it will be along the same successful line in the future. Italy is not a superpower but has an economic and a military power. It is a power because of its . Italy has no particular bilateral interest and is willing to play an active role as a reliable international partner for Peace and international cooperation. So Italy is a great country at the international level.



** Journalist*

A photograph of three soldiers in full combat gear, including helmets and large backpacks, moving through a dense field of green and reddish-brown ferns. The soldiers are wearing camouflage uniforms. The central soldier is looking towards the camera, while the others are slightly behind and to the sides. The background shows more foliage and trees.

EIRE

THE NEW ARMY

*Interview with General
Colm E. Mangan
Chief of Staff of the
Irish Defence Forces*

by Enrico Magnani *

Ireland, a militarily neutral nation since its independence, has expressed its intention to take part in PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, with the aim of contributing to the stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic area. To this end, its Armed Forces had to be thoroughly streamlined and reorganized. This and other subjects are dealt with in the interview with Lieutenant General Colm E. Mangan, Chief of Staff of the Irish Defense Forces.



General, can you describe the Irish Army?

Our defense forces (DF), made up of volunteers only, comprise:

- Permanent Defense forces (PDF)
- Reserve Defense forces (RDF)

The first, 10,500 strong, include the army, navy and Air Force; the second, with 14,000 reservists, are used to augment the PDF, when and where required.



"Casa" twin turboprop aircraft, Irish Air Corps.

The Army is divided into three brigade groups. The navy, being the main naval agency of the nation, carries out naval defense tasks. The Air Force must safeguard the security of our national air space and support both ground and sea operations. as regards the PDF and the RDF, training and logistic requirements are met by the Defense Forces Training centre (DFTC) and by two logistic bases. A number of specialized units are under the direct responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Staff (operations). Among them there are one Air Defense Regiment, one unit of Special Defense forces and the Army Rangers.

The DF have been assigned the following tasks by the government:

- defend the nation from possible armed assaults;
- co-operate with civil organizations

(in essence, assist, on demand, police forces who are mainly responsible for keeping law and order, as part of their effort to guarantee the internal security of the nation);

- take part in multinational peace support, crisis management and humanitarian relief activities, acting within the UN or under a UN mandate, as well as in regional security missions authorized by the UN;
- ensure the protection of fisheries, according to the obligations taken on by Ireland, as a member of the EU;
- carry out other tasks (search and rescue activities, aeromedical evacuation service, ministerial air transport service, natural disaster relief operations, assistance in guaranteeing essential services, co-operation in fighting sea water pollution).

To perform these tasks, a thorough military training is required. to this end large resources are allotted to endow personnel with the necessary capabilities,

knowledge and experience.

the general public constantly witnesses to the DF contribution to police operations.

subversive activities have called for a massive intervention of DF, for two reasons mainly. Firstly, police forces are unarmed on most occasions and require to be adequately protected to carry out certain types of actions. Secondly DF, relying on large military capabilities and specialized equipment, can be effectively employed for security tasks.

The DF co-operate in the following sectors:

- security of critical installations;
- area reconnaissance
- valuables escorts
- ordnance convoy escorts
- prisoners escorts
- monitoring industrial explosives
- specialized investigations
- air support
- combating drugs trafficking
- ordnance disposal.

Since the beginning of the new millennium, DF personnel have

A female soldier armed with a "Stayer" machine gun.

totally performed about 50,000 individual tours of duty, serving in 36 humanitarian and peacekeeping operations all over the world. presently - october 2, 2000 - as much as 911 troops have been employed in 15 different operations, including UN, EU and OSCE missions. Enlisted men have served in Lebanon, East Timor, Sarajevo and Kosovo, while officers have been deployed as observers in other missions. Besides carrying out thier institutional tasks, the Navy and the Army are mainly responsible for the protection of fisheries and carry out maritime survaillance operations on territorial waters. The width of Ireland's exclusive fishing area is of 132,000 square nautical miles approx., i.e. five times that of the mainland and 16% of all european waters. Moreover, Ireland owns 118,000 square miles of continental shelf, exceeding the per capita average of EU nations by 14 times. The Air Force has also been tasked to carry out search, rescue and aeromedical evacuation operations.

The tasks assigned to the Df are numerous and diverse. In fact, military personnel deliver humanitarian assistance during major emergencies (accidents and natural disasters), ensure the operation of fundamental services, on demand (e.g. during strikes in the industrial sector), carry out search and rescue and aeromedical evacuation operations, meet governmental air transport requirements and assist in combating sea water pollution due to oil spills. They also take part in official ceremonies, such as the "Ireland equestrian event" and are actively engaged in equestrian sports.

Ireland has acceded to the NATO-sponsored Partnership



for Peace, after a long internal debate. What do you think the repercussions of this choice and the army's engagements in this program will be?

The participation in PfP is really beneficial to the DF in planning and preparing peace support operations. In fact, taking part in PfP allows forces to adequately train and learn the techniques and operational and doctrinal procedures, necessary to carry out present and often multi-dimentional peace support operations. DF capabilities and operational readiness are thus

emphasized . All activities will be centered upon training with other PfP members, so as to integrate one of our combat groups into an international brigade framework. We also want EU partners to share our experience , acquired over the years by staging crisis mangement operations.

Ireland has been a neutral nation since its independence. Following the decision to accede to the PfP, can the term "neutral" take on a new meaning, in a world which

seems to have ruled out all bloc-to-bloc confrontations?

Ireland's participation in PfP neither gives rise to constitutional or national sovereignty problems, nor is contrary to our neutral stance. In fact, the PfP does not oblige Ireland to take part in defense missions, in compliance with NATO or EU treaties, nor requires it to fulfill legally binding tasks at international level. The participation of DF personnel in PfP-connected activities - training or exercises - has no legal restrictions.

Our government, knowing that the PfP is a voluntary, flexible and self-differentiating process, has clearly defined national priorities in its presentation document, which are absolutely in line with our military neutrality policy.

Ireland, taking part in the PfP, subscribes to the basic concept that the stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic area may be obtained through co-operation and joint action only. Our accession to the PfP reaffirms Ireland's commitment to abide by the obligations set by the UN Charter and the principles of the Universal Declaration of human rights. Irish foreign policy has always been focused on supporting international security and carrying out peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.

The army, together with the DF, has recently contacted a large international consulting firm for drawing up a renovation and reorganization scheme. What are the reasons for this very original choice, if compared to the policy followed by other nations, where similar projects have been directly drawn up by the General Staffs?

The DF have not hired external contractors. In 1998 the

Government set up an Efficiency Advisory Group (EAG) to assess the activities and procedures carried out at ministerial level. During that review process, the Group focused on the Ministry of Defense and the DF's administrative sectors. Concurrently, owing to the changes occurred in the defense policy during the '90s, the government decided to redefine the tasks assigned to the DF, as a precondition for a more radical reorganization of all military systems and structures, to be carried out under the EAG supervision. The Group decided to commission an in-depth study on the DF to a consulting firm, perhaps in the hope of having an evaluation from an external viewpoint. The team of consultants included a number of Canadian officers recently dismissed from active service. The EAG also hired a retired senior officer from New Zealand. These experts drew up a report for the Group, as did the DF chief of Staff.

Based on those reports and the

documents developed by other parties (Officers and associations of Officers and other ranks' Representatives), the EAG submitted a report to the government, which endorsed its conclusions and gave directions to draw up and implement a plan addressing the problems pointed out. The Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Quartermaster corps were among the members of that implementation group.

What are the repercussions stemming from the implementation of the DF reorganization plan?

There has been a 36% reduction in the number of personnel authorized to serve within the DF ("the establishment"). Later on, a defense policy document, issued in February 2000, provided for a further 8% cut.

There has been a shift from a force organized on 4 Commands, with one Brigade each, to a new





their numbers and lower their average age.


The Army has acquired a wide experience in UN-mandated peacekeeping operations, together with that gathered in

Left.

Troops undergoing training in the "Curragh" area.

Below.

Soldiers serving in the mission in Lebanon.



structure based on 3 brigades. One command level has been scrapped disbanded and training and logistic functions centralized.

C2 functions have been reorganized at top level and a new strategy has been adopted as regards personnel, to streamline

NATO missions in bosnia-Herzegovina and kosovo. What lessons have been learned from participating in so many multinational engagements?

Ireland has been participating in UN peacekeeping operations since 1958. From that time on, as

already said, more than 50,000 hours have been spent in performing individual tours of duty in 40 countries all over the world. We have taken part in almost 40 different UN missions.

To date, the most important operation is UNIFIL in Lebanon, where we have committed a Battalion and a large number of personnel to the force headquarters. We have learned a lot from these overseas engagements and are now convinced that we can really operate in an international environment. We have also profitably worked shoulder to shoulder with our Italian colleagues in UN missions. In fact, the Italian air wing serving with UNIFIL has greatly supported our Battalion in Lebanon.

As regards SFOR, the DF have committed a military police Battalion in Sarajevo. They are also represented in the International Police HQs, together with the Italian Carabinieri and the Spanish Civil Guards. The Irish contingent, together with Spanish and Italian forces, also carries out routine military police functions in Sarajevo. These tasks include investigations, military movement control and patrolling activities.

We have learned many lessons from SFOR, as we had the opportunity of testing our capabilities in the field by performing police tasks in an international environment. Thus, our conduct has proved to be perfectly in line with the best international procedures. Presently we take part in KFOR with a heavy transport Company, equipped with IVECO DROPS, similar to the Italian vehicles. The third transport Company has its HQs in Lipljan, 12 km from Pristina, and has perfectly integrated into the overall KFOR organization.

As in the case of the troops committed to SFOR, the experience drawn from this mission has confirmed the importance and effectiveness of the present training in the logistic and operational sectors.



A warship during an exercise.

The European council has recently decided in Helsinki and Lisbon to set up a European military force with an independent Command and control structure, connected to the Atlantic Alliance to some extent. Are these decisions compatible with Dublin's choice to keep a neutral stance?

In Helsinki the main objectives were defined, while in Lisbon the best political course to attain them and their inherent responsibilities were identified.

The Irish government fully endorses the fact that "Europe must have an autonomous operational capability, sustained by reliable

military forces, ready to react to international crises", as long as this objective refers to humanitarian and rescue missions only, i.e. peacekeeping or peacekeeping-related tasks. this trend is fully in line with our traditional foreign policy guidelines, as regards military interventions. consequently, we feel that we can carry out the mandate set by the Helsinki and Lisbon agreements, though keeping our neutral attitude.

Your army has enrolled a small number of women. how long have you been employing female personnel? Can you summarize their contribution to the military?

The Irish DF enroll 400 women against a force of 10,500 troops.

Presently they are about 4% of the whole force, but this percentage will certainly increase in the future. Since 1996 their numbers have trebled, in line with international military trends and with the developments of society at large. The DF foster women's enrollment into the Army, Navy and Air force. No political restrictions whatsoever have been imposed on their serving in the armed forces. In fact, the DF are proud of granting equal employment opportunities.

Within the Army's main programs, there is a plan to upgrade and enhance tank and light armored car fleets, Infantry transport and combat vehicles, field artillery assets and tactical

helicopters, although under the authority of the Air Corps. At What stage are these programs at present?

The DF have recently been reorganized and restructured. Moreover, a **white book on defense**, illustrating a military development plan, was published in February, for the first time in the history of Ireland. In this document the Secretary of Defense has allotted an investment package to the Army, Navy and Air Force, to update and re-equip their forces. In particular, the Army will acquire more modern assets, the Navy new shore patrol vessels and the Air Force medium lift helicopters. The Government has also approved the acquisition of 40 MOWAGs and a medium-range a/a guided weapons system. The Navy is presently supervising the construction of a new ship at Appledore (England) and has issued a call for tender for the supply of medium lift helicopters and fixed-wing trainers.

Ireland, though neutral, has a long tradition of military co-operation with some nations, like the US, the UK and India. Can you illustrate the terms of your Army's multilateral co-operation?

Both the Government and the military are aware that a relationship with the international military community is necessary to maintain our standards and keep up with the latest developments in the field of military doctrine and procedures. We have a long record of military experience at international level, having served in several UN overseas missions and recently in those sponsored by the EU and led by NATO. The contact with different nations has proved beneficial to our troops and allowed us to transpose the Irish

point of view into international military affairs.

A last question, Mister General. Your Army has a great tradition of military horsemanship. At what stage is this specialty at present?

The DF Horsemanship School is placed in the "Mc Kee" Barracks, Dublin. It is the most prestigious national centre in this sector. The School was established in 1926 and the Army horsemen have always ranked among the best winners in showjumping and three-day event competitions. They have represented Ireland in European, World and Olympic

Championships, contributed to the victories obtained during the Aga Khan Trophy at the Royal Dublin Society and taken part in other important events in renowned places, such as Aachen, Calgary and Rome. These achievements have been constant over time and the School is presently highly competitive at world-wide level. In recognition of the awards won by the school, the Army has launched a new initiative to help young civilian horsemen obtain scholarships sponsored by the Ministry of Defense.

□

** Journalist*

Lieutenant General Colm E. Mangam started serving in the Infantry Branch in 1961. He was first assigned to the "General Training Depot" of the "Curragh Command". From 1961 to 1979 he was almost always at the "Curragh Command", holding different positions in the 3rd and 30th Infantry Battalions, the Branch School and the General Command. In 1964 he became Platoon Leader at the 31st UNFICYP Infantry Group (Cyprus). In 1968 he served as assistant officer to the UNFICYP. From 1972 to 1974 he was a military observer with the UNTSO in the Middle East. After attending a Staff Course in Germany from 1977 to 1978, he was appointed Inspector at the "Command and Staff School of the Military College", and kept that position until 1985. In the same year he served in Lebanon with the 57th UNIFIL Infantry Battalion, as Operations Officer. In late 1985 he took up his duties at the Operations Section of the Defense Forces Command. He commanded the 3rd Infantry Battalion from 1989 to 1990 and the 68th UNIFIL Infantry Battalion from 1990 to 1991. In the 1990-1991 period he served with the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) in Yugoslavia.

Once promoted to the rank of Brigadier General, in 1995 he was appointed Commandant of the Military College and in 1996 Commanding General of the "Eastern Command". In November 1998 he became Major General to cover the position of Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. On September 25, 2000, he took up the position of Chief of the General Staff with the rank of Lieutenant General.

Lt. Gen. Mangam is married with three children.



INDIA AND PAKISTAN


The relations between the two countries remain very precarious. It is impossible to foresee any substantial improvement, since the causes of this difficult coexistence have never been removed. The development of nuclear programmes is at the foundation of a difficult dispute, made of accusations and threats which disturb the entire subcontinent.

According to General Pierre M. Gallois, Gen. de Gaulle's well-known military adviser, the world is witnessing a phenomenon that can be compared to that of the communicating vessels: while the vertical nuclear proliferation is being partially curbed, the horizontal one is expanding (1), thus changing the geography of military power.

Up to now, India and Pakistan have given priority to the nuclear option rather than to chemical and biological weapons. Proof of this are the international engagements they have taken: both Countries kept themselves at the edge of the

Non Proliferation Treaty, of 1968 while they ratified the Convention on chemical weapons of 1993 and the one on biological weapons of 1997. In May 1998, a sudden chain reaction started in South Asia, triggered by the test of the Haft V/ Ghauri Pakistani missile, made on April 8, 1998. India carried out five nuclear tests, two on the 11th and three on the 13th, which were numerically matched by Pakistan with five tests on May 28, in Baluchistan, and with another near the Iranian border, which also squared accounts with the first Indian test of 1974. In short, both Countries gave up their policy of





Development under the nuclear shade

by Roberto Nocella *

"nuclear ambiguity" and obtained a "place in the sun" despite the protests, worries and sanctions of the international community. Moreover, the possibility of escalation of the Kashmir conflict, in which the two countries have been entangled since 1947, is at present a cause of particular concern.

INDIA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

It should be said, first of all, that India was interested in nuclear energy for reasons of

economic development.(2). The military programme is therefore subsequent. The quasi-synchrony of the 1998 tests could suggest a "couple proliferation", as was the case with the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war and the feared war between Argentina and Brazil in South America. Nevertheless, despite all appearance, clearly the Indian nuclear programme, especially at the beginning, was "coupled" more with the People's Republic of China's than to the Pakistani one. Actually, the determinant factor was the growing Indian insecurity as regards its powerful

Communist neighbour: in October 1962, the Chinese troops defeated the Indian army and India was compelled to give up 34,000 km in Askai Chin. Moreover there was the Chinese Lop Nor nuclear test of October 16, 1964 and the risk, run during the second Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, of having to fight on two fronts: along the Line of Control (LoC), i.e. the ceasefire line between India and Pakistan established in 1949, and along the Indo-Chinese frontier. At that point, the New Delhi government tried, without success, to obtain a nuclear warranty from the

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN

Population: 141,553,775 (July 2000)

0 - 14: 41%

15 - 64: 55%

over 65: 4%

Life expectancy: 61.07 years

Men: 60.27 years

Women: 61.91 years (2000)

Ethnic Groups: Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun (Pathan), Baloch, Muhajir (Indian immigrants and their descendants)

Religions: Moslem 97% (Sunnite 77%, Shiite 20%), Christian, Hindu and others 3%

Languages: Punjabi 48%, Sindhi 12%, Siraiki (variant of Punjabi) 10%, Pashtu 8%, Urdu (official) 8%, Balochi 3%, Hindko 2%, Brahui 1%, English (official), Burushaski and others 8%

Literacy: 37.8 % of the total population
50% of the men

24.4% of the women (1995)

Source: CIA, *The World Factbook* 2000.

REPUBLIC OF INDIA

Population: 1,014,003,817 (July 2000)

0 - 14: 34%

14 - 64: 62%

over 65: 4%

Life expectancy: 62.5 years

Men: 61.89 years

Women: 63.13 years (2000)

Ethnic Groups: Indian 72%, Dravidian 25%, others 3%

Religions: Hindu-Aryan 80%, Moslem 14%, Christian 2.4%, Sikh 2%, Buddhist 0.7%, Jain 0.5%, others 0.4%

Languages: Hindi (national language and mother tongue for 30% of the population), English, Bengali (official), Telugu (official), Marathi (official), Tamil (official), Urdu (official), Gujarati (official), Malayalam (official), Kanada (official), Oriya (official), Punjabi (official), Assamese (official), Kashmiri (official), Sindhi (official), Sanskrit (official), Hindustani (popular variant of Hindi and Urdu, spoken mainly in the northern regions of India)

Literacy: 52% of the total population
65.5% of the men
37.7% of the women (1995)

Source: CIA, *The World Factbook* 2000.

United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain. Having had no positive answer, India made its first nuclear test ("Pokhran I") on April 18, 1974, destined to "peaceful ends" (3).

In 1979, Pakistan became a crucial country for the United States, because it was located midway between Khomeini's new Shiite Iran and Afghanistan, invaded by the Soviet Union. On the geopolitical plane these events could prelude a Soviet expansionism towards the Indian Ocean, through Baluchistan, to the Persian Gulf (4). These risks were perceived by President Carter; the Reagan administration sent a heavy supply of armaments to Pakistan, which had to sustain the resistance of the *mujāhidin* against the Red Army.

The consequences of this new regional scenario induced many analysts to believe that India could reestablish its superiority only through nuclear weapons.

PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

Also the Pakistani, at the beginning, conceived nuclear energy as a kind of propeller of economic development (5). Only Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had proposed with a certain perseverance a military programme and in 1966, as Foreign Minister, had gone as far as to say that his people "were ready to eat grass if this was necessary to obtain a bomb" (6). The time became ripe a little later. In order to understand the reasons that prompted Pakistan to start its military programme in 1972, one should consider two elements: its inferiority from the conventional viewpoint, confirmed by the ruinous defeat suffered in its third war against India in December 1971; the association made by the Pakistani of this defeat with the secession of East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh (literally



The sanitary aspect is particularly important in densely populated Countries.

"Nation of Bengal"). Finally the works were sped up under the direction of Abdul Qader Khan after the Indian nuclear test of 1974.

The United States reacted by dissuading the French from implementing an accord that envisaged to supply Pakistan with the technology and knowledge necessary to regenerate plutonium. One of the main instruments of pressure was the adoption by the Congress, in 1976, of the Symington amendment, according to which the United States could interrupt any military cooperation with the supply-side and demand-side protagonists of the so-called "plutonium economy".

During the eighties, the nuclear cooperation started between Pakistan and China caused concern in the US Congress, which, in 1985, passed the

Pressler amendment, stating that the economic and military assistance put by the US government at Pakistan's disposal would stop if the US President were to ascertain that Pakistan possessed a nuclear weapon. Anyway, in the following years these sanctions were never inflicted, not even when, in 1987, following a crisis fueled by Indian military exercises known as "Brasstacks", scientist Khan avowed to a journalist that Pakistan had the perfect capability of assembling a "bomb". Of course Reagan's restraint depended on the role that Pakistan was playing against the Soviet Union (7).

The Red Army's withdrawal from Afghanistan, decided by Gorbachev, and the disgregation of the Soviet Union produced two effects: on the one hand, for the Americans Pakistan ceased to be a forefront country, on the other, India lost its main counterbalance to Chinese power. A distinctive mark of the new times were the US sanctions which, during the

Bush presidency and according to the Pressler amendment, hit Pakistan in 1990.

PAKISTAN'S DETERRENCE

From the standpoint of the logic of discussion, the nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan only *partially* reflects that between France and the Soviet Union during the cold war. Even if both the antagonist couples are characterized by an evident unbalance as regards territorial extension and nuclear weapons, what really counts is the mutual capability of threatening the adversary with a politically and economically unacceptable strike.

In this sense, although at military level Pakistan can count only on short-range missiles, with a nuclear attack it could inflict damages that would be unbearable: in the northern part of India there are in fact many heavy-water centrals, the destruction of which would be fatal for India. According to a

THE DECOLONIZATION PROCESS AND THE KASHMIR CONFLICT

The conflict over Kashmir dates back to the period of decolonization of the *British Raj* in the Indian sub-continent. At the time, the main political formations were the Congress Party and the Moslem League, founded respectively in 1885 and 1906. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi's and Jawaharlal Nehru's Congress Party intended to establish a great lay State which could assemble peoples of different religions and languages, according to the principle of "unity in diversity". On the contrary, the Moslem League of Mohammad Ali Jinnah wanted to build two Moslem States located respectively in the northwest and northeast of India. This project was translated into the Lahore resolution of March 23, 1940. *Pakistan* was the denomination chosen for the first State entity: in the Urdu language Pak means "Pure" while Stan means "State": The term represented a kind of geopolitical manifesto, because every letter indicated a territory. "P" stood for Punjab, "A" the Afghan frontier, "K" Kashmir, "S" Sind, "TAN" Baluchistan.

Successively, the Moslem League preferred to constitute a *single* "State" "Pure" from the religious point of view. According to Jinnah the foundation of the State identity rested on the *theory of the two nations*, inspired by the poet Allama Iqbal, according to which peoples of different religions could not live together. When the Constituent Assembly met for the first time on December 16, 1946, the deputies of the League did not appear and the Congress Party was forced to accept the partition of British India into India and Pakistan in April 1947. Both India and Pakistan obtained their independence in August 1947.

The decision did not mitigate the tension, for the future of the *rajah* States, which in the past had been protected by Great Britain, remained uncertain. Among the latter there was the State of Jammu and Kashmir, where the Dogra Hindu dynasty ruled over a mostly Moslem population (77%). Its belonging to Pakistan was considered by the Pakistanis a logic consequence of the application of the abovesaid theory of the two nations. In October 1947, as a consequence of the migration of some tribes from Pakistan and of the ensuing chaotic situation, Maharaja Hari Singh solicited the intervention of the Indian troops, which clashed with the Pakistanis in an undeclared war. Indian Prime Minister Nehru made the intervention conditional on the signature of the *Instrument of Accession*, with which the Singh kingdom joined India. According to Pakistan the treaty was signed only after the Indians' entrance into the kingdom's territory, thus prefiguring a case of aggression. The truce came into force on January 1, 1949 and state of Jammu and Kashmir was partitioned by a 700 km long ceasefire line, or Line of Control (LoC). Pakistan obtained the northern territories and Azad ("Free") Kashmir, while India kept control over Jammu, the Kashmir Valley and Little Tibet (or Ladakh), which it integrated into its national territory between 1954 and 1959.

During the cold war India and Pakistan have clashed in two further conventional wars, in 1965 and 1971. Kashmir still remains the stage of numerous violent strifes, on whose nature India and Pakistan's attitudes are utterly antithetic.

nuclear expert, it would be sufficient for Pakistan to develop the capability of destroying Bombay (the financial centre), New Delhi (the administrative centre), Bangalore and Hyderabad (the centres of high technology) (8).

Pakistan, owing to the extension of its territory, the range of its missiles and the absence of a fleet of submarines equipped

with nuclear weapons, has only one possibility: to strike first. The doctrine of "first use" is directly related to the weakness in the conventional field.

Considering the devastating consequences of an Indian retaliation, it can be excluded that Pakistan would employ nuclear weapons during the first stages of a possible conventional conflict.

Facing page
A temple near Delhi.

Below
Inside an Indian fort.

INDIA'S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE


India's nuclear doctrine was outlined in 1999 by a document of the *National Security Advisory Board*, whose preamble underlines that "the very existence of offensive doctrines in relation to the first use of nuclear weapons and the insistence of some nuclear States on the legitimacy of this employment also against non nuclear Countries" constitutes "a threat for the peace, stability and sovereignty of the States".


The nuclear doctrine rests on two pillars: "no-first use" and achievement of a minimum credible deterrence.

The first pillar is nothing new, as it was announced in Parliament ten years ago by Raja Ramanna, Deputy-Minister of Defence of the time (9). In the past India, has urged Islamabad's authorities to come to an agreement on a generalized no first use, which in strategic terms would have two consequences for Pakistan:

its nuclear weapons would become useless;

the Country would remain at the mercy of the conventional superiority of India.






The formulation of the second pillar must be understood remembering that the Indian planners cannot avoid keeping into account an extreme hypothesis, i.e., a simultaneous

and concerted attack from Pakistan and China. In particular, India fears an encirclement by the PRC; after the supply to Pakistan of Chinese missiles M-11 during the first years of the past

decade, this perception has been strengthened by a deployment of nuclear missiles in Tibet.

India has thus decided to experiment a panoply of carriers capable of striking any spot on the Chinese territory. Theoretically, an Agni II missile (10) launched from the Indo-Chinese border could reach Hong Kong, while an Agni III could destroy Beijing or Shanghai.

In order to make India's deterrence credible, its forces should not be susceptible to immediate destruction in a single attack. In view of this, not only must India deploy its arms along the whole of its territory but also obtain the so-called *nuclear Triad*, i.e. the capability of launching nuclear missiles from the air,





water and ground. The Indian project of a nuclear submarine (ATV- Advanced Technology Vessel) is still in progress, as well as the missiles that it should carry: Sagarika ("Oceanic") and Dhanush.

About the fundamental question of command and control, whose inefficiency could trigger an accidental nuclear war, the doctrine indicates that the final decision about the use of these weapons must be made by

the political authority, represented by the Prime Minister.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE KASHMIR CONFLICT

As regards the relation between the Kashmir conflict and the implicit risk of escalation, it is important to remark that since India and Pakistan are neighbouring countries, the consequences of

nuclear explosions will hardly remain limited to the enemy territory. In this sense a "pure" deterrence would be based on the potential employment of a radioactive boomerang, i.e. on the threat of nuclear retaliation against the aggressor. These considerations are of course valid for Pakistan, since India, according to the doctrine enunciated, supposes a prior Pakistani nuclear attack.

A Pakistani decision of employing such arms would not

Country	Missile	Range	Load	Propellant
India	Prithvi SS-150	150 km	1000 kg	Liquid
	Prithvi SS-250	250 km	500-750kg	Liquid
	Prithvi SS-350	350 km	50-1000kg	Liquid
	Agni I	1 500 km	1000 kg	Liquid/Solid
	Agni II	2 500 km	1000 kg	Solid
	Agni III	3 700 km	1000 kg	Solid
	Agni IV	4-5000 km	1000 kg	Solid
Pakistan	Haft I	80 km	500 kg	Solid
	Haft II	300 km	500 kg	Solid
	Haft III/ M-9	6- 800 km	500 kg	Solid
	M-11 (CSS-7)	280 km	800 kg	Solid
	Shaheen / Haft IV	750 km	1 000 kg	Solid
	Gahuri I / Haft V	1500 km	500-750 kg	Liquid
	Gahuri II / Haft VI	2- 2300 km	750-1 000 kg	Liquid
	Shaheen II	2000 km	750-1 000 kg	Solid

Facing page

Pakistani T90 tank.

Right

Launching test of a Gahuri missile.

only entail the destruction of the contested object (Kashmir) but also the killing of many Moslems that live in India. On the other hand, the more credible the Pakistani nuclear threat becomes, the more India will be induced to abstain from starting a conventional war. The two countries would find themselves in a situation of "two scorpions shut up in a bottle" (11), since a nuclear, or even conventional, attack would be lethal. This may lead to a strengthening of the guerrilla in Kashmir. In this case India would be trapped in the dilemma of continuing to be worn out in Kashmir and the temptation of crossing the Line of Control as a punitive measure.

Tha Pakistani nuclear weapons could have another objective: as the tension with the following danger of escalation increases, there will be a greater the pressure from some members of the international society to internationalize the solution of the conflict (12).

On the operational plane, the connection between the strife over Kashmir and the race to nuclear weapons is represented only by a future miniaturization of the weapons.

In any case it must be kept in mind that no nuclear logic or theorem can offer a solution to the political conflict over the future of Kashmir.

□

* University Researcher

NOTE

(1) Gallois, P.M., "Ante la proliferaciòn nuclear", *Política Exterior*, vol. VII, no 36, 1993, p.60. Vertical proliferation regards the increase in the number of nuclear weapons of the five permanent members of

the Security Council of the UN, while horizontal proliferation means the increase in the number of Countries equipped with this type of armaments.

(2) The Department of Atomic Energy was created on August 3, 1954.

(3) Ganguly, S., *India's Pathway to Pokhran II*, "International Security", vol. 23, no 4, 1999, p. 149 to 160.

(4) According to Ambassador Sergio Romano, the Russians feared the diffusion in Central Asia of the ayatollahs' radicalism. Therefore the invasion of Afghanistan was probably suggested by the need to integrate this Country within the Soviet security belt. See Romano, S., "I luoghi della Storia", Rizzoli, Milano, 2000, 2nd ed., p. 197.

(5) The Pakistani Commission for Atomic Energy was in fact constituted in 1957.

(6) Rebolledo, V. G., *India y Pakistán: dos nuevas potencias*

nucleares?, "Revista Espanola de Defensa", year 11, no 125-6, July-August, 1998, p.72.

(7) Ahmed, S., *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program*, "International Security", vol.23, no 4, 1999, p. 180 to 188.


(8) Gupta, A, *Nuclear Forces in South Asia: Prospects for Arms Control*, "Security Dialogue", vol.30, no 3, September 1999, p.321.

(9) Subramanian, N.V., *Sombras nucleares sobre Cachemira*, "Le Monde Diplomatique" (Spanish edition), July-August 1999, p.19.

(10) In the Hindu religion "Agni" is the name of the God of Fire.

(11) This image was used by the American scientist Robert Oppenheimer, one of the fathers of the atomic bomb, to describe the particular condition of the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war.

(12) Gass, N., and Nemeth, N., *The Kashmir Issue and the New World Order*, "Strategic Studies", vol.XIX, no1, 96/97, p.18.




AUSTRAL AMERICA

On the road towards unity

In the last 10 years an integration and economic cooperation process has taken place in the southern part of the american continent.

This has paved the way to new political relationships with the rest of the world.

Europe welcomes these changes and is interested in this newly shaped reality, also because of the historical and cultural reasons which have always linked the two sides of the atlantic.




by Ornella Rota *

Latin America entered the new millennium envisaging new and positive prospects for its future and taking part in a series of political/economic/social

movements which could change the balance of the area and also that of the whole continent.

This year, for the first time since the '30s, the economies of Latin-



American countries will seemingly have inflation rates lower than 10%. Chile will probably be the nation with the highest economic recovery, exceeding 5%, as last year. Brazil's development and a weak dollar should help Argentina's exports, allowing for a 4% growth rate.

To consolidate or even improve the results obtained and reach other pre-established objectives some pre-conditions are required. Peace is first priority, both at internal and inter-state levels; in fact, hostilities generate impoverishment and misery triggers fresh hostilities. As a consequence, unemployment is on the rise. The Bolivia Ambassador, Mr. Blanco Z., was reported as saying: "The challenge we have to face is job creation now". Bolivia has been a democratic country since 1995, after an exhausting series of coups d'état.

It has been proven that a democracy does not wage war

against another democracy, therefore, it is absolutely necessary to safeguard this form of government, though not deeply rooted in the area.

Newly elected governments have to face a tremendous challenge to implement great institutional reforms, not only aimed at ruling out a long tradition of unreliability but also at reaching a stable and fairly high level of economic growth – today it is still lower than that of South East Asia, the new global benchmark – as well as implementing political stability, modern labor legislation and judiciary system.

Any economic recovery action calls for politically complex and unpopular measures with the consequent risk of not being re-elected. Even the integration process can give rise to discontent among that part of the electorate whose political choices may "punish" some politicians

Bahia shantytown – Brazil.

being based on the fulfillment of voters' contingent interests only.

As regards current changes, their common denominator is the aspiration to abolish national boundaries, widen traditional fields of action and integrate different cultures.

The goal is to survive and play an ever important role in an increasingly globalized world where single entities, though powerful, are doomed to lose the match.



The idea of an enlarged South-American homeland dates back to the XIX Century (Simon Bolivar). It became widely known during the '60s and has recently given birth to new initiatives, even at institutional level. Among these initiatives, there is the **Andean Pact**, which, in 1989, expressed the will to transform

the region into a peace, security and co-operation area; the **MERCOSUR** (Common Market of the Southern Area, including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay with Bolivia and Chile as associate members) established by the Treaty of Asunción in 1991 and entered into force in 1995 and the Mercosur Declaration, issued at Ushuaia (Argentina) in 1998, which committed all member and associate Countries not to produce, host and use weapons of mass destruction.

It is the whole continent, however, which shares the common

ambition to form alliances, join in associations and expand.

The NAFTA (North America free trade Agreement) signed in 1992, should lead to lifting customs barriers between the US, Canada and Mexico in 15 years, to create a 400 million people market. Meanwhile, by 2004/2005, another giant project should be launched, that is the FTAA (Free trade area of the Americas, from Alaska to the Tierra del Fuego). The FTAA organization has called the third summit of the Americas in Quebec in next April: 34 leaders



Above.

A general view of Santiago.

Left.

Peruvian soldiers during a military parade in Arequipa.

of the Western hemisphere countries (Fidel Castro excluded) will discuss the ways to find new markets, the requests to submit to the present Washington administration as well as all possible initiatives to take as regards Colombia, exhausted by guerrilla and paramilitary groups.

Mercosur is already well-established and about to become one of the most important organizations. Its main bodies are: the Common Market Council (foreign affairs and finance ministers) and the Secretariat (based in Montevideo). The Chairmanship rotates every six months and will be held by Paraguay until June 15 next.

People can circulate freely among member and associate Countries without holding a passport but an ID card only, and attend primary or secondary schools in another country.



There are no limits also in the business sector. An individual is free to work where he wants and this can be a very good solution to unemployment. People can also freely practice their professions within the area, but their national diplomas must be first evaluated (through a series of documents, above all the academic syllabus) and then officially validated by the authorities of the host country, who can sometimes require further exams.

The common market system will be further implemented by 2006, when the whole area will follow organizational regulations similar to those adopted by the EU; it will be a potential market of at least 130 million inhabitants. About 96% of goods will circulate freely and duty free.

The circulation of all other products will be limited and a quota will be applied to them for a certain time. All these measures have been taken to prevent sudden internal imbalances, but will be gradually abolished.

As regards exchanges, new measures will be applied to all sectors, including services

(e.g. a national in a foreign Country where there are no consulates of his own Country can resort to the Consulate of another Country belonging to the Mercosur); infrastructure (mainly in the energy, transport and telecommunication sectors); drug alternative crops ; scientific and technological developments (e.g. telemedicine stations to link far-away areas) etc.

Concurrently, the harmonization effort will continue as regards the macroeconomic policies of different member countries. On the whole, this region will make up 68% approx. of member countries' GDP and be the fourth economic area at global level.

Its security repercussions are fundamental, as it has defused historical and sometimes bloody rivalries which have spoilt past relations among some of these nations. A case in point are Argentina and Brazil, whose military regularly meet, are the most enthusiastic supporters of their progressive rapprochement process and co-operate in running a bilateral agency for mutually monitoring nuclear weapons, banned by both

countries. Further security-related repercussions are increased intelligence and police co-operation in combating terrorism, recycling and smuggling activities and drug trafficking.

As it is world-wide recognized and officially established by the UN Conference on Organized crime, held in Palermo in last November, these crimes are tightly connected and mutually reinforcing.

This has been the first Common market to be ever organized in South America and it took about ten years to be fully implemented, against the forty or so employed by Europe to set up a similar market (the Coal and Steel Community dates back to 1951).

South Americans have been advantaged by a series of elements, e.g. by the use of two languages only, Spanish and Portuguese (the first is taught in Brazilian schools), very few compared to European standards, and by a natural development process.

"Even if a political union has not been reached yet - said the Brazil




Ambassador, Mr. Paulo Tarso Flechta de Lima – *the countries concerned will certainly further their co-operation also at this level and better understand their problems, relying on mutual solidarity and respect* “ These countries still aspire to establishing a monetary union and a supra-national Commission tasked to set mandatory rules for all member nations.

In the Autumn of 2000 Brazil, the nation heading the overarching project of progressive rapprochement, sponsored and hosted the first Summit of South American leaders, owing to its geographical position, bordering with about ten other states. That important and new initiative was held without involving the US for the first time and gathered the Presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Guayana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela, together with the Chairmen of the Inter-American Development Bank and the Andean Development Agency.

The most enlightened Latin American leaders hope to unite the

largest possible number of nations. Policy makers' efforts are directed towards this aim and as stated by the Paraguay Ambassador, Ms. Lilia Romero Pereira: “ *Politicians can find an agreement more easily than we technicians can do. In fact, sometimes our meetings seem to make matter worse and not better, when problems are examined in detail*”. In the opinion of the Uruguay Ambassador, Mr. Carlos Brugnini: “ *We happened to live in this globalization age and must adapt to it. We do not seem to have any other choice, like in the case of the law of gravity. But we set only one condition: everybody should be equal before these laws* “. This is especially true in the export sector, which is first priority in the MERCOSUR, and in Latin America as well.

Although a free trade accord between MERCOSUR and the EU was signed in 1995 and various bilateral agreements were subscribed between single nations and European partners, exporting goods to our continent is still a hard and exhausting process, while there are no limitations for importing our products there. As



regards foodstuffs (e.g. meat) the limitations imposed by the European laws create large food stocks, which will eventually be

Left.
Kukulcan Maya Pyramid at Chichen Itza.

Right.
The University of Santiago.

Below.
Cartagena historical centre.

sold off, mostly to the US. It has already been recognized that open economy nations have a development rate higher than close economy ones and that what is exported is almost as important as the rate of export expansion. In fact, in countries exporting high added value goods, whose production requires large fund allotments, high technology and a specialized workforce, real wages are high. On the contrary, in countries exporting primary


giving thus rise to the hope of an increase in wages as well. Then a progressive export downturn followed and today raw materials

redemption, exporting about 40/45% of its domestic output all over the world. "We could say that about 1/3 of our exports go to Asia, 1/3 to Europe and 1/3 to America" said the Rome Ambassador, Mr. José Gone, who took part in the MERCOSUR negotiations with the EU. "A strong Europe, both economically and politically, would contribute to reaching a world-wide balance; in fact, the power would no longer be in the hands of a nation only, but equally shared among all". Chile participates in MENSUR as an associate member. "Our country is not a full member, as its economy is much more open than that of other nations. We apply unified and very low customs duties to all goods. For instance, this year Italian exporters will pay a 7% tariff, scheduled to become 6% next year, and that rate will progressively decrease over time. MERCOSUR, on the contrary, has established different customs duties- generally higher than ours by 12/13% approx.- for each type of item. The differences among our taxation systems may prevent Chile from becoming a fully integrated member"

products real wages are low. At the beginning of this reform process, exports seemed to rapidly increase all over Latin-America,

and their by-products with a low added value are mainly exported.

Chile is the country which best symbolizes South-American



□

* Journalist,
Contributor to "La Stampa"

Conscription has played a significant role in fostering cohesion among many generations of Italians, who started to know each other, speak the same language and identify as Italians while serving in the ranks of the Army units. The Armed Forces' professionalization process, though sparking contrasting reactions, has already become a national law and there is no possibility of backing out. This reform has met the operational requirements of the Army and also reflected the deep changes occurred in our society.

by Luigi Semprini *



FAREWELL TO CONSCRIPTION

With love, but no regrets



EMOTIONAL REACTIONS TO THIS CHANGE

The passing of the "Rules for the establishment of a professional Army" and the ensuing abolishment of conscription has sparked opposite reactions by its opponents and supporters.

Many young men have rejoiced, being prone to dodge all

burdensome duties, but apart from that, there is no reason for gladness or sadness. On the contrary, Parliament should be praised for its commitment to pass such radical changes in the military organization almost unanimously. This way, the armed forces will be ready to face the operational requirements stemming from the new international geo-political

environment, and adapt to Italy's changed social and economic conditions.

These new trends are in line with the provisions of our Constitution, stating that all citizens are duty-bound to defend their Nation (art.52). In fact, art.2 of the new rules envisages the possibility of resorting to compulsory call-up "when a state of war is declared, pursuant to art. 78 of the Constitution, or a serious international crisis occurs, affecting Italy directly or as part of an international organization".

Therefore, conscription has not been abolished, but "frozen", i.e. it will be immediately reinstated, if an unfortunate emergency occurs.

These changes were unavoidable, as the need was felt by our military to reach the same effectiveness as that of our partner nations, both at Atlantic and European level. Unfortunately our youth had to renounce the positive lessons drawn from military life, which past generations had benefited from. In fact, doing the military service was considered as a very important experience in the past, and is not completely negligible even today.

On the one hand, no one can deny the necessity of transforming the Armed Forces into a completely professional organization, for purely military reasons; on the other, our society has been deprived of **"added value"** men, such as recruits and non regular officers, who are psychologically balanced, physically fit, dedicated to duty, accountable, sociable and professionally qualified.

Every young man, even the most skeptical and disenchanted, is aware, at least unconsciously, of having acquired an added value, potentially useful in all work environments and human relations, at the end of his military service. Moreover, recruits, upon being discharged from the army, may feel proud of having played a socially useful role.



An instructor teaching a conscript the right firing position during a blank training exercise.

A national community which can rely on a large number of militarily experienced citizens will be advantaged in establishing good human relations.

These seemingly demagogical statements, familiar to military professionals with a long track record of command, should not be overlooked by skilful politicians, aware of the social events of their time. During her premiership, Mrs. Thatcher once stated at the House of Commons that, after the abolition of conscription, the rate of juvenile crimes had risen by some percentage points in Great Britain.

A GLANCE BACKWARDS

To have a clear perception of the extra-military repercussions of conscription, it is necessary to cast a backward glance at the events which took place in Europe in the last two centuries and their connections to our national history.

Most historians agree that mass conscription originated from the French Revolution, while the principle of compulsory call-up belongs to an even older age, the Roman Republican period. The so-called *conjuratio* was then in force, according to which Roman

people would "report to the Consul's call-up, when their country was at risk".

Mass conscription is an offspring of modern Europe, the cradle of a bourgeois society, supporting the concept of "Nation", which inspired the states formed in the XIX century. These states were often made up of backward and non homogeneous national entities, typical of the Middle Ages.

Mass conscription thus superseded all fragmentary and diverse enrollment systems used by medieval local, mercenary and corporative militia, characterized by special privileges, prerogatives and ancient traditions. The only heir to this set of rules, though revised and highly modernized, is the Swiss *militia army* model.

Mass conscription, strongly supported by French revolutionary environments, after being used to man large Napoleonic armies, became particularly well-accepted by the Prussian military, willing to shift from the old "Junker" army of feudal origin to a new military instrument, tailored to support Bismark's power policy. Thus the concept of *armed nation* was born, based on mass conscription, which was believed to play a pedagogic and support function towards society at large. This model prevailed over the Jacobin

one, mainly inspired by revolutionary passion, its strong and weak point at the same time.

A military force based on a militia army could rely on a high degree of **social consensus**, while that of an armed nation was not so popular; in fact, draft dodging and desertion rates reached very high peaks in the armies of that time.

Conscription was sometimes seen as a social nuisance and even raised some doubts about its legitimacy. Suffice it to say that in 1789, during the French Revolutionary Assembly, conscription was accused of prejudicing the rights of the individual and interfering with the inviolable sphere of his personality. These allegations were soon dropped, when people were called upon to save the Revolution and their homeland.

The armed nation model of Prussian origin was not an isolated case, on the contrary it was adopted by all countries in Continental Europe, the young Kingdom of Italy included. Great Britain too was obliged to follow suit, during the two World Wars. The armed nation model adopted by the Kingdom of Italy was initially based on the recruitment law of the Sardinian Army, passed by Minister Lamarmora in 1854, to meet the strategic requirements of that period.

After Italy's unification, Giuseppe Garibaldi and Carlo Pisacane, following the guidelines of the Democratic Left, supported a change in the law then in force, with the aim of replacing a standing army with a militia army. However, that effort was unsuccessful owing to the heavy defeat of Garibaldi's militia at Mentana. As a consequence of that military debacle, the Italian Army's General Staff decided to change its recruitment system, without

Italian soldiers of INTERFET in an East Timor village.

abolishing the standing army, but cutting its running costs in peacetime.

This way, Italy's military policy seemed to adapt to the Prussian model, while in fact it was based on a "**large framework**" **army model**, also chosen by other minor European powers, ambitious enough to aspire to a Prussian-type army, but too poor and undeveloped to be able to build it up.

Actually a standing army was set up, based on highly selective and socially discriminating conscription, with very long service periods. In line with the armed nation model, a **generalized pre-military education** was introduced into schools. It was centered on gymnastic activities and aimed at preserving the health of future generations. The National Association of Marksmanship was set up for the same purpose and spread all over the territory of the Kingdom. Other European nations too promoted similar initiatives, irrespective of their democracy levels.

The 1875 law on conscription laid down more equitable rules on the subject, by establishing that **serving one's country was both a general and individual duty**; thus the old draft system allowing for discriminations and inequalities was superseded. That law also **abolished the subrogation principle** and envisaged the possibility of **family leaves** for the first time. Those fit for military service were randomly assigned to a **first category** (effective strength) and a **second category**, where troops underwent basic training only and were put in the ready reserve, as a force liable for active duty. The service lasted three years in the first category (4-5 years in the Cavalry), but the Minister of that time had the faculty of ordering 1/5 of recruited personnel to be relieved from active duty ahead of time for budgetary reasons.



In the same year 1875 a **third category** was established, comprising those exempted for family reasons, who were not obliged to serve in the army in peacetime, but could be mobilized in wartime. The 1882 and 1888 laws provided for further early discharge and exemption cases, while the 1910 Spingardi law reduced the length of service to 18 months.

Draft dodging rates initially were at 11%, then lowered to 7% - 3% in the following years, mainly owing to mass migrations and to the different administrative laws governing the conscription of expatriates. However, as much as 304,000 migrants returned home from abroad on the eve of World War One to enroll in the armed forces and another 300,000 Italian-Americans joined the US army as voluntary personnel. On the whole, there were few trials for draft dodging (some thousand cases). Conscription was based on national, rather than regional, criteria, owing to technical requirements (employment of infrastructure), strategic needs (coverage of the territory) and socio-political reasons (fostering national cohesion). Only Alpine troops **were exceptionally recruited on a regional basis**, requiring qualified men, both

psychically, physically and vocationally. In essence, the Army's main role became that of defending the homeland. The militarization system of Prussian origin was inspired by dedication to duty, discipline and love for one's country. Thus the Army widened its national and democratic footing, drawing its forces from all social strata, being inspired by an egalitarian principle according to which doing the military service was a personal duty of all citizens. Moreover the Army took up the role of "**great school of the nation**", as the majority of the youth passed through its ranks and received both a military and civil education, including physical training as well.

At the end of the 1800 century the most extremist wing of the Socialist Left had strong anti-military feelings and rejected the military service on ideological grounds, advocating a reduction in national military strength through "transarmament" measures, in view of an ideal world-wide disarmament.

During the first World War the rules governing conscription were continually modified, to fully man an army of about 3 million men; following the last change, the young belonging to

the '99 birth-year group were called up and their contribution was pivotal in achieving victory.

In the period between the two World Wars, training courses for **non regular officers** were increased, to fill the staff positions necessary to bring units at their full strength, and to also meet particular technical and logistic requirements (medical officers, veterinarians and pharmacists, technical officers etc). The introduction of a non regular officer career allowed for making a selection among the exceeding numbers of draftees, promoting academic education and providing the ready reserve with its mobilization staff. These requirements were typical of a large-framework army, which had to rely on mass mobilization.

Draftees were recallable until they were 55 up to 1946; later on, until they were 45, as is the case even today.

In the first years following the Second World War, when the sad memories of the military defeat and the tragic events which took place after the armistice were still alive, the Army General Staff strenuously supported conscription, as the only effective recruitment source capable of meeting personnel requirements. The same view was shared by the Constituent Assembly as well. The

Army General Staff also decided to supplement the conscript force with a large number of **long-term enlisted specialists**, but that plan immediately failed, given the very unfavorable economic and regulatory terms of recruitment established for them. In fact, those provisions were unacceptable, especially in a period of strong economic recovery where employment and salary rates were on the rise, particularly in the north of Italy.

The Army tried to make up for a lack of specialized personnel by adopting some "makeshift solutions", i.e. employing the most proficient recruits, who could specialize at military schools or operational units in limited times, together with already skilled personnel. As said before, these were "makeshift solutions" which entailed some risks and did not allow the army to reach the specialization level required for it to become a modern and efficient organization.

All attempts to raise the salaries of volunteers were obstructed by some political parties, conceptually hostile to the Army's enrollment of volunteer troops, ready to criticize both conscription and the armed forces in general, and to cut the Defense budget. Those parties completely disregarded the

generosity and self-sacrifice shown by officers and other ranks during major natural disasters (landslide in Vajont, flooding in Polesine, earthquakes in Friuli and Campania, etc.).

For more than forty years conscription was the subject of a demagogic denigration and disinformation campaign, aimed at leading the youth to think that doing the military service was a useless and needless waste of time, and dodging it was no longer disgraceful.

The insidious repercussions of that defamatory campaign, coupled with a culture where mothers have always had more power than anywhere else, were unfortunately widely felt by Parliament. In fact, it passed a set of laws which negatively affected the qualitative level of draftees and created great disparities between enlisted men and conscientious objectors, naturally to the detriment of the former. Those laws envisaged further causes for deferment of and exemption from military service, reduced the conscription period, stated the possibility of becoming conscientious objectors without establishing stringent rules and enabled auxiliary personnel to enroll in the Police and Fire Department Forces.

As a consequence of those new rules and of the declining birth rate affecting birth-year groups, the army had to rely on fewer but very motivated conscripts, comprising small groups which rejected the idea of conscientious objection, as detrimental to the possibility of finding a job in the future.

PAST MERITS

Conscription has been provisionally "frozen", owing to operational requirements mainly,



Italian soldier on training, armed with AR 70/90 Beretta rifle.



Bersaglieri engaged in combat training in a built-up area.

but perhaps its past and recent merits have not been carefully analyzed yet.

Besides the consensus gained, conscription was considered for about 140 years as a **powerful tool of liberation, national unification and socialization among the young.**

It could still play a vital role in preserving the most sacred values of our nation, now considered as obsolete by some sectors of the public and purposely ignored by many associations inspired by noble but somewhat confused ideals.

Even today young recruits, sharing the duty to serve their country, make useful experiences away from the media attention, establish true friendship ties and cherish genuine solidarity feelings.

Some years after the Kingdom of Italy was established, A. Della Rovere, the then Minister of the War Department, issued a decree to relieve from active duty *"those Neapolitan soldiers who were obliged to drill in 1857"*. Corps Officers were ordered to advise the discharges *"to behave on all occasions as all honest citizens and honored soldiers should do...not to get married before being duly authorized...and to*

keep all items of clothing tidy". Those seemingly obsolete guidelines, issued at a time when social conditions were extremely backward, especially in Italy's southern provinces, are in fact strong evidence of the educational effort made by the Army right from the beginning.

In 1863 the then Minister of the War Department organized a smallpox vaccination campaign for all in-barracks conscripts and civilians. It was the **first mass vaccination** ever held after the unification of the nation, to prevent a lethal epidemic very common at that time.

The Army tried to extend its educational effort over several aspects of social life, to such an extent that it tried to urge recruits to save their money, a habit not very popular at the time. In fact, a circular letter dated 1883 and signed by Minister Ferrero, advised conscripts to spare the sums credited to their post-office savings books, in order to gain bank interest and "promote a positive image of the Army in the countryside", once returned to their home towns. The initiatives taken by the Army to educate generations of conscripts both morally, culturally and physically are described by

century-old collections of the "Giornale Militare".

While the physical benefits deriving from past pre-military and military training were apparent, not so outstanding was the armed forces' huge **contribution to fight illiteracy in society** (in the 50's 27% of the population was still illiterate or semi-illiterate). Up to the end of the 60's groups of young teachers would flock to the barracks every afternoon to teach their grown-up pupils. These girls were very committed and worked around the clock to fill the cultural gaps of their students. Their efforts were rewarded by the joy of presenting each of their pupils, upon being discharged, with a tardy but well-deserved primary school certificate. In the following years, there was a decrease in the numbers of those without a primary school certificate, but the military still carried on their task, which then aimed at getting all soldiers to obtain a junior high school certificate. No detailed investigations have been carried out to date, to verify how many conscripts, upon being discharged, have exploited their military experience to find a job. Such an investigation would yield astonishing results. A case in point is that of many former drivers of armoured vehicles or artillery caterpillars who changed their military driving license into a civilian one and were immediately employed by public transport companies or private enterprises looking for lorry drivers. Likewise, many of those who served as operators of earth-moving machines or motor craft in the Engineer Corps were recruited by large building companies; railway engineers, instead, were immediately hired by national railways. Another example of this kind is the category of pilots and

captains working for several airlines or similar concerns, who were specially trained and obtained a precious pilot license when serving as non regular pilot officers in Army, Navy and Air Force's units.

Lastly, everybody, even those non specialized in this sector, recognize that conscription had positive repercussions on public health as well. In fact, a huge amount of data was collected from clinical tests and the medical-legal investigations connected to the enrollment of birth-year groups. These data have been stored by hospitals and Military Districts and may be statistically exploited to obtain information useful for medical research, in the field of prevention mainly.

A GLANCE FORWARDS

Every major innovation process can have a positive outcome, if based on accurate forecasts and handled according to sound managerial principles along its transitional phase. If the forecasting activity is inaccurate, the whole process may incur a stalemate, a delay or a complete failure.

The transition of our military system to a completely professional organization, characterized by a progressive scaling down of conscription, is threatened by the risk of recruiting an insufficient number of volunteer troops. This risk is ascribable both to the adoption of inadequate legislative measures and to some side-repercussions which might completely neutralize their effects.

As said before, Parliament has courageously tackled the military issue, but perhaps has not taken very effective steps to manage the transitional period. In essence, the initiatives to boost recruitment numbers seem unfocused, as some provisions governing that subject seem to foster hopes rather than certainties. As is the case in the



Italian soldiers undergoing amphibious training.

UK, only one thing must be guaranteed: **a job at the end of the military service**, either in the public or private sector. It is well-known that often, in the public sector, job opportunities are granted not based on efficiency criteria but rather on the willingness to preserve one's sphere of power or sectorial interests. In the private sector, on the contrary, an employer, if not hindered in his choice, is more likely to privilege a young applicant with a wide track record of knowledge and experience. **Article 5 of the new regulations** is especially praiseworthy, providing for the establishment of a structure similar to the "resettlement department" in the UK, tasked to carry out information, promotion and coordination activities, in order to assess recruitment trends and help honorably discharged volunteers find a job. There is the risk, however, that interpretative subtleties and procedural red tape may prevent this rule from being

implemented in the short term, thus hindering the possibility of setting up a de-bureaucratized and highly computerized structure, staffed with experienced personnel, both military and civilian. The main detrimental side-effect which may negatively affect volunteer recruitment is the performance of a voluntary civil service, on a payment basis. This way, soldiers, instead of carrying out a state specific function, like national defense, are employed as a free workforce by dubious charitable institutions, with strong ideological or religious connotations, not performing any institutional tasks.

Whenever the government is incapable of tackling exceptional relief requirements, owing to possible structural inadequacies, it can allot some ad-hoc funds to hire really qualified personnel. In so doing, it will spare a large



Italian and French soldiers on a joint firing exercise.

amount of resources and reduce the number of the unemployed.

There is a robust Civil Protection and Fire Department organization, tasked to carry out civil relief tasks



at national level, and supported by other state agencies, the armed forces included.

In the framework of this reorganization process, **disbanding all draft bodies** should be carefully taken into account. In fact, some of them may still play a useful social role, particularly medical test structures, such as:

- draft offices at Military Districts (connected to national municipalities)
- draft boards (selecting those fit for military service)
- medical boards cooperating with selection groups (assessing personnel physical fitness level).

These bodies, duly modified and functionally subordinated to different organizations (even the Health Department), may turn useful if conscription is reinstated and may still be employed to gather critical data, necessary to

Bersagliere on guard duty at the Naples Attorney General's office during operation "Partenope".

monitor public health. This way, **the health of eighteen-year-old boys and girls will be thoroughly screened**, as is already the case in France with the "*rendez vous des citoyens*".

As regards the economic aspect of this major overhaul process, without going into financial details, it stands to reason that the items of expenditure relating to professional troops have positive repercussions on other sectors equally financed by the state budget. For instance, there has been a cut in the funds allocated to boost youth employment opportunities. Military expenses covering personnel dual civil-military training are equally effective, as recruits, upon being discharged, can more easily find a job. This is also true for other dual-use items of expenditure (medical, scientific research sectors, etc).

In sum, the focus on conscription indicates that the military, though unwillingly, had to rule out this system, which was its major manning source for over 140 years, both in peace and war. But a certain discomfort is felt by the national public as well, witnessing the disbandment of an institution still alive in the heart of the nation and loved, with its pros and cons, by all those who have been honorably discharged after serving their country.

The Army has put aside all emotional feelings and is looking to the future with a balanced attitude, taking into account all possible risks. Moreover, the Army is confident that it will always be supported by new legislative regulations, if necessary, and that patriotic feelings may slowly but progressively come back.

Elderly soldiers may have some doubts and regrets, but must not fear that the Army will put aside its old military values to follow this new professionalization trend.

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
** Lieutenant General (ret.)*

TRAINING AND SIMULATION



The Italian Army is experimenting a new training method based on simulation techniques.

It is a virtual activity which reproduces actual operational scenarios and has remarkable advantages for it saves human resources and materials, has no impact on the environment and reduces the risk of accidents.




by Ghino Andreani *

One of the challenges the Italian Army will have to face in the new millennium, in order to make a resolute step forward in the quality of training, is the simulation project.





All Western Armies, both NATO and European, have invested, and are still investing, remarkable resources in this sector, with a view to improving the training of their personnel and attaining furthermore notable advantages such as: lower impact on the environment, savings as regards ammunition, fuel, movements of personnel and general reduction of risks.

In short, simulation training permits to train the units (Staffs and formations) in an actual setting, both live and virtual, coinciding with the reality on the field, and to evaluate the actions performed in terms of operational validation of a Unit. Clearly this type of validation is very useful for the units destined to out-of-area missions in NATO, UN or European operations, with operational scenarios reproducing the exact operational situation of the moment.

In this sector, in 1998 the Italian Army conducted a study



OPERATIONS CENTRE




of feasibility which in May 1999 resulted in a global project to be completed within five or six years.

The project, entrusted to a Lieutenant General with a limited Staff, had an initial budget of approximately 110 billion Lire and consists essentially in constituting training Centres for Command Posts and combat training Centres for Units. The **former**, designed for training Staffs of intermediate Commands, Brigades and Regiments are now being prepared at the War College and the Infantry School. The system, produced by CAE, a German company based in Stolberg, has already been acquired at Regiment level, and will be delivered soon to Intermediate Commands and Brigades. The **latter**, designed for unit training,

are being realized at the Capo Teulada range (heavy function),

Monteromano (medium/light function) and Torre Veneri /



Cavalry School (for personnel training).

Considering the size of the abovementioned ranges and the operational requirements of the Service, the units to be trained are reinforced minor complexes (artillery, engineers, helicopters etc.)

Furthermore, a standing company-size "opposition force" (OPFOR), which will follow the techniques and procedures of the hypothetical enemy, will be stationed at the Capo Teulada and Monteromano ranges. The system is based on a BT46 laser duel-simulator, produced by the Swedish company SAAB, and on a management centre. Both systems will have to be interfaced with the Army's Command and Control system (SIACCON) produced by Marconi. These interconnections will allow the

VILLAGE FOR BLANK TRAINING



simultaneous training of a whole Regiment, with its Command


Post deployed on the field at Cesano, two companies on live

COMMUNICATION AND TRANSMISSION OF DATA

**POSITION
DATA**

**PLAYERS'
SITUATION**

**EFFECT
OF
FIRE ACTIONS**






training - one at Capo Teulada and one at Monteromano - and two companies on virtual training at Cesano.

Finally, the project envisages the establishment of an infrastructure for combat in built-up areas at the Capo Teulada range. The installation will be divided into a urban sector for training with individual and unit weapons, and a village, in a different area, with 70 buildings, 3/4 of which in European style and the rest in Mideastern style, for dual-simulation training with individual weapons, tanks, helicopters, mortars, artillery etc. There will be also a sector for the generic and specialistic training with explosives and NBC materials, with particular attention to the chemical side. The Body appointed to supply the logistic support will be the Heavy-Maintenance Pole (South) in Nola.

The project is adequate to the available resources and to the

operational requirements of the Service and will permit to train and validate, each year, all Command Posts of the

Intermediate Commands, Brigades and Regiments and one company for each Branch Regiment. The national authority for validation




will be the Commandant of the War College.

In conclusion, the present situation of the project, after the first year of activity,* is the following:

- conclusion of the infrastructural planning (operations rooms, range centrals, range organization etc.); beginning of work in 2001;
- acquisition of CAE and SAAB systems;
- first experimental exercise at Regiment level (Infantry School, Cesano, September 4 -

URNS



STRATEGIC SIMULATION	TACTICAL SIMULATION		
JTLS	Level	Environment	Allocation of systems
	1 st	LIVE & VIRTUAL	Regiments Branch Schools VIVARO TORRE VENERI
	2 nd	LIVE	CAPO TEULADA MONTEROMANO TORRE VENERI
	3 rd	CONSTRUCTIVE	War College Infantry School

October 5, 2000) with the employment of the 187th "Folgore" Paratroop Regiment;

- qualification, during 2000, of about 100 officers at the simulation schools of foreign armies. These officers will be analysts of information systems for the management of the simulation centres, as well as observers and controllers who will be the judges on the field, and will also constitute the Brigade teams entrusted with the initial and elementary training (BT46 duel simulators).

The project is ambitious, but adequate to the Army's requirements and the resources available. In 2001 the activity will continue without interruption, and will reach its conclusion with the first Brigade-level exercise, carried out by the "Centauro" Brigade at the War College in Civitavecchia.

The project places us on a level with the most advanced Armies, and will be an excellent "letter of introduction", both within the alliances and within the framework of the activities under way for the creation of a European military instrument.

* Lieutenant General,
Project Manager


AVAILABILITY OF TRAINING AREAS

CAPO TEULADA
8 months in a year



MONTEROMANO
9 months in a year





THE SINGLE FUEL CONCEPT

by Fabio Grandi *

Reference is made to the NATO document whose object is the attainment of interoperability through the employment of a single fuel in the battlefield for both air and ground operations.

The Single Fuel Concept (S.F.C.) is based on the need of streamlining the logistic structure of modern military forces whose land and air components are increasingly operating at joint level.

In 1988, all NATO Countries agreed upon the content of the S.F.C. document drawn up by the NATO Pipeline Committee having the following long-term goal *"attaining interoperability of assets through the employment of a single fuel in the battlefield for both air and ground operations, with specifications similar to civil fuels in use with NATO European Countries and with chemical-physical characteristics allowing for fielding, storing, transporting and delivering said fuel through the NATO pipeline network"*.

The need for this streamlining process has always been deeply felt in the military both at operational and logistic level: suffice it to mention the standardization of small arms calibers.

In the past, many solutions were found to this problem with alternating results. During the Second World War, the Germans did not develop a multipurpose fuel but designed and produced a multiple-fuel engine (for "Tiger" tanks), thus solving the problem of a great variety of fuels by adapting

to the fuels available in the field.

The employment of aircraft has had a strong impact on present choices, due to the specific requirements of turbine engines; therefore, kerosene fuel (aviation fuel) -NATO F-34 and NATO F-35- has been chosen as the only reference fuel to attain fuel standardization.

Given the importance of this issue, many NATO Countries have started testing the effectiveness of ground vehicles in service with their respective Armed Forces and using the above mentioned aviation fuels.

Italy has been carrying out tests on S.F.C. for almost a decade. These tests have been managed and performed by CETEM (The Italian Army Motorization Technical Center) both at the CETEM Headquarters at Montelibretti and at different operational units, namely at the "Morbegno" Battalion of the 4th Alpine Corps and at different engineer units equipped with special vehicles particularly relevant for the testing activity (Tab.1).

The great variety of additives (anti-ice, antistatic, anticorrosive) which are usually added to aviation fuels for security reasons has made the testing activity more difficult.

The impact of such additives on the performance of diesel engines

had to be evaluated and a decision was made to use the JP-8 (NATO F-35) as the standard aviation fuel thanks to the large availability of this product.

Once the reference fuel had been chosen, compatibility tests on diesel engines were initially focussed on the parts mainly affected by the employment of a different fuel, having a viscosity coefficient lower than that of gasoline. In particular, the performance tests were carried out on those parts exploiting the viscosity of diesel fuel for-self lubrication, like rotary injection pumps.

Initially bench tests were carried out at CETEM on two identical injection pumps employing aviation diesel and kerosene fuels respectively over a 12 h 900 rpm cycle and 12 h 1,700 rpm cycle, repeated 42 times for an aggregate number of 1,008 hours. The wear level of the kerosene powered engine was slightly higher than the that of other, but not detrimental to the prosecution of tests. Once the initial test had been concluded, most burdensome trials were carried out on a batch of 6 pumps working for a 1,000 h operation cycle at 80% of their maximum speed, each using a different fuel. At the end of these tests, pump wear levels were assessed by measuring and comparing the mass loss of each component (Fig.1). Also in this case, the use of kerosene fuel did not create major damage to the pumps (cracking, seizing, etc) but produced a slightly higher wear level only and a limited decrease in performance standards.

The following step was that of bench-testing a 8062.24 FIAT engine (used on ACM/80 vehicles) propelled by F-34 and F-35 fuels, according to the NATO AEP-5 cycle, during an operation cycle of about 400 h (working load distribution in Fig.2). Various parameters, i.e. power, torque, specific fuel consumption and grade of smoke were measured at maximum and minimum rpm speeds.



Tab. 1

Performance of some diesel and kerosene-powered vehicles in service within the Italian Army

Vehicle	Dimension	Diesel powered	Kerosene powered	Difference %
M/180 ISOLI	Power	240Kw	228Kw	-5
Truck crane	Torque	1150 Nm	1058 Nm	-8
25000 MATTEI	Power	63 Kw	56 Kw	-11
Engine compressor	Torque	438 Nm	395 Nm	-9
BM/20 - MT	Power	175 Kw	167 Kw	-4
Astra Truck	Torque	1869Nm	1835 Nm	-3
FR/130	Power	108Kw	102 Kw	-5
Front Loader	Torque	627 Nm	578 Nm	-7
FL-14C	Power	70 Kw	66 Kw	-5
Tracked excavator	Torque	516 Nm	461 Nm	-10

The lack of significant engine wear was demonstrated by the substantial stability of the power delivered and the torque generated, together with a very limited rise in specific consumption levels and a constantly low grade of smoke.

The test excellent results were confirmed by the visual examination and the dimensional control of all engine parts, disassembled at the end of the test cycle. That positive outcome was also confirmed by comparing the above mentioned parameters with those yielded by an identical F-54 gasoline powered engine resulting in a slight power and torque decrease, amounting to 7% and 6% respectively, due to the employment of kerosene. A 20%

smoke decrease was registered, allowing for an enhanced visibility.

Along with the above mentioned technical tests, a wide program of practical trials was carried out at the "Morbegno" Alpine Battalion based in Vipiteno.

These trials were split up into three subsequent phases with the employment of about one hundred ACM/80, ACL/75 and VM/90 vehicles together with Ducato, Mini-bus, BM/210 and M/120 Astra assets in service with the unit.

In the first phase, carried out in winter only, vehicle tolerance to the new fuel was initially tested, thanks to the employment of F-65 fuel (50% kerosene 50% gasoline).

In the second phase, F-34 kerosene was used for one year and in the third phase for two

more years, until 100,000 kilometers were covered.

At the end of this phase, two ACM/80 (8062.24 Fiat engine) and two ACL/75 (8062.02 Fiat engine) were delivered to CETEM to test their wear and performance levels.

The tests carried out have shown that the injection pumps had excellent performance levels, while acceleration capabilities were slightly degraded and the effort at the hook was almost identical. Grade of smoke values were excellent also in this case. Lastly the visual examination of engine parts did not detect relevant defects of fatigue wear.

Therefore the outcome of this last phase proved to be positive, as no major defects were detected, negatively affecting unit operational capabilities.

In fact, drivers, though employing their usual driving techniques, did not identify a decrease in performance levels.

The only remarkable drawbacks were some cases of contamination of the injection pump oil on the ACL/75 due to fuel leakage, and a possible vapor-lock phenomenon on the VM/90, detected on two vehicles only, under high temperature and engine stress conditions.

It can therefore be stated that the F-34 fuel can be used in place of the F-54 on all the above mentioned vehicles in service with the Battalion.

To widen the scope of the survey, similar test were carried out on several special vehicles used by Engineer units.

As test data had to be recorded in situ, it was impossible to measure all relevant parameters, the necessary instrumentation being untransportable. Only power and torque curves were evaluated and the satisfying results obtained are shown in Table 1.



ACP 80 earth-moving heavy truck in Bosnia.

In conclusion, all tests carried out proved that the employment of kerosene is desirable, also given that drivers found almost no differences in using the various fuels.

However, some advantages and drawbacks were detected when the tests were carried out, due to the different characteristics of the two fuels, as shown in Tables 2, 3 and 4.

The value of kerosene flow temperature is very low, thus solving all starting and operating problems, registered when using gasoline under low temperature conditions.

The kerosene fuel combustion reduces deposit and corrosion levels in the engine parts involved in the combustion.

Kerosene fuel does not totally emulsify with water; therefore, its microbiologic pollution is remarkably reduced, calling for lower maintenance interventions on engine parts, with a reduced filter consumption.

Kerosene has a higher stability level, which reduces the possible production of rubber or similar products and also the need for tank and filter maintenance.

The use of kerosene results in lower smoke emission levels. The possibility of being detected is also reduced and this translates into an advantage not to be neglected in the military sector. But there is another major advantage as regards the civil sector that is the lower environmental pollution, once the problem of kerosene desulphurization has been solved.

However, the most important advantage for the military is the very reason at the basis of the survey: streamlining the logistic support by eliminating the great variety of fuels. The outcome of this streamlining process is positive, in that it reduces the possibility of fuel generated pollution due to mistakes in

handling it; allows for a greater storage capability in depots, as it is no longer necessary to use different tanks for all stored fuels; makes the delivery of supplies easier, reducing the number of personnel to be assigned to storage related operations; maximizes the use of pipelines thanks to the abolition of downtimes in changing fuel and to the reduced need for maintenance activities.

The positive repercussions of streamlining the logistic chain are particularly felt in the military for its positive impact on the operational capabilities of units in the field, but they are also deeply appreciated within

the civil sector, as a better use of depots, tanks and pipelines would result in lower costs and eventually in reduced product prices.

The major drawback is a slight and therefore fully acceptable reduction in performance levels. However, once gasoline fuel has been totally eliminated, the problem of reduced performance could be solved enhancing injection systems by appropriately increasing the fuel flow through an ad-hoc calibration.

However, the need for using gasoline in certain areas of operations is not to be ruled out as, today it is impossible to decide on possible areas of

Fig. 1

Endurance test results (1,000 h) on BOSCH VE 4/9 F2200 R 24 rotary pumps





Fig. 2

Percent workload distribution during a working cycle NATO AEP-5

(Speed % - Load %)



Tab. 2

Comparison between Diesel and Kerosene fuels' major properties

Property	Units of measurement	Diesel	Kerosene
Relative density	Kg/m ³	820'860	755'830
Distillation (Final point)	°C	370	288
Flash point	°C	56(minimum)	38 (minimum)
Flowing point	°C	-18 (minimum)	lower than -50
Kinematic viscosity At 40°	Mm ² /s	2.0'4.5	1.2
Kinematic viscosity At -20 °	Mm ² /s	undetectable	8(maximum)
Cetane number		45 minimum	37 minimum (42 medium)
Medium Calorific Value	MJ/l	36	34.3



VCC-1 "Camillino" Armored vehicles being refueled during their mission in Bosnia.

Tab. 3

Comparison between values obtained using diesel fuel and kerosene

Engine revolution	1200	1400	1800	2000	2200	2600	3000	3200	3400
Power (Kw) Gasoline	44,8	55,2	76,7	84,8	94,6	106,9	116,6	117,7	75,5
Power (Kw) Kerosene	43	53	72	81	89	102	107	110	52
Torque (Nm) Gasoline	351	375	404	410	409,1	390,5	372,7	347,9	215,1
Spec.Cons.(g/Kw) Gasoline	342	363	382	390	386	375	344	328	145
Spec.Cons.(g/Kw) Kerosene	233	208	209	210	214	216	243	255	339
Opacity (°Bosch) Gasoline	3,6	2,9	2,4	1,9	1,7	1,8	2	2,5	2,7
Opacity (°Bosch) Kerosene	2,7	2,2	1,9	1,3	1,3	1,2	2	2,6	2,5

Tab. 4

Numbers of carbon atoms of each fuel's hydrocarbons

C ₄	C ₆	C ₈	C ₁₀	C ₁₂	C ₁₅	C ₁₈	C ₂₀
PETROL							
DIESEL FUEL							
KEROSENE							

intervention based on the Armed Forces employment doctrine presently in force. A feasible solution is to adopt injection systems equipped with automatic adjustment devices, based on the fuel employed.



Another drawback is the higher wear level of the mobile components of rotary injection pumps, but it can be easily overcome by only employing line pumps or, if more cost-effective, pumps made up of materials whose physico-chemical characteristics enable them to work under the most difficult conditions.

In conclusion, making the Italian Army logistic chain shift from gasoline to kerosene fuel seems to be not only possible but also desirable, based on the experience drawn from practical trials, from the results obtained at CETEM and from the lessons learned during the Gulf War and the intervention in Somalia.

□

* Captain,
4th Regiment "Altair"

SUMMARY SOMMAIRE INHALT RESUMEN



Efficacité et crédibilité. Entrevue au Général Mario Arpino, Chef d'État Majeur de la Défense, par Giovanni Cerbo (p. 2).

La réforme des Forces Armées dans un sens professionnel, ratifiée par le Parlement en Octobre 2000, permet de construire des Forces Armées modernes, capables d'accomplir les missions qu'ils doivent remplir. Pour cette raison, on a eu un tournant qui a fait époque et que s'insère dans le plus gros projet de renforcer le pilier européen de l'Alliance Atlantique pour concrétiser l'idée de l'Europe de la sûreté commune. Dans ce panorama on s'insère la proposition italienne de constituer un deuxième ARRC à "framework" national. Dans cette entrevue, le Chef d'État Majeur de la Défense donne aussi de détaillées réponses à la perspective de constituer un service civile que devrait substituer celui militaire. Après de ça il souligne, à raison, les tragiques vicissitudes de la guerre de libération et le rôle central que le monde militaire, avec son patrimoine de valeurs, peut jouer pour le développement sociale, culturelle et démocratique de la Nation.

L'idée stratégique dans un monde qui est en train de changer, par Umberto Cappuzzo (p. 12).

La morale des buts et la compatibilité des moyens employés pour les atteints constituent un problème qui devient plus difficile à cause de la crise de l'idée stratégique. Aujourd'hui on manque surtout une moderne conception politique et une doctrine stratégique mise à jour capables d'indiquer des sûres options dans la gestion des crises. L'intervention en Kossove représente, soit un échec politique de l'Europe soit une confirmation des limites des armes où la diplomatie manque.

Un nouveau rôle pour les Nations Unies,

par Giulio Fraticelli (p. 28).

L'Auteur examine les hauts et les bas des missions des Casques Bleus avec une vision étendue à la perspective de donner à l'Organisation des Nations Unies des pouvoirs et des instruments effectives, grâce auxquels il est possible d'améliorer sa capacité d'intervention dans toutes les zones instables de notre planète. Ce travail analyse, après de ça, de significatives réflexions sur l'important rôle, d'un point de vue politique et militaire, que l'Italie pourra jouer à l'intérieur des Nations Unies pour la sauvegarde de la paix dans le monde entier.

L'Europe de la Défense, par Maurizio Coccia (p. 36).

Entre l'Europe et les États Unis il y a des divergences mais aussi de bonnes motivations pour l'amélioration des relations dans les domaines du développement et de la sûreté. L'Union Européenne, dans son projet de constitution d'une défense commune, doit réaliser - en termes politiques, économiques et technologiques - un meilleur et plus équilibré rapport euro-atlantique-américain: aucun composant, s'il est seul, a une adéquate crédibilité de résoudre les grands problèmes de la pacification du monde entier.

Network-Centric Warfare, par Giovanni Caravelli (p. 52).

Les projet "Network-Centric Warfare" (NCW) et Future Combat System (FCS), qu'on est en train d'étudier et de développer dans les Forces Armées américaines, constituent un nouveau système pour la prévention et pour la gestion des crises, fondé sur les très grandes potentialités des technologies de l'information. Le NCW est un système intégré de rassemble, élaboration et valuation des données pour la construction de possibles panoramas de crise et de conflits que permet d'individuer les actions qu'on peut entreprendre à niveau politique-stratégique pour la sûreté nationale et internationale. Le FCS, en empruntent du NCW toutes les informations nécessaires, configure une vaste gamme

d'activités et d'opérations sur le théâtre de crise.

Le soldat italien dans les missions de paix. Entrevue à l'Ambassadeur Staffan De Mistura,

par Danilo Moriero (p. 66).

Le rôle des Forces Armées italiennes dans les opérations de soutien à la paix constitue le noyau centrale de cette entrevue. L'Ambassadeur souligne en particulier les caractéristiques propres du soldat italien que lui portent à joindre harmoniquement la professionnalité avec la prodigieuse disposition à la réussite pour les activités diplomatiques et sociales.

Eire. La nouvelle Armée de Terre. Entrevue au Lieutenant Général Colm E. Mangan,

par Enrico Magnani (p. 72).


Les Forces Armées irlandaises, composées de seuls volontaires, s'articulent en forces de défense permanentes (Armée de Terre, Marine, Aéronautique) et forces de réserve. Outre qu'aux tâches de défense du territoire, elles donnent le support aux forces de police et assurent la vigilance et le contrôle des zones de pêche. L'EIRE a adhéré au PIP et a tiré d'importantes expériences de l'active participation à presque quarante opérations de «peace keeping».

Inde et Pakistan. Le développement à l'ombre du nucléaire, par Roberto Nocella (p. 80).

Ce travail donne des satisfaisants éléments de clarté à propos des programmes nucléaires poursuivis par l'Inde et le Pakistan. La description des faits est enrichie de stimulants réflexions relatives à l'endémique conflit pour le Kashmir et à la syndrome d'encerclement de l'Inde qui se sent menacée de la puissance chinoise.

Amerique australe. En route vers l'unité, par Ornella Rota (p. 88).

Le MERCOSUR (Marché Commun du Cône Sud) est une récente initiative inspirée à la création d'une "Patrie sudaméricaine de larges frontières". Les Pays membres (Argentine, Brésil, Paraguay, Uruguay) et ceux qui sont associés (Bolivie, Chili) ont déjà tiré de cet Organisme communautaire des



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grandes bienfaits qu'intéressent l'occupation, l'instruction, l'économie et la sûreté.

Service militaire adieu!, par Luigi Semprini (p. 94).

Cet article s'est inspiré des commentaires de signe opposé enregistrés de plusieurs parties de l'opinion publique à propos de récentes normes approuvées par le Parlement au sujet de la professionnalisation des Forces Armées. En partant des vicissitudes vieilles et récentes à propos des services militaires obligatoire l'Auteur tire des indications sur les mérites qu'il a toujours eus et qu'il les sont dûs pour ce qui concerne l'éducation, la culture et l'amalgame parmi les jeunes de différente extraction sociale et géographique. La solution des Forces Armées complètement professionnelles est en train de susciter quelques sincères désappointements, mais quelquefois il est motivé aussi d'inavouables intérêts.

L'instruction et la simulation militaires,

par Ghino Andreani (p. 102).

L'Armée de Terre italienne a commencé, en 1999, un nouveau projet d'instruction militaire avec des simulations, qu'ira se terminer dans 5 ou 6 ans. Il est un projet ambitieux que permet d'examiner la validité opérationnelle des unités employées dans les missions "hors de zone" et que concerne en la construction de plusieurs centres d'instruction militaire pour sièges du Commandant et de plusieurs centres d'instruction au combat dans les centres habités.

The single fuel concept, par Fabio Grandi (p. 108).

Dans le cadre du processus de rationalisation de l'instrument militaire, il est particulièrement important l'assouplissement de la chaîne logistique garantie de la standardisation des matériaux et en particulier des carburants. L'expérimentation de plus de dix ans, faite par le Centre Technique de la Motorisation, a démontré la compatibilité des moteurs Diesel à l'emploi de combustible aéronautique.



Effizienz und Glaubwürdigkeit.

Interview mit General Mario Arpino, Generalstabschef der Verteidigung, geführt von Giovanni Cerbo (S. 2).

Die vom italienischen Parlament im Oktober 2000 beschlossene Umwandlung der Streitkräfte in eine Berufssarmee erlaubt es, moderne Streitkräfte zu schaffen, die in der Lage sind, die Missionen zu erfüllen, zu denen sie gerufen werden. Dies ist ein epochaler Wandel, der sich in das weitergehende Vorhaben einreicht, den europäischen Pfeiler der atlantischen Allianz zu stärken, um das Europa der gemeinsamen Sicherheit zu konkretisieren. Dies geht einher mit dem italienischen Vorschlag, einen zweiten ARRC auf nationaler Ebene aufzubauen.

In dem Interview macht der Generalstabschef der Verteidigung auch konkrete Vorschläge zu einem Zivildienst, der den Militärdienst ersetzen soll. Zu recht geht er auf die tragischen Ereignisse des Befreiungskrieges und auf die zentrale Rolle ein, die das Militär mit seinen Werten für die soziale, kulturelle und demokratische Entwicklung der Nation spielen kann.

Strategisches Denken in einer Welt im Wandel,

von Umberto Cappuzzo (S. 12).

Die Ethische Ausrichtung der Ziele und die Kompatibilität der zu ihrer Erreichung anzuwendenden Mittel stellen ein Problem dar, das durch die Krise des strategischen Denkens noch komplizierter geworden ist. Es fehlt heute an einem modernen politischen Konzept und an einer Strategielehre auf dem letzten Stand, die klare und sichere Handlungsoptionen in internationalen Krisensituationen zu geben in der Lage wäre. Der Eingriff im Kosovo

steht einerseits für das politische Versagen Europas, andererseits ist es eine Bestätigung der begrenzten Möglichkeiten bewaffneter Eingriffe, dort wo die Diplomatie versagt.

Eine neue Rolle für die UN, von Giulio Fraticelli (S. 28).

Das wechselhafte Schicksal der Blauhelmissionen wird vom Autor dahingehend untersucht, wie man den Vereinten Nationen effektiv Macht und Mittel geben kann, ihre Eingriffsfähigkeit in sämtlichen Krisenherden der Welt zu erweitern. Die Arbeit entwickelt desweiteren treffende Überlegungen zur wichtigen Rolle, die Italien - politisch und militärisch - innerhalb der UNO für den Schutz des Weltfriedens spielen kann.


Europa und Verteidigung, von Maurizio Coccia (S. 36).

Zwischen Europa und den USA gibt es Meinungsverschiedenheiten, aber auch gute Gründe für die Verbesserung der Beziehungen im Bereich der Entwicklung und der Sicherheit. Die EU muß bei ihrem Projekt der Schaffung gemeinsamer Verteidigungsstrukturen auf ein besseres und ausgeglicheneres euro-atlantisch-amerikanisches Verhältnis setzen: kein Teil des Bündnisses ist für sich glaubwürdig genug, um die großen Probleme der Friedensschaffung in der Welt zu lösen.

Network-Centric Warfare, von Giovanni Caravelli (S. 52).

Die Projekte Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) und Future Combat Systems (FCS), die derzeit von den amerikanischen Streitkräften ausgearbeitet und entwickelt werden, sind eine Neuerung zur Vorbeugung und zum Management von Krisen. Sie gründen auf dem enormen Potential der Informationstechnologie. Das NCW ist ein integriertes System der Sammlung, Aufarbeitung und Bewertung von Daten zur Ausarbeitung möglicher Krisen- und Konfliktszenarien, die es ermöglichen, frühzeitig zu erkennen, welche Aktionen auf politisch-strategischem Gebiet für die nationale und internationale Sicherheit einzuleiten sind. Das FCS,

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das vom NCW sämtliche Informationen erhält, bereitet ein breites Spektrum an Militäroperationen auf dem Krisenschauplatz vor.

Der italienische Soldat auf Friedensmission. Interview mit dem UN-Botschafter Staffan De Mistura, geführt von Danilo Moriero (S. 66). Die Rolle der italienischen Streitkräfte bei friedensunterstützenden Operationen ist der Kern des Interviews. De Mistura unterstreicht vor allem die besonderen Eigenschaften des italienischen Soldaten, die ihn dazu führen, in harmonischer Weise Professionalität mit einer erstaunlichen Versatilität für diplomatische und soziale Tätigkeiten zu verbinden.

Eire (Republik Irland). Die neuen Streitkräfte. Interview mit Generalleutnant Colm E. Mangan, geführt von Enrico Magnani (S. 72). Die nur aus Berufssoldaten bestehenden irischen Streitkräfte gliedern sich in ständige Verteidigungskräfte (Heer, Marine, Luftwaffe) und Reservekräfte. Abgesehen von den Aufgaben der Landesverteidigung unterstützen sie die Polizeikräfte und garantieren die Bewachung und Kontrolle der Fischereizonen. Die Republik Irland hat an Partnership for Peace teilgenommen und wichtige Erfahrungen durch aktive Mitarbeit an etwa vierzig Peacekeeping-Operationen gesammelt.

Indien und Pakistan. Die Entwicklung im Schatten der Atomwaffen, von Roberto Nocella (S. 80). Der Artikel beschreibt klar und ausführlich die Nuklearprogramme Indiens und Pakistans. Die Tatsachenbeschreibung wird ergänzt durch anregende Überlegungen, die den endemischen Konflikt um den Kaschmir betreffen sowie das Einkreisungssyndrom Indiens, das sich von China bedroht sieht.

Südamerika: auf dem Weg zur Einheit, von Ornella Rota (S. 88). Der MERCOSUR (Gemeinsamer Markt des südlichen Horns) ist eine

Initiative zur Schaffung eines «südamerikanischen Vaterlands der weiten Grenzen». Die Mitgliedsländer (Argentinien, Brasilien, Paraguay, Uruguay) und diejenigen, die beigeordnet sind (Bolivien und Chile) haben von dieser Gemeinschaft bereits deutlich profitiert, was Beschäftigung, Bildung, Wirtschaft und Sicherheit betrifft.

Wehrpflicht ade, von Luigi Semprini (S. 94). Der Aufsatz geht von den entgegengesetzten Kommentaren aus, die der jüngste Parlamentsbeschluß in der Öffentlichkeit ausgelöst hat, die Streitkräfte in Richtung eines Berufsheeres umzuwandeln. Aus weit zurückliegenden sowie jüngeren Erfahrungen mit der Wehrpflicht gehen Hinweise auf Vorzüge und Verdienste hervor, die diese Institution im Bereich von Bildung und Erziehung sowie in demjenigen des Zusammenbringens junger Leute unterschiedlicher sozialer und geographischer Herkunft zu verzeichnen hat. Die gewählte Lösung der vollständig aus Zeit- und Berufssoldaten bestehenden Streitkräfte erweckt manch ehrlich gemeinten Unmut, der allerdings manchmal auch aus nicht zugegebenen Interessen gespeist wird.

Ausbildung und Simulation, von Ghino Andreani (S. 102). Die italienischen Streitkräfte haben 1999 ein neues Ausbildungssystem mit Simulationsübungen in die Wege geleitet, das in fünf bis sechs Jahren seinen Abschluß finden wird. Es ist ein ehrgeiziges Vorhaben, das die operative Erprobung der "out-of area" einzusetzenden Einheiten ermöglicht und das in der Schaffung von Ausbildungszentren für Kommandostellen und für den Häuserkampf besteht.

Das "Single Fuel Concept", von Fabio Grandi (S. 108). Im Zuge der Rationalisierung der Streitkräfte wird es besonders wichtig, die Logistikkette zu verschlanken, was durch eine Standardisierung der Materialien, insbesondere der Kraftstoffe, erreicht wird. Eine über zehn Jahre andauernde Versuchsreihe,


vom Centro Tecnico di Motorizzazione der Streitkräfte, hat sogar die Kompatibilität von Dieselmotoren zur Verwendung von Flugbenzin beweisen können.



Eficiencia y credibilidad. Entrevista al General Mario Arpino, Jefe de Estado Mayor de la Defensa, de Giovanni Cerbo (p. 2).

La reforma de las Fuerzas Armadas en el sentido profesional de la palabra, hecha por el Parlamento en el Octubre del 2000, permite de construir unas Fuerzas Armadas modernas en grado de absolver las tareas para las que se formaron. Un cambio epocal que se pone en el más gran proyecto de reforzar la columna europea de la Alianza Atlantica para concretizar la seguridad común de Europa. Por eso se da importancia a la propuesta italiana de construir un segundo ARRC a "framework" nacional. En la entrevista, el Jefe de Estado Mayor de la Defensa da puntuales respuestas en relación con la perspectiva de instituir un servicio civil para sustituir el militar. Se para, pues, en las tragicas vicendas de la guerra de liberación y su rol central que el mundo militar, con su patrimonio de valores, puede desarrollar para el crecimiento social, cultural y democrático del País.

El pensamiento estratégico en un mundo que cambia, de Umberto Cappuzzo (p. 12). Eticidad de los fines y compatibilidad de los medios usados para lograrlos constituyen un problema hizo más difícil por la crisis del pensamiento estratégico. Hoy faltan una moderna concepción política y una doctrina estratégica moderna capaces de indicar seguros



SUMMARY SOMMAIRE INHALT RESUMEN

opciones en la gestión de las crisis. La intervención en Kosovo representa, por un lado un fallecimiento político de Europa y, por el otro, una confirmación de la limitada posibilidad de las armas donde la diplomacia carece.

Un nuevo rol por las Naciones Unidas, de Giulio Fraticelli (p. 28).

Las alternas vicendas de las misiones de las Gorras Azules son examinadas por el Autor con visión extendida a la perspectiva para conferir a la organización de las Naciones Unidas poderes y instrumentos efectivos, que acrezcan la capacidad de intervención en todas las áreas inestables del Planeta. El trabajo desarrolla, pues, significativas reflexiones sobre el importante rol político y militar, que Italia podrá desarrollar en el interior de ONU para la tutela de la paz en el mundo.

La Europa de la defensa, de Maurizio Coccia (p. 36).

Entre Europa y los Estados Unidos existen divergencias pero también buenos motivos para mejorar las relaciones en los campos de desarrollo y de la seguridad. La Europa Unida, en su proyecto de constituir una defensa común tiene que fijarse - en términos políticos, económicos y tecnológicos - en un mejor y más equilibrado raporte euro-atlántico-americano: ninguna de las componentes, sola, tiene una bastante credibilidad para resolver los grandes problemas de la pacificación del mundo.

"Network Centric" Warfare, de Giovanni Caravelli (p. 52).

Los proyectos "Network Centric Warfare" (NCW) y "Future Combat System" (FCS), en plan de desarrollo en las Fuerzas Armadas Estadounidenses, constituyen algo nuevo sistema para la prevención y la gestión de las crisis, basado en las enormes potencialidades de las tecnologías de la información. El "NCW" es un sistema integrado de recogida, elaboración y evaluación de datos para construir unos posibles escenarios de crisis y conflictualidad que permitan la individualización de las acciones por emprender a nivel

político-estratégico para la seguridad nacional y internacional. El "FCS", mutuando por el "NCW" todas las informaciones útiles, enseña una variedad de actividades y operaciones militares en el teatro de crisis.

El soldado italiano en las misiones de paz. Entrevista al Embajador Staffan De Mistura, de Danilo Moriero (p. 66).

El papel de las Fuerzas Armadas italianas en las operaciones de sostén de la paz constituye el centro de la entrevista. El Embajador subraya en particular las características peculiares del soldado italiano que lo llevan a juntar armónicamente la profesionalidad con la prodigiosa versatilidad para las actividades diplomáticas y sociales.

EIRE. El nuevo Ejército. Entrevista al Teniente General Colm E. Mangan, de Enrico Magnani (p. 72).

Las Fuerzas Armadas irlandesas, hechas por solos voluntarios, se articulan en fuerzas de defensa permanentes (Ejército, Marina, Aeronáutica), y fuerzas de reserva. Además de los compitos de defensa del País, ellas llegan ayuda a las fuerzas de policía y aseguran la vigilancia y el control de las áreas de pesca. El EIRE adhirió al PIP y tractó importantes experiencias por la activa participación a casi cuarenta operaciones de «peace keeping».

India y Pakistan. El desarrollo a la sombra del nuclear, de Roberto Nocella (p. 80).

El trabajo lleva esaurientes elementos de claritud para los programas nucleares perseguidos por India y Pakistan. La descripción de los hechos se enriqueció por estimulantes reflexiones sobre el endémico conflicto para el Kashmir y la síndrome de cerco de India que se siente amenazada por la potencia china.

América austral. En camino hacia la unidad, de Ornella Rota (p. 88).

El MERCOSUR (Mercado Común del Cono Sur) es una iniciativa nueva inspirada a la creación de una Patria

suramericana por muchos confines. Los Países miembros (Argentina, Brasil, Paraguay, Uruguay) y los asociados (Bolivia, Chile) trajeron del Organismo comunitario notables beneficios que interesan el trabajo, la instrucción, la economía y la seguridad.

Mili adios, de Luigi Semprini (p. 94).



El artículo toma inspiración por los comentarios opuestos grabados por varias partes de la opinión pública sobre las últimas normas dictadas por el Parlamento en orden a la profesionalización de las Fuerzas Armadas. De los hechos lejanos y cercanos conectados a la conscripción obligatoria surgen unas indicaciones sobre los méritos que le competen sobre el plan educativo y cultural y sobre el del juntar entre los jóvenes de diferente extracción social y geográfico. La solución de las Fuerzas Armadas integralmente profesionales hace levantar una sincera oposición, pero a veces motivada también por inconfesables intereses.

El entrenamiento y la simulación, de Ghino Andreani (p. 102).





El Ejército italiano empezó, en 1999, un nuevo proyecto de entrenamiento con simulación, que se terminará en 5-6 años. Un proyecto ambicioso que permite la validez operativa de las unidades usadas en misiones "afuera zona" y que consiste en la constitución de centros de entrenamiento por puestos de Mando y centros de entrenamiento al combate en las ciudades.

The single fuel concept, de Fabio Grandi (p. 108).

En el ámbito del proceso de racionalización del instrumento militar asume una particular importancia el estrechamiento de la cadena logística garantizada por la estandarización de los materiales y en particular de los carburantes. La experimentación de más de diez años, conducida en Italia por el Centro Técnico de la Motorización, demostró la compatibilidad de los motores Diesel usando el combustible aeronáutico.



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THE CONSTITUTION**

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
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


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Rivista Militare aims at broadening and updating the technical and vocational training of Officers and NCOs. It is thus a means of propagating the military way of thinking and a forum of study and debate. Through the publication of articles of technical and scientific interest, Rivista Militare also aims at informing the general public on the Army and on military issues.

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CHANGE AT THE TOP OF THE ARMY



ONOURS

Military Honours were rendered by a formation Brigade with Army Flag and Band, under the orders of Brig. Gen. Domenico Rossi, Comander of the "Granatieri di Sardegna" Brigade.

ADDRESSES

- Lieutenant General Francesco Cervoni,
Army Chief of Staff, outgoing;
- Lieutenant General Gianfranco Ottogalli,
Army Chief of Staff, incoming;
- General Rolando Mosca Moschini,
Defence Chief of Staff;
- The Hon. Sergio Mattarella,
Minister of Defence.

Lieutenant General Gianfranco Ottogalli is the new Army Chief of Staff as of May 17, 2001. He replaces Lieutenant General Francesco Cervoni who, on the same date, left the active service for age limit.

The changing ceremony was held in Rome, in the yard of the "Macao" Barracks, in the presence of the Minister of Defence, the Defence Chief of Staff, the Chiefs of Staff of the other Services and the representatives of the Veterans' Associations, with the participation of many civil, religious and military authorities and a great number of citizens.





Lieutenant General Gianfranco Ottogalli was born in Aquileia (Udine) on August 26, 1938.

He attended the Military Academy, the Application School and the 97th Staff College Course in Italy as well as the 11th Staff College Course in the United Kingdom.

Main Command positions held: Commander, 3rd "Verbano" Sapper Battalion; Commandant, Army Engineer School; Commander, "Gorizia" Mechanized Brigade; Deputy Commander, Tuscany-Emilia Military Region.

Staff positions: Chief, Operations Section at the "Brescia" Brigade HQ; Chief, Staff Section, Office of the Army Chief of Staff; Chief, 3rd Section, Infrastructure Office, Army Staff; Chief, General Office of the Army CoS. From 1995 to 1997 he held the position of Director General, State Property, Works and Engineer Materials Directorate.

From February 8, 1997 to April 19, 2001, he has been Deputy Chief of Staff of Defence. On May 17, 2001, Gen. Ottogalli has been appointed Army Chief of Staff.

Gen. Ottogalli is a graduate in Strategical Sciences and speaks fluent English. He has been awarded the following decorations: Grand Officer of the Order of Merit of the Republic of Italy; "Mauriziana" Medal; Golden Cross for Seniority in Service; Bronze Medal for Long Command; Bronze Medal for participation in rescue operations during natural disasters; Knight, Order of St. Gregory the Great; Silver Medal of Merit of the Italian Red Cross; Grand Officer with Swords of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta; Knight Commander with Plaque, Sacred Constantinian Order of St. George; Grand Officer with Plaque of the Sovereign Military Order of the Iron Crown of the Italic Kingdom.



MILITARY SERVICE, CIVIL SERVICE AND THE CONSTITUTION

Presentation by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army
at the Round Table held at "La Sapienza" University
(Rome, February 20, 2001)

INTRODUCTION

The subject of this Round Table is very topical, especially if we consider the legislative measures recently approved by Parliament.

I refer, in particular, to the "Norms for the Institution of the Professional Military Service" and to the Law on the "Institution of the National Civil Service".

They are certainly two measures of great consequence, both from the political and the social viewpoint, approved in a moment when the Army is undergoing a deep structural transformation.

During my presentation I shall not discuss the merits of the political decisions that have been made.

I am neither a constitutionalist nor a philosopher of politics. As a soldier and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army I will discuss how the Service, that I represent here, intends to proceed in the allocation of resources for its organization.

In view of this, I will divide my conversation into two parts, separate but closely connected and interdependent.

In the course of the first part I will outline briefly, with some simple historical references, the Army's structural evolution in relation with the possible systems of recruitment, pointing out the reasons that imposed the transformation phase which, as I mentioned, the Service is now going through.

In the second part I will focus our attention on the important laws recently approved by

Parliament as well as on the main issues that these measures - which can be defined as "epochal" - are implying and will certainly imply in the future.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE ARMY'S STRUCTURE: A RETROSPECTIVE SURVEY

Most historians maintain that the principle of conscription dates back to republican Rome, where the people had the "duty to answer the consul's call when the Motherland was in danger".

In modern times, the line of thought upholding conscription as the foundation of a strong and independent republican state, not subject to the shortcomings believed to be typical of the mercenary armies, goes back to Machiavelli. In fact, in his "Art of War" - a real treatise on that art - the ethic foundation of military duty is established and expressed for the first time.

The mass compulsory conscription adopted by France during the revolution was actually born together with modern Europe, i.e. the rising of the middle class, upholder of the idea of Nation.

At the end of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, a large part of continental Europe adopted similar conscription systems, since they were the only capable of providing enough soldiers to the Armies, which were often engaged in military campaigns.

The national states that in the second part of the '800s had already started their unification process (especially Prussia and Piedmont), applied the conscription system with great conviction, albeit with several corrections, such as exemptions and substitutions.

After the annexation of new territories to the Kingdom of Italy, conscription played a very important role in fostering social mixing and in developing a new national sentiment.

In 1875 a new law on conscription introduced a greater equity, sanctioning the general and personal obligation to serve, instead of the simple subjection to conscription, and revoked the substitution system.

The two great world-wars peremptorily confirmed, for obvious reasons, the absolute necessity of conscription.

After WWII, compulsory service continued to be the basis of the recruitment for most of NATO's continental members and for all Warsaw Pact countries.

In Italy, the Army General Staff was strongly in favour of conscription, which was considered an important element both for the gradual reconstruction of the sense of "national identity", which was undermined after the 8th of September 1943, and as a guarantee of stability of the democratic system.

After WWII the Italian conscription, internationally acknowledged as the best, gave proof of very high effectiveness. Suffice it to mention as an example, in the international environment, the mission in Lebanon in the early '80s, in a particularly insidious and exacting context and, in the '90s, "Vespri Siciliani", a national operation conducted from 1992 to 1998 with the employment of conscripts. Not to mention the great generosity and spirit of sacrifice shown by conscripts and Cadres on the occasion of the great natural disasters (floods in Vajont and Polesine, earthquakes in Friuli and Irpinia, etc.).

The real turning point - when public opinion and military experts realized that something was changing in the world's geopolitical picture - occurred at the beginning of the '90s.

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops occupied the whole territory of Kuwait and, some weeks later, the Iraqi government declared its annexation as Iraq's 19th province. The UN Security Council met on the same August 2, and approved the first of a long series of resolutions (no 660) which, gradually, should have put Iraq in a position to choose between surrender and war. It was war. The armed actions started on January 16, 1991 and, as everybody knows, Italy, although insistently urged, did not participate in this operation with land forces.

This was a clear signal that the new general picture would cease to be characterized by a very strong, real, unidirectional and unidimensional threat, with a low probability of materialization

(among other things, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved on March 31, 1991), but rather by a series of risks of different nature and low intensity, but with an imminent and very high probability of becoming real.

In substance, it became clear to everybody that, in order to meet the new types of risks, it was necessary to have readily employable forces, free from any kind of restraint. The door was therefore opening to a "mixed" recruitment model, i.e. based on conscripts and professionals.

This new geopolitical picture caused - first within the Atlantic Alliance and then in the European Union - a real conceptual evolution which ended in the more and more recognized need to participate in the planning and conduct of the operations for crisis management.

Coherently with both the Atlantic Alliance's new strategic concept (together with the increasingly felt need of developing an autonomous capability of crisis management within Europe) and the new trend concerning the reduced availability of resources, human ones in particular, mainly due to the demographic decrement, the regionalization of the military service, conscientious objection and the trend in the recruitment of volunteers, the Italian Army decided to reorganize itself on the basis of the principle of multinationality of the military formations. As a matter of fact, the recourse to multinational formations is compulsory, being the only way to have a military instrument in a position to guarantee the capabilities that could not be achieved autonomously.

In view of this, last November the Defence Ministers of the European Union met in Brussels and sanctioned their Countries' commitment to provide the contributions necessary to reach, by the end of 2003, the objectives established by the Helsinki Declaration of December 1999.

This formal act by the Defence Ministers of the Fifteen Nations of the European Union is a fundamental milestone towards an autonomous capability of crisis management, which is the objective fixed in Helsinki.

As regards the land forces that our Country will have to provide, they amount to approximately 22,000 men, out of a European total of 115,000.

Obviously, in order to have the personnel rotate in the operations theatre compatibly with the times of psycho-physical recovery and reconditioning of the units, and according to the action taken by the Allied Countries, we should be able to avail ourselves of at least 70,000 men, considering only the operational forces.

In these terms, the engagement of the Italian Army is on a level with that of the other major European countries, and is coherent with the Nation's will of participating fully and equally in the construction of the European Security and Defence Identity, which is a fundamental pillar of the European Union.

But, what is today the structure of our Army, if we consider the enlisted personnel?

At the moment, as is well known, the Army is based on a "mixed model", i.e. conscripts and volunteers. I shall give some figures in order to explain, albeit roughly, what we have at our disposal.

In particular, excluding Officers and NCOs, the following categories of enlisted personnel are present:

- conscripts, about 50,000: they serve for ten months in the Commands and units destined to presence, surveillance and general support activities. Considering the shortness of their service, their employment outside the national borders is not envisaged. Among other things, this component has been undergoing a considerable decrease, not only for demographic reasons, but also owing to:
 - the growing phenomenon of conscientious objection (approximately 110,000 cases in 2000);
 - the conscripts' decision of serving in the Armed Corps of the State and in the Fire Department (about 12,500 in 2000);
 - legislative measures which, in case of natural disasters, rightly grant early discharges to

conscripts, or give them the possibility of being employed in State and local administrations (about 8.500 in 2000).

- one-year volunteers, about 13,000: they are conscripts who voluntarily serve for an extended period of 12 months. As a priority they are assigned to the reaction forces and can be employed out-of-area in humanitarian missions or in low-intensity peace support operations;
- short-term volunteers: they are approximately 21,500 and serve for three years, extendable to five. They are mainly assigned to the projection and reaction units and have no limitations of employment. At the end of their period of duty, they can either become regular volunteers or move to other Administrations or, much to our regret, will have to be discharged;
- regular volunteers, about 12,000. They are recruited, as we have just seen, among the short-term volunteers. They are assigned to the projection units and, later in their career, can be employed in schools and training centres as instructors or in less operational jobs, usually technical ones. These volunteers are the only recruitment source for the sergeants' rank, which they can achieve through exams.

The present transition phase, with the Army structured on a "mixed model", will come to its conclusion in a few years, as envisaged by Law no 331 of November 14, 2000, concerning the "Norms for the Institution of the Professional Military Service".

In any case the Army in particular, in order to reach and keep the established force-objectives, will have to continue recruiting, every year, a substantial number of volunteers.

THE NEW IMPORTANT LAWS

In 1997, as implementation of the "Rognoni" model of defence which provided for a total of 250,000 men for Defence (150,000 for the Army), the Decree 464 was prepared and approved. It referred specifically to the Army, reorganizing the technical/operational area, adapting it to the abovementioned manpower available.

Later, in 1998, another Defence Model envisaging 230,000 men (137,000 for the Army) made it necessary to reorganize again the technical/operational area, correcting the previous Decree. This was done, and a new Decree (214/2000) was approved.

Only five months later - November 2000 - the said Law on Professional Service was approved. It provided for a further reduction of the Armed Forces' personnel, from 230,000 to 120,000 men (112,000 for the Army).

In substance, we shall still have very much to work on the organization, in order to find a solution capable of reconciling the use of the available scarce resources with the national requirements and the international commitments.

One thing is certain: we cannot reduce any further the operational forces of the Army, since they are the very "raison d'être" of a Defence organization worthy of its name.

The other main points of Law no 331 of November 14, 2000 "Norms for the Institution of the Professional Military Service" are:

- discontinuance of conscription, whose re-adoption is envisaged only in exceptional cases (state of war; very serious international crisis calling for an increase in the numerical strength of the Armed Forces). In the 7-years transition period, the Armed Forces' requirements will be met by calling the young men born up to 1985.
- recruitment of volunteers for pre-fixed terms of one or five years, to be employed both in Italy and abroad, with the possibility, after the fifth year, of being granted two biennial re-enlistments.
- promotion of the cultural and social training as well as of the quality of life, through the

improvement of the training and infrastructural standards, putting the latter in line with the norms on health, safety and accident prevention.

- progressive assignment to the civilian personnel of the Ministry of Defence of administrative and logistic tasks, also employing, within the ordinary appropriations, private firms for logistic activities.

The measures on professionals were accompanied by the unprecedented decision of opening the military career to women.

After years of proposal, debates, delays and false starts, the introduction of the women's military service was sanctioned in October 1999 by Law no. 380, and regulated by the Decree of January 2000.

Our Country was the last in Europe to admit women in the Armed Forces, but it has the advantage of "learning" from the experiences of others.

Without dodging the complex theoretic, ethical and political knots of the issues related to women soldiers, we will obviously have to tackle the concrete problems connected with an innovation which is going to change the Army's face. We believe that, in this respect, we have systematically studied and probed the main problems connected with this important change: from the possible forms of recruitment (direct or "by quotas" commission, etc.), to the integration into the units, considering also the aspect concerning the access to combat corps and specialties. As regards the latter aspect, it was decided that, in principle, women will be employed in all tasks and jobs envisaged for men.

During 2000, fifty women have joined the Army, through the admission to the Military Academy and by "direct commission". Furthermore, 273 women were enlisted as Short-Term Volunteers. This is a precious resource, and we will make every effort to put it to good use, being fully aware that the success of our organization also depends on this type of recruitment.

The debate on these great reforms obviously concerned also the future of conscientious objection and civil service.

Once the right of declaring oneself a conscience objector was recognized by Law in 1972, the phenomenon became a deep-rooted choice in society, involving tens of thousands of young men every year.

The 200 applications of 1973 became 13,746 in 1989 and 72,169 in 1998, increasing 360 times in 25 years.

In 1999, applications have gone up to 108,555.

As is known, this matter is regulated by a law of 1998, which allows the citizens who do not accept the recruitment in the Armed Forces and Armed Corps of the State, the right to carry out their conscription duty through a civil service, different and autonomous from military service.

The relevant responsibilities have been taken up by the National Office for Civil Service, established at the Prime Minister's Office. To meet this requirement, the Office will have to establish its own peripheral organization by August 1, 2001.

Obviously, the discontinuance of conscription will remove the present relation between number of conscripts and number of objectors, but will not solve the problem of choosing between voluntary military service and voluntary civil service.

In this regard, on February 14 a law was approved, providing for the institution of a national civil service, aimed at meeting the requirement, felt by public opinion, for a better and more efficient discipline of the service. This measure, besides considering the Law of 1998 on conscientious objection, introduces new norms which allow the Country to develop modern social policies, more respondent to the needs of the individuals and the community.

The new law offers, on the basis of deep personal convictions, and with equal dignity, the possibility of choosing between civil service and conscription and permits to join the civil

service on a voluntary basis. The latter provision, considering that conscription will be discontinued and replaced by an exclusively professional army, will give the civil service the possibility of assuming a specific autonomy vis-à-vis its military counterpart.

Article 2 of the Law directs the Government to issue, within 12 months, one or more Decrees which should determine the subjects admitted to the voluntary civil service and relevant modalities of access; the duration of the service, in relation to the different employments; legal rights and remuneration.

In particular, an important principle concerns the legal and economic treatment of the civil-service volunteers, which must take into account the treatment of the one-year volunteers.

The same principle of "equality" must be recognized as regards the benefits concerning the volunteers' training and their entry into the working world.

In view of this - without diminishing the importance of the civil service - I believe that the Decrees should clearly differentiate the two types of service when they deal with the volunteers' status and recognitions, considering the respective specific characteristics.

CONCLUSIONS

The tirades about conscription and volunteers are anachronistic and misleading.

Conscription has been for 140 years a powerful instrument of emancipation, national unification and socialization among the young. Afterwards, the operational scenarios where we were going to operate imposed the choice of a Volunteer Army, as was done by other Nations.

This choice, which must be implemented with resolution and without hesitation, is the solution to the issues of operational capability, readiness and professionalism of the military instrument. Problems, as I said, which were already highlighted during the Gulf War.

It was not by chance, in fact, that the same solution was adopted by many Nations. Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States have a pluriennial experience on the matter. France selected this option about three years ago, Spain will have fully professional Armed Forces this year, Germany intends to proceed towards the same type of reform, following Holland, Belgium and Denmark. Also Greece, in spite of its delicate geostrategic position, is seriously considering this subject.

It is, in substance, a decision shared by the European Union and the whole Atlantic Alliance.

But the discussions about voluntary civil service and voluntary military service is also misleading, since the two services are "distant and different" from each other.

We hope and wish that the new Decrees deriving from the Law on the "Institution of the National Civil Service" recognized the peculiarity/priority of the voluntary military service vis-à-vis the civil one, without diminishing - of course - the importance of this very valuable form of social commitment.


Striving to put both on the same level *tout-court* would create an unacceptable disparity of treatment, to the disadvantage of the military world, which is subject to a remarkable number of bonds, risks and responsibilities, which make the civil service much more attractive. This would be another "disturbance", precisely at the critical moment when the Armed Forces, which have their share of problems already, are moving from a mixed model towards an entirely professional one.

To carry on with both "discussions" would delay the process of complete professionalization of the Army, which cannot be renounced or postponed any longer, as I hope I have been able to demonstrate in the short time I have had at my disposal.



Lieutenant General Roberto Speciale

A LOOK AT THE MEDITERRANEAN



by Maurizio Coccia *

Italy has been looking at the Mediterranean from time immemorial not only for economic reasons but also for social, cultural and security motivations.

During the last years, sensitiveness and concern have grown, owing not so much to the increase in the migration flow, but rather to the danger of disengagement of Europe and other "actors" in the South, somehow caused by the weight of

the American politico-economic decisions.

In the Mediterranean, Italy has carried out many mediation activities, both nationally or together with other western Countries, in support of peace and development in the Region. Italy has been doing a lot as a Country, but very little in the general perspective which, as we said, from the Suez crisis onwards has been managed directly by the US which, by doing so, reduced the weight and

the meaning of any other initiative, no matter how commendable.

In the last years, also Italy is shaping itself coherently with the growth of the European identity and structure. Italy, as a member of Europe, continues to look at the Mediterranean, trying to draw new impetus from the increased strength of the region.

The present period is not one of the best. Oil is back to the forefront, accompanied by the usual ghosts: inflation, rise in

Italy, Europe's border Country, is called upon to play a more and more crucial role in the Mediterranean area.

The cradle of millenary cultures but also of deep contradictions and rapid political and economic changes, the "*mare nostrum*" is a real springboard for the construction of a free-exchange area, emancipated and independent from the hegemonic powers.

prices, limitation of mobility. This trio can depress even the greatest enthusiasts, since it reminds us, in the worst possible way, of the limits in our progress and of the dangers deriving from so much dependence.


Also, it should not be forgotten that the "black gold" in the region has largely contributed to preserve and strengthen ancient beliefs and

behaviours, which coexist with a sincere pursuit of peaceful coexistence and development.

From 1999 to this day, the most significant political changes in the region have been: the appointment of Bouteflika as President of Algeria, the accession to the thrones of Morocco and Jordan of Mohammed VI and Abdallah, the succession of President Bachar in Syria and the Conservative victory in Israel.

In the US, the return of the Republicans to the White House is particularly significant.


The ruins of the "Lion's Gate", in the pre-Hittite town of Khat-tushash, Turkey.




The arrival of the young heirs is a stimulus, albeit in different forms, of the effort to improve the quality of life of the respective populations, while in the last two events it is possible to perceive a tendency to a more authoritarian management of the still numerous unresolved disputes. Therefore, we can even surmise a recrudescence of the local tensions and uneasiness, made worse by a further diversity between North and South, of the various national perceptions of the facts and their motivations.

THE WEST'S POINT OF VIEW AND EUROPE

The global system, even if it is not yet prevailing, is in any case very widespread in the West, and is aimed at objectives of peaceful



Above.
Children in a casbah.



Left.
Israeli patrol on the Lebanese border.

recognition and coexistence, albeit within a macroeconomic frame of competition. It does not imply a reduced control of the state authority over its territory and the national community.

The universal rights of man and the effort to have them respected by the political leaders of all Nations, at the moment have fostered the aggregation of the

weakest countries to the promoting, and stronger, ones. The weaker ones must deal with a growing internal opposition, hostile to internationally sanctioned restrictions, prescinding from their merits.

In the other Countries, the transnational non-governmental organizations are importing and accepting the external pressures

for these changes, with significant effects on the internal policy.

The strategy aimed at this kind of future is designed, pursued and defended with every possible means by the US, whose position in the international arena has been evolving, for quite some time, from that of a superpower in a bipolar world to that of a real politico-economic empire with no credible rivals.

Therefore, the political thought of the US becomes the reference which the others should pursue, or at least take greatly into account. This logic does not change on the Mediterranean shores.

In the region, this way of thinking continues to be influenced by the Israeli problem, owing to the American Jewish lobby, and also by the Near/Middle East, which is the logistic hinterland of strategically

*Ancient temple in Petra, Jordan.
(III-I Century B.C.).*

important regions, such as the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula and Central Asia.

Pacification, coexistence and national interest are a critical mixture, and in fact the results achieved so far do not produce great satisfaction, because the local crises have now become chronic.


The basic problem is that the US, the West as a whole and the various international Institutions have not succeeded in working out a world policy where there should be a place for everyone with clear responsibilities of management and rules of behaviour. As a consequence, there is no collective recognition between the Nations and their peoples.

Thus, one should not be surprised if national interests surpass all other logics, even elementary ones, like the security and survival of mankind.

Europe, in its present phase of political and economic aggregation, does not have its own sovereignty, therefore spends most of its capabilities within its own borders, with no projection to the outside. Its international impact is thus very reduced in comparison to what it could be, also because the attention to the Mediterranean and the willingness to intervene continue to be very different in the various countries. All this different viewpoints are visibly unified only by the common subjection to the United States.

In the analysts' circles, Europe's role in the region is often defined as that of a "payer, non player".

But, even considering these limitations, there are signs of a common will to strengthen the European influence in the Mediterranean, a will based on a dual strategy: greater harmonization of the employment



of the resources made available by the member States and involvement of all other countries in the acceptance of the Document on Peace and Stability.

The righteous intentions promoted by the Barcelona Conference in 1995, and its sequels, came to a standstill because of the problems between Israel and the Palestinians and, even more, because Europe did not give a clear answer to the question of its Mediterranean priorities, with a security prospect as wide as that of the

socio-economic expectations of the local populations.

Europe is mainly concerned about the changes that must be introduced into its institutions in view of the enlargement to the East. Furthermore, the European bureaucracy, in carrying out the approved programmes, distorts the motivations of the commitment itself.

In short, it is clear that the project of identity and integration, aimed at achieving an incisive international role, is very inadequate.

Then there is NATO, which deserves appreciation for many reasons. First of all, that of expressing, in an agreed form, the intentions and the possibilities of the European Community. Then, the inclination to act as an organization for regional security, and not just as a military alliance. The Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue with seven non-NATO Countries (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria) actually intends to reach the political objective of explaining the new goals, monitoring the local view on the security problems.

An important element of the Dialogue is the preparation of a detailed programme of activities and initiatives aimed at a better cooperation.

Mutual knowledge and cooperation are important aspects, and are being fruitful. Morocco and Jordan participate in the NATO-led operations in Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo.


In short, we can say that in the environments described above it is possible to see a commitment which does not derive from national security or energy interest, as it was in the past, but is also open to common values. This implies a continuous commitment which is generally taken for granted, and whose burdens are too often underestimated.

The approach to the Mediterranean issues by other important Countries (Russia, China, Pakistan) is not characterized by the same generosity.

The time of the revolutionary ideals is over, and the Russian dreams of "penetration in the warm seas" are far away.

Today's Russia reshapes its international policy in the region which, although limited by the Country's objective possibilities and a wide recourse to consultations, is still directed to two main objectives: Russian influence and the market.

And it is because of the market, together with an intense human



interaction and the continuing changes in tactics and strategy, that, around the Mediterranean, diametrically opposed values can thrive and proselytize, so that "pacification" and "cooperation" always have to deal with "authoritarianism", "ethnic pride" and "nationalism".

In the present scenario, the level of contrast is higher than is generally believed. Saddam Hussein's Iraq and, yesterday, Slobodan Milosevich's Yugoslavia, are just the tips of an iceberg. The fact that those leaders and, even more, their decisions, are still respected and defended, shows the existence of a collective will tending to democratization but, at the same time, feeding a wide and persistent cultural opposition to the democratic changes promoted by the West. The present scenario is one of transition which, on the one hand, gives a good hope for the success of the western values and, on the other, calls for the

revision and modification of those values, in order to adapt them to the situation. Also, it is necessary to work hard, and long, not to recede from the changes achieved.

The US and Europe, at the same time, are generous in aid and advice and are playing upon the economic factor, as they have been doing for a long time.

For many years, it was generally and firmly believed that the growth of the economy would attract all other creeds towards the western values.

Today we can say with absolute certainty that the economic component of the West's aid to development has amply failed, for the simple reason that the aid flow has never reached the people, but has ulteriorly fed the conservative oligarchies, capable of opening to the new, without involving the underdeveloped masses, which practically receive only the price increases in all products, starting with the essentials.

Left.
General view of Cairo, Egypt.

Right.
Mauritanian woman.

Hence the race to migration and illegal work. The dismissed workers claim back the land leased to sharecroppers. Nepotism and favouritism grow, and invigorate tribal, religious and clan relationships.

Religious integralism thrives on this social disintegration, where everyone tries to remedy as he can.


The most enlightened governments have become aware of the importance of enlarging the decision-making base, calling to power new forces capable of controlling the people's discontent.

But these are still tactical concessions and not radical changes, because power is firmly in the hands of a bourgeoisie which can act with Western ideas and values, but only to protect its wealth and not to reduce the national imbalances.

THE THEORETICAL SOLUTION OF ALL EVIL IS NOT ECONOMIC, IT IS GLOBAL

It would be enough to strengthen the decisions of the Barcelona Conference, which are a real project for peace in the Mediterranean, based on the distribution of wealth in exchange for the distribution of security, up to the point of envisaging the realization, by 2010, of a zone of free exchange and stability.

Although the Palestinian, Israeli, Lebanese and Syrian disputes once more render this project difficult, still the plan has its own conceptual value, because the association intends to achieve a threefold goal in the fields of economy, policy and security.



It can be observed that attention, willingness and support vary in the North, and reach the Southern Countries in different forms. Israel and Egypt receive more than 90% of the US aid to the region, while the rest is divided between Jordan and Palestine.

Europe is politically and diplomatically engaged, but its attraction and convincing capability are remarkably lower. In the southern outlook, the American

economic help is welcome, but the European common market is not, since it could sink the frail local economies.

It really seems that both North and South should redefine their priorities and make things clearer in order to achieve a common objective, which could be that of free circulation, as a concrete economic demonstration of a wider and more incisive commitment, capable of overcoming any socio-

cultural obstacle, starting with the religious aspect.

The objective appears to be far away, but the road taken seems to be the right one.

THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH

While globalization stimulates the solidarity and awareness of the West, in the South there is still a kind of nationalism which is unable to realize the advantages of a system of free circulation similar to the European one. The preference still goes to bilateral relations, rather than to multinational and communitarian ones.

Even with these limitations, a spontaneous evolutionary process is under way, even if it is not in the headlines as much as war and terrorist attacks, and is too often bedimmed by the continuous requests, proposals and decisions of the Western world, with the US in the front line.

In the Maghreb the internal balance is in the hands of the religious party, the military, the bourgeoisie and the government apparatus, i.e. of the leader.

Any modernist concession causes, rather than new vulnerabilities, reactions that can easily be expected. For instance, to give a left-wing party the possibility of leading an alternative government (as was done in Morocco, first experience of this kind in the Arab world) is an enlightened act, but has the shortcoming of leaving a religious party alone in the opposition, making it very radical. This, sooner or later, brings the military against the opposition, using methods and strategies which are certainly not enlightened. As a consequence, the government is driven to the margins, or even delegitimized, putting the internal and international balances at serious risk. Algeria went through an experience of this kind, and we saw the results.

It can be observed, therefore, that innovation is neither easy nor safe, so much so that it makes, the compromises among the ruling elites understandable, but this reduces the space for realizing real changes. It is much easier to denationalize the State redistributing the benefits in one's own circles, rather than democratize it, because this implies the devolution of some resources to uncontrollable sectors.

Still, a pseudodemocratic transformation could rely precisely on the religious component, which is an aggregative element of the social drives, and remains an essential element for the legitimation of power, which looks for an institutional authority and a democratic compromise, and becomes radical when it must appropriate new power spaces occupied by others.

The peaceful government in Morocco should be ascribed more to the flexibility and sensitivity of King Hassan II rather than to the religious character of the monarchic regime, also because the monarchy, far from being contested, is an integrant part of the national identity, as a federative element in a divided Country and a guarantee of cultural, economic and political pluralism.

Freedom of speech is ample, and so is the decentralized management of the local communities, but control is still tight to prevent too much liberality from turning into anarchy. In this climate, also the islamic parties move with moderation, albeit tactically and for limited periods of time, since they are to a certain extent bound to the Crown, and aware of the lessons emerging from the Algerian tragedy. Their destabilizing potential is not underestimated, and controls the modernist zeal of the new Sovereign, who has to deal with a political system which delegates



The port of Algiers.

to the leader all political decisions.

At the moment, the internal economic policy has not been defined yet, and the new power arrangements are still unclear.



Meanwhile, the gap between economic growth, opportunities and employment becomes more and more visible. The first commitments do not go beyond manifestations of charity and compassion for the many poor and of modernism towards the many young.

Internationally, a knot that has to be untied concerns the conflict in Western Sahara, and therefore the relations with nearby Algeria. The possibility of implementing a plan for local autonomy, supported by American negotiator James Baker, involves previous direct talks with the Polisario Front and Algeria, but

they don't seem close at hand. This affects regional cooperation in the Maghreb, and has a negative effect on the constitution of a large internal market and the possible association with the European Union.

As can be seen, there is a possibility that, after the first



Left.

Israeli tankers on their vehicle.

Right.

View of Ankara, Turkey.

the fair distribution of profits. The same can be said about social support. Health, Education and Housing are in a rather good situation, and place Tunisia among the developing countries. The legal protection of women is the most advanced in the region, and all religions are entitled to the same dignity.

But, at the same time the press has lost all its autonomy, and this is particularly visible when considering the growing freedom enjoyed by the mass media in Algeria and Morocco. The electoral campaigns do not raise public debates, and the intellectuals are retired into themselves. The collective efforts aim at preserving the status quo, and other ways out are not in view, because any form of freedom or self-criticism could take the Country back to the old situation when President-for-life Bourguiba controlled a society which was politically, economically and socially adrift.

At the present time, Tunisia's growth is very important in the African context, but it is fragile and questionable if compared with that of the western Countries. Apart from the fact that economic pre-eminence, without an adequate social freedom is, by its very nature, unstable and vulnerable.

So far, we have been discussing two successful Countries, where the recent transformations are visible and far-reaching. We have already said that changing is not easy. It would be impossible, for example, to talk about democratic evolution without taking into account the Moslems' position. To exclude them, as was the case in

innovative impulse, King Mohammed VI, familiarly called M6 by his close supporters, could retrace his steps and adopt his father's traditional views, based on personal power, supported by the security service rather than by law.

While the Maghreb, as a whole, is characterized, by its extreme economic difficulties, Tunisia stands out for its successful economic accomplishments, which, however, are paid with political authoritarianism and loss of freedom, to the point of making it a police State.

In the Summer of 2000, at the 10th Durban Meeting, organized

by the World Economic Forum and the Community of Austral Africa, Tunisia won the palm as the most competitive economy of the African continent.

The key to success was the denationalization programme, started in the 70s and relaunched during the last ten years.

In 1987, the year of Gen. Ali's non-violent constitutional – or "surgical" – coup d'état, the Country started reversing the course which was keeping it in dire poverty. The economic successes affect not only the leaders and the entrepreneurs, but the population as well, thanks to a government system controlling



Algeria, means to condemn the Country to violence and to the authoritarian perversion of rules which place the military of the repressive forces in a position of being arbitrators, with the support of a large part of the bourgeoisie and a good level of international consent.

The experience made so far suggests that to assign a precise place to the religious component permits to meet most social requirements and does not imply dangerous deviations such as those of Afghanistan and Iran. The difference is that in the Maghreb many people have work connections with Europe, and therefore absorb many democratic convictions and ideas.

The connection of the national community with the emigrants fosters a very important osmosis of cultures and enriches social maturity.

The challenge is serious, and the danger is real. On the other hand, the road can only be that

of collective recognition, albeit with all possible measures aimed at averting violent repercussions, so it is worth continuing to support one another.

In Algeria, there is a new tendency to reexamine the war of independence, looking more for capital errors than for national legitimization or demagogic revision. The effects of the internal pacification achieved by the recent amnesty have been shaken by the renewal and worsening of the Middle East conflict. Still, there is a de-facto pluralism, even though it did not find its expression during the presidential elections held in the Spring of 1999. Therefore, the return to past authoritarian forms does not seem very plausible.

In North Africa there is an old fracture between Maghreb and Mashrek, made worse by Libya's political vacuum. A connection is maintained, somehow, by the mediating role of Egypt,

which lately started a strategic partnership that, up to then, had been limited to small shows of good will, mainly in the field of regional emergencies. The first initiatives involve Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia.

This collaboration is a sign of Egypt's political role in the region, but tends also to contain the incidence of fundamentalism within the two Countries.

Libya's comeback on the international scene, after years of isolation, is characterized by a renewed commitment to the "United States of Africa" which marks also the formal separation from the Arab world, with the exception of Egypt. This is due to economic reasons, as well as to motivations of internal pacification. The main problems derive from unemployment, up to 30%, and from the obsolescence of the structures, emphasized by the opening of relations towards the exterior.



Left.

One of the Kazimayn Mosques in Baghdad.

Right.

View of Belgrade, capital of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

the ideology in support of a genuine interest for the African continent.

The Saharan origin of these peoples, aware of the region's endemic troubles and, since Roman times, famous for their capability of reacting and fighting, indissolubly binds them to the Africa of the collective imagination, and lends credibility to their cooperative and stimulating commitment.

Egypt plays a moderating role which proves its regional superiority. In 1981 Mubarak inherited a Country on the brink of a confessional explosion, economically wrecked, and outlawed by the Arab world because of the Camp David agreements.

Twenty years later, Egypt's economic takeoff places it among the emerging countries. The merit goes to political stability and farsighted decisions, starting from that of being the guarantor of the region in the eyes of the Western world, following its transformations, albeit with the prudence recommended by the particular scenario.

In view of this, the economic liberalization is not a model to copy, but is still a political signal and a visible manifestation of intentions. The economic denationalization takes place mostly within the ruling class, which is protected at all costs as a bulwark against the least controllable aspects of the innovations. All this prudence, together with a resolute reaction against armed Islamism, has reduced the risks of destabilization, which were particularly dangerous in the early 90s, as a direct consequence of the coup d'état of

Despite a yearly income of about ten billion dollars from the oil pipeline, the life of the Bedouins, most of whom are urbanized, is precarious. "Pharaonic" projects, such as the employment of the entire oil income for the infrastructure, including the distribution of water through an underground river, or the construction of a competitive tourist system, have utterly failed. Here is therefore little hope for foreign investments. The embargo left its permanent marks, starting with an unused air fleet, which is now obsolete and needs an ample renewal.

The return of Gaddafi's dream of guiding Africa to redemption and revenge, albeit without recourse to violence, but through economic development and cultural, technical, agricultural and industrial cooperation, has already stirred intense reactions, and is not devoid of the well-known demagogic components typical of the charismatic leader. At the same time, there are numerous opportunities and capabilities, including the general disengagement of the Western powers, the religious influence witnessed by Tripoli's Society for the Appeal to Islam, the interventionist tradition and



1989 in Sudan, carried out by an Islamic junta, and of the events in Algeria, when it seemed that the entire Moslem world could fall under the revolutionary wave.

There are also several negative implications, such as the collusion between the rich and the powerful, the opposition inside the government as a consequence of its absence outside it, and the large gap between the "public", which is inefficient, and the "private", which is available only to the wealthy.

There is still some concern about the internal and regional role of the Armed Forces, that receive two thirds of the US aid (2.1 billion dollars, in return for the signature of the peace agreement with Israel in 1979) which continue their modernization, keeping pace with Israel's conventional forces.

Furthermore, most of the economic miracle derives more from the austerity measures of the early '90s and from revenues, rather than productivity: oil, Suez Canal, tourism, returns from emigrants, US aid. Therefore, we can say that in Egypt there is the paradox of a growing economy without real development.

There is no lack of wide-ranging projects, such as that of building a second delta for the Nile, which would irrigate 500.000 ha on the western shore of Lake Nasser, raising the cultivated area from 5% to 25% of the nation's surface. Also, two industrial poles are under construction in the Gulf of Suez and in Port Said, that could employ a considerable number of workers. Expectations are high, even though other projects have failed before, as that of

populating the desert area between Cairo and Alexandria.

Internal politics are conditioned by two dangerous factors. On the one hand, it is acknowledged that religion is a particularly inflammable mobilization element in the Egyptian society despite any other political and economic consideration, showing that it is a hard basis which must be taken into account in any transformation. In fact, it is not the political expression of a militant Islam, but rather a fundamentalism diffused at conscience level and, as such, much more difficult to canalize.

On the other hand there is the danger and mystery of Mubarak's succession. He is 73, and this is a real taboo subject in the Country, because it is closely connected with the recognition that the government's elite is old and



inclined to inactivity. Many ministers have remained at their posts since 1981. Meanwhile the Country has become “younger”, and is now dynamic and creative. So, the brake imposed on it is more and more evident, and threatens to suffocate even the routine.

In the international field, Mubarak had acknowledged the double identity, Arab and Mediterranean, of the Country, and followed the strategic line of his predecessor: abandonment of the socialist field, alliance with the US and peace with Israel.

After years of boycott by the Arab Countries, Egypt has regained its prestige as regional leader, but at a very high price because, meanwhile, the Arab world has broken into fragments, Iraq has been outlawed and the Gulf is under American protection.

At the moment, the Arab world follows the directives of a triumvirate made up by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, Countries capable of expressing the values

and resources considered of primary importance in that particular context. They are, respectively, the consistence of the population, the real and potential economy of oil resources, the legitimacy of the struggle against Israel.

In its crusade against fundamentalism, Egypt has assembled important partners, such as Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Jordan; the cooperation among the security services of these Countries is very successful.

In the peace process between Israel and Palestine, Egypt draws advantage from its strategic position and mediation capability.

Its role, now very important, could come to an end once peace were achieved, and Israel could be present and active in the Arab world and in the Near/Middle East, in the name of cooperation, integration and free competition.

The answer to this challenge depends on the economic and

political changes that the Country will be able to carry out till then, in order to compete with Israel.

Egypt's only primacy that should not be disputed is its cultural leadership within the Arab and Islamic context, since Israel is historically foreign and does not have an adequate attractive capability.

Looking at this kind of future, a disturbing element could be Israel's approach to Turkey and Jordan.

A potential project for the future could envisage a pro-American coalition with Palestine and Jordan, even though Egyptian public opinion is still instinctively against normalization with Israel.

In this scenario, the agreement on the association with the European Union seems to be a good insurance, largely aimed at offsetting the expected reduction of the present income. The delay in its ratification, on the contrary, shows that Egypt does not want its economic liberalization tested

Left

Panoramic view of Cairo, Egypt.

Right

July 1994. Meeting of King Hussein and Yitzhak Rabin in Washington, for the signature of the Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan.

too closely, since it is seen more as a political factor for the achievement of the primacy in the region rather than an economic factor of competition in the western market.

In Israel, as in the Palestinian territories, the continuous attempts at normalization dig a ditch between leaders and governments, whose alternating political manifestations of good will and intolerance aim at the internal consensus, replacing the existing certainties with the rules of personalism and opportunism.

In the region, destabilization is on the increase. In Jordan, where 60% of the population is of Palestinian origin, the peace treaty with Israel is harshly criticized and terrorist attacks are carried out. Also Egypt has to endure again the violent deeds of the fundamentalist parties.

The Arab trend is towards peace, but without accepting Israel. According to surveys, its economic and technological aspects are considered interesting, while its culture is not accepted. Therefore, if Hebrew is now studied in some countries, this is for commercial reasons only.

As for the Israelis, their reaction to this lack of interest is to do everything in their power in order to save as much as possible, without having to discuss everything each time.

In this sense, things have gone a long way, starting from the end of taboos that, up to a few years ago, were considered unquestionable, such as the constitution of a Palestinian state, the partition of Jerusalem, the return of the refugees to the occupied areas. Also



in this case, history is examined with a critical look, without the strained interpretations of the past.

The new prospects of coexistence are approved by the majorities, also because the old confrontation to the bitter end ceased in 1973, when the formula of classic war and uprising against Israel was abandoned by the Arab countries. The contrast has turned into *intifada* – guerrilla warfare in the cities – on one side, and exhausting mediation on the other. According to many, this type of contrast, diffused within the Palestinians, is very difficult to control, contain and win, as proved in Viet-Nam, Afghanistan and Algeria. The local youth, both Arab and Israeli, have not known the war, since the last open conflict goes back to 1973, and the results of the Gulf War have been seen, in their entirety, only in Iraq. Even the *intifada* concerns only a minority of Palestinians.

Between war and peace, therefore, indifference is the winner, because it convinces most people on both sides, as shown by the low number of voters in the elections.

The strategic alliance between Turkey and Israel has strengthened the security of the latter, but created serious problems for Syria,

Iraq and Lebanon. The presence and role of the US was reduced, much to the pleasure of the Americans, who were the not-so-occult mediators of the accord. To redress the situation, cascades of new agreements are signed. A strategic partnership between Syria and Iraq is in the making, and a security alliance has been formed between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Egypt increases its already remarkable talent for flexibility and mediation, avoiding further dangerous tensions in the region.

THE FACTORS OF CHANGE IN THE SOUTH

In a general environment of objective democratic impossibility, where individual freedom could have to be paid with the fundamentalist revolution, and economic development implies a stable situation achieved with authoritarian methods, the best possible result has been a certain form of convergence towards the western model.

The results, anyway, can be considered good, if one considers that in countries whose economies, until a few years ago, consisted in natural resources or external aid,

today there are discussions about denationalization, liberalization and interaction with Europe. Evidently, confidence and capabilities are growing, even if the awareness of the present situation advises to postpone to better times the contacts with other markets.

The coexistence of opposing extremisms resulted in the tendency, more or less visible from State to State, towards forms of more or less democratized authoritarianism with the selection of original and prudent forms, to the point that the analysts talk about a "homeopathic" evolution based on the time factor, considered in its widest dimension, which tends to the infinite. This is something much slower, and less clear, than the Chinese policy of the "little steps".

Each country follows the trend just described, adjusting itself to the model it can afford, taking into account its own history and the actual situation, both internal and international. Great care is devoted to the balanced involvement of the main actors of public life: religious party, Armed Forces, bourgeoisie and politicians, making sure that the government does not lose too much power, since it is impossible to predict into what hands it could fall.

Whenever possible, the goal is to increase the power of the people, through a delicate compromise with the religious leaders, whose social incentive could have a great influence on economy and politics. In this subtle game, success is largely in the hands of the "leader".

In any case there is a growing conviction that a better coexistence between rich and poor, as well as between yesterday's former enemies, is now possible.

For those who hold wealth and power, the question is to guarantee the prolongation of their status in exchange for greater flexibility and openmindedness. The fall of the values and ideals of the bipolar period facilitates this compromise,

which is a basic element for a possible collective recognition in the region.

There are several signals in that direction. In the South there is a growing conviction that regional cooperation is at least as fruitful as the bilateral relations with the US and the European Community, even though the new power poles seem to be the result of internal choices rather than the achievement of external goals and objectives. This process has a positive side, since the willingness to cooperate tends to reduce the number of critical situations.

Furthermore, the present situation is characterized by the reduction, or even the end, of the sanctions against Iran, Iraq and Libya, on account of the new security responsibilities directly or indirectly assumed by those Countries. Compared to the past, there is a significant basis for more open and positive actions, less conditioned by ideology.

The great projects under way might not achieve the stated goals, but have the undeniable merit of offering jobs, economic continuity and hope for the future to many workers, thus reducing the social malaise.

The political and economic engagement of Libya in the vast African continent exploits the diffused international disengagement from the area and shuns the old temptation of applying coercive measures. This bears witness to a new capability of employing democratic means, which, even if not perfect, is commendable and worthy of success.

The coexistence of political, economic and religious goals is more difficult in view of their social implications, but there are great expectations for the future. At this time it is clear everywhere that to isolate one component is too dangerous, as witnessed by the events in Algeria.



Amman, Jordan. King Abdullah's Mosque.

One can ever say that the greatest success of the present leadership has been the political process of reduction of the serious dangers deriving from the fundamentalist revolution which, only twenty years ago, had brought the Southern Mediterranean countries to their knees, and made the West despair of a democratic change.

The most alarming signals come from the growing tension between Israelis and Palestinians.

In the Arab countries, the worsening of the Israeli-



Palestinian strife leads to a violent, albeit episodic, revival of fundamentalism or to diffused forms of political disengagement. Even these manifestations are signs of social growth, since they imply the refusal of the "holy war" and the mass mobilizations of former times.

Therefore, integration with Israel is possible and is actually already working, if not much publicized, in the commercial sector.

About the risks inherent to the changes under way, it can be said that the slow pace caused by the limited scenarios and the relatively small areas where the changes can take place, also reduce the danger


of conflicts which, on the contrary, is very high when the transformations take place without reservations, with an intensity equal to their speed. Suffice it to think of Yugoslavia.

**THE KEYWORD,
AT LEAST AT LEADERSHIP
LEVEL,
IS TOLERANCE**

Israel's proposal of a new coexistence with the Palestinians in Jerusalem goes beyond the level of a confrontation between extreme ideologies in the very delicate field of religion.

The overture caused attacks from within both sides, which are the origin of the present situation, but doubtlessly the project will proceed, for the simple reason that, by now, it has been digested. The current tactical "about turn" towards radicalization does not wipe out the strategy of the intermediate accords and compromises, which are of fundamental importance for governing the daily life in a limited area.

Finally, Egypt and its leader present themselves as the motor of transformation and collective recognition by the rest of the world, without losing their Arab



Left.
Tel Aviv, Israel.

Right.
General view of Marrakesh, Morocco.

ITALY'S ROLE

To govern the world in a more efficient way, all should have a greater awareness of the challenges and a better knowledge of the instruments available. In the international environment, it is necessary to overcome the phase of acquiescence to the American thought, and proceed with the expression of an extended leadership reflecting a multipolar reality. The US would be the first to rejoice, since it tends to involve in the government of the world the highest possible number of countries, including those on the Southern and Northern shores of the Mediterranean.

This means that the subjection to American decisions is a choice, and not the necessary precondition for dialogue and cooperation with one country or another.

There should be no doubts or second thoughts about the strategy to follow, also because collective recognition, mediation and tolerance are management instruments everywhere, not just in the Mediterranean.

From this point of view, Italy's role stands out, since our Country, owing to its geographical position, can be considered a border nation of the European Union, but also a country of liaison and interpretation of the values and convictions prevailing in both North and South.

Therefore the engagement taken with France and Spain must continue, possibly involving also other Nations as natural European ambassadors in the Mediterranean, shifting even further the attention from the national interest to the Community's all-including ones.


identity. Mubarak must be appreciated for his clear choices, his ceaseless pursuit of peace and mediation, his support to Palestine, his recognition of Israel, the fight against terrorism and the involvement of the other Countries of the region. In short, a great vision, which takes already for granted the conclusion of the peace process, and plans for the future.

Population increase, poverty, underdevelopment, water, oil, migration, drug trafficking, security, continue to be in the background, but are now moving to the margins of attention, since the licit alternatives are on the increase.

The same can be said about terrorism, a type of criminal violence characterized by political motivation and secrecy.

Out of the twenty-eight recognized terrorist groups listed

in the "*Federal Register of Terrorist Organizations*", compiled by the US Government and updated starting from 1997, seventeen are active in the Mediterranean area. The problem, as a whole, consists in the coexistence, in a limited area, of cultures, behaviours, objectives, forms of government and legal organizations very different from each other. This permits to easily bypass any security measure and to keep equally easy connections and synergies, even at a distance. The path of multinational collaboration and convergence of behaviour, in order to establish a credible control screen as a premise for any possible response, has now been marked out. The question is to persist, working even harder in the near future.



Tasks come as consequences. We ought to be good Europeans; sensitize our partners to the Mediterranean problems and the possible solutions; act directly, vigorously supporting all well-deserving initiatives, no matter where they come from, even if times are long and results remain uncertain.

It is necessary to promote the firm belief, widely shared in Italy, that any kind of attention and sensitivity towards the problems that the southern countries have to face during their development process is an investment for mutual security and peace in the future.

The same is true for the collective effort aimed at supporting normal relations and improvements in the quality of life, giving adequate recognition to the best leaders.

It is a demanding endeavour, but made somewhat easier by the synergy of the strategic choice, which is the same for the US and

for Europe, and begins to be understood also to the South of the Mediterranean.

It is therefore necessary to adopt policies going beyond the mere bilateral and sectorial logics pursued so far by the members of the European Union.

On the other hand, times are ripe for a substantial change, if it is true that the Palestinians want more "actors" involved in the peace negotiations i.e., besides the US, also the UN, the EU and Russia. As a consequence, the international community, and therefore also Italy, will find itself in the situation of having to take up a position on specific problems.

A good reference for a Mediterranean vision is Egypt, which has long projected itself beyond regional peace and beyond the cooperation among all regional actors, Israel included.

In the case of Italy, also the cultural factor should not be forgotten, since it affects social life, which is where most problems and dangers are present.

Italy, being a catholic country, can open itself to a religious dialogue easily than any other European nation, in the common pursuit of understanding.

Keeping in mind the Arab component of the complex personality of the Italians, it seems also appropriate to suggest to give more importance to facts rather than to principles, without incurring in the political temptation, so common in the South, to demagogically exaggerate their contents and meanings, which results in making them ridiculous.

Moderation and constancy are necessary because the road is long and uphill.


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**Major General (ret.)*

OPERATIONAL READINESS IN UN MISSIONS

Taking the right steps is a necessary prerequisite for carrying out all activities.


Timely and focused operations are mandatory in implementing UN-led peacekeeping missions, as troops are often called upon to intervene in line with political agreements, which are difficult to reach and keep over time, without an appropriate security support. This requirement almost always clashes with an operational environment where no standing forces are deployed, i.e. one UN Corps or even one Brigade; force requirements are met "à la carte" upon deployment, thus delaying operations.




by Giulio Fraticelli *

SELECTING A TARGET

Once a Security Council Resolution is passed, establishing the initial day of a mission, its mandate and number of forces, several weeks of hectic activities follow to address issues already dealt with at staff level between the International Staff and force contributing countries.





During these weeks, only a restrained anxiety is felt, typical of all eves, which never escalates. At this point no media reports are issued.

A few weeks later, things usually change: newspapers begin to speak of "delays" and the same complaint is voiced in the area of operations as well. But nobody can answer the question "what do these delays refer to?". So far, no agreement has been reached on UN forces' readiness level.

Some senior officials make reference to the 1956 Suez crisis and its short deployment times (a

few days), without considering that the past political scenario was different from today's. Others, more pragmatically, think that 4-6 months at least are required to deploy a mission, based on the complexity of operations.

An effort has been carried out by the so-called "Brahimi Panel" to clarify this and other concepts in the field of UN effectiveness in peacekeeping operations. Nations should consider 30 days (90 days for complex missions) as a reference time to prepare their forces for deployment, following a Security Council resolution.

When comparing these times with NATO readiness levels (AMF excluded) or with those of the future European Force (60 days), the kind of readiness proposed by the UN can be easily accepted as a planning parameter, always taking into account that possible changes may be necessary to meet contingency requirements, which are constantly escalating.

Now every effort should be made to meet the selected target, but at this point things get complicated. Before suggesting possible solutions to reach the necessary readiness levels, the decision-making process should

be taken into account, as its development times may heavily impact upon the overall force readiness times.

INITIAL DECISION MAKING PROCESS

Three main actors play a leading role in planning and taking all decisions: the International Staff, the contributing countries and the Security Council.

The International Staff acts without waiting for the Security Council resolutions to be passed. It takes timely actions, based upon diplomatic activities and draws up contingency planning, to be taken into account by the Secretary General in addressing his report to the Council, whenever ad-hoc resolutions are



Above.
Italian troops engaged in
Operation "Albatros" in Mozambique.



Left.
AH129 "Mangusta" helicopters in
Somalia.

required to start, extend, change or terminate a mission. Given its dimensions and structure, the International Staff (more precisely the Department for Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO) is unfit to carry out the assigned tasks, especially as regards its military component. In fact, not only should it perform planning activities, but also crises response

operations, as confirmed by the above-mentioned "Brahimi" Report. Therefore the decision has been taken to increase personnel numbers.

A seamless and effective planning activity will allow for setting up the peace-keeping establishment (force generation), in step with the final phase of the diplomatic process, so that new

missions will be conceptually and structurally defined, when official agreements are finally reached.

In this case, the previously established time line (30 or 90 days) can be met, at least as far as the International Staff is concerned.

Let's now move on to force contributing countries.

Nations' responses to the International Staff's requests are varied, irrespective of their resource availability. Some nations reply within 48 hours, others within weeks, though



having similar employment procedures for out-of-area deployments.

Our country, even if strongly committed to peace-keeping, both qualitatively and quantitatively, is not considered as a reference model as regards decision-making within the UN. This is obviously a simple statistical analysis.

Nations' replies should not be simple "yes" or "no" answers, but should be more articulated, even if limited by some restrictions and caveats. These replies should be clear and sufficiently reliable and express a political and not a technical will only.

Some countries, and Italy is among them, must and can make a stronger effort. Conversely, the Security Council would be obliged to act in a state of

uncertainty as regards national contributions, which should be established both officially – as is the rule- and unofficially, i.e. at a preliminary but equally binding stage.

Lastly, the Security Council needs no less than 30 days to carry out informal consultations and regular sessions. This is also due to the fact that the major contributing country (the USA) needs as many as 15 days to complete the Administration/Congress staffing procedure necessary to approve a new mission.

This procedure is possible if the Council reaches an overall agreement and has to finalise its implementing procedures only; otherwise, the established time frame risks being extended beyond schedule. but this is a different problem.

In sum, contributing nations, together with the Security Council, have to take decisions running against the clock, while the International Staff (DPKO) carries out a mission activation and support role. The timeliness of decisions mainly depends on nations' decision making procedures and, to a certain extent, on those of the Security Council. For example, if either party takes a decision in 30 days and could not proceed in parallel with the other, thus exceeding the time established for a non complex mission, forces would be obliged to deploy at full speed.

These simple considerations are only aimed at focusing the attention on the fact that Commands, units, UN observers and civilians taking part in a mission are not computer *chips*,

acting within the times required by those who hold the "joystick". Nations are therefore called upon to take timely decisions, in line with the requirements set by new missions.


FORCE PREPARATION

As already said, the UN has no permanently assigned forces. The possibility of creating such type of forces was addressed immediately after the establishment of the UN and put aside at the eve of the cold war period. The Security Council then took on the stereotyped role we all too well know. In the 90's the Council was given more flexibility, but no major steps forward were taken in this sector.

Though the UN had sometimes failed to promptly react in the past, there are some who are opposed to the concept of permanently assigned forces even at a "technical" level only. There are others who express their reservations of a political nature, as regards the authority which will direct these forces or, even more pessimistically, the will of transforming the UN into a really effective organisation whose activity cannot be controlled.

Economic reasons connected with estimated expenditures add to the arguments against setting up a standing force, which, unfortunately is a subject of little interest for those countries playing a leading role in the field of peace and security.

The organisation has thus tried to find a possible make-shift solution, by establishing the so-called Stand-by Arrangement System (SAS). This structure connects about ninety countries to the International Staff, based on their terms of membership, which are usually laid down in a bilateral Memorandum, by which a nation accepts to make its forces, military observers or civilian policemen available to the



Italian patrol at the old port in Mogadishu.

UN, in a contingency, subject to confirmation upon employment.

So far, 34 nations have completed SAS procedures (Italy was one of the first countries to put its Army units, ships and cargo aircraft at UN's disposal).

The SAS has proved to be a valid planning and organisational standardisation instrument. But it is not so much effective as

regards force readiness, being unable to guarantee that forces will be really employed. In fact, this system envisages a double level of endorsement: nations must first subscribe the Memorandum and then confirm their engagement before deployment, just like traveller's cheques, which require two signatures to be cashed.

In effect, though nations are ready to contribute about 150,000 men to peacekeeping missions, NATO cannot even guarantee the deployment of a single man! Thus, when planning



a mission, the DPKO always starts its force generation process from scratch and has to face several difficulties in collecting all necessary human and material resources, especially when the most powerful countries have already committed their troops to other organisations.

As a consequence, preparation times go well beyond the standards (30-90 days) set by the UN; these delays can become exceedingly long and sometimes can even block a force generation process, given the endemic difficulties in finding specialised troops in such

sectors as C2, rotary wing components and logistics.

Some North European countries, together with Italy and other nations, have set up a Brigade level structure, the so-called SHIRBRIG(1) to overcome these difficulties and give new momentum to a their traditional peacekeeping role. This structure is based on a Brigade HQ with pre-established core elements and modules (Battalions, Companies) provided by several nations and earmarked for deployment. The Brigade can be deployed in 15-30 days and be

put under the authority of the UN or other organisation for no more than 6 months,

This initiative, fostered by the International Staff, was not completely supported by developing countries, though being opened to all participants. In fact, there are still some drawbacks at operational level. Firstly, political endorsement is required, but in this case procedures will be more rapidly completed, given the homogeneous nature and reduced number of participants. Secondly, interventions are

limited in scope, as only operations under Chapter VI of the UN Charter – peaceful settlement of disputes- are to be staged, i.e. those not entailing coercive measures. Lastly, another difficulty is to be overcome at present, that is providing all necessary resources, including logistic assets and airlift capabilities towards possible employment areas.

In sum, the SHIRBRIG, whose readiness level was validated last year, has not been employed yet, while its present Commander and a limited number of staff are serving in Ethiopia and Eritrea with the UNMEE mission, to which Italy is giving its precious contribution.

The concept of a standard Brigade has gathered a widespread consensus and will continue to do so in the future as well, thanks to the above-mentioned Brahimi Report, promoting the implementation of this initiative in several geographic areas and encouraging nations to reach similar agreements.

However, the SAS and the SHIRBRIG are not adequate enough to meet the above mentioned readiness requirements, given the lack of a force permanently assigned to the UN.

First of all, political reservations on the type of missions to be carried out should be overcome, to encompass all tasks presently assigned to a force deployed to the theatre, based on an agreement signed by the main parties involved, i.e. all tasks which are not included within traditional warfighting operations.

Moreover, an effort should be made to keep previous engagements, without having to interrupt co-operation with other organisations (UN, NATO, EU, etc). Planning cycles have to be envisaged based on political priorities and earmarked resources, in order to establish the force level that each nation shall commit over a certain time




Italian paratrooper during mission "Airone" in the Iraqi Kurdistan.

(one or two years). Whether forces were deployed or not, at the end of that period another country within the same organisation will take over. In short, force availability can be guaranteed for a short time frame only. Actually a standing force of 50,000 men would be better than a purely theoretical contingent 150,000 strong, as envisaged by the UN SAS.

In this framework, both mission length and contingents' rotation cycles are two reasons why nations are obliged to limit their engagements. In the end, the bottom line is possibility of relying on few but really available men, adequately trained and equipped and rapidly deployable.

Training is another critical issue, as regards operational readiness. This subjects requires a detailed analysis which goes beyond the scope of my presentation. Suffice it to say that peace-keeping training, being inherently complex, cannot



be a national responsibility only. The UN should take steps to constantly carry out a more in-depth and preventive evaluation of the troops to deploy, by adopting the necessary structural changes at DPKO level mainly.

A mission requires both units and men to deploy, but also the establishment of an HQ with all its military and non military components. Given the dimensions and expectations of troop contributing nations, there is the need for setting up a multinational command. The necessary amalgamation of all


key elements, essential to the success of a mission, may therefore be delayed. The proposal of setting up a RDMHQ (2) has been suggested at UN level, to be a core element regularly incorporated into the DPKO. This HQ, duly augmented, would be deployed to the theatre of operations for an initial period (e.g. 3 months), then re-deployed to the National Staff upon deployment of the official HQ, in view of further commitments.

While this idea has not been put into practice yet, another proposal is gaining ground,

according to which a selected number of personnel, not belonging to the International Staff, should be deployed at short notice (one week).

We are hopeful that one of these solutions may lead to a positive outcome, also thanks to the often mentioned Brahimi Report.

Now let us spend a few words on logistics. This sector is strictly linked to the approval of Security Council Resolutions (allocation of budgetary funds and necessary supplies). This system is not operational by nature and therefore will never allow for



Left and below.

VCC1 and their crews belonging to the paratroop Brigade engaged in Operation "Ibis" in Somalia.

Right.

"Italcon" medical personnel provide aid assistance to the civilian population during the peace-keeping mission in Lebanon.

keeping the time schedule established at the beginning of a mission.

Two corrective measures have been envisaged by the Brahimi Report: first, the Secretary General should be authorised to make expenditures - up to \$50 million - without waiting for Security Council Resolutions, and second, the stock levels (*start up kits*) at the Logistic Base in Brindisi should be increased.

We do hope that these corrective measures will be implemented.

So far military units' and observer officers' readiness capabilities have been taken into account, but the above-mentioned considerations can be also applied to civil police personnel and civilians taking part in any peacekeeping mission.

The readiness level of civil police forces as well is linked to the availability of qualified personnel tailored to UN standards.

The employment times scheduled for these forces have recently been affected by the increased number of requirements, as compared to national resource availability.


Therefore, it is increasingly clear that nations should take



into account the growing requirements of civil police (CIVILPOL) forces necessary to carry out UN missions, when evaluating their police force levels. In a year's time force requirements shifted from 4,500 to about 9,000 men; therefore as is the case with the military, the number of civil police forces shall be increased, given the growing demand for conflict

to face two problems mainly: the number of personnel and their linguistic skills.

Much is still to be done as regards civilian personnel. Today's complex peace-keeping missions, which are often called upon to reconstruct state institutions shattered by internal conflicts, require a wide range of experts belonging to different administrative sectors.



Apparently, the reconstruction effort must not abide by the same readiness schedule applied to the security components. On the contrary, this concept is only partially true and cannot be applied to all civilian components. In fact, a mission is effectively carried out if all tasks are harmonised and operational components synchronise their efforts in all sectors, also as

regards restoring effectiveness and building confidence in the area of operation, a task not to be undervalued. Therefore, the prompt availability of good managers is paramount, but this requirement has not sufficiently been met yet. Databases should be set up both at the DPKO and national levels, listing the experts to be recruited in each sector at the beginning of a mission; this way, hasty and undetailed requests, usually partially satisfied, will no longer be forwarded.

CONCLUSION

At present, UN-led missions' operational readiness cannot rely on permanently assigned forces, but can be increased by adopting ad-hoc measures at UN and national levels. Countries require a limited political explanation

but a careful technical planning in line with the schedule of international commitments, in order to obtain rewarding results with almost the same amount of resources.

Making a step forward along this path would almost solve the dilemma of those tasked to decide on possible interventions in peace-keeping missions, reduce the number of casualties and, in some cases, prevent conflicts and even cut overall costs.


Investing energy to this purpose will be worthwhile.



**Lieutenant General*

NOTES

- (1) SHIRBRIG: Stand-by High Readiness Brigade
- (2) RDMHQ: Readily Deployable Mission Headquarters




The US Army is engaged in an effort of global transformation which conjugates the most sophisticated technologies with organization and training.

The objective is to realize a more agile, reactive and employable force, with better survivability. In the following interview, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki discusses with us these and other subjects.



USA THE NEW ARMY



INTERVIEW WITH GEN. ERIC K. SHINSEKI CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE US ARMY

by Enrico Magnani *

General, what are the most important programmes in the US Army agenda for the early years of the 21st Century?

The United States Army not only must fight and win the Nation's wars, but also conduct military operations in support of our National Command Authority. To this end, it has begun to transform, in order to meet the challenges of the new century. This transformation will affect structure, equipment and training, all leading to a more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable and sustainable force.

Some time ago, the 4th Infantry was transformed into a *laboratory* for the land forces, and is experimenting the feasibility of the so-called *Force XXI*. Could you tell us in what way this


development will impact on the structure of the US Army in the future?

One of the Army's focus areas is achieving information dominance. This has been incorporated within the force development, design and fielding process. At the same time, the Army has taken measures to ensure our ability to fight as part of an integrated joint and multinational force.

The RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) emphasizes speed in the decision-making process and in operations, as well as the accuracy and surgical precision of the actions. What will be its time frame, and how will this

doctrine be implemented?

As you said, RMA is already in place in many units. The four Advanced Warfighting Experiments conducted since 1995, and the advanced digitization capabilities now is use





by the 4th Infantry Division and the 3rd Corps, are clear examples of employment of new technologies. Meanwhile, the Army continues to pursue cutting-edge technologies, as evidenced by our efforts to build the Objective Force, whose units should be operational at the end of this decade.

US Army contingents are an important element of several multinational forces that are now working in the Balkans. What are the lessons learned from these particular experiences that involve both peacekeeping and peace-enforcement?

In our view our experience in the Balkans, working with our partner Nations and NATO allies, has been a success story. Furthermore, these operations have demonstrated the efficiency of the Alliance and reinforced the importance of interoperability in multinational operations. Peacetime engagement

with the allies will also remain critically important to developing interoperability, one of the cornerstones of success in contingency operations.


The US Army, although placing a great emphasis on the maintenance of superiority, at all levels, during military operations, is conducting studies about non-lethal weapons. What is the state-of-the-art of this technology? Is it really deployable, and in what kind of scenarios?

We are in the initial phase of study of non-lethal weapon technology and are still studying various proposals regarding their employment. We will not speculate on the feasibility of their use until the subject matter experts have completed their analysis and findings.

In what way will the future soldier, the so-called *cyber*

***warrior*, be different from the rifleman of today?**

The soldier of the future,



equipped with the ***Land Warrior*** systems (an advanced digitized, modular weapon system), will have enhancements to the

Right.

An NCO of the 2nd Detachment, 7th Air Squadron.

Facing page, above.

Members of Company C, 1st bn, 26th Infantry Regt, on patrol along the border between Serbia and Kosovo.


Facing page, below.

A vehicle of the Transport Platoon, Company A, Forward Support Bn.

individual soldier's ability to shoot, move, communicate, remain tactically aware and survive. Among other things, he will be equipped with technology that enables him to communicate quickly and accurately using digital technology. He will be able to engage targets while reducing personal exposure, and greatly increase his individual and collective contribution to the battle.

The hypothesis of a worldwide general conflict seems over now, and yet the US Army has the biggest and most modern tank fleet in the world. What will be the future of the armoured component?

Our heavy formations employ a main battle tank that some consider the finest in the world, and will continue to play a vital role in the US Army throughout the coming decades. Our heavy forces - the so-called *Legacy Force* - must fulfill our mission requirements. To maintain overmatch and win decisively against any potential adversary, we must continue to train and maintain these types of formations until the convergence of technology and the interim Force formations are realized in the *Objective Force*.



Artillery has always been one of the most technologically developed components of the Army. What are the plans for the replacement of the MLRS and M109 fleet? What will be the fire support for the medium-light forces of the future?

The Army maintains that it must have field artillery to fight and win on the future battlefield. Each component of the forces has unique and


critical missions in every conflict. The successor to the M109 Paladin, the Crusader, is a critical element of the Army's vision for future forces because of its rapid and accurate long-range fire, its ability to trap and kill, and its survivability. The Crusader is a sophisticated artillery system that will be effective in every mission and every theatre. Initially, fire support for our Interim Brigade Combat Teams will consist of eighteen

155mm towed howitzers. As part of the efforts to develop the Objective Force, the centerpiece of our fire support system beyond 2012 has not been identified yet.

Engineers and Signals now have full roles in any military operation, as well as that of force multipliers and pillars of Peace Support Operations. In the architecture of the US Army of the 21st Century, what will be the future for these specialties?

We envision that Engineers and Signals will remain critical members of the combined arms team. The technological advancements in these areas will continue to demand tough, disciplined soldiers with the requisite skills needed for the Objective Force.

The logistics component of the Army needs strong cooperation with other services. This



Logistics redesign is a major component of the Army transformation. We are currently partnering with industry to identify new technologies that will enable us to make the *Objective Force* a reality. Additionally, we are working with our sister services to identify logistical commonalities,

Facing page.

The leader of a rifle squad and his interpreter, members of Company B, 3rd bn., 505th Paratroop Regt., talking to some children near Gjilane.

Above.

A woman NCO in charge of fuel supplies and a mechanic of the Transport Unit, Special Troops bn., 5th Corps.

Left.

Stationary flight of an AH-64 "Apache" helicopter at very low altitude.



cooperation maintains the credibility of the operational forces. Do you foresee something new coming in interservice and/or civil-military cooperation?

and to determine the most efficient way to move Army forces by air and sea. The Army is working to reduce its deployed footprint in the battlespace and reduce logistics

demand on strategic airlift. The logistics elements are transforming with a reorganization of the Army Materiel Command and Theatre Support Command. We are also focusing on developing and fielding strategic/mission/combat configured loads; developing intermediate support/staging base doctrine and structure; reviewing strategic air and sealift and prepositioned stocks/sets; enhancing power projection infrastructure, both in the US and overseas; fielding logistics vehicles with on-board upload/download; and reviewing/validating contractor and Host Nation Support.



The US Army has the world's biggest paratroops and airmobile units. What will be the future of these forces as tilt rotor systems develop?

Tilt rotor technology presents some very interesting and potentially useful applications. However, our airborne and light infantry units remain the most deployable and practical war fighting formations in contingency scenarios. The Marine Corps is currently at the forefront of developing this capability and we will continue to share their insights as they develop the doctrine associated with this

new technology.

In a general picture of force reductions, the US forces in Italy and the "Lion Brigade", on the contrary, were reinforced in personnel and equipment. Will the "Lion Brigade" see other changes? What role does this unit play in European and Mediterranean security?

There are no near-term changes anticipated for US Army forces serving in Italy. Southern European Task Force soldiers will continue their

contingency role as before: a short-notice, forcible, entry-capable reinforced Infantry battalion, ready to execute missions as directed.

The US Army is completely based on professional personnel, including a significant number (more than 10%) of women. Is it possible to evaluate the impact of the presence of women on the professional level of the personnel?

Women fill critical roles and perform a number of very important duties. They serve



proudly and make a significant contribution to the US Army, a most respected institution in our culture.

In a force that looks to the future, what is the weight of military tradition?

Military tradition and heritage are extremely important to our soldiers. Last summer "The Army" celebrated its 225th birthday and, although it is relatively young by European standards, we take great pride in the fact that it has been in existence since before the Nation

Above.

Lt. Gen. James C. Riley, Commander of the V Corps, aboard a 2A5 Leopard tank.

Facing page.

US servicemen chatting with young Kosovars.

Left.

A member of North Carolina's National Guard giving toys to Moldavian children.



gained its independence. Military tradition is definitely a motivating factor and a very important part of our culture.

What is the relationship today between the US Army and the American citizens? What is the most important feedback between the military and civil society in America today?

We have a very good relationship with our citizenry. If

one is to believe opinion polls, the Army consistently ranks at the top as applies to "trust" in large institutions. Many people believe that the Army lives by its values, and indeed we are proud of our record of shaping the lives of young Americans. We imbue them with a sense of commitment, pride and selflessness in service to the Country. Finally, every soldier eventually returns to civilian society, bringing skills and experiences that contribute to the growth of our Nation.

In the US land forces, the National Guard and Army Reserve have great roles. Has the experiment with the integration of guardsmen and reservist units in Multinational Forces and Observers (MFO) in Sinai been the source of innovations in policy for the reserve forces?

The MFO mission and the use



General Eric K. Shinseki was born in Lihue, Hawaii, on September 28, 1942. He graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1965 with a Bachelor of Science Degree.

General Shinseki has held a variety of command and staff assignments both in the continental United States and overseas: among others, Artillery Forward Observer and Squadron Commander in Vietnam, Staff Officer with Headquarters US Army Hawaii and US Army Pacific, Professor of English at the US Military Academy.

At Fort Bliss, Texas, he served as the Regimental Adjutant of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment and as the Executive Officer of its 1st Squadron.

General Shinseki's ten-plus years of service in Europe included assignments in Germany as Commander of a Squadron, 7th Cavalry, and Commander, 2nd Brigade. Furthermore, he has been Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Training and Assistant Division Commander for Manoeuvre.

He served as the Assistant Chief of Staff G3 (Operations, Plans and Training) of the VII Corps, and as Deputy Chief of Staff for Support at LANDSOUTH (Verona, Italy). From March 1994 to July 1995, General Shinseki commanded the 1st Cavalry Division in Texas.

In 1996, upon his promotion to Lieutenant General, he became the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, US Army. In 1997 he was appointed to the rank of General and assumed duties as Commanding General of the Allied Land Forces in Central Europe, and Commander of the NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

On November 24, 1998, he assumed duties as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and, on June 22, 1999, as Chief of Staff.

General Shinseki holds a Master of Arts Degree in English Literature and attended, among others, the Army Command and General Staff College, and the National War College.

He holds numerous decorations and awards.

General Eric K. Shinseki is married and has two children.

of the Reserve component therein has been more a consequence of the increasing role and pace of missions experienced by the US Army globally. As is known, the Reserve component (both National Guard and Reserves) makes up approximately 54% of our Army formations. With this percentage of reservists, coupled with an increased pace of operations around the world, the logic of increased use of the Reserve component is justified. In the case of the Balkan operations, many of the skills required, such as Civil Affairs and psychological operations, are resident primarily in the Reserve component, thus making the use of these soldiers practical. They have served exceptionally well in all missions assigned.

□

** Journalist*

BULGARIA

THE NEW ARMY

by Enrico Magnani *



**Interview with Lieutenant General
Tencho Pavlov Dobrev
Commander of the Land Forces**

Winds of reform are blowing also within the Bulgarian Armed Forces, as Lt. Gen. Tencho Pavlov Dobrev, Commander of the Land Forces, tells us in this interview. The cornerstones of the process of reform are: structural reorganization; technologic modernization; integration with civil society; interoperability with NATO.

General, what is the present situation of the Bulgarian Army?

Obviously I have my own personal view of the situation of the Bulgarian Army, but I will limit my answers to the Land Forces, since I am their Chief and I have authority and competence over them.

The new global reality, and in particular the reality of the Balkan peninsula after the end of the Cold War, determined the need to radically reorganize the Army and, in particular, the Land Forces. In order to make them capable of meeting the new requirements and challenges, we have worked out a plan for their reorganization, restructuring and development, the so-called "Plan 2004". The plan considers the new tasks and is divided into three phases: year 2000, years 2001-2002, years 2003-2004.

From the functional point of view, the Land Forces are organized as follows:

- Rapid Reaction Corps;
- Defence Forces;
- Cover and Territorial Defence Forces.



At the moment, we are at the end of the first phase, during which we accomplished the reform of the Land Forces Command and Rapid Reaction Corps, with their logistic and support units. The units of the Rapid Reaction Corps have also been reorganized, together with those earmarked for the participation in Peace Support Operations and for the constitution of multinational units. A section of the Intelligence, Communication and Engineer formations within the Land Forces Command has also been modernized.

Right now, as a result of the activities carried out within "Plan 2004", our Land Forces have a combat-ready Rapid Reaction Corps, while the restructuring and redeployment of the Defence and Territorial Forces is in progress.

The Bulgarian Army has a relatively limited experience as regards UN-led peacekeeping operations, but it has taken part in the constitution of SFOR and KFOR. What lessons have been learned from these commitments?

Land Forces units participated

in peacekeeping operations in the Balkan peninsula, within the SFOR and KFOR multinational forces. The successful outcome of these missions depends on the solution of some problems.

First, the specific training of our units. We started studying the experiences made by the NATO Armies. In this respect, our participation in multinational forces together with Dutch and Greek contingents has been very useful.

Taking into account the lessons we learned, we established a training centre specialized in preparing the units earmarked for participation in UN-led operations.

Equipment and weapons must conform to NATO prescriptions. This is a priority, which goes together with the wish, expressed by the leaders of our Republic, that Bulgaria should become a member of the Atlantic Alliance.

In view of this, we attribute great importance to the study of languages, which is an

indispensable factor in order to acquire interoperability with other NATO Armies and to conform to their standards.

Within the Land Forces Command there are special centres capable of organizing, rapidly and efficiently, the operational activity of the units called by the Government to participate in UN missions.

Is the adhesion to NATO a national strategic objective? What are its possible consequences?

Integration within NATO is really a national strategic objective, for which there is political and social consensus. This was clearly expressed in the "Declaration of the National Assembly" of May 1997, and confirmed in the "National Security Concept" of April 1999, as well as in "Plan 2004" for the organization and development of the Army.

The institution of a wholly European security system is more than necessary and we believe that there are no alternatives. Furthermore, only through its integration within NATO, Bulgaria can reorganize its economy, build and renew national infrastructure, quickly fill the technological gap and pursue higher-level political, economic and military objectives. Thus, if we ask ourselves how this will affect our Land Forces, it is easy to answer that the participation in the Alliance is going to sharply increase our operational capabilities, making our rather limited forces more mobile and better equipped.

At any rate, our integration in the collective security system will entail the improvement of the capabilities necessary to perform certain tasks, such as, for instance:

- participation in multinational peacekeeping operations;

Women volunteers of the 61st Motorized Brigade.





- joint NATO exercises on our territory;
- far-reaching reform of the Land Forces, according to "Plan 2004".

In general terms, we can say that the reform is based on four basic aspects:

- structural;
- technologic;
- social;
- interoperability with NATO land forces.

From the structural viewpoint, during the period 2000-2004 the reform will concern more than 180 Land Forces units. By the end of 2000, thirty of them were reorganized, and an equal number was put at the Command's disposal. At the same time, the reorganization of the Command itself was completed,

so as to make it compatible from the organizational and functional point of view.

The Land Forces Command pays due attention to the structural and organizational aspects which concern personnel and equipment of the Rapid Reaction Corps. The organization concerns also the Immediate Reaction Forces and, by 2004, will lead to the creation of the Defence Forces and Territorial Defence. From the technologic point of view, it is envisaged to reequip the Land Forces in order to adapt them to NATO standards.

From the social viewpoint, the realization of the reforms affects mostly the personnel of the Land Forces. The gradual discharge of a large number of servicemen and their social integration are

Infantrymen in combat training.

difficult measures. In this respect, we consult Countries like the US, Great Britain and Germany, to profit by their experience.

The Ministry of Defence has organized special centres for the retraining and social readaptation of the soldiers who, by the end of this year, will be reduced by 10%.

Another key element of the reform is to implement the interoperability with NATO. Our soldiers will thus be able to participate in joint activities, at both unit and command level, adjusting to the structures and forces of the Alliance, in order to

Infantrymen from a motorized unit on patrol.

Turkey. What are the prospects of these agreements, and the possible developments from the military viewpoint?

Bulgaria has contacts with all NATO members, including Greece and Turkey. The military leaders attach particular importance to the relations with these two Countries.

This cooperation, from the military point of view is extremely important, also considering that in 1997 Bulgaria expressed the wish to join NATO as a full-fledged member. The achievement of this objective, would not only increase stability in the Balkans, but also promote a fruitful exchange of military experiences, which would make the way ahead easier and shorter.

What are the priorities in the process of interoperability with NATO? Will it be possible to achieve standardization in training and compatibility of weapon systems?

The achievement of interoperability with NATO, and in particular with its land forces, is a key element for the integration of our Country with the Euro-Atlantic security structures. The implementation of MAP (Membership Action Plan) through the "Annual National Programme" implies the introduction, knowledge and application of the administrative and logistic standards of the Alliance.

To achieve interoperability, the main areas of action are:

- restructuring and reorganization of the Land Forces along the lines fixed by "Plan 2004" and MAP;



perform all the functions envisaged by the peacekeeping operations.

Our soldiers understand very well the present reform and its consequences. In fact they are aware that the result of this process will be an Army of reduced dimensions, but highly

professional, adequate to the times and capable of assuring the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the Nation.

Bulgaria cooperates with the other NATO nations of the Balkans, i.e. Greece and



- realization of 19 of the 79 "Objectives for Partnership", which prescribe the attainment of a determinate level of interoperability for the forces and relevant equipment assigned to Peace Support Operations and to those within Art.5 of the Washington Treaty;
- preparation and implementation of specific programmes for the development of particularly important areas, such as linguistic training for Command personnel, consultation system, C3I systems, logistic support, training of PSO forces and production of official documents concerning the employment of the Land Forces.

As a result of the implementation of "plan 2004", the Land Forces

Command was restructured according to NATO standards. At present, the reform of the Army Corps and their units is under way.

On the basis of the reorganized units, our Land Forces will include: a Rapid Reaction Corps, Immediate Reaction Forces, Defence Forces and Territorial Forces.

The process of planning and revision, which is taking place with the active participation of the whole Country, includes interoperability objectives and partnership objectives.

In 1999 the Land Forces have been working for the achievement of 17 interoperability objectives. At the beginning of 2000, Bulgaria was assigned 82 partnership objectives, 19 of which concerning directly the

Physical training at Pleven's Training Centre for junior Commanders and recruits.

Land Forces. They will be our priorities up to 2006. This year we are working for the achievement of 11 partnership objectives concerning land operations, peacekeeping training, logistic support, tactical modernization and the establishment of structures for civil-military cooperation.

On the basis of the agreed time limits and of the available resources, in 2000 we constituted and trained the following units for Peace Support Operations: a mechanized company; an NBC company; an NBC recce platoon;



"Peacekeeping training" of the troops of the 2nd Command, Rapid Reaction Forces.

an Engineer company; an Engineer platoon (now in service with the Dutch contingent of SFOR); a transport platoon (with the Greek SFOR contingent); an Engineer platoon (with KFOR).

According to "Plan 2004", a defence potential is going to be established within the sector of the operational capabilities for NATO missions. It will include:

- a mechanized Brigade;
- an Engineer battalion;
- an NBC unit.

Another important element for the achievement of interoperability is the participation in the MPFSEE

Brigade of a mechanized battalion and several Officers for the Brigade HQ.

It must be noted that training is proceeding exclusively according to NATO standards, with the periodical issue of an operational-readiness certificate. Most of the practical realization of the interoperability process takes place through the units participating in the activities of "Partnership for Peace".

The Land Forces have taken part in the following activities:

- 1996: two exercises, in Albania and the United States;
- 1997: two exercises, in Bulgaria and Greece;
- 1998: five exercises, in Greece, US, Rumania, Macedonia and Turkey;
- 1999: three exercises, in

Greece, Canada and Italy;

- 2000: six exercises, in Portugal, Albania, Rumania, Turkey, US and Bulgaria.

Five exercises will be carried out in 2001.

As a whole, more than 300 servicemen, between Officers, NCOs and troops, have taken part in these activities since 1996.

During the exercises, the training level was practically assessed. This also permitted a professional enrichment, besides improving the training level.

The achievement of interoperability between our Land Forces and NATO's would be unthinkable without the standardization of training, which will be obtained through the reform of the School system. This falls within the province of the

General Staff, and therefore I shall not discuss it. Instead, I would like to discuss the activities which concern directly the Land Forces personnel. As we said, at this point the priority areas appear to be: linguistic training for Command personnel, Command and control procedures and exchange of information.

A particular element of the standardization of training is the certification of language proficiency according to STANAG 6001. At the present moment, 193 Officers have passed this test.

Another path towards standardization is the attendance, by our Officers, of foreign War Colleges, Academies and other military schools. Up to now, 104 Officers have completed a training cycle abroad.

As regards the interoperability of armaments and equipment, it is possible to achieve it through the employment of materials produced in NATO countries, or with the production of these systems by our industries.

Do your modernization plans envisage the adoption of systems produced in Western Europe, and if so, in what sectors?

In 1998 we made a careful analysis of our armoured forces, from both the quantitative and the qualitative point of view. Considering the reorganization envisaged by "Plan 2004", we prepared a programme for modernization and rearmament of the Land Forces, which goes up to 2015. For the next three years, the programme aims at acquiring a highly reliable cost-effective general-purpose diesel vehicle, with a good ecological index. The purchase of modern tanks, infantry weapons and artillery materials from NATO countries depends on the availability of financial resources, which are rather

Lt. Gen. Tencho Pavlov Dobrev was born in Sofia on May 25, 1942.

He attended the "G. Damyanov" Military Academy in 1965, and the War College from 1970 to 1973. After commanding several minor units, he held a number of Staff positions at the Engineer Department, the Engineer Inspectorate and the Training and Operations Department of the Land Forces.

Gen. Dobrev attended the "Voroscilov" War College in Russia from 1984 to 1986, and later held the position of Department Chief and Chief of the Engineer Directorate at the Land Forces Command and the General Staff.

In 1998 he was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics and, on July 11, 2000, Commander of the Land Forces.

Lt. Gen. Tencho Pavlov Dobrev is married and has two sons.

limited at the moment. But I believe that, in the course of the reform, we shall be able to look in that direction.

What is the role of the Army in Bulgarian society? What is the activity of the Armed Forces in favour of the civilian population?

The reform envisages the disbandment or redeployment of many units. During the Cold War the Army was mainly deployed along the southern border. Now many barracks, located in the border towns, will have to be closed. This has had an immediate negative impact on the local economy. All the mayors of the cities concerned, without exception, have insistently demanded that those installations remain open (and this shows the bond between Armed Forces and civil society, a bond that, from the point of view of practical benefits, goes back to 1878, when the Army was constituted). This difficult question will have to be studied and investigated for several years by specialized research institutes. The bonds mentioned

above are mainly "horizontal", i.e. with local authorities and social organizations/institutions.

Last year, the Land Forces participated in two large-scale national campaigns: in April, 6076 men and 111 heavy vehicles have been engaged in the national "spring-cleaning", and in the summer the Land Forces took an active part in putting out countless fires caused by the worst drought of the last 50 years.

"Plan 2004" also provides for a radical reorganization of the forces, in order to face crisis situations in the whole national territory. Right now, my Command is working at the completion of modules organized by subject: first type, against fires; second, wintertime natural disasters; third, floods; fourth, industrial disasters; fifth, earthquakes.

The programme envisages the training of personnel, preparation of equipment and activation of a specific communications net, all within the framework of a fruitful interaction with local Authorities and central Administration.

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**Journalist*

NON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

The requirement to guarantee a credible security level against terrorist attacks has been already recognized almost worldwide. The most effective strategies to counter a terrorist attack waged with the use of unconventional weapons are the following: an intelligence organization focusing on prevention, a civil protection apparatus capable of rapidly intervening to limit the side-effects of any attack by employing state-of-the-art detection and NBC decontamination systems, timely relief and evacuation efforts and effective medical personnel. First of all, political initiatives are required to solve the most critical socio-economic issues affecting many areas of the world.



by Gianfranco Tracci*
and Ulderico Petresca **


HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND DISARMAMENT TREATIES

It is impossible to go back in history and identify the first terrorist attack carried out with non conventional weapons. Even mythological gods were tempted to cross the threshold of fair play in hitting their opponents, hi the Iliad, Apollo was reported to have spread an epidemic on the Achaean battlefield to avenge an offence committed by the Greeks against one of his priests.

However, mythological gods and in particular the one "with the silver arch" were not the first to use systems which today may be considered as true biological

weapons, hi many religions there is the belief that plagues, draughts and calamities are directly sent to humanity by the heavens or divine messengers. These disasters were sometimes interpreted as warnings or punishments.

Ancient Eastern traditions, especially in India, rejected the use of non conventional weapons as opposed to their ethics. But the Greeks and the Persians were not reluctant to use non conventional weapons, which they employed on several occasions, as testified by historical documents, hi fact, the Greeks worshipped Medea and Circe, sisters of the goddess Hecate, for their capability of concocting poisonous drugs, magic potions and other non



Manzoni. Both heads of state and emperors had recourse to these attacks when necessary. History has it that Jerusalem was conquered in 1099 by Crusaders, after they had poisoned its water resources. In 1155, Frederick Barbarossa polluted the wells in Tortona with the corpses of soldiers; 800 years later, during the Civil War, General Jackson decided to follow Barbarossa's example by contaminating some water springs with the carcasses of dead animals at Vicksburg in the New Continent.

In 1763, Sir Amherst, governor of the British colonies in North America, wrote to Colonel H. Bouquet suggesting him to spread the small pox virus among the Indians in Pennsylvania, who were threateningly besieging Fort Pitt (today Pittsburgh) by sending them infected clothes, in order to extirpate this execrable race. Thus he closely followed the pattern already adopted by the French and by Pizarro in South America, some centuries earlier.

The employment against those peoples of what would be considered today as a biological weapon, shows that it could be effectively used both in defensive and offensive actions and that a terrorist/plague spreader was absolutely necessary to spread it.

Even though toxin biological and chemical agents were still in use, following the discovery of mustard gas by Guthrie in 1860 - further developed by Meyer in 1866 - it can be noted that, as early as the 19th century, many countries felt the need to limit the previously accepted use of "toxin agents" at least in armed conflicts, as testified by the Paris Protocol and the First International Conference in The Hague in 1899. But, while some key figures, like emperor Napoleon III, strongly committed themselves to ban these weapons, others followed the opposite direction: during the Civil War, Donaghy, a unionist, suggested that the American

government use chlorine grenades to limit "bloodshed in the battlefield".

During the XX century there was an incredible and rapid development in the industrial research sector; new toxin chemical products were tested also in battlefields, immediately followed by good-will initiatives to ban these weapons in future conflicts.

In 1907, The Second Conference to ban all chemical weapons was summoned in The Hague, but only five countries signed the treaty. During World War I, almost all belligerents extensively used non conventional weapons, not only in the front line but also in rear areas. Within this context, Germany has always denied having sent its experts to spread cholera in Italy, plague in St. Petersburg, anthrax in Rumania and Mesopotamia and among horses sent to Europe from the US or having delivered contaminated toys and sweets to other countries. Was it psychosis due to wartime propaganda or plain truth?

Based on the experiences gained during World War I, the Geneva Protocol, signed by 38 nations in 1925, established that "the use of choking gas or other bacteriological agents in wartime was banned" but allowed for using these weapons when reacting against an attack. Having no adequate verification instrument, it did not succeed in preventing all belligerents from going to war with large supplies of "non conventional weapons" and, in particular, Germany from developing nerve gas, extremely more dangerous than mustard gas and phosgene which had been used during World War I. Luckily, these weapons were never used.

Nevertheless, the 1925 Protocol marked an important step forward, but it was only 70 years later that the Paris Convention was signed in 1993. This Convention definitely banned, with no preconditions, the use of

traditional mixtures deemed necessary to reach their objectives.

Besides mythology, very ancient documents testifying to the employment of non traditional weapons, state that also at that time it was difficult to identify those responsible for their use.

History books report several cases of poisoning water and food supplies or even a king or a famous knight, as the result of a pre-planned plot or an extreme attempt to get rid of an enemy.

After the Greeks and the Persians, also the Romans made a wide use of these weapons. Since the Middle Ages, many terroristic actions have been carried out at the hand of poisoners and plague spreaders, as reported by

this kind of weapons in future armed conflict, thus settling all controversial issues of the Geneva Protocol.

Despite the important discoveries in the field of chemical weapons, they were not used during World War II, unlike biological and nuclear weapons. In fact, China blamed Japan for the employment of plague germs and other toxins in Mancuria, while the US, winner of the nuclear armament race, entered the nuclear era with the bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

RISKS DERIVING FROM THE EMPLOYMENT OF NON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

At the end of World War II it appeared that after the first nuclear bomb attack and the development of new chemical and bacteriological weapons, all risks related to the employment of non conventional weapons even in non-armed conflict scenarios, escalated due to the enhanced lethality of these weapons. And it was also clear that the kill capability of "non conventional weapons" was moving at the same speed as the scientific research, in the biological sector mainly, where the possibility of creating new life forms to be used in conflicts or other situations was about to become a reality. Since then, a trend has been followed to sign treaties, bans and international agreements with encouraging results, but these instruments do not encompass the whole range of "non conventional weapons" yet and do not prevent non-signatory countries from using them in the battlefield or in terrorist actions.

The lethality of "non conventional weapons" can be better illustrated by recalling some terrorist actions carried out with their employment. In 1978, Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian journalist, died in London, hit by a 1,5 mm platinum-iridium bullet poisoned

with ricin, a highly toxic powder extracted from castor oil plants growing in many gardens. Vladimir Kostov, another Bulgarian journalist, was equally injured in Paris in the same year and Boris Korcsac, a Soviet national, was injured in the US in 1998. These attacks show how simple it is to find and employ highly toxic chemical agents such as ricin for terrorist purposes. In 1984, 750 people were poisoned at The Dalles in the US after eating in a same restaurant. The reason of the poisoning remained unknown for about two years, when Sheila Anand admitted her responsibility, upon leaving the sect headed by the guru Bhagwan Shree Raneesh. She confessed to having grown bacteria in the sect labs and used them to poison restaurant food.

In October 1992, Shoko Ashara, leader of the Japanese sect "Sublime Truth" was able to seize the highly lethal Ebola virus directly from patients in Zaire, where he had gone with 46 other followers to assist the victims of that disease. In 1995, 12 people died and 5000 were severely injured in the well-known attack in the Tokyo subway perpetrated by the same sect this time inspired by murderous intentions.

The following story is a good example of how easily dangerous biological agents can be found on the market and employed for other than humanitarian purposes: in 1995, Larry Harris, a technician working in a Ohio lab, ordered and received a postal parcel with three vials containing plague bacilli from the American Culture Collection, Rockville, Maryland.

Fortunately, that parcel was seized before being delivered to the addressee, as the man turned out to be a member of a dubious organization pleading in favor of "white power". Harris was then found guilty of "postal fraud" only by a federal Court.

Since 1989, the issue of bio-terrorism", as regards food

poisoning (chocolate, cakes and fruits), has been addressed many times also in Italy. These events have sparked debates on the possible risks deriving from terrorist attacks against food and agriculture, water and livestock, with the employment of biological agents and toxins mainly.

Some significant events testify to the fact that the risk of a terrorist action of this kind, both in Italy and abroad, is not so far-fetched as it may seem.

Sadigappar Mamalayev, director of the Institute for agricultural research in Kazakstan, has recently said that his Institute had developed special techniques to infect both animals and plants with terrible diseases. Ken Alibek, a Russian writer, wrote in his "Biohazard" that most of the 10,000 Soviet scientists who had worked in this sector at least until 1992, were looking for a job and might be hired by some nations interested in military biological research.

The Non Proliferation Review " reported a remarkable increase in the number of terrorist attacks in 1999. Without going into the details of said report, it is however to be stressed that the terrorist activities carried out by Osama bin Laden and his followers are arousing growing concern; in fact this group is suspected of planning attacks envisaging the employment of weapons of mass destruction. In fact, the "champion of Jihad" has been accused of setting up plants and labs also in Sudan to carry out research and development of biochemical weapons and of planning the procurement of nuclear weapons. As it is too well known, the US has bombed a chemical plant in Sudan suspected of providing Osama bin Laden with chemical toxin agents.

The above mentioned report also listed several confiscation cases of facilities and biological agents such as anthrax, viruses, toxins, chemical agents and even vials

Italian soldiers are trained to decontaminate their vehicle and weapons with the employment of a small capacity device.

filled with cobra poison (in Bangladesh), which could be easily employed for terrorist purposes, in fact, there are many and very effective means which can be used by terrorists; the nerve gas used in the Tokyo subway proved to be more lethal than first-generation chemical weapons. Such agents, whose lethal doses weigh less than a gram, are not difficult to produce or procure, in fact, it cannot be ruled out that some of these armaments, no longer under governmental control, may be readily available on the market, following the latest political turmoil in the Balkans and in Eastern European countries.

RISKS DERIVING FROM THE EMPLOYMENT OF OTHER WEAPONS

Besides the deep concern over the hypothetical employment of not conventional weapons by terrorist groups, there is also the risk that new types of weapons are employed, not easily classifiable but equally dangerous, being somewhat similar to mass destruction weapons.

As regards biological weapons, the lethality of new biological elements, such as ebola, marburg and HTV viruses of suspected laboratory origin, is not to be underestimated. They are proof that new biological elements can be created, whose virulence may sometimes get out of control.

Another worrying aspect may be the employment of nanotechnology for terrorist purposes allowing for the production of miniature aircraft, armed with multipurpose smart mines.

In the Information Technology sector, "ciberwar" is the buzzword, to indicate that a terrorist might



cause the crash of the global IT system by entering viruses on the net, with easily understandable repercussions, given the development and significance of on-line communications.

In the sector of radio-frequency emissions, the HERF gun has been recently produced, a directed energy weapon which employs high energy radio frequencies to destroy computer assets mounted on military and commercial air platforms or belonging to banks and national security systems.

SOME GENERAL REMARKS

The origins of terrorism are not clear, as well as the means to eradicate this phenomenon, which has been deeply analyzed, but not effectively countered yet. Terrorism, though rooted in history, has had a more decisive impact on the events of our century as compared to the past, and in most cases has had international repercussions.

Terrorist actions have always been extolled by their supporters and theoreticians and have sometimes been considered as a type of warfighting. Many terrorists have often been able to operate safely from "sanctuaries" based in friendly countries. There are no certain and experimented cures to counter this phenomenon, as its true matrix has not been identified yet. A "soft" attitude has seldom yielded positive results in this field; in fact, drastic measures have often defeated or even completely uprooted terrorism, when it was not the expression of a national and widely supported political movement. As a matter of fact, terrorism has never attempted to bring down the harshest dictatorships; no major terrorist actions were carried out against nazi Germany, fascist Italy or communist regimes. On the contrary, in democratic countries, political reforms or concessions have not always been capable of staving off all internal forms of terrorism. To counter terrorism,

ad-hoc political measures should be promptly taken by those countries where very serious social and national inequalities, recognized as such at international level as well, could give rise to terrorist attacks. The problem of terrorism, which has been escalating over the years, can be solved by the international community only. To this aim, nations should establish tighter co-operation ties, although there are some countries which still support this type of warfighting and are reluctant to condemn it. The international law should be capable of controlling and countering terrorism; in fact, a concerted effort should allow nations to better identify its supporters and theoreticians. In general, the attention of the media is very important also in the case of international terrorism; unfortunately these acts are more and more frequent worldwide and the employment of traditional means does not make headlines anymore; terrorists are therefore trying to resort to new systems capable of drawing the interest of the media. Thus, the risk of resorting to non conventional weapons is increased, in order to generate a strong momentum. A case in point is the employment of nerve gas in the Tokyo subway. That heinous massacre has certainly raised great concern among the general public all over the world. The possible employment of nuclear weapons is not to be ruled out as well; unduly appropriations of fissile materials have often been reported in some nuclear weapons states. Should these materials fall into the wrong hands, they could be used to build home-made devices, possibly triggering a serious international crisis. State-of-the-art technologies have developed other equally lethal weapons, such as toxins, germs and poisons to be employed for terrorist purposes only, which can be easily produced, even with limited resources and traditional technologies.

Iranian soldier scorched by mustard gas following an Iraqi air attack during the 1980-1990 Iran-Iraq war.

CONCLUSIONS

Terrorism has historically proved to be one of the most detrimental aspects of reality man has always had to come to terms with. Many times terrorist attacks were a means of internal political strife or the expression of deviated behaviours on the part of individuals or groups/factions.

At present terrorist actions are increasingly common at international level, as compared to other types of warfighting; in fact, they have proved to be much more effective and economical than other kinds of combat. This phenomenon should therefore not be undervalued, but be firmly opposed by means of new and more focused defence systems.

To address the root causes of terrorism without resorting to the policy of "an eye for an eye", an awareness campaign should be launched among the nations willing to uproot these causes, which may help resolve the most stringent social and economic issues still plaguing some areas in the world. To eradicate this phenomenon, however, ethnic groups' different cultural and religious traditions should be taken into account. When preventive and repressive measures are enforced at international level, all possible legislative solutions should be adopted, leveraging on the discouraging effect of particularly strict national rules on terrorism. Ad-hoc conventions should be also signed at international level obliging nations to extradite terrorists and entrust them to international tribunals.

Many countries have recognized the difficulty of guaranteeing a sufficient level of security against this threat, especially after the latest successful terrorist attacks. Priority one should be to adopt an approach



allowing for identifying all possible threats in order to take preventive and repressive measures aimed at countering all risks inherent in the most dangerous scenarios.

In this context, the possibility is to be taken into account that future terrorist attacks will be increasingly waged with the employment of non conventional weapons, requiring more specific and diversified techniques. To this aim, a civil protection apparatus is required, capable of rapidly identifying any type of attack and limit the damage of all terrorist actions. This structure shall be tailored to employ the most developed NBC detection and ordnance disposal equipment, rapidly evacuate a great number of casualties, select and adequately train personnel belonging to the national medical service in particular skills and establish casualty evacuation and first-aid stations.

Lastly, the need is felt for an adequate intelligence apparatus aimed at preventing all emergency situations. Many countries are now focusing their attention on a possible escalation of terrorism linked to the employment of non conventional weapons, which may entail unpredictable repercussions generally lasting longer than expected.

□

* Brigadier General (ret)

**Captain (MD), ITN



by Mario Ruggiero *

MEETING OF THE FINABEL COMMITTEE IN ROME



The Army Chiefs of Staff of FINABEL countries met in Rome on March 15 and 16, 2001.

The acronym employed by this organization is formed by the French initials of partner countries (France, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg). FINABEL was the first military co-operation agency to be established at European level, but is little known because its activities are usually carried out within a narrow circle of experts.

During the meeting in Rome, the Chiefs of Staff who took part in the event launched important initiatives aimed at giving more visibility to the positive results obtained by FINABEL.

Before analyzing the outcome of the meeting in detail, the background of this organization and its assigned tasks will be briefly illustrated.

BACKGROUND

The Committee was set up by the Chiefs of Staff of France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg in October 1953, by authority of the five countries' Ministers of Defense. The Committee, initially labeled FINBEL, is aimed at jointly studying and developing procedures to co-ordinate the armaments and military material sector. FINBEL was officially recognized by NATO in 1954.

After the demise of the European Defense Community (EDC), FINBEL allowed NATO European members to keep their necessary military connections, at least at Army Chiefs of Staff level.

It is worth recalling that Germany has started taking part in FINBEL meetings since June 1955 only, for contingency reasons..

In March 1956, the Inspector of German Land Forces, duly authorized by the Ministry of Defense, took part in the organization as a fully-fledged member.

Thus the name FINBEL was changed into FINABEL when Germany joined in. Under this new name, which included Germany as well, FINABEL is the only inter-allied organization directly subordinated to the Army Chiefs of Staff of participating nations. Within this framework, they can therefore hold a multilateral meeting each year, to create a really co-operative environment among nations.

In January 1972, the UK authorized its Army Chief of Staff to take part in FINABEL activities and on March 29, 1973, it became an official member of the Committee.

Spain was officially admitted to the club on March 23, 1990, during a meeting held in Luxembourg. Finally, on March 15, 1996, Greece and Portugal joined in.



Last March a meeting was held in Rome by the FINABEL Committee, whose members are the Army Chiefs of Staff of France, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Italy. The Committee aims at establishing closer ties among member countries, in order to develop joint concepts on force employment, define military material requirements and study the lessons learned during multinational operations.

TASKS

The FINABEL organization is tasked with fostering cohesion among European countries, which belong to NATO and have similar concerns and requirements, given their geographical position. The aim is to reach military co-operation in the following sectors:

- development of land forces' employment concepts and their logistic support;
- definition of military materials requirements
- study of training procedures and methods
- experimentation
- co-operation in the information sector.

The production of military materials goes beyond the scope of this organization. However, the FINABEL Committee contributes to the standardization efforts, through the development of employment concepts and the definition of materials requirements.

STRUCTURE

FINABEL organization and functioning are defined in a special



"Charter" signed by the several Army Chiefs of Staff, which is constantly updated based on the amendments made by the Committee. The latest version dates back to March 2000.

The organization is structured as follows:

- Committee of the Chiefs of Staff
- Committee of Principal Military Experts (PMEs)
- Group of Assistants to the PMEs
- Working groups

- Co-ordination Commission
- Standing Secretariat

COMMITTEE OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Committee usually meets once a year. On that occasion the country which will host the following meeting will be selected.

During the meeting, the Chiefs

of Staff receive a status report on the activities carried out by each Working group and establish the guidelines and programs for the following year. They may also exchange views on issues of common interest.

COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPAL MILITARY EXPERTS

The Principal Military Experts hold the rank of General (they usually are also Chiefs of the General Planning Department of their respective General Staffs). They meet twice a year and are the executive branch of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff.

In such a capacity, they:

- analyze the directives of their Chiefs of Staff and translate them into tasks to assign to ad-hoc working groups,
- monitors working groups' activities
- establish working programs, based on the guidelines of FINABEL Chief of Secretariat.

During meetings, experts exchange their views on issues of common interest.

The PME Group is traditionally chaired by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Belgian Army.





GROUP OF ASSISTANTS to the PME

Each PME is supported by an Assistant, a Staff Officer who co-operates in carrying out the assigned tasks. Assistants meet three times a year under the chairmanship of the Chief of FINABEL Standing Secretariat. They are the core of the Committee and the reference points for all national delegates.

They see to the following tasks:

- monitoring the activities of the several groups
- defining the lines of conduct of their PMEs
- drawing up proposals to improve the works already completed
- planning the activities for the following year
- distributing Standing Secretariat's documents to the national delegates and Commands concerned

WORKING GROUPS

There are nine working groups at present, which are directly supervised by the Committee of the PMEs. Each of them is specialized in a sector, considered as first priority by the Chiefs of Staff, i.e:

- general concepts;
- force employment;
- intelligence;
- training;

- logistics;
- command and conduct of operations;
- fire support and a/a defense;
- engineer activities;
- air mobility.

These groups usually meet twice a year in an always different place.

CO-ORDINATION COMMISSION

The Commission is chaired by the Chief of the Standing Secretariat and gathers the working groups' chairmen and the Assistants to the PMEs. It is tasked with guaranteeing that working groups better coordinate their activities and establish tighter co-operation ties.

The Commission meets in Brussels once a year and carries out its works in two phases:

. in the first phase a preliminary plenary meeting is held, during which the groups' chairmen illustrate and further explain the directives issued by the Chiefs of Staff and PMEs. Then the chairmen refer on the progress status of the works carried out by their groups, on the difficulties encountered and table proposal on how to improve their works;

. in the second phase there are meetings with a limited number of participants, i.e. two or more chairmen, aimed at harmonizing study activities on specific sectors.

STANDING SECRETARIAT

The Secretariat has its HQ in Brussels at the Belgian Army General Staff and is supervised by a French Colonel, supported by a staff made up of one Belgian Senior Officer, one NCO and three employees.

The budget to cover the Secretariat's running expenditures is established by the PMEs each year and funded by member nations.

OUTCOME OF THE MEETING IN ROME

The meeting allowed nations to discuss current topics relevant to the national General Staffs, at various levels of command. In particular, the following issues were analyzed:

- progress status of the activities to set up the new European Forces, especially as regards the possible integration of land forces;
- reasserted importance of the so-called "medium forces" (neither light, nor heavy) in present operational scenarios;



- FINABEL future, in view of the development of the Common European Defense and Security Policy;
- possible integration in the sector of qualification and training.

FINABEL Chiefs of Staff have agreed to compare their respective views in order to enhance their mutual understanding on specific topics, though being aware that

the subjects at issue involve responsibilities well beyond single Service level.

As regards qualification and training, the decision has been taken to carry out a more in-depth study on real co-operation opportunities, by comparing the cost-effectiveness of the several national proposals. In the sector of instructors' qualification, this activity will be aimed at establishing

single multinational centres, tasked with qualifying personnel of all FINABEL countries.

In particular, the sectors which have gathered more consensus are those specialized in the qualification of instructors for:

- warfighting in mountain area;
- NBC;
- peace support operations;
- special forces;
- EOD and mine clearance;
- General Staff procedures;
- employment and maintenance of common materials.

In sum, though limited in time, the meeting of FINABEL Army Chiefs of Staff achieved outstanding results, especially as regards the development of future training activities. In fact they are pivotal to an increased co-operation between the armies of those nations which are already operationally engaged in multinational organizations.



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


SOUTH EAST ASIA

The region is characterized by a crisis coming from far away, often from remote and forgotten places, with their histories of ethnic enmities, religious intolerance and political irredentism. The instability is not caused by large-scale conflicts but rather by local guerrilla warfare and revolts which foster poverty, often in the shadow of tomorrow's mirage: oil.



by Ornella Rota *



American and Russian ships cruise the seas of South-East Asia, the Chinese presence is increasingly active and there is a growing Japanese attention to the region. This is the area where there is the world's highest number of conflicts (potential or in progress); ethnic, religious, ideological, political and social rivalries pile up, cross and melt together. There is a constant demographic growth (an increasingly important element in geopolitical evaluations), and the concrete risk that the diffusion of



Facing page, above.
National monument in Djakarta, Indonesia.

Facing page, below.
That Luang in Vientiane, Laos.

Above.
A main street in Hanoi, Vietnam.

Asian nationalism is added to Islamic radicalism. There is the dream of immense oil resources hidden in the Sulu sea and an arms traffic that has reached astonishing levels. For example, between '92 and '96, in Malaysia, military expenses have gone up from 4% to 11% of the State's total budget; in Singapore expenditures had increased by 20% in 1995 and in the same year the Philippines have started a fifteen-years modernization plan of their armed forces. According to some analysts,

during the nineties the countries of South East Asia have bought over 3000 fighter planes. The security of these countries, depending mainly on the sea, has required a sharp strengthening of the Navy: acquisitions of frigates and corvettes (missile launchers) have followed one another, Thailand in 1996 bought a small aircraft-carrier.

The fall of the Wall has highlighted problems that had been long in existence and have been accelerated by the crisis of 1997: ethnic rivalries fomented by heavy social differences, separatist tendencies nourished by economic discontent as well as identity claims, dangerous irredentism, progressive politicization of religious beliefs, isolation that coincides with belonging to particular creeds. Misgovernment, cruelty and ferocious repressions have encouraged the spreading of rebellions.

In South East Asia, the difficulties of coexistence among different faiths often involve Islam, which is frequently diffused among the poorer classes. In Indonesia, where this religion is dominant, some movements request a more strict observance of the Koran, especially as regards the judicial system, now based on Dutch law, with proceedings differentiated in accordance with the ethnic group of the persons involved. In Malaysia, the most important opposition formation is the *Parti Islam Semalaysia* (Malay Islamic Party), which after the election of 1999 controls two States of the federation. As regards the Philippines, the inhabitants of Mindanao, who call themselves "bangsa moro", refusing the Philippine motherland, identified themselves with Islam already before the arrival of the

THE REFUGEES

Although there are no large-scale conflicts as in other areas of the world, refugees in the Asian continent are a rather serious problem. According to the High Commissioner of the United Nations for Refugees, about 5 million people were forced to emigrate and about 2.5 million, expelled from their homes, moved somewhere else within their country's borders.

Cyril Cornelius, regional secretary for Asia of the World Association of Christian Communication, believes that refugees are a "difficult problem, especially for the south-eastern Asian Countries, where they continue to be considered an internal question of the single countries, instead of trying to find new forms of cooperation at international or regional level". No State of the area has signed the conventions or the protocols of the United Nations on the fundamental rights of the refugees (India keeps the same attitude).

From Myanmar, about 250,000 Moslems of the Rohingya ethnic group have fled to Bangladesh. Today, more than 100,000 Karen refugees live along the Thai border. Some hundred thousands of other Burmese (between half a million and 800,000, mostly from the interior), belonging to different ethnic minorities, are in camps on the borders with Thailand, where they have either fled or been deported.

In Mindanao (Philippines), the evacuees are about 700,000. The situation in Indonesia is even more dramatic. In West Borneo, for example, there are at least 100,000 evacuees living at Pontianak; a similar number of people, who in August of 1999 escaped the massacres committed by the pro-Indonesian troops in East Timor, are still living in West Timor. The island of Sulawesi still shelters 180,000 refugees and evacuees. In the Moluccas, the religious strifes on the north have caused the displacement of over 100,000 Christians and 130,000 Moslems and, on the south, of 130,000 Christians and 90,000 Moslems.


Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. Besides these five provinces, the consultation would concern other cities, peopled mostly by Moslems, in particular half of the urban centres of Lanao del Sur and some localities to the north of Cotobato, such as Pikit and Carmen.

Irredentism is part of this atmosphere, but it seems to be lived in a way different from other areas: in practice, there is a tendency to give more importance to the cultural domination rather than to sheer territory (this tendency falls within the so-called "Asiatic values", which are shared by the continent, beyond the various national regimes). Among the most serious disputes, there is that between Singapore and Malaysia for the island of Betuh Putih; between Thailand and Malaysia, for the possession or the common exploitation of the marine oil deposits; between Indonesia and Vietnam, concerning other oil fields

Spaniards, four centuries ago. Thus they use the Koran as a shield to protect their identity, which they consider threatened by the demographic pressure of the Catholic Philippines; this attitude mirrors that of their Indonesian coreligionists of Aceh (in the north of Sumatra) who fear possible upsettings fomented by the "Javanese imperialism".

Inevitably, all this favours the proliferation of separatist demands, which are to be feared also for the possible rebound effects. If the inhabitants of Aceh obtain from Djakarta the ample autonomy they want, other provinces will put forward the same requests; already in June of the past year, the *Irian Jaya* region has declared its independence. But also the Moslem Filipinos will be influenced: the two separatist movements are already

demanding a referendum like the one that allowed East Timor (whose independence will be officially proclaimed in 2002, meanwhile the new-born entity remains under UN administration) to get rid of the Indonesian tutelage. The formations were born at the end of the sixties, when Salamat Hashim (who graduated in Cairo at Al Azhar, the most celebrated Islamic university) and Nur Misuari founded the Moro Front of Islamic Liberation (MFIL). In 1998, Misuari signed a peace treaty with Manila and today governs the autonomous region of Mindanao, while Hashim continues his struggle for independence and fights for a referendum asking to all the inhabitants (independent of their religion) to choose between autonomy, independence or federalism in the zones of





Above.
The High Court Building in Kuala-Lumpur, Malaysia.

Left.
Manila, Philippines' capital city.



exploited by Djakarta in the Natuna islands. There is irredentism also in Vietnam, which with China and Taiwan claims the Paracel islands and, with China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines claims the Spratly islands. In 1998, Malaysia and Indonesia had asked the Court of Justice of The Hague to decide about the destiny of two of the fifty-two islands in the sea of Celebes, near the frontier between Kalimantan (the Indonesian part of Borneo, where the immigrants from the island of Madura continue to clash with the Dayak tribes) and the Malaysian state of Sabah.. The contested territories are Ligitan and Sipadan, where last year 10 Westerners and 11

citizens from eastern Countries were kidnapped. In the Gulf of Thailand, instead, what weighs on the relations among the coastal Countries are especially the disputes about fishing rights.

Within this framework of fears, avidity, tensions and disputes, the possibilities of influence of US, Russia, China, and Japan, are, and will be in the future, very much limited. Born at the end of the cold war, the movement of regionalization continues in fact to acquire assent all over Asia, fostered by political alliances stipulated between local governments, aimed specifically at discouraging external interferences.

Everywhere, violence makes penury even worse. Myanmar, the Country of the thousand pagodas and golden spires, since 1962 has been closed in the impenetrable isolation wanted by a military dictatorship which, in 1990, after the first, and only, multi-party elections, outlawed all opposition parties and movements. The National League for Democracy had won all along the line (392 out of 485 seats); its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, was imprisoned and condemned to forced residence; in 1991 she was awarded the



Burmese weaver at her loom.

A NEW US STRATEGY

Recently, the strategic plan prepared by the General Staff for the reorganization of the US Armed Forces in the 21st Century was presented to President George W. Bush. The plan suggests to concentrate interests and concerns on the Asian continent, with particular regard to the areas of the Pacific and the South East.

The impossibility to politically control the situation in the area entails both a greater military engagement and an effort to continuously update the prevention and security strategic information.

The document emphasizes the ever increasing power of China (which from a policy of "balance" is moving on to a closer entente with Russia, an evolution very assiduously promoted by Putin), the multiplicity of the internal movements of the Asian Countries and the increase of shady traffics which favour a permanent instability, especially in the south-east, and finally the growing difficulty to control the so-called pariah States.

In view of this, the document continues, the maritime communications assume more and more importance, and the strategies of prevention and defence will have to be based essentially on the ability to operate at great distance (hence the maximum importance that should be given to missiles) and on the availability of light ships (while the aircraft-carriers would become a little less determinant).

Nobel Prize for Peace. Against this background, there was an exacerbation of old ethnic tensions, such as those with the Karen - a Christian minority in a land that has always been Buddhist - who have their very own different cultural identity. As long as the restrictive commercial policy of "military socialism" lasted, the Karen guerrillas financed themselves with the tolls imposed on the borders of

THE NATIONS OF SOUTH EAST ASIA

Brunei: Area 5,765 km²; Population 260,482 (cens. 1991), 322,000 (est. 1999); life expect. M 73, F 78 (1997); GNP/inhab. 25,160 US\$ (1996); Ethnic groups: Malay 67.2%, Chinese 15%, Indians 11.5%, other 6.3%; Religion: Moslem 67.2%, Buddhist 12.8%, Christian 10%.

Cambodia: Area 181,035 km²; Population 11,426,223 (cens. 1998), 11,746,000 (est. 1999); life expect. M 52, F 55; GNP/inhab. 300 US\$ (1997); Ethnic groups: Khmer 89%, Vietnamese 5.5%, Chinese 3.1%; Religion Buddhist 95%, Moslem 2%.

Philippines: Area 300,076 km²; Population 68,611,332 (cens. 1995), 74,454,000 (est. 1999); life expect. M 66, F 70 (1997); GNP/inhab. 1,200 US\$ (1997); Ethnic groups: Neo-Malay 40%, Indonesians 30%, Chinese 10%, Paleo-Malay 10%, Indians 5%, other 5%; Religion Catholic 84%, Independent Filipino Church 6.2%, Moslem 4.6%, Protestant 3.9%.

Indonesia: Area 1,919,317 km²; Population 179,378,946 (cens.1990), 210,126,000 (est.1999); life expect. M 63, F 66 (1997); GNP/inhab. 1,110 US\$ (1997); Ethnic groups: Javanese 39%, Sundanese 16%, Malay 12%, Madurese 4%, other 29%; Religion Moslem 87.2%, Christian 9.6%, Hindu 1.9%, Buddhist 1%.

Laos: Area 236,800 km²; Population 4,581,258 (cens.1995), 5,297,000 (est.1999); Life expect. M 51, F 54 (1997); GNP/inhab. 400 US\$ (1997); Ethnic groups: Lao-Lum 67%, Lao Theung 16%, Lao-Thai 8%, other 9%; Religion Buddhist 58%, Animist 34%, Christian 2%, Moslem 1%.

Malaysia: Area 392,733 km²; Population 17,563,420 (cens.1991), 21,830,000 (est.1999); life expect. M 70, F 74 (1997); GNP/inhab. 4,530 US\$ (1997); Ethnic groups: Malay 58%, Chinese 25%, Indians 7%, other 10%; Religion Moslem 53%, Buddhist 17%, Hindu 7%, Christian 6.4%.

Myanmar: Area 676,577 km²; Population 35,307,913 (cens. 1983), 45,059,000 (Present est.); Life expect. M 58, F 62 (1997); GNP/inhab. 2,610 US\$ (1997); Ethnic groups: Burmese 69%, Shan 8.5%, Karen 6.2%, Rakhine 4.5%, Mon 2.4%, Chinese 2.2%, Kachin 1.4%, other 5.8%; Religion Buddhist 87%, Christian 5.6%, Moslem 3.6%, Animist 1.1%, Hindu 1%.

Singapore: Area 648.1 km²; Population 2,705,115 (cens. 1990), 3,324,000 (est.1999); Life expect. M 75, F 76; GNP/inhab. 32,810 US\$ (1997); Ethnic groups: Chinese 77%, Malay 14.1%, Indian 7.6%; Religion Buddhist 31.9%, Taoist 22%, Moslem 14.9%, Christian 12.9%, Hindu 3.3%, Animist 0.5%.

Thailand: Area 513,115 km²; Population 54,532,300 (cens. 1990), 60,856,000 (est.1999); Life expect. M 67, F 72 (1997); GNP/inhab. 2,750 US\$ (1997); Ethnic groups: Thai 98.9%, Chinese 0.9%, other 0.2%; Religion Buddhist 95%, Moslem 4%, Christian 0.6%.

Vietnam: Area 331,040 km²; Population 64,375,762 (cens. 1989), 78,705,000 (est.1999); Life expect. M 66, F 69 (1997); GNP/inhab. 310 US\$ (1997); Ethnic groups: Vietnamese 87.1%, Tay 1.7%, Hoa 1.5%, Thai 1.5%, Khmer 1.4%, Khome 1.3%, Muong 1.3%, Nung 1.1%, Meo 0.8%; Religion Buddhist 55%, Catholic 7%.

These nations are members of the Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN), established in 1967 with the aim of pursuing cooperation objectives in the political, economic and social fields. The most recent members are Vietnam (1995) and Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar (1997). Papua-New Guinea has the status of observer.

Source: "Calendario Atlante De Agostini 2001"

Thailand and with traffics with the Thais (especially arms and ammunition in exchange for timber and minerals). But, when the Myanmar government decided to open the country to the market economy, the Karens began to lose importance for the Thais who, indeed, helped to drive them away from their forests full of precious timber.

The insecurity of the area is made worse by the pirates, who have always been a plague there, and by oil, whose new reserves are the mirage of tomorrow.

The pirates sail, often with total impunity, the Malaysian, Filipino

and Indonesian seas, which are studded with tens of thousands of islands and indefensible both because the equipment (radar, patrol boats, etc) of the various governments' Navies is inadequate and, sometimes, because of the very physical conformation of the places. The 230 attacks recorded in 1999 (40% more than in the previous year) have occurred either along the sea route that from the Bay of Bengal reaches the China Sea, or along the 780 km of the Straits of Malacca, where an average of 200 ships a day crowd a strait 74 km to 37 km wide and from 43 m to 5 m deep.

As regards oil, according to very recent discoveries, it seems that there is not only the largest island of Mindanao to float on a sea of crude but also the smaller islands of the sea of Sulu which connects the Philippines, Malaysia, Borneo and Brunei as far as the micro-archipelago of the Spratly Islands. There is enough to fuel further greeds and economic/strategic interests all over East Asia.

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**Journalist,
Contributor to "La Stampa"*

THE MISSILE DEFENCE SHIELD

A THREAT OR A NUCLEAR DETERRENT?

The concepts expressed in this article
are the Author's personal opinions

by Massimo Amorosi *

The US Missile Defense System does not seem to be extremely reliable and safe. "Asymmetric" threats, such as terrorist actions, attacks with the use of biological weapons and computer systems would bring the most powerful country of the world to its knees.

The concept of missile defense is not new within the strategic debate which is taking place in the US. The plans developed in the '60s (*Sentinel and Safeguard*) were superseded by Reagan's well known *Strategic Defense Initiative* (SDI) and then by Bush senior's *Global Protection Against Limited Strikes* (GPALS) plan, up to the *National Missile Defense* (NMD) program introduced by the Clinton Administration, which has already been supplanted by more ambitious initiatives under study by the Bush Administration.

AIM OF THE MISSILE DEFENSE SHIELD

President Bush has made clear that the acquisition of a limited Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability is aimed at protecting US citizens and territory, together with allies, friends and other nations, from possible attacks carried out with the use of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM, with a range exceeding 5,500 km) by the so-called *rouge states* or *states of concern*. They are "outlaw" countries, such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq, which, acting against US national interests, are constantly monitored by Washington.

The Republican Administration has explained that this defensive architecture would be necessary to prevent one of the above mentioned countries from using the threat of a possible attack waged with long-range missiles to coerce or blackmail the US or other nations.


According to the *National Missile Defense Act*, signed by former President Clinton on July, 23, 1999, the NMD system, besides being a defensive umbrella against the new threat posed by rouge countries, would also shield the US from a possible accidental attack,

conducted from Russia without authorization or by mistake, or from China.

LIMITS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION PLAN

The system proposed by the Clinton Administration, which roused many doubts about its effectiveness, was based on the following basic components: X band radars, a network of enhanced early warning radars, kinetic kill vehicles (KKV) mounted on ground-based interceptors (GBI), a

employed to saturate a defense system, metallized balloons to shroud a warhead, used together with a high number of empty balloons, in such a way that a sensor cannot discriminate between real and dummy warheads. Another countermeasure whose possible employment has been analyzed by the above mentioned report, is to reduce the infrared emission of a warhead by covering it with a shroud cooled by liquid nitrogen, thus preventing the KKV from homing on and destroying it. It is worth recalling the final conclusion of the report, according to which the NMD system would become



constellation of SBIRS - both high and low- and a complex Battle Management/Command, Control and Communications Centre (BM/C3).

More specifically, a report of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology/Union Of Concerned Scientists (MIT/UCS) highlighted its vulnerability compared to the simple countermeasures that any nation, owing the technology to build long-range ballistic missiles, may adopt to bypass or penetrate that shield. Among these measures are hundreds of chemical-biological sub-munitions which can be

ineffective with the employment of these countermeasures, even if pre-empted by the US.

In the light of these considerations, it would be worth resuming the definition of the Reaganian *star wars* as a "*Maginot line in space*", given in 1983 by Geoffrey Howe, former foreign Office Secretary.

Probably Russia is already planning to equip its new "ICBM Topol-M" with several countermeasures, to oppose the US plan. Beijing may well follow suit, at least to protect the credibility of its limited strategic deterrent, 20 ICBM "DF-5A/CSS4"


SYSTEM ELEMENTS




**Defense Support Program/
Space Based Infrared System
High Component**




**Space Based Infrared
System / Low Component**




**Upgraded Early
Warning Radar**




Ground Based Interceptor



**Battle Management / Command,
Control, & Communications**



**Kill
Vehicle**



X Band Radar

with a single warhead deployed in special silos and one submarine armed with ballistic missiles; however, the possibility that China will modernize and upgrade its arsenal beyond present governmental plans, cannot be ruled out.

Moreover, the missile defense system was subjected to several tests which could not prove its capability to counter the above mentioned countermeasures; in fact, the system was previously instructed to discriminate between dummy and real warheads, thus acting in an unrealistic scenario. For these reasons, coupled with the skepticism of his European allies and the opposition of the Moscow government, Clinton decided in last September to postpone the system's first deployment phase, leaving the final decision to his successor.

BUSH'S BMD PROJECT TAKES SHAPE

George W. Bush has often declared that he wants to start the deployment of the NMD system as soon as possible and that, at least in its initial phases, it will probably be built around the main components of the plan envisaged by the previous Administration.

These components may also be quantitatively increased, for instance by installing a greater number of interceptor missiles in supplementary launch sites, added to those previously planned. The possibility of abiding by the scheduled time line will ultimately depend on the future test results, both from a political and technical point of view.


The system, thus configured, will be progressively integrated

*Elements of the NMD system proposed
by the Clinton Administration*

with similar sea-based and air-based defensive apparatuses. This way, US allies and friends will also be protected, a move aimed at gathering a wider international consensus around a very controversial initiative. The system will also become more reliable, by the enhancement of its hit-to-kill capabilities during the several phases of a missile trajectory. These options are known to be very popular among the Republicans.

The Navy theatre missile defense program, called *Navy Theatre Wide* (NTW), once duly enhanced, will be the backbone of the "sea component" of the BMD system, even if its operational effectiveness is still to be certified by ad-hoc tests.

Theater Air and Missile Defense Family of Systems



However, the BMDO (Ballistic Missile Defense organization) and the Navy do not seem to have reached an agreement on the schedule and structure of the naval component. According to some analysts, the latter may nonetheless contribute to set up an initial BMD capability, in case of an emergency to counter a threat from North Korea. As regards space components, space-based interceptors (SBI) and space-based lasers (SBL) would offer a continuous and global coverage, although being part of long-term projects, given the still insufficient maturity of present technologies.

Within the technical plans drawn up by the Bush Administration, a key role is played by boost phase interceptors (BPI), thanks to their capability of killing a missile when it is most

vulnerable, i.e. in the first minutes after its launch and before it can release its weapons load and mainly activate its countermeasures. In particular, it is worth mentioning the USAF airborne laser (ABL) program among the various systems of this kind.

It is still to be proved that an extended NMD system, as that explained above, is safer than the previous one and can better resist any countermeasures. Some Chinese engineers are reported to be working on a laser coating (*jiguang rongtu*) to be applied to ballistic missiles, which perhaps has been already tested, to reduce the effectiveness of a missile defense high-power laser, such as that mounted on ABL aircraft.

It is therefore most likely that even an "enlarged" version of the

USAF Airborne Laser employment scenario

missile defense shield will not be able to significantly reduce the level of future and present threats to the US.

MISSILE THREAT DEVELOPMENTS

A study on the *Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project* has shown that the awareness of the risk posed by the ICBMs, as officially stated by the Rumsfeld Report in 1998, named after the former chairman of the bipartisan Commission to assess the missile threat to the US and present Secretary of Defense, was greatly

influenced and perhaps deviated by the events of that year. In fact, in 1998 India and Pakistan experimented their nuclear arsenals, Iran tested its "Shahab 3" and, most importantly, North Korea launched its "Taepodong-1" missile.

That event had great international repercussions and worried Pentagon environments in particular, with regard to Pyongyang regime's missile programs and their possible implications, if exported to other hostile countries.

It may be inferred from the above mentioned study that the global ballistic threat has been significantly reduced over the last 15 years.

Russia has made the most significant draw-down of its strategic arsenal (equal to 52%), while in the '80s as many as 2,318 ICBMs equipped with 9,540 nuclear warheads were aimed against the US. Today about 5,200 warheads are deployed on 1,100 missiles.

Moreover, in that period more countries were engaged in developing long-range missiles, as compared to the present. As regards intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM), with a range between 3,000 and 5,500 km, they have been completely scrapped by the INF Treaty in 1987, except two dozens systems of this kind belonging to the Chinese arsenal and the North-Korean "Taepodong-2" under development.

On the contrary, the threat has undergone a qualitative change: the capability of launching short-range missiles (SRBM, with a range shorter than 1,000 km) has significantly increased and the plans to develop medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM, with a range between 1,100 and 3,000 km) are expanding, though in a limited way. This is not to say, however, that the US has to face no missile threat.

THE THREAT OF AN ACCIDENTAL ATTACK, UNLEASHED FROM RUSSIA WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION OR BY MISTAKE

Since the end of the bipolar confrontation the Russian arsenal of ICBMs, armed with nuclear warheads, has been significantly reduced and this process will probably be further developed in the next decade. According to some forecast, there will be a possible reduction of up to 1,000 warheads, or even less, irrespective of future negotiations or US decisions. Nonetheless, there is still the risk on an accidental attack, waged without authorization or by mistake, according to MIT experts.

First of all, the Russian early warning system seems to be in critical conditions, owing also to some gaps in its coverage capabilities. Moreover, although the cold war belongs to the past, Moscow, as well as the US, keep some of its deterrence assets at a high level of alert, in order to survive to an enemy *first strike* and carry out retaliatory measures. All this can but increase Washington's fears. According to the BMDO, the most likely scenario, in the case of an unauthorized attack, is a launch from a Delta-IV type (carrying as many as 64 warheads) or a Delta-III type (carrying as many as 48 warheads) submarine as the Typhoon will be shortly withdrawn from service.

The Russian SRBMs have a range long enough to hit the US territory, even if launched from a stationary position. This would not be a limited attack, as the most reliable estimates have established that as many as 500 warheads could be launched.

THE THREAT OF AN ATTACK FROM CHINA


At presents, there are no possibilities that the Peoples'

Republic of China may wage an attack accidentally or without authorization, at least because fuel, warheads and launchers are reportedly kept disassembled. At this point the feasibility of an hypothetical attack against the US seems far-fetched. In fact, the risk of such an attack is extremely low, for fear of a retaliatory action by the US, unless really vital interests are at stake, like the issue of Taiwan, as far as Beijing is concerned.

THE THREAT OF AN INTENTIONAL ATTACK BY A ROGUE COUNTRY

Some rogue countries are expected to pose a missile threat against the US in a few years' time, also by the use of first generation systems, like solid propellant missiles.

It must be stressed at this point that developing nations shall not necessarily resort to the ICBM option only to wage an attack with mass destruction weapons. The same Rumsfeld Report stated that "*an attack launched from the sea with short-range ballistic missiles is another possibility...this would also allow to target an area in the US wider than that which could be hit by a missile launched from the mainland*". Moreover, the above mentioned report does not make any assessment of the threat posed by cruise missiles, though admitting that some developing countries, engaged in producing ballistic missiles, may be interested in them, given their special performance. Some documents issued by the *National Intelligence Council* (identified by the acronym NIE: *National Intelligence Estimates*) state that an attack waged against the US may be carried out by launching short-range weapons of this kind even from commercial vessels.



NEW ASYMMETRIC THREATS

So far only missiles have been analyzed which, together with assets such as military aircraft and special forces, are considered as "traditional" platforms. But there is a wide range of untraditional means used in asymmetric conflicts which cannot be ignored, like suitcases, commercial vehicles or couriers, public transport systems and private land, sea and air assets.

The concept of "strategic asymmetry" has thus been developed which, in the framework of military affairs and national security, includes the whole range of actions and concepts adopted by an enemy to maximize his strong points, exploit his opponent's weaknesses, gain the initiative or a greater freedom of action. This concept, as old as war, was further refined by Liddell Hart,

who suggested an "indirect approach" in the strategic field. The best strategy, he maintained, is that of avoiding enemy strengths and analyzing its weaknesses instead.

The asymmetric threats commonly include the proliferation and employment of mass destruction weapons, together with the use of *Information Operations* (IO) and *Non Conventional Operations* (NCO). It is worth pointing out that the most devastating asymmetric attacks waged against civil targets in North America, Europe and Japan have been so far carried out without the use of military means.

Intelligence documents focus their attention on this subject, in view of a detailed assessment of the threat against the US. *"We are of the opinion that the US may be subjected to an attack waged with*

*Launch of a Chinese
"DF-SA/CSS-4" ICBM.*

the use of mass destruction weapons in the next few years, possibly carried out with non missile systems at the hand of non state organizations; in fact these systems are cheaper, more reliable and accurate. They also do not allow to clearly identify the attackers", said Robert Walpole, chief of the US Intelligence for strategic and nuclear programs, to the Senate in Washington in February of last year. He probably referred to the biological attacks launched with the employment of off-shore craft, cars and trucks spreading pathogens or of unmanned helicopters employed for farming purposes; he might also make reference to nuclear weapons



Launch of a "Trident" MIRVed missile from a submerged US nuclear submarine.

smuggled or concealed in cargo ships and detonated in US ports. These are only hypotheses, but taking into account that each year 400 million people travel to the US, 800,000 aircraft land in its airports and 9 million cargo ships dock in its ports, the seriousness and feasibility of this type of threat cannot be ruled out. In fact the American society, and in general all Western countries, have a series of soft points, mainly due to their openness towards the rest of the world.

The Rumsfeld Report did not analyze these weaknesses at all, as stated by one of the

members of the same Commission.

The US intelligence and security services have made clear that these alternative attack systems, though less effective than the ICBMs, have some advantage points over them, i.e.:

- low cost;
- possibility of being secretly developed and deployed;
- higher reliability;
- enhanced accuracy, compared to the ICBMs, over the next 15 years;
- increased effectiveness, compared to ballistic missiles, as regards the dissemination of biological /bacteriological agents;
- capability of disrupting the effectiveness and scope of any missile defense system.

This threat is further enhanced by the acquisition of high-tech

sensors and communication system by rogue countries and non governmental agencies. The exploitation of civilian assets, such as the Internet and images aired by commercial satellites, together with the proliferation of advanced weapon systems, allow "asymmetric" enemies to better focus their operational plans, target their actions and more seriously damage the enemy.

Intelligence analysts have concluded their statements by saying that these non conventional means and methods are cause of increasing concern and "*will become a valid option in the hands of terrorists*".

NBC TERRORISM AND THE NEW EXTREMISTS

Terrorism is asymmetric by nature; in fact terrorist actions can be as successful as traditional military operations waged against more powerful forces, requiring a limited number of resources and causing few casualties in one's own forces. According to Mr. Cohen, the former DoD Chief, terrorism is the new global threat which has supplanted the old bloc-to-bloc confrontation. During the Cold War, transnational terrorist groups were directed and supported by foreign governments and had specific political goals which made them easily detectable targets.

Conversely, new generation terrorists have no clearly understandable ideals, mobilize only for undefined ideological and religious crusades and have increasingly weaker ties with possible sponsor nations. Moreover, their dispersed but not well established structures make them not easily detectable targets.

These extremists are the most keen to use NBC weapons, though automatic rifles and bombs still remain the traditional

“working tools” of terrorism. The employment of biological weapons in terrorist actions seems to be a more remote possibility than the employment of even relatively rudimentary nuclear weapons (e.g. radioactive devices), though in the future it may be a possible option for groups with higher strategic ambitions. In fact, all technological innovation efforts carried out by the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo faction, responsible for the 1995 attack against the Tokyo subway with the use of sarin gas, and by the Al Qaida organization, led by Osama Bin Laden, seem oriented towards the nuclear sector.

IS CHINA AN ASYMMETRIC PLAYER?

The possibility cannot be ruled out that also great nations, besides sub-national groups and rouge countries, may resort to terrorism. Some reports recently issued by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) testify to the fact that terrorist techniques are considered, like Information Technologies and *ciberwar*, as means to be possibly employed in a future conflict with the Western world -mainly the US. And it could not be otherwise, as China is aware that it cannot compete with the Western military superpowers, either in the conventional or in the nuclear sector.

CONCLUSIONS


To sum up what has been said before, the following conclusions may be drawn:

- the NMD has proved to be vulnerable to some simple countermeasures and there is no evidence that an “enlarged” version of this system may give better results;
- the risk of an attack waged by

Russia with no authorization or by mistake is serious, as well as real. To face this threat, a co-operation effort should be made. First of all, the two sides (i.e. also the US, which has already experimented this method) should equip their warheads with hit-to-kill devices. They may moreover agree to reduce the number and readiness level of their respective strategic arsenals. Many experts support the idea of countering the Chinese missile threat with a mix of co-

valid on the occasion of the Gulf War against Saddam Hussein in 1991. In a deterrence perspective, besides preventive surgical strikes, the possibility that a powerful nation may wage an attack against the life of a leader of a rogue state is also accepted;

- before resorting to the use of ICBMs, rogue countries and non governmental organizations may adopt asymmetric means and strategies to strike the US and the Western countries. Terrorism is typically asymmetric



Osama Bin Laden, chief of the “Al Qaida” organization.

operation and deterrence measures;

- as regards the missile threat posed by rogue countries, many analysts say that if prevention measures fail - such as strengthening control regimes over armament exportation, MT-CR mainly, and co-operation initiatives - the US may well resort to deterrence. Thus a well-known concept will be resumed, which proved to be

and the most mediate threat posed against the US, which cannot be countered by any missile defense system. On the contrary, this system, when deployed, might enhance the US military superiority in the eyes of its opponents and competitors (China included), who could react by developing increasingly sophisticated and disruptive asymmetric synergies.

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** University researcher*

FUTURE ARMY

AVIATION

A Black Hawk helicopter is shown from a high-angle, rear-quarter perspective, flying over a dense, snow-covered forest. The helicopter's main rotor blades are blurred due to motion, and its tail rotor is also visible. The aircraft is equipped with various external stores, including missiles and fuel tanks. The background consists of a dense forest of bare trees covered in snow, with a soft, hazy light filtering through the canopy.

DOCTRINAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL TRENDS FOR EU-WIDE EMPLOYMENT

The Air Cavalry will undergo major changes, at least at doctrinal level. In fact, the Aviation is increasingly assuming a pivotal role, as an autonomous force capable of carrying out real combat tasks and not only support functions in land operations. This article is a follow-up to a previous report published by the same author in “Rivista Militare”.

by Giampaolo Giannetti *



This article is aimed at widening our review of the European countries which have adopted and implemented the concept of air mobility/ air mechanization, focusing on the initiatives taken by them to organize and employ that branch of the Army commonly called Army Aviation (or Air Cavalry, like in Italy).

UNITED KINGDOM

To round up what has already been said in a previous article (*Rivista Militare* n. 6/2000), the operational structure of the Army Air Corps, as established by the Air Maneuver Doctrine¹ envisages the following:

- the 16th Air Assault Brigade, organized on three attack helicopter Regiments (the first will be combat ready in 2002); each Regiment will include:

- 2 Assault Squadrons (each with 8 AHs);
- 1 Utility Squadron (with 8 LUHs, which are last-generation LYNXs);
- 1 HQ Squadron;
- 1 Maintenance Squadron.

Each Regiment shall be capable of deploying 3 Forward Operational Bases (FOBs), which will alternate to set up a Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP). The British AHs (the WAH 64 "Long-bow") are armed with:

- "Hellfire" antitank missiles (16 max. to each vehicle);
- 30 mm cannon (max. vehicle load: 1,200 rounds);
- CRV7 rocket system (max. vehicle load: 4 pods with 19 rounds each = 76 rockets);
- air-to-air missiles.

As it can be noted, the Italian A 129 "International" helicopters are equipped with the same

armament, apart from the cannon caliber (a much debated issue).

Once taken into account that in the UK utility helicopters (40 Puma and 48 CH-47) are in service with the RAF and not with the Army, the Assault Squadrons' organization and tasks could be analyzed, but it would be pointless, as this subject goes beyond the scope of this article and has been already thoroughly discussed.

It is however necessary to point out that these forces' organization, means, personnel, training and tasks are largely similar to those of our Air Cavalry. What really differentiate Italy from the United Kingdom, is that the British Army has developed its doctrine around an innovative employment of helicopter units, deemed pivotal both in traditional war operations and in all other types of conflict as well.

FRANCE

It is needless to mention the ALAT and its 4th DAM, the oldest airmobile Division in Europe, which has been employed in more than 60 crisis situations over the last 20 years. This is certainly one of the most prestigious Large Units which testifies to the development of the concept of force projection and air mobility in France. General Bonnet was reported as saying, " *It is unconceivable to carry out military, humanitarian, peace keeping and personnel evacuation operations without the employment of armed helicopters and particularly the TTHs. The employment of airmobile units has proved to be the best way to ensure the freedom of action necessary to political authorities during the course of operations aimed at safeguarding national interests*".

Since the war in Algeria, the French Army has employed the ALAT in all contingency situations, transforming the 4th DAM into its Division of choice, as regards force projection. Moreover, according to General Bonnet, " *Tiger and NH90 Attack Helicopters will allow France and Europe to reach great airmobile operational capabilities*". General de Reviers de Mauny, former ALAT Commander stated, " *A shift has been made from single helicopters and patrol formations to airmobile divisions (240 Helicopters). This change is in line with the principle of power concentration, supported by Clausewitz and then Douhet, which enables troops to carry out operations considered as impossible up to few years ago*".

SPAIN

FAMET (*Fuerzas Aeromobiles del Ejercito de Tierra*) is presently selecting attack helicopters (Apache, Tiger or others) to equip its *Airportable Brigade*



Above.
AB-412 helicopters.

Right.
An Air Cavaby A-129 during operation IBIS in Somalia.


(about 4,200 men). Reportedly 24-30 vehicles are needed.

As regards the employment doctrine, the Spanish Army is analyzing the concepts adopted by the UK, the Netherlands and France, besides the US doctrine, as declared by General Barbudo Gironza. " *But it is difficult to adapt the doctrine of an Army equipped with about 9,000 helicopters to the requirements of a European country which is now developing its Army Aviation*" he added.

In short, Spain too is taking significant steps forward in the field of air mobility, if not in the air mechanization sector.

FINLAND

In 1998, the Finnish Army had 9 helicopters – 7 Mi-8 and 2



Hughes 500, but the 1997 White Book of Defense had already announced a new course of action:

- downsizing of the mobilization force from 540,000 to 430,000 troops;
- reorganization of forces on:
 - 2 Armored Brigades (the 2 already existing);
 - 6 Scout Brigades (from the 10 already existing);
 - 11 Infantry Brigades (from the 14 already existing);
- organization of 3 new rapid intervention Brigades (called "Brigades 2005") mainly relying on fire power and mobility. The latter capability should be acquired through the procurement of helicopters for a value of up to FM 2,2 billion (about ITL 700 billion) in 10 years. These Brigades, based on:
 - a Reconnaissance Company;
 - 3 Scout Battalions;
 - 1 a/a Battalion;
 - 1 Artillery Battalion;

Nothing more should be added to explain this very clear plan.

We may go on dealing with Greece, Belgium, Sweden and many other countries, but the underlying concept will still be the pivotal role played by the Army Aviation all over Europe. In fact, the Army Aviation is no longer a special branch tasked with supporting land forces' operations, but an autonomous force, capable of "seeking, fixing and carrying out maneuvers to hit and kill the enemy in all weather, day and night conditions unconstrained by terrain features".

This is the meaning of air mechanization.

It is therefore apparent that Europe, more precisely the EU, is willing to acquire air mobile/ air mechanized units to respond to all crisis or threat situations,

EU member nation will be considered as posed against the whole EU community".

What is the present level of air mobility / air mechanization in Europe?

There is still a long way to go. At NATO level, for instance, only one of the five Divisions earmarked for the ARRC is air mobile, i.e. the Multinational Division (Central) (MND(C)). It is based on:

- the Belgian *Paracommando Brigade* (3,300 strong, with a limited number of vehicles);
- the German 31st *Luftlande Brigade* (with approximately the same strength as the Belgian Brigade);

An A-139 combat-support helicopter.



- Engineer, signal, logistic, a/t missile units, will be equipped with LUH, TTH and ESC helicopters.

together with other Armed Forces' components. Mr. Prodi, President of the EU Commission, said, "any threat waged against a

- the Dutch 11th *Luchtmobiele Brigade* with a Helicopter Tactical Group (5,500 strong);
- the British 16th *Air Assault*

Left.

Landing A-109.

Below.

The NH-90 will soon be adopted by Army and Navy.



out territorial defense tasks, unlike the first Brigade, which is a rapid deployment force. Both Brigades will avail themselves of the 108 CH - 53 G transport helicopters.

Germany is clearly oriented towards enhancing the role of air mechanization, but Europe at large has not developed sufficient air mobile capabilities yet. Suffice it to say that the whole heavy duty helicopter fleet belonging to NATO European countries and Canada, includes 230 machines, while the US has



Brigade (already mentioned).

Germany will shortly contribute its 1st Air Mechanized Brigade, equipped with 96 Tiger, 48 NH

and 18 Bo 105 helicopters. A 2nd Brigade will be set up in the future, based on a similar force structure but will mainly carry

as many as 900 vehicles. Utility helicopters are 1,450 against the 3,000 owned by the US, while the scheduled acquisition plan will

Front view of a A-129 "Mangusta" helicopter in flight.

only replace already obsolete aircraft.

If our analysis enlarges from air mobility to air mechanization, to encompass the number and type of *attack* or *combat* helicopters, besides *lifters*, it will be increasingly clear that Europe is far from putting into practice its conceptual guidelines. But, besides real means acquisition possibilities, a problem which heavily affects all Armies in peacetime, many European countries are developing ad-hoc plans, concepts, doctrines, employment rules, requirements and debates, while others still look upon helicopter units as simple support elements. At the beginning of any exercise, the exercise Director introduces the participating units and call Brigades, Regiments and Battalions them by their names, then lists the vehicles employed, 24 Leopard, 36 M113 and.... 12 helicopters.

However, doctrinal and organizational concepts are well-known and governed by established rules:

- the Army Aviation, the subject of this article, operates in a ground environment and not in the air-space. It is an element of the land forces;
- the Aviation is one of the branches of the Army and not its air component;
- the Aviation expands the battlefield, both in space and time, and force availability;
- in operations, the Aviation is tasked with identifying and destroying enemy land forces and their supports. Together with Infantry and Armored Units, the Aviation is the core of the Army maneuver forces;
- the Aviation carries out combat and combat support functions. It contributes to the success of operations by allowing



Commanders to exert their main efforts at the right moment and in the right place.

are not important, only concepts matter).

□

**Lieutenant General (ret.)*

As regards air mechanization, the following requirements have to be met:

- a large increase in the number of combat vehicles, as compared to transport vehicles;
- a decisive step forward as regards vehicle all-weather operational capabilities, in particular those of night vision systems, to carry out fire-and-forget operations in night-time.
- adoption of new and more effective vehicle protection systems.

In conclusion, these are ground-breaking concepts aimed at giving a new and more important role to the Army Aviation (or Air Cavalry, names


NOTES

(1) "Air Maneuver" provides for integrating the operational capabilities of the Army's ground and air assets to acquire superiority in the battlefield. The aim, means and procedures are conceptually similar to those of land maneuvers, but the tempo of air operations is more sustained in disrupting and destroying enemy forces, thanks to helicopters' operational capabilities (ISTAR-intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and *recce*- fire power, speed, range, maneuverability etc) and their independence from the lines of communications.

Since 1998 the Italian Army General Staff has made an effort to develop simulation activities to train and prepare its forces, in view of the new operational scenarios and the ensuing requirements to update its means, materials and training techniques.

This new trend will allow for taking a quantum leap in the training sector, by enhancing forces' operational effectiveness, without employing Army's ranges for live fire training. This way, it will be easier to evaluate Commanders and staffs' capabilities to carry out the C2 function, reduce the risks of possible incidents, cut expenses and devote more time to training activities.

by Ajmone Genzardi *



SIMULATION AS A TRAINING TOOL



With the development of computer science, the number of applications allowing for carrying out numerical simulations reproducing the behavior of complex systems (1) are increased.

These simulations are particularly

effective when a complex process (2) can be broken down into a number of elementary subsets, easily translatable into mathematical or numerical figures or similarly, when a very complex system can be synthesized into the joint effect

of simple interactions among its different elements. Traditional applications of these simulations are weather forecast, the analysis of phase transitions in physical systems, etc.

When stochastic laws govern an elementary process, the analysis of a complex phenomenon can be based on average values drawn from a probabilistic sample. In this case, the phenomenon is simulated as a sequence of elementary subsets, randomly sampled (through algorithms generating random numbers, objects, events, etc.) and following the same probability distribution as that of the real subsets. This technique, developed by particle physics in the late 50's to simulate electromagnetic showers and currently used in many applications, is commonly called "Montecarlo Simulation", being based on random numbers like those drawn from *roulette* gambling.

One of the greatest achievements of Information Technology has been that of simulating complex systems. Actually, in the IT sector, simulation is a method of studying system behaviors; its elementary applications allow for modeling physical problems and replicating the behavior of system components through mathematical relations, algorithms and procedures.

Therefore, the development of simulation software requires:

- knowledge of the physical system's behavior to replicate it (in the case of systems based on a great number of variables, like military operations, some of them are parameterized);
- clear vision of what to reproduce;
- awareness that the system to replicate is made up of a series of sub-systems.

When the system to be reproduced is continuous and requires the representation of elements that can assume a wide



Fig. 1

range of values, the latter are to be approximated through the adoption of discrete and finite values, as computers offer no better options.

A program which replicates a given system (i.e. a simulator) is mainly based on the following parameters:

- software applications reproduce a physical system in its relevant aspects only;
- data representation is approximate in a continuous system, even if the final result is to be as close as possible to reality.

When a physical system, following well-known development rules, is to be reproduced, the software should adjust to the system's behavior to effectively replicate it; this is the only way for a system to reproduce selected aspects of reality without significantly deviating from the real world.

The rules governing the behavior of a physical system may be unknown, like in the case of military operations where an opponent's behavior is to be simulated following doctrinal and human concepts totally or partially unknown. This is true for operational simulation (*Wargaming*: when the opponent's role is played by the system). In this case, operators should only intervene to modify all relevant parameters, in order to reproduce the possible developments of a physical system.

Several models may reproduce the outcome of an operation, but only one is universally accepted.

Wargaming has not been finalized yet; in fact, so far "artificial intelligence", often improperly cited, has not been fully applied in the IT sector, as computation capabilities are still insufficient. Training simulation,

however, performs a well defined function and is already used by many nations.


SIMULATION IN THE MILITARY SECTOR

Simulation applications were first applied in the military sector in the '50s to optimize the course of submarines. In the following decades these applications were further applied to the civil sector for technical, managerial and commercial purposes and then readapted to military requirements, thus creating a "slice technology" sector, rapidly expanding in the last few years.

Simulation applications are traditionally used in the following sectors:

- air: meteorological systems, flight simulators;
- land: video display systems,

Fig. 2



weapons system simulators and image generation systems;

- sea: mobile platform systems,
- air space: interactive display systems of multiple-source data (satellites, probes, sensors, etc).

Military applications are aimed at training individuals or teams (fig.1). In this respect, simulation becomes a useful tool to support all training stages, from basic skills to command and control functions. At the end of a training cycle, soldiers can be considered fit to enter the battlefield.

Simulation is generally split up as follows:

- operational simulation, focusing on the decision-making process
- training simulation, focusing on the preparation of operators, teams or staff.

Operational or support simulators are used to quickly assess the outcome of commanders' decisions,

test their effects and evaluate the difference between the real and planned situation (fig.2).

Training simulators, on the contrary, are made up of hardware and software capable of adequately reproducing the real world, as:

- they are based on the rules of physics (i.e. flight simulator);
- the behavior of the opponent is not simulated but managed by a team tasked with supervising the OPFOR (Opposing Force), as in the case of the GESI simulator for Command Post exercises at Regiment and Brigade level, which will be shortly fielded.

It can be therefore inferred that Training Simulation belongs to those types of simulation programs where the rules governing a physical systems are well known (laws of physics, weapons systems and vehicles'

performance, terrain conditions, etc).

Training simulation can be classified as strategic and tactic.

The first allows for training joint and combined Commands. The second, in turn, encompasses three different levels, based on the requirements to be met:

- the first level comprises systems tailored to train individuals or teams and platoons on the use of personal or crew-served weapons or systems (guns, tanks, light armored vehicles, helicopters, aircraft, etc), both in *Virtual* and *Live* simulation environments.
- the second level comprises the equipment necessary to train troop formations (Brigades, Tactical Groups, Company Teams, Task Forces) to carry out force-on-force exercises employing their assigned weapons in a live environment.

TACTICAL SIMULATION

Fig. 3

LEVEL	ENVIRONMENT	ALLOCATION OF SYSTEMS
1st	LIVE AND VIRTUAL	- Regiments - Branch Schools - Vivaro Pole - Cesano Pole - Torre Veneri Pole - Viterbo Pole
2nd	LIVE	Range Capo Teulada Range Monterotondo Compound Persano Range Torre Veneri
3rd	CONSTRUCTIVE	War College Infantry School

Virtual Simulation

Fig. 4



Piloting simulators for helicopters



Crew simulators for armoured vehicles

Fires are simulated, e.g. through laser beams and fire effects are recorded and played back to the "actors", by the deactivation of weapons and the indication of the wounded or dead in action (*Live simulation*).

- the third level includes ad-hoc systems to train Commands and Staffs (at Division, Brigade, Tactical Group level) to command and control their subordinate units in operations. Simulation is carried out in a reference scenario where two or more opposing forces are deployed to wage both War or PSO operations. The effects of their respective decisions are displayed following mathematical models (*Constructive simulation*).

PREVIOUS SYSTEMS

In the '80s the US had set up a CTC (*Combat Training Center*) at Fort Irwing, California, to train Brigade level units and test simulation systems and techniques. In 1991 the US DoD (*Department of Defense*) was mandated by Congress to draw up a draft report on the measures necessary to apply M&S (*Modeling and Simulation*) to enhance the Armed Forces' capabilities.

In 1994, the DoD issued a directive which led to the development of the MSMP (*Modeling Simulation Master Plan*) to be applied to all Defense components – i.e. education and training, operation, analysis, research, development, verification and validation,


production and logistics sectors – in order to establish systems' employment strategies.

Today's simulation systems allow for carrying out highly realistic training which has greatly enhanced the overall effectiveness of the military instrument. The US is therefore looking upon simulation as a critical "strategic resource", pivotal to its units' effectiveness.

NATO AND EUROPE


In 1966, a *Steering Group* was set up within CNAD (*Conference of National Armament Directors*) which drew up policy guidelines to define a technical standard upon which to build simulation models, interoperable within the NATO MSMP project,

CONSTRUCTIVE SIMULATION



Duel simulators for individual laser-weapons

LIVE SIMULATION




BT46 laser duel-simulators




GAMER mobile simulation central.

Fig. 5

LIVE SECTOR



BLANK SECTOR



establishing a set of rules and procedures necessary to reach interoperability in the simulation sector. NATO considered this project as a preliminary step to address the issue of interoperability with the CIS (*Communication and Information System*). The objective was to set EU-wide simulation standards but it was the US to take the lead through its HLA (*High level Architecture*) Protocol which solved all management problems of the DIF (*Data Interchange Format*) allowing allied nations to cross-exchange their databases and reach interoperability in the future.

In fact, HLA protocol is aimed at integrating processes and

interactions through distributed connections allowing for real time data transfer.

Furthermore, it is worth recalling some initiatives at European level, such as WEAG (*Western European Armaments Group*) - a technological agency for armaments development - and CEPA 11 (*Defense Modeling and Simulations Technologies*) - a group aimed at identifying simulation systems and technologies, which includes Italy.

SIMULATION IN THE ITALIAN ARMY

The Army had not sufficient resources to devote to the

simulation sector until a few years ago. In fact, it focused its attention only on first level simulation systems (individual equipment for small arms and a/t weapons, flight and cockpit simulators), while second level (tactical systems for unit training) and third level (*Constructive simulation for Command Posts*) apparatuses were not taken into account.

However, the Army is going to bridge its technological gap in this sector; in fact Italy is actively participating in all working groups at NATO level and a project group has been set up on simulation. Chaired by Lt.Gen Ghino Andreani (see *Rivista Militare* n.1/2001),

this group is concurrently developing the "Virtual" "Live" and "Constructive" sectors, to equip the Army with a system capable of training not only individual soldiers but also Commands and units (Fig.3)

As regards first level simulation systems (Fig.4), the project group has assessed several types of simulators and adopted a uniform co-ordination policy to maximize its resources. An acquisition plan is underway ad regards ad-hoc systems for small weapons, a/t weapons, indirect fire weapons, flight simulators, turret simulators, crew simulators and mission simulators to equip "Ariete" and Centauro vehicles (Vivaro and Torre Veneri Centres), "Dardo" and 8X8 armored fighting vehicles (VBC) (Cesano Centre) together with flight simulators for Air Cavalry assets (Viterbo Centre).

In the *Live* sector, the project group has acquired BT 46 laser combat simulators for direct fire weapons, to be mounted on tanks and armored vehicles, already fielded to Cavalry Regiments,

both light and armored. These systems will allow for simulating duels among real weapons systems by employing special laser equipment and be field-tested next June at the Torre Veneri Range (Lecce) by units mounted on "Centauro" light armored vehicles and on "1A 5 Leopard" tanks and at the Cellina Meduna training area (Pordenone) by units mounted on "Ariete" tanks and "Centauro" light armored vehicles.

The SAAB BT 46 simulators, meet 1st and 2nd level force-on-force training requirements. In fact, as soon as similar systems are acquired, to be fitted to direct fire weapons - both portable, a/t and heli-mounted-together with simulators for indirect fire weapons - artileries and mortars - the BT 46 and their control stations will be fielded to the new 2nd level Combat Training Centres at Capo Teulada (heavy component), Monteromano (light component), Persano (out-of-area operations and evaluation tests) and Torre Veneri (personnel training).

A SAAB GAMER mobile station, tailored to train platoon level opposing forces, will be tested at Torre Veneri by the end of this year.

This system will allow for monitoring in real time field operations carried out by two opposing platoons, both equipped with BT 46 (fig.5).

The CTCs at Capo Teulada and Monteromano will host company level units, drawn from operational forces on a 6-8 month rotational basis, to play the role of opposing forces (OPFOR), necessary to train exercising units in a realistic environment.

These forces will use the methods and concepts applied by potential opponents, irregular and terrorist formations, etc.

Besides a CTC, the Capo Teulada range will also set up an infrastructure for military operations in urban terrain, with one sector for live training (about 30 buildings) and one for blank training (about 70 buildings). The blank training sector will replicate a European and Middle-Eastern environment and be




Fig. 7

equipped with simulation systems tailored to carry out realistic force-on-force operations.

In the live training sector small groups, made up of no more than 4 soldiers, will be trained in the use of small arms (fig.6).

As regards *Constructive* simulation, important steps forward have been made, both as regards system acquisition and the development of a specific mind-set. In fact, the GESI simulation system (fig.7,8), produced by CAE, a German-Canadian company, allows commanders and staffs to exert command and control over their subordinate units and will be shortly upgraded to train and validate Command Posts before their out-of-area deployment (fig.9).

"Orione 2000", a Regiment level exercise carried out at the Infantry School last September, officially testified to Italy's capability of conducting international simulations and was a preliminary stage for setting up a Regimental Simulation Centre at Cesano next year.

CAX (*Computer Assisted Exercise*) preparatory activities have been extremely important. In fact, during the three weeks prior to the exercise, the project group took a series of initiatives, supported by a simulation pool comprising young, brilliant and highly skilled officers, who drew their technical and practical knowledge from their one year's experience in this specialized sector.

These initiatives have provided for setting up:

- equipment ;
 - wiring systems ;
 - LAN connections for C2 systems;
- and for carrying out
- system tests;
 - scenario upload;
 - Combat leaders and operators' training in the use of simulator.

The project group's training activities will further envisage the CAX Pegaso 2001 (Fig.10) scheduled for September next, to be carried out with the participation of the Centauro Brigade at the Army War College, which will host the Brigade Simulation Centre.

This exercise, similar to the "Orione" but conducted at Brigade level, will allow for deploying 10 Command Posts (1 at Brigade, 8 at Regiment/Battalion levels and 1 Division level staff detachment) and, for the first time, all C4 systems (Command, Control, Communications and Computer) under validation (Fig.11), some



Fig. 8



of which are already interfaced:

- SIACCON: command and control automated system;
- SORAO : target acquisition system;
- SIF/SIR: artillery fire control system;
- SICCA/SICOT: Air defense fire control system;
- NBC Analysis: NBC activities management system;
- SIELOG: Automated material management system.

After the CAX "Pegaso", the project group will carry on its research, development, study and experimentation activities aimed at acquiring the systems necessary to support:

- operational decisions, to

quickly simulate the effects of Commanders' decisions before they are assumed as own lines of action. This systems shall interface with SIACCON, from which it will draw all situational data;

- development of new weapons and/or units. This system will allow for evaluating the suitability of new weapons to counter possible threats, in order to avoid useless overlaps or operational-ballistic gaps.

Moreover, both 3rd level *Constructive* simulation centers and 2nd level *Live* combat training centres will interface with each other and with the SIACCON.

These interconnections will allow a Brigade or a Regiment to train some units in a real environment in the CTCs and other units in a virtual environment in the simulation centres; these units will conduct force-on-force exercises, be mutually connected and operate in a single scenario.

The project group will also deal with the selection and training of technical staff, who will be tasked with managing future centres, and of Observer/Controller Officers who, together with technical staff, will monitor all exercise activities, to draw the "lessons learned", which are the final and most important step of a whole training cycle.

The following deadlines have been set for the completion of above-mentioned projects:

- 2002, the Civitavecchia simulation centre for Brigade/Regiment training and evaluation, and the Cesano centre for War and PSOs activities;
- 2003-2005:
 - CTCs at Capo Teulada, Monteromano, Persano and Torre Veneri;
 - Interface among CTCs, simulation centres and the Army C2 system (SIACCON);




Fig. 9

- Village for military operations in urban terrain with a live and a blank training area;
- fielding of decision support systems.

CONCLUSIONS

The resources allocated by the Army for promoting the employment and development of Information Technology will allow for maximizing existing equipment, working procedures, standard protocols and concurrently increase the know-how of personnel, teams and staff, so as to reach European

training standards. Once the project is finalized, Civitavecchia, Cesano and mainly Capo Teulada and Monte Romano ranges will be the centres of excellence in the training sector.

In fact, it will be possible to exploit ranges around the clock and enable subordinate Commanders to counter in the field an opponent following different rules of engagement and unit Commanders and staffs to assess the soundness of their decisions in the "simulated" field.

In short, this project will allow the Army to take a quantum leap in the training sector, in order to face the

challenges of the 21st century based on a robust technical foothold.

□

**Brigadier General,
Chief, Project Manager Office*

NOTES

(1) A series of coordinated elements forming an organic whole governed by a set of rules

(2) Method to follow, operation or set of operations to carry out to achieve an established aim

Fig. 10

WS PREPARATIONS FOR "CAX PEGASO 2001"





Fig. 11

Software SIACCON 1



SORAO



CEPHALONIA

NOT TO FORGET

by Enrico Pino *



THE SITUATION OF THE "ACQUI" DIVISION BEFORE SEPTEMBER 8TH

In 1943 the "Acqui" Mountain-Infantry Division belonged to the VIII Corps, a Major Unit of the 11th Army. The Division was responsible for the entire Greek territory and the Ionian Islands. In May 1943, the command of the Army was assumed by Gen.

Vecchiarelli, who ordered the transfer of several units and headquarters. As a result, the Division assembled in Cephalonia all the forces stationed in St. Maura, Corfu and Zante, with the exception of the 18th Infantry Regiment, which remained in Corfu with the 3rd battalion of the 33rd Artillery Regiment and became subordinate to the XXVI Corps as of August 15.

Since June 20, 1943 the Division Commander had been Maj. Gen. Antonio Gandin, former Chief, for almost three years of the Operations Office of the Supreme Command. Gen. Gandin had, under his orders the following formations:

- Divisional Infantry Command (Gen. Luigi Gherzi);
- 17th Infantry Regiment (Lt. Col. Ernesto Cessari);



Between September 15 and 22, 1943, on the Ionian island, the Italian Army, wrote, with the "Acqui" Division, one of the finest pages of its history.

Still today, when they see a rising column of smoke, the elders of the island say: "It's the souls of the "Acqui" ascending to Heaven".

The President of the Republic paid homage to all those wonderful soldiers who accepted their death to affirm the values of dignity and military honour. Thanks to them, the Motherland did not die, but started its revival.

four artillery battalions, two 20mm machine-gun sections, and two machine-gun companies.

The garrison of the island also included the Argostoli Navy Command, subordinate to the Division for disciplinary matters, under the orders of Cdr. Mastrangelo. It was equipped with a few torpedo-boats, some mine-sweepers and two 120mm and 152mm batteries. As a whole, the Italian garrison consisted of about 11,000 men and 525 Officers.

After the fall of Mussolini, a closer Italo-German integration was decided. The 11th Army became a mixed Army, subordinate to the German "E" Army Group, and the Italian garrison of the island was integrated with a German contingent. Its Commander was Lt.Col. Barge, and consisted of the 966th Fortress-Infantry Regiment (two battalions armed with heavy weapons, especially mortars) and a battery of self-propelled guns (eight 75mm and one 105mm). The German garrison was about two thousand strong, with 25 Officers, and was cordially welcomed by the Italian commanders and units.

After the arrival of the Germans, the island was divided into three sectors:

- North, assigned to the 317th Inf. Regt., reinforced by three cannon batteries, the Headquarters were at Macriotica;
- South, assigned to the 17th Inf. Regt. reinforced two artillery battalions, a Navy battery and a German self-propelled battery; the Headquarters were at Keramies;
- Lixuri, assigned to the German troops, with HQ in Lixuri; Lt. Fault's self-propelled battery and an infantry company were stationed at Argostoli, outside the sector.

All three sectors were subordinate to the Division HQ, which was located at Argostoli and linked to the Greek mainland through a submarine telephone-cable, while the communications with Italy were ensured by the radio sets of the Division Engineers and Maritime Command.

The Division had food suppliers for about ninety days, and its ammunition stocks were sufficient for three or four combat days.

Its position was significant within the Greek-Albanian

- 317 th Infantry Regiment (Col. Ezio Ricci);
- 33rd Artillery Regiment (Col. Mario Romagnoli);
- several Engineer units;
- Divisional logistic units, including three field hospitals and a surgical team;
- a company of Carabinieri;
- a company of "Guardie di Finanza".

The Division was reinforced by

theatre, since Cephalonia, owing to its position barring the access to the Gulf of Patras and therefore to the Isthmus of Corinth, could be very important if the Allies attempted to land on the Greek mainland.

SEPTEMBER 8th

Late in the afternoon of September 8th, at about 6 p.m., the radio operators of the Navy Command learned from the BBC that the Italian Government had asked for an armistice. The Navy Command started immediately to inquire for confirmations, and its operators got in touch, but only for a moment, with their counterparts in Corfu, just in time to receive a desperate appeal: "We are overwhelmed by the Germans"; then the communication was definitively interrupted. The news about the armistice spread fast in the whole island, and at 7 p.m. reached the Division Headquarters, while in town there were manifestations of joy, initially joined also by some Germans, who obviously believed that the war was about to end also for them.

Gen. Gandin realized immediately that the situation was very serious and took the necessary measures to reestablish order in town, including a curfew and the activation of armed patrols; calm returned in a short time, and also

the Germans went back to their barracks. At about 9 p.m. the Division HQ received a radiogram from the 11th Army, with a message from Gen. Vecchiarelli: *"Following the armistice, the Italian troops of the 11th Army will abide by the following course: if the Germans do not commit acts of armed violence, the Italians will not - I repeat, will not - turn their weapons against them; they will*

using force, to any armed violence".

In order to have more indications on the situation deriving from the armistice and about the Division's future activities, desperate attempts were made of contacting the Army, the Corps and other nearby Commands: no answer was received; the only communication was a radiogram ordering the departure of the torpedo boats and other ships for Italy. This was done the same night, leaving the Division even more isolated from the mainland.

On September 9th the Division Headquarters continued to wait for orders.

Gen. Gandin summoned Lt.Col. Barge (who from that moment became the emissary of Gen. Lanz, Commander of the XXII Mountain Corps, to whom Gandin's Regiment was subordinate and who had the task of disarming the Italian units) and informed him about the text of the message received the night before, as well as the attitude that, as a consequence, the Italians had to take from then on.

The German officer stated that, although he had no instructions, he considered advisable to continue in the collaboration for the maintenance of public order.

After the conversation, Gen. Gandin invited Barge to dinner; he kindly declined, due to duty engagements, and asked Lt.Fault to participate in his stead. The dinner went on in a friendly atmosphere and in his final toast,



General Antonio Gandin, Commander of the "Acqui" Mountain Infantry Division from June 20, 1943.

not - I repeat, will not - make common cause neither with the rebels nor with the Anglo-American troops that happened to land. The Italian troops will react,

Lt. Fault wished Italy, *"so tried by an unfortunate war, better luck and a more favourable destiny"* and declared that *"whatever the future relations between the Acqui Division and the Germans, even if it came to fighting, on the German part there would always be chivalry and loyalty"*.

This was reported by Capt. Bronzini, who survived the massacre and, at the time, was in service at the Operations Office of the Division HQ.

Meanwhile, the Greek propaganda was spreading rumors of ill-treatment of Italian soldiers by the Germans on the Greek mainland, and started spreading the idea that, once the Germans were driven out of the island, the British, who were already the masters of Italy and the Mediterranean, would make provisions for the repatriation of the Italians. Bronzini says: *"The idea enticed our soldiers, since most of them had been away from home for more than thirty months, and many had not even enjoyed a short period of leave"*.

Actually, these rumors commenced to achieve the expected results: already in the morning of the 9th a certain restlessness and a growing anti-German feeling started to show.

Gen. Gandin, unwilling to create a climate of hostility with the former allies, decided to leave in the sector of Lixuri the Italian batteries deployed among the German troops. This aroused sharp criticism and edginess even at the "Acqui" Headquarters.

In the evening, at about 8 p.m., at last, a long radiogram from the 11th Army arrived; it said that, as a result of an agreement reached with the German Command *"... all collective weapons and artillery must be handed over to the incoming German units; individual weapons must be kept in an adequate number to meet possible requirements against the rebels"*.

Therefore, the Army's Divisions had to hand over the artillery guns

and the other heavy weapons, since the Germans had pledged to repatriate all Italian servicemen within a short time, in accordance with procedures to be defined.

Obviously, the message caused great amazement in the Headquarters, since the surrender of the weapons contrasted with Badoglio's announcement, whose conclusion was: *"Consequently, all hostile acts against the Anglo-American forces by the Italian forces must cease everywhere. Nevertheless they will react to any attack from other sources"*.

At the moment, it was known what the Allies or the Germans were going to do, and the

time, attempts were made to contact Italy and the Greek mainland by radio. All national and foreign radio-stations were monitored, but no clarifying news about the situation was received.

On September 10th at 8 a.m., Lt. Col. Barge, accompanied by Lt. Fault, reported to General Gandin, and asked him to comply with the request expressed by his Command: according to the agreements with the 11th Army, the entire garrison of Cephalonia had to hand over all its weapons, including the individual ones, the following morning, in Argostoli main square. At this point,




Italian antiaircraft position.

delivery of the weapons could very likely leave the Division defenceless, at anybody's mercy.

General Gandin, faced with an order openly in contrast with Badoglio's directives, found himself in a dramatic situation, with no easy way out. There were also doubts that the message could be a fake, i.e. broadcast by the Germans. The message was then returned to the Army, defining it *"partially illegible"*. At the same

General Gandin started to play for time, hoping to postpone his decision until a new connection with the higher Commands could be made: he said that new orders were expected from the Italian Command, from which he had received only a partially readable message. He added that possibly its content was along those lines, but the message was returned with the request of its exact repetition. In any case, even if the order was confirmed, he believed that the individual weapons should not be surrendered, and considered unacceptable that the



delivery should take place in the town square. Lt. Col. Barge seemed to understand the point, and promised to report the General's wishes to the German Command.

The Commander of the "Acqui" was fully aware of the difficulties he was going to have in his relations with the Germans, and of the problems that his actions

could cause: it was possible to fight against them, taking advantage of the favourable ratio of 11,000 to 2,000, but it was necessary to consider that the Government had ordered to react to violence, not to attack first; and the Germans, up to that moment, had not committed any violent act against the "Acqui". Furthermore, even if the

Germans were driven out of Cephallonia, what would happen if they decided to turn their forces in the Balkans against the Division, in order to take back the island? The Italians, abandoned and far from reinforcements and supplies, would certainly be overwhelmed, and he felt responsible for the life of 11,000 men, just at a moment

when the war seemed to be over.

General Gandin, then, decided to summon the Commanders of the Division's Infantry, the Commanders of the Infantry and Artillery Regiments, of the Division's Engineers and of "Marina Argostoli", in order to have their views. Together with the Chief of Staff, he drew a picture of the situation and, at the end of a long discussion, received discordant opinions: the Infantry Commanders and the Commanders of the Infantry Regiments and Engineers were in favour of handing over the weapons, while the Commanders of Artillery and Navy were against. At the close of the meeting, the General authorized the Commanders to inform their units of the text of the radiogram received the night before. Therefore, in the morning of the 10th, all soldiers learned about the orders and about the situation of uncertainty surrounding their Division.

There were rumors, according to which the Germans had seized by force the HQ of the 11th Army and the troops started being excited, while the Greek propaganda went so far as to distribute leaflets inciting the Italians to fight against the Germans: *"Italian soldiers!*

The time has come to fight against the Germans! The Greek patriots are at your side". The idea of fighting rather than surrender the weapons, was catching on among the Italian soldiers.

Late that night Lt. Col. Barge returned to General Gandin, and told him that the German Command was willing to postpone the delivery of the arms to a later date to be agreed upon and accepted the surrender of the artillery guns and heavy weapons only. But the Germans were not in a position to provide for the repatriation of the Italians, not until the necessary ships were available. General Gandin, continuing his delaying tactics,

asked for definite guarantees on the preservation of the individual weapons and on the fact that the artillery pieces could be handed over at the moment of the departure from Cephalonia, while the heavy weapons should be delivered upon arrival in Italy. In substance, he relied on the prestige he had among the Germans - with whom he had carried out delicate tasks, and who highly appreciated him - in order to conclude an honourable agreement, convenient for all.

Early in the morning of the 11th, the Division HQ received a message by Lt. Col. Barge: the General's requests were generally accepted and, furthermore, it was suggested that the Italians left the responsibility for the Island

Italian troops capturing German soldiers.



to the Germans, moving to an assembly area in the interior. But, for the first time, an explicit request for a clear stand was formulated: the German Command wanted to know, in clear terms, what attitude the "Acqui" Division intended to assume; the Commander, therefore, had to answer one of the following questions: in favor

of the Germans, against them or surrender the weapons. The deadline for the answer was fixed at 7 p.m. of the 11th.

The letter, albeit not hostile, compelled the General to give the definite answer that he had tried to delay while waiting to establish a connection with Italy. Thus, he decided to summon again his subordinate Commanders, who, as in the preceding meeting, gave him contrasting opinions: the majority was in favour of yielding the weapons, while the Artillery Commander, Col. Romagnoli, and Cdr. Mastrangelo were against it.

After meeting the Commanders, Gandin decided to ask also for the opinion of the Division's chaplains, who could have a better knowledge of the spirit of the soldiers, considering the daily contacts they had with them.

The meeting started at 6 p.m., and the General described his great distress with these words, reported by the chaplain of the 33rd Artillery Regt, Padre Romualdo Formato, a survivor of the massacre: *"You are priests, servants of God. You know the soul of the soldier, and can be very precious to me at this moment."*

COMRADES OF THE ITALIAN ARMY

With Badoglio's treason, Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany have been cowardly abandoned in their fatal struggle.

The surrender of the weapons by Badoglio's Army in Greece has been completed, without bloodshed. Only the "Acqui" Division, whose commander is general Gandin, a supporter of Badoglio's, stationed on the islands of Cephalonia and Corfu, and isolated from the other territories, has refused the offer of a peaceful delivery of arms, and started to fight against the Fascist and German comrades.

This struggle is utterly hopeless. The Division is divided in two, surrounded by the sea, without supplies, and cannot be helped by our enemies.

We, your German comrades, don't want this fight, and therefore invite you to lay down your arms and rely on the German garrisons of the islands. Also for you, as for the other Italian comrades, the road to the Motherland is open. But, if the present unreasonable resistance continues, you will be crushed and exterminated by the preponderant German forces which are now concentrating. Those who are taken prisoners then, will not be able to return to their Country.

Therefore, Italian comrades, move over to the Germans as soon as you receive this leaflet.

This is the last opportunity to save your life!

The German Corps-Commander

A leaflet dropped by German planes.

behind us, on the very close Greek mainland, there are more than 300,000 Germans, certainly ready to rush here, with men and equipment. They can launch their Stukas squadrons and slaughter us with no problem at all. Would the troops, then, fight in a good spirit? Would they resist, defenceless, under the bombings? Keep these comments in mind and tell me your opinion in all conscience, suggesting which one of the three points I should take as a lesser evil." Padre Formato goes on: "We were seven: all, except one, were in favour of the third point".

At 7p.m. Lt. Col. Barge reported to the Division HQ, and the General told him that he agreed to the delivery, but obtained a delay, for the official statement, until the following morning. Throughout the evening and the night, however, there were meetings with the Germans, during which they were told that, with the troop movements under way, they were giving the impression of reinforcing the units stationed at Argostoli, contrary to the promises of good relations with the Italians. As a matter of fact it was easy, by then, to see that between Lixuri and Argostoli there was a heavy traffic of trucks with only a few men on board, but always empty on their return trips.

On the contrary, General Gandin decided to withdraw the battalion deployed at Kardakata, a high place dominating the island, so that its presence could not be interpreted as a sign of hostility.

It was agreed that the movement would take place on the following day, and the German Command undertook to send no more reinforcements and to restrain from moving troops within the island.

This is an extremely tragic moment for the Division and for myself. I have on my conscience the responsibility for the lives of more than ten thousand young men. The life of all these boys could be endangered by the decision I am about to make. An ultimatum of the German Command in Athens invites me to make a decision on one of the following points: continue fighting at the side of the Germans; fight against the Germans; surrender our weapons. I premise that I am bound, before God and the Country, by an oath of loyalty to His Majesty the King. It is certainly not for me to remind you, men of God, that an oath is a sacred act, through which we call God himself as a direct witness of what we affirm and promise.

The new legitimate Government of the King has signed an armistice. Therefore, we cannot anymore take up our arms against yesterday's enemy. But, on the

other hand, why should we, without serious reasons or provocations, turn our weapons against people who, for three years, have been our allies, fought the same war and shared our sacrifices?

That leaves open the solution of peacefully surrendering our arms. I have been assured that this would only concern the heavy weapons, most of which were given to us by the Germans themselves. But wouldn't this be in contrast with the spirit of the armistice and, as a consequence, wouldn't we break our oath to the King? And what about military honour, which is a thing dearest to a soldier and to an unlucky but still glorious Army such as the Italian Army is? And yet, on one of these three points I must make a decision. Consider that, in case of armed conflict against the Germans, in a first phase we would certainly prevail, since we are very numerous and strong in this island. But let's not forget that

General Gandin's protracted contacts with the German Command caused a worrying unrest among the troops; it was rumoured that the General was a coward and wanted to disarm the Division in the face of a scant number of Germans and he was accused of being a "Germanophile" and a "traitor".

Because of this state of unrest, the agreed withdrawal from the important position of Kardakata was seen as a first step towards surrender and yielding of arms; some Officers recalled from Kardakata contacted their colleagues of the 33rd Artillery Regt, a unit with strong anti-German feelings. Among the latter, in particular, Capt. Pampaloni (commander of the 1st. Battery), Lt. Apollonio (3rd. Battery) and Lt. Ambrosini (5th. Battery) had already contacted several junior Officers of the Regiment and some Carabinieri and Navy Officers. During these contacts, Cdr. Mastrangelo had said, without hesitation that "if the Army artillery starts firing, the Navy will join in the fight". At the same time, the Greek propaganda was getting more and more insistent, and was openly looking for contacts, up to the level of Division HQ, where they sent a former Captain in the Greek Army, offering the partisans' willingness to participate in the fight against the Germans.

In the afternoon of the 12th a rumor, which was later confirmed, maintained that in the Lixuri area the Germans, certain that they were going to disarm the Italians, had overcome the "Carabinieri" and "Guardia di Finanza" stations and two artillery batteries. General Gandin, informed just as he was about to meet Lt. Col. Barge, was indignant and asked him for an explanation of the aggression. Barge said that he did not know the facts; he believed that the event was

certainly due to individual initiatives, and assured the General that he would have the Italians released immediately and the artillery pieces returned as soon as possible. But after the tension calmed down, the German Officer informed the General that the Oberkommando had taken the negotiating power away from him and, as a consequence, all negotiations conducted up to that point were null and void. The German Command had no more intention of discussing, but only wanted to know whether the "Acqui" was against the Germans or was going to surrender its weapons to them.

While this discussion was going on, the German aggression, during which the Italians had been disarmed at Lixuri, caused rumors among the units that the General had decided and ordered to surrender the arms. Tension became very high; Lt. Pampaloni and Capt. Apollonio managed to be received by the Division Commander, together with Lt. Ambrosini and Capt. Pantano from the 317th Infantry. Their purpose was to inform the General that they and their men were not going to obey the order to surrender their weapons, but were going to fight against the Germans.

"During the discussion - Apollonio wrote in one of his reports - Gen. Gandin was standing, with his hands on the

desk. His face was white and covered with cold sweat, revealing an indescribable internal anguish. His expression and his words showed a man overburdened by the weight of his responsibilities". At the end of the discussion, the General retained his liberty of action and asked the Officers not to take any initiative.

Gen. Gandin, besides the unrest, which was rife among the units and could make him lose control of the Division, had also to face the new situation created by the Germans with the aggression at Lixuri; he called a council of war, which was to start at 8 p.m. On the way to the meeting, his automobile was the object of acts of hostility by Italian soldiers, to the point that a hand grenade, which luckily did not explode, was thrown, and a soldier boldly snatched the Command standard from the car. At the end of the council a document was addressed to the German Oberkommando: the Division Commander, offended by the German behaviour, from then on refused to deal with officers of lesser rank, and unaccompanied by an Officer, known to him, from the Italian 11th Army. Furthermore, he enjoined the Germans not to send reinforcements or move units and assured that no hostile

A position of Italian machine gunners.



acts would be committed if the Germans fulfilled these pledges.

At about midnight, a communication from Corfu increased the tension. Col. Lusignani, Commander of the 18th Infantry and military Commander of the island, informed that he had reacted to the injunction to surrender the Regiment's weapons, and had overwhelmed and taken prisoner the German battalion; furthermore, three airplanes were shot down during the fight. The news was received with pleasure by the Division staff, but the General, considering the soldiers' excitement, ordered not to spread it, at least for the moment.

In spite of all precautions, the units spent a night of great excitement. Some Italian Officers met with Greek patriots in order to cooperate in possible future actions; junior Officers from the infantry and artillery Regiments met to discuss and arrange common actions, in view of the order that, by then, everybody expected.

At about 6 a.m. of the 13th, two large German motor-craft appeared on the sea, loaded with troops and medium-caliber guns, heading for Argostoli. Clearly they were reinforcements for the Germans in town, and immediately the batteries of the 33rd Regt, commanded by Capt. Pampaloni, Lt. Apollonio and Lt. Ambrosini opened fire on their own initiative, followed by the Navy's 208th battery. One of the craft sank, the other was damaged and abandoned and its personnel swam to the shore. The Germans reacted with artillery fire from Argostoli and Lixuri. The fight inflamed the hearts, and fire ceased only following an order by Gen. Gandin, but the batteries stopped only after the Germans' had fallen silent. The first clash between Italians and Germans caused five dead and eight wounded among the

MARCH 1, 2001: PRESIDENT CIAMPI VISITS CEPHALONIA.

A thunder and a sudden downpour of rain, on an island where it never rains, cover President Ciampi's words, in Cephalonia, giving them an almost epic tone: "Those soldiers decided to resist, did not surrender their arms to the Germans, and went on to their death".

Around the monument to the Fallen of the "Acqui" Division, not far from the "Red House", where the slaughter of 136 Italian Officers took place, one can feel the tension of the great evocative events and the awe-stricken atmosphere surrounding the memory of the irrational acts of men at war. Intermittent rain falls on the full-dress uniform of the two "Corazzieri", on the white head of the President, who refuses the hat offered by an aide, on the "Alpine" hats of the "Acqui" survivors and on the families that, in consideration of their age, have accompanied them in the long one-day journey from Italy to this large and beautiful rock on the Ionian sea. A pilgrimage which started before dawn and continued through the day, following a precise sequence of events and a rigid protocol, owing to the presence of the Italian and Greek Heads of State. In a morning with an autumn-like climate, unusual for Rome, where March is already springtime, three airplanes of the Italian Air Force are warming up their engines, waiting for the over ninety passengers from every part of Italy, including journalists of the most important national papers and television nets. The three planes take off at intervals of a few minutes and enter the black and low clouds that will accompany them all the way to Greece. The last two planes are occupied by the "Acqui" veterans, well aware of the meaning of their return, after fifty-seven years, on an island where their lives had been hanging by a thread which did not break by a sheer miracle. On the seat

***"Today we remember the tragedy
and the glory of the Acqui Division.
Our heart is heavy with grief
for the fate of those
who were companions
of our youth,
and full of pride for their behaviour".***

next to mine sits the daughter of an Officer of the "martyrized" Division. She is shy about her feelings, and tells me that she was only one year old when her father, a few days before the armistice, insisted to go back to his soldiers on the island because things, after the fall of the Fascist regime, did not look good at all.

Now, on her mind, there was only one intention: to see the infamous "Red House" where her father had been mowed down by the submachine guns of the Alpenjäger from Austria and Upper Adige, led by Major Von Hirschfeld, the Officer who had said to his men: "Mein Jäger, the next twenty-four hours belong to you!" That place, for her, was the tomb, the altar and the monument to the sacrifice of her father. To kneel on the same spot where he had fallen to the ground with four comrades had been, for years, the greatest wish in her life and the nightmare of an orphan who had never known her father, alive or dead. She had already planned to go to Cephalonia at her own expense but, when she learned about the President's pilgrimage, she wrote him, asking for a small place on one of the airplanes, hoping that the survivors could tell her something about her father. She had read everything possible about the tragedy of Cephalonia, but she still felt in her heart the emptiness of a presence that she could not fill. From the monument, she wanted to walk the

short slope to the sea and the "Red House", but was advised against it by the scarcity of time. Nevertheless Ciampi's long concentration before the memorial stone, which had lasted much longer than the "honours" and the sad notes of the bugle call, gave her time for reflection: the President of the Italians, her President, with his head bent under the rain, seemed to have taken on himself the grief of all presents, and particularly of those who, like her, had hoped to touch with their hands an improbable sign of the last moment, when the dying men of the "Red House" had sent to heaven their final farewell to life and their faraway families.

The ceremony continued at the nearby monument to the Fallen of Greece, where the two Presidents briefly mentioned another period, as ill-fated as that of the post-armistice, when the two nations, bound by ancient ties of civilization and friendship, bitterly fought each other as a result of the decision made by two mad dictators. A useless conflict which now, as was proved by the words of the two Presidents, appears to be settled by a strong common accord, destined to last.

After the commemoration of the Greek soldiers, the rigid programme of the visit takes us again to the airport, where a wing of helicopters is waiting to fly to the deck of the cruiser "Garibaldi", anchored off St. Teodoro's point. The water foams under us, owing to the strong mistral wind. Here, nine hundred servicemen of the "Acqui" drowned in the wreck of the ship which was taking them to the imprisonment camps, after surviving fights and massacres. Many of them were machine-gunned by the German escort, who did not want

anybody to escape from the Cephalonia slaughter. For many of the survivors, this short flight over the sea where they had to swim ashore and where many of their comrades had died because they could not do it, will remain as one of the most dramatic moments of the entire journey. And

***"You consciously decided
your destiny.
You made clear that our Motherland
had not died.
Indeed, with your decision,
you reaffirmed its existence.
Upon these foundations
was based the resurrection of Italy".***

we can understand why, when President Ciampi cast a garland of flowers on the rough water of the Gulf of Lixuri, the three salvos fired by the sailors of the "San Marco" Regiment caused a sudden start in the hearts of the veterans, and their memory went back to those terrible moments. Later, in the spacious hangar of the cruiser, the President, visibly moved, devotes himself completely to the survivors. His hug is tight, warm, almost stifling. Everyone wants to shake his hand, tell his story, thank him for being there. During this memorial ceremony so far away, but so close to the place where twelve thousand men decided to sacrifice themselves for the honour of Italy and to keep their oath, we all went through emotions and memories which are very seldom experienced on similar occasions. On the way back, while the planes fly over the scenes of so many fights, where the Italians had to succumb to the fury of the Stukas, but made the Germans pay dearly for their victory, I try to imagine the fires that lit up the night of September 27th; the fires which reduced to ashes the dead bodies of hundreds of human beings. Remembering these men, the elders of Cephalonia, still today, turn their eyes to the evening mist and whisper, as in a prayer: "It's the souls of the "Acqui" going to Heaven".

Ilvio Muraca

Germans and an Italian soldier was wounded.

After a while a seaplane landed in the Gulf of Argostoli with a Colonel from the Oberkommando, accompanied by a Captain from the Italian Air Force. The Italian Officer, while waiting for the conclusion of the discussion between the German Colonel and Gen. Gandin, had an informal conversation with the Officers of the divisional staff, and said that, in general, the Army had decided to surrender its weapons to the Germans: *"Only the "Acqui" is making such a fuss"*.

This sentence caused disconcert in the Headquarters; at the end of the meeting, at about noon, the German envoy and the Italian escort left for Athens, with the information that the Division would give a definite answer about its decision by twelve o'clock on the following day, September 14th.

Meanwhile, the personnel of the 2nd battalion, 317th Infantry Regt, refused to move to a new sector that would permit a better disposition on the northern front, since they believed that the movement precluded the surrender of the arms; only late at night the battalion, persuaded by the convincing action of the Officers, moved to the new area.

The units were reached by the first rumors on the outcome of the meeting: apparently the "Acqui" was to concentrate in the Samos, Digoletu and Porto Poros areas, keeping all its weapons, and with the possibility of taking them back to Italy if there was enough tonnage available.

Padre Formato wrote: *"The result of the negotiations appeared to have relaxed the nerves of everybody"*; but calm lasted very little, because during the night the news spread that the German Command was not willing to transport the heavy weapons, owing to the scarcity of suitable transportation.

Everybody took this explanation as a kind of trap, also because



St. Teodoro peninsula: the pit near the "Red House" where most of the "Acqui" Officers were shot, and where, later, the remains of slain sailors were also discovered.

meanwhile, the crews of the two batteries captured the day before by the Germans at Lixuri had come back, and their reports about the ill treatments they had suffered after their disarmament provoked an irrepressible hatred and fierce resolutions of revenge. Moreover, a communication from Zante informed that the Italian garrison, after the surrender of the weapons, had been embarked on German ships bound for Athens. The situation seemed clear: the 11th Army had been deceived, and had yielded to the requests; only Cephalonia and Corfu were resisting the German pressure.

On the night between September 13 and 14, Gen. Gandin started considering a resolute action and, to be sure that his decision was the right one, asked the Regiment Hqs to have their troops express their opinion on three points: against the Germans, with the Germans, surrender of the arms.

In the morning of the 14th the answer arrived: everybody wanted to fight against the

Germans.

Father Formato's comment: *"Everybody moved very rapidly to a full war-climate".*

At the same time, a communication from the Supreme Command was received by the Navy Command: *"General Gandin must resist with arms the German injunction of disarmament in Cephalonia, Corfu and other islands".*

The Division HQ was abandoned, and the most delicate documents destroyed. Teams of Engineers started mining crossroads.

At 12 o'clock the Chief of Staff of the Division met with Lt. Fault in Argostoli, and delivered Gen. Gandin's answer: *"By order of the Italian Supreme Command and will of the Officers and Soldiers, the "Acqui" Division does not surrender its arms. The German Higher Command, on the basis of this decision, is asked to give a definitive answer by 9 a.m. tomorrow September 15".*

In the afternoon several German Stukas flew over the island, without conducting any hostile

action, but as a show of force. The units received the news, which had been concealed up to then, of the capture of the German garrison by the Italian garrison of Corfu. This deed inflamed the spirits even more, and the excitement grew when reinforcements and supplies, shipped to the Germans by sea and air, started to arrive to the Paliki peninsula.

The shipments continued through the night between the 14th and the 15th. The Italian Command protested, but to no avail.

Early in the morning of the 15th Lt. Col. Barge asked by phone a postponement of the ultimatum to 2 p.m., which was granted by Gen. Gandin, who later sent a message to his units, explaining the latest events and urging everybody to get ready for a hard fight.

At 2 p.m. a formation of 24 Stukas appeared over Cephalonia: *"The sky - says Padre Formato - was full of German airplanes, and in a moment the land became a hell of whistles, explosions and flames".*

THE BATTLE

The Germans had taken advantage of the days of negotiations to reinforce the units deployed on the island, so that, at the beginning of the battle, their garrison was at least three thousand strong.

The battle was characterized by three main phases, and in all of them the Italians were clearly inferior, owing to the lack of air force.

The first phase took place on the 15th and started with a preparation fire, short but very

violent, conducted by the Stukas. This permitted the Germans to take the initiative in the sector of Argostoli and Parsa. Initially the IIbn of the 17th Infantry was taken by surprise and was unable to fight back the attack, and the Germans conquered Mt. Telegrapho, albeit for a short time. The II/17th, in fact, was able to reorganize and, late in the afternoon conducted a counterattack, while, at the same time, the III/17th moved towards the port area. At that point, the Germans found themselves in serious trouble, and had to send reinforcements from Lixuri, with fifteen vessels which landed at St. Teodoro. The Italians reacted violently and effectively: the whole artillery broke out, the ships were sunk and the Germans, having no more landing craft in Cephalonia, remained caged in the Argostoli peninsula. They started falling back to the St. Teodoro point. where they were compelled to surrender, leaving 500 men and a 75mm battery in Italian hands. Numerous messages were sent throughout the day, informing the Supreme Command about the beginning of the operation, and requesting air interventions against the German attacks. The battle ended at midnight but, because of the harshness of the fights and their ups and downs, nobody realized the significance of the success achieved. Thus, the Italians missed the opportunity of defeating once and for all the German contingent stationed in the island, preventing the successive arrival of reinforcements.

Gen. Lanz, Commander of the XXII Mountain Corps, responsible for the operations in Cephalonia, at this point considered the situation to be

very critical, and tried to exploit as much as possible the operational inertia of the Italians. During the night he requested Oberkommando to replace Lt. Col. Barge with Maj. Harald Von Hirschfeld, considered more resolute, and to ship to the island, as reinforcements, two infantry battalions, one artillery battalion from the 1st Mountain Division and one battalion from the 104th Jäger Division. Furthermore, he asked for the support of all available fighter-bombers to the operations in Cephalonia. His requests were granted, and the reinforcements landed in groups at the Aghia Kyriaki bay from 16 to 20 September. As a consequence, the force ratio was reversed in favour of the Germans.

The second phase of the battle took place from 17 to 19 September, on the initiative of the "Acqui" HQ, which organized a concentric attack by four battalions (I, II, III/317th and I/17th) for the reconquest of Kardakata, the important position which was voluntarily, and too hastily, abandoned during the negotiations.

"Unfortunately - Apollonio recalls - this operation did not achieve the results hoped for. In

fact, while the II/317th and the III/317th succeeded in entering the towns of Kardakata and Kuruklata, the I/317th, surprised by fighter-bombers near the Bridge of Chimoniko and counterattacked by the Jäger battalion (the first reinforcement which had arrived on the island), is wiped out on September 18, leaving on the ground, in only 4 hours of combat, 37 Officers and about 400 NCOs and soldiers". During the second phase the conquest of Cape Munta, on the southern tip of the island, was also attempted, in order to eliminate a German garrison stationed there. The action, entrusted to a formation battalion, did not have a favourable outcome due, once more, to the intervention of the German air force. During this action, it was very clear that for the Germans the rules had changed: they did not permit a military chaplain, who was driving an ambulance, to assist the wounded, who were shot the following day, with other hostages.

During the battle, the German airplanes dropped, besides bombs, also leaflets inviting the Italians to lay down their arms, otherwise "prisoners will not be



Outskirts of Argostoli: the positions held by the 3rd and 5th battery of the 33rd Regt between September 9 and September 15.

able to go back to their Country". Despite this warning, no one left his combat station. The absence of the air force was a heavy handicap for the Italian troops, but, in response to pressing requests, the Supreme Command had made known that it could not send any air support.

In the third (and last) phase, on September 21 and 22, the initiative was taken by the Germans who, by then, had at their disposal all the reinforcements arrived from the mainland.

Their action started at 00:01 of the 21st, before the attack to

the deployment, was frontally attacked by a Jäger battalion and on a flank by a mountain unit. After about four hours of violent fight, in which almost all the Officers and 300 soldiers and NCOs were killed, the battalion was encircled and captured. After that, the Germans moved to the attack of the batteries of the 33rd Regt, which surrendered after a desperate defence, leaving 180 artillerymen dead on the field. Then the Germans went on with two Jäger battalions, and reached the mountain area, where, at about 2 p.m., they surprised the logistic services of the Division at

"Acqui". Throughout the fights, Gen. Gandin continued to ask the Supreme Command for air support, but with no result. The situation was coming to a head: at 12 o'clock of the 22nd, the Grenadiers and the Jäger, after overwhelming the last resistance of the remnants of the III/17th and the 158th Engineer Company - which, in a succession of very hard fights lost almost all Officers and 200 NCOs and soldiers - reached the outskirts of Argostoli, while two mountain Jäger battalions entered the stronghold, moving along the ridge overlooking the town. The resistance of the "Acqui" Division was broken, and at 2 p.m. an unconditional surrender was granted.

During the week-long battle, 65 Officers and 1250 NCOs and soldiers had fallen in combat.

THE REPRISAL

The most dramatic events in Cephalonia took place outside the rules of war: 155 Officers and 4700 between NCOs and soldiers were killed on the spot, treated "according to the Führer's orders".

To describe this tragic epilogue, we must rely on the memory of the survivors.

Capt. Pampalani recounts what happened in the morning of the 21st, when the Germans reached his battery: "A German Captain arrived, with about 100 men, and ordered that our arms be surrendered. Through an interpreter he asked me to hand in the breech-blocks, threatening me with death. Fifteen minutes later, he repeated his request.

Meanwhile, the Germans were taking all wallets, watches, fountain pens, and even trouser belts. I protested, saying that the possession of the prisoners should have been respected. He answered: you are not prisoners, you are traitors.



Kardakata planned by Gen. Gandin for 6 a.m., could take place.

The Germans launched their decisive attack with a Grenadier battalion and a Jäger battalion for the frontal action, while two Jäger battalions (Klebe combat-group) carried out a wide encirclement of the entire Italian deployment, with the Argostoli stronghold as their common objective. At 2 in the morning the III/17th was surprised from the rear, on its starting position, and wiped out. At about 4 a.m. the II/317th, which was the hinge of

The St. Barbara gorge, where the corpses of about 40 Officers from the 17th and 317th Infantry Regt were found.

Francata and Valsamata, while the other two battalions, Grenadiers and Jäger, breaking through the defences of the I/17th - which left almost all its Officers and 350 NCOs and soldiers on the ground - reached Pharsa, Davgata, Pharaklata, at approximately 4 km from Procopata, tactical HQ of the

They seized about 30 men and took them I don't know where, then ordered us to line up in a single file. The soldiers started to feel that something tragic was about to happen. Someone said: they'll kill us all. I was calm, since I was very far from thinking what was going to happen very soon.

The German Captain told me to step aside, and gestured to start walking... armed his pistol and, as soon as I was a few steps in front of him, he fired, hitting me in the neck. I feel down without pain, and I remained conscious. At the same time, all my soldiers were massacred with a machine gun placed on one side. They all yelled, a single cry of pain.

Then silence.

I could feel the warm blood on my left shoulder. My watch, which they had not taken before, was visible on my right wrist: a German took it, not noticing that I was still alive: Immediately afterwards the Germans left, laughing and sneering.

Padre Formato says: "Very probably, the Germans had received the order to exterminate the whole Division, or at least to decimate it on a very large scale. In any case, already in the morning of the 21st, the surrendering Italian units were exterminated. The Officers were taken to isolated places, away from the troops.

All Officers were killed, the troops were largely decimated.

Even the 44th Medical Section, whose soldiers wore the Red Cross armband, was taken to a solitary spot and almost completely wiped out: out of ninety men, only about fifteen survived.

The decimation work continued after the Division's official surrender, throughout the afternoon of the 22nd and the whole 23rd.

On the same day, the 22nd - says Lt. Apollonio - the Germans started the retaliation.

Maj. Hirschfeld announced to his soldiers: the next 24 hours are yours.

On the 22nd, an unforgettable

massacre took place at Troianata, where 600 men, between Officers and soldiers, were killed. They were assembled in an enclosure, with machine guns placed on two sides. Racking cries, invocations to "mamma", death-rattles, blood.

There are, still alive, several eyewitnesses who survived remaining for hours and hours under the dead bodies of their comrades. Eighteen hours after the slaughter, a German NCO arrived on the scene and yelled: Italians, if you are still alive, come out, you will not be harmed. Fifteen soldiers belived him, and went out. Shortly

THE "RED HOUSE"

A condition of the surrender was that the Officers of the "Acqui" HQ should go by their own means to Argostoli by 9 p.m. on the 22nd. They went, and were confined in a large flat close to the former Navy Command.

In the evening of the 22nd, General Lanz informed the Army Group Command of the end of the resistance in Cephalonia and asked for instructions on how the prisoners should be treated. Answer: "General Gandin and his Officers must be immediately dealt with according to the



Troianata: about 400 soldiers of the 11/17th were found inside this well.

after, a sneer was heard, followed by the burst of a machine gun.

There was no mercy even for those who were hospitalized. In the morning of the 25th, in fact, 7 wounded Officers were taken from the hospital and shot, in relation for the escape of two officers, the night before, from the same hospital.

Führer's orders". It is necessary, at this point, to specify that on September 11 the OKW had issued the "directives on the treatment of the military of the Italian Army and Militia", which were changed, in a restrictive form, on September 15: "By order of the Führer, the Italian Officers who had resisted, or negotiated with the enemy or the guerrillas were to be shot; the NCOs and troops were to be sent to the eastern regions and recruited for the labour service".

Capt. Bronzini wrote "In the morning of the 24th, the Chief of Staff of the Division enters our room and tells us that a German 2nd Lieutenant has taken our General. It is 7:30. A shiver of grief runs through our blood and soul.

At 8:00 the Chief of Staff comes back: hurry up - he says - they have come to take us also. The interpreter has said that we must go to the German Command, for the successive transfer to another

trucks are arriving, one after the other, unloading dozens of Officers of all branches: they have been taken prisoners during the fights, or have surrendered after the capitulation, on the 22nd".

Says Padre Formato: "About ten German soldiers are facing us: they wear combat helmets and carry sub machine guns. We all become aware of the situation.

Capt. Bronzini: "As soon as the trucks arrive, several officers are

they all come to me and give me their wedding rings for their faraway wives, a small chain, or any other souvenir....

The torture goes on for more than four hours, four hours of farewells, of endless embraces".

"All of a sudden - recalls 2nd Lt Esposito - there was like a moment of suspension: 2nd Lt Clerici was marching to his execution, singing the "Legend of the Piave".

Col. Romagnoli, my Commander - Padre Formato continues - had a real veneration for his daughter, a university student and Red Cross nurse. He embraces me; calm and imposing, he goes to his death smoking his pipe".

Bronzini: "Also Capt. Carocci. General Gandin's aide, moves forward voluntarily. He says to me: I don't care about dying, but my family will never get over it. He walks briskly, just as he used to do when his General called him. At the gate he turns round, smiles and waves to us. Then we hear the burst".

The testimonies given by the survivors are very numerous, it would be impossible to relate them all here.

At about ten, a young German lieutenant arrived and said that the Officers from the provinces of Trento, Belluno, Bolzano and Merano were pardoned. The executions continued; the Officers from those provinces were spared and so were those who, by showing photographs or certificates, could claim some kind of fascist "credit".

Padre Formato: "It was 1p.m. when, by chance, I looked at the face of the German lieutenant. I saw a sense of weariness and terror.

his eyes were ringed and swollen". This sight convinced the chaplain to desperately ask the Officer to suspend the executions.

Half an hour later - Padre Formato continues - the Officer comes back. He talks to the interpreter, who translates with a very loud voice: the German



The "Red House".

place, where we shall be more comfortable.

We go down the steps. we are about forty Officers. Two light lorries are waiting in the street. We get aboard, packed in the little space available, and set off to the German Command, where we are going to be questioned. What will they ask?... We leave the last houses of Argostoli, and enter the open country. The trucks are speeding towards St. Teodoro, round the promontory and head south. One kilometre south of St. Teodoro there is a small red house, destroyed by the bombings of the preceding days: the high enclosure wall is still intact. The two lorries stop at the gate.

German soldiers armed with sub machine guns make us enter the enclosure. Meanwhile, more

approached by German soldiers who grab their wrists looking for a watch, search every pocket, take wallets and valuable objects, rings from fingers".

"We believed that the machine guns would be placed in front of us in this enclosure - Bronzini continues - and then we would be killed. The procedure was different: a German interpreter - there are no Officers present - shouts "eight out!" or "twelve out!". Eight or twelve Officers came forward and are accompanied outside. Straight after, we hear a fusillade.

"Everybody keeps wonderfully calm", says Padre Formato. "Before going to the firing squad

Command pardons all those who are present here".

We, the last remaining, look at each other - says Capt. Bronzini, - there are fourteen of us including Padre Formato. The Officers from Trentino and the "fascist" ones join us: altogether we are thirty-seven. From 8:30 to 13:00, about four hundred Officers have passed through the courtyard of the red house: only thirty-seven of us are still alive, marked for ever in our soul".

The fate of general Gandin has never been known.

Says Capt. Bronzini: *"From the moment he was separated from the Officers, he was never seen again, neither by the Italians nor by the Greeks. In the afternoon of the same day, the 24th, a German soldier told me that the General had been shot early in the morning, the first of the group of Officers killed that day".*

The tragedy did not even spare the bodies of the Italians killed in combat or shot.

Padre Formato: *I repeatedly begged to let me bury the poor corpses: they did not even allow me to make a summary survey of the bodies, or to compile a list of the dead.... Later I learned that most of the bodies were not buried. For several nights, instead, they lighted up the sky of the island with their pyres. The bodies, piled up and imbued with gasoline, were burned.*

Other bodies, weighted with rolls of barbed wire, were thrown into the sea, at the entrance of the bay of Argostoli. The 17 sailors forced to perform this dreary operation were killed on the 28th, to get rid of dangerous witnesses.

But the agony of the "Acqui" Division did not end on that tragic September 24. At least another 1300 Italians died at sea, during their transfer from Cephalonia. Of these, 720 drowned on September 28, when the ship "Ardena", hit by a mine launched by an allied plane, sank at only two and a half miles from the port of Argostoli.

The sinking of the "Marguerita" cost the life of another 544 Italians packed inside the ship. Wounds and malnutrition took more lives among those who had remained in Cephalonia; at the end, they reached the number of about 2000. In mid October, 300 of them, mostly out of exhaustion, gave in to the German proposal of joining the auxiliary services. Others were transferred to Greece and then to Germany, while about thousand remained on the island as prisoners of war. They organized themselves into cells, and continued their underground struggle against the German garrison of the island, until the armed insurrection of August 26, 1944. Those who had not been captured went to the mountains and cooperated actively with the local guerrillas, or moved to the Greek mainland to fight with the partisans.

The survivors of the "Acqui" returned to Italy on November

The courtyard of the "Red House".


12, 1944: there were 1256 of them.

CONCLUSIONS

The account of the facts described above was based on the memory of the survivors and on the reports kept in the archives of Historical Office of the Army Staff. They are reports written immediately after the end of the war, when the prisoners repatriated. Obviously, since they are personal memories and not official documents - most of which were lost after September 8 - they do not have an official "seal", although the events so recounted largely coincide with what the researchers found when studying the German documents.

To find an explanation of what took place in Cephalonia is no easy task.

Evidently, those tragic events are part of the countermeasures taken by the Germans as soon as Italy decided to stop fighting. The will of disarming the Italian units at all costs and to occupy the Country and the territories held





Enclosure wall of the "Red House". Here the Officers were assembled before the execution.

by Italy up to that moment derived from the strategic situation of the time. In particular, the Ionian islands were indispensable for the defence of the Balkan peninsula.

Long discussion have taken place over the "anomalous" initiative, taken by Gen. Gandin, of carrying out a "referendum" among all the units of the Division, before the final decision. One could say, considering how things went afterwards that, by this act of collective conscience, each and everyone consciously assumed the full responsibility for the development of the events on the island and, at the moment of defeat, could face its tragic consequences with a serene soul, as is witnessed by the survivors, since each was aware of having forged his destiny of his free will and not according to orders from above.

At the trial for war crimes, held in Nuremberg at the end of the war, Gen. Telford Taylor, Chief prosecutor for proceeding no 7, said: *"This deliberate slaughter of the Italian officers who had been captured or had surrendered is one of the most arbitrary and shameful*

actions in the long history of armed combat. In fact, these men wore a regular uniform, carried their arms openly and followed the rules and customs of war. They were commanded by responsible leaders who, in repelling the attack, followed the orders of Marshal Badoglio, who was their Commander in Chief and the duly accredited leader of their nation. They were regular soldiers, who were entitled to respect, human consideration and honourable treatment".

General Lanz was sentenced to

twelve year's imprisonment for the events which had taken place under his jurisdiction, and spent only five years in prison. Major von Hirschfeld, Commander of the German troops who massacred the "Acqui" Division, was not brought to trial, because he died in Warsaw, with the rank of General, in January 1945.



We can conclude the remembrance of that tragic September on the island of Cephalonia, with the words of historian Giorgio Rochat: *"Anyone who has seen the hills of Kardakata, devoid of any shelter from artillery fire and Stukas bombs, cannot but feel a deep admiration for the soldiers of the "Acqui", who conducted repeated assaults against those hills with a courage and a determination which deserved more respect from the enemy and better appreciation by the people of Italy".*

□

**Colonel,
Chief, Historical Office,
Army General Staff*

*Trojanata: corpses of executed
Italian soldiers.*





Un coup d'oeil à la Méditerranée, par Maurizio Coccia (p. 10).

Dans les Pays de la côte de la Méditerranée il y a une tendance à se construire une identité stratégique. En analysant les changements politiques les plus importants, à travers les exemples de l'Algérie, du Maroc, de la Syrie, de la Jordanie et d'Israël, on commence à s'entrevoir les signaux de nouveaux projets comme la construction de la paix fondée sur la distribution de la richesse au lieu de la sûreté, jusqu'au moment de prévoir une zone de libre échange et de stabilité. Un parcours long et fatigant pendant lequel l'Italie peut assumer un rôle déterminant.

Promptitude opérationnelle dans les missions ONU, par Giulio Fraticelli (p. 28).

La première garantie de succès pour les missions de paix à la tête de l'ONU est la promptitude opérationnelle des forces. Les Nations Unies sont maintenant dépourvues de forces permanentes qu'on peut mobiliser en temps voulu et le processus de décision qui conduit à l'intervention de «peace keeping» est confié à une série de passages et de compétences que très souvent prolongent d'une façon insoutenable les temps de réaction. C'est vrai, il y a des organismes qui font ça au besoin, comme pour exemple: le SAS (Stand by Arrangement System), une structure qui est composée d'observateurs militaires et civiles; la SHIRBRIG (Stand by High Readiness Brigade), un Commandement Brigade précomposée qu'on pourrait employer dans 15-30 jours et pour une période maximum de 6 mois. Mais ceux-ci, jusqu'à maintenant, n'ont été pas capables d'assurer des interventions rapides et efficaces.

La nouvelle Armée de Terre des États-Unis. Entrevue au Général Eric Shinseki, par Enrico Magnani (p. 38).

L'Armée de Terre des États-Unis a mis en marche un radical processus de rationalisation par aborder les défis du nouveau siècle. Les transformations plus importantes regardent les secteurs des systèmes d'arme, de l'instruction militaire, de la logistique, de la coopération interforces et de la flexibilité opérationnelle.

Bulgarie. La nouvelle Armée de Terre. Entrevue au Général de Corps d'Armée Pavlov Dobrev, Commandant des Forces de Terre, par Enrico Magnani (p. 46).

Le Général Tencho Pavlov Dobrev, Chef des Forces de Terre bulgares, souligne les contenus essentiels du processus de réforme qui est en train d'intéresser les Forces de Terre de son Pays. Le «Plan 2004» prévoit quatre types d'intervention: la réorganisation des structures opérationnelles et de commandement; la modernisation technologique des équipements et des armements; l'intégration de l'Armée de Terre avec la société civile; l'effective interopérabilité avec les forces de l'OTAN. Il est bien sur cet aspect, en particulier, qu'on est en train de concentrer les efforts principaux, considérée la volonté de la Bulgarie, déjà exprimée en 1997 et répétée en 1999, d'entrer à faire partie de l'Alliance Atlantique.

Les armements non conventionnelles et le terrorisme international, par Gianfranco Tracci et Ulderico Petresca (p. 54).

Les armements «non conventionnelles» risquent d'être utilisés aujourd'hui même dans des panoramas différents des conflits armés. Leur capacité de destruction, qui va du même pas de la recherche scientifique, a déjà trouvé et trouvera vraisemblablement un toujours plus large emploi dans les actions du terrorisme. Le risque peut s'étendre, avec des conséquences très graves, aussi dans le secteur des biotechnologies: empoisonnement des aliments, du bétail et de l'eau à travers l'emploi d'agents biologiques et de toxines. Qu'est-ce qu'il faut faire devant l'hypothèse d'une «escalation» de la menace du terrorisme? Comme

premier remède, il faut identifier les formes de la menace pour, après de ça, réaliser des mesures de prévention et de répression, dans un tableau de collaboration intergouvernementale, qui doivent s'opposer aux panoramas plus périlleux.

Le Comitato FINABEL est réuni à Rome, par Mario Ruggiero (p. 59).


Dans cet article l'Auteur examine les contenus de la 59ème réunion des Chefs d'État-Major des Armées de Terre des Pays FINABEL, qu'il y a eue à Rome le 15 et 16 mars 2001. Depuis il trace un bilan concis de tout ce que cet organisme a fait pour ce qui concerne: le futur de la défense européenne; le rôle des Armées de Terre dans les panoramas actuels; l'interopérabilité dans les secteurs de l'instruction et de la formation militaire.

Le Sud-Est Asiatique, par Ornella Rota (p. 64).

En Cambodge, Laos, Philippines, Birmanie, Malaisie, Singapour et Indonésie, même s'il n'y a pas des conflits étendus, existent beaucoup de raisons pour parler d'une vraie et propre «crise asiatique». Les hostilités ethniques fomentées par la pauvreté et les rivalités sociales, les intolérances religieuses et les irrédentismes politiques, les gouvernements sans scrupules qui opèrent au nom de profits milliardaires, alimentent la diffusion de persécutions et révoltes. Les fugitives arrivants à la recherche de lieux plus sûres sont des centaines de milliers et ça se passe tandis qu'il y a la complète absence d'accords et de protocoles internationaux qui sauvegardent les droits fondamentaux des réfugiés.

Le bouclier spatial. Une menace ou une force de dissuasion nucléaire?, par Massimo Amorusi (p. 70).

Le bouclier spatial des États-Unis a été conçu pour la défense du Pays de la menace missilistique de la part de la Russie, de la Chine, de la Corée du Nord, de l'Iran et de l'Irak. Le nouveau système de défense ne semble pas être capable de contraster avec efficacité les menaces «asymétriques» du terrorisme, des attaques avec les armes biologiques et des opérations d'«intelligence» et d'espionnage.



SUMMARY SOMMAIRE INHALT RESUMEN

L'Aviation dans les Armées de Terre de demain. Tendances doctrinaires et ordonnatrices pour l'emploi à l'intérieur de l'Europe, par Giampaolo Giannetti (p. 78).

L'Europe veut se doter de forces aéromobiles/aéromécanisées capables de faire front, avec les autres composantes des Armées de Terre et des Forces Armées n'importe quelle situation de crise et de menace. Mais le chemin qu'il faut parcourir semble encore très long: il suffit penser que l'Europe de l'OTAN et le Canada possèdent 230 hélicoptères de transport lourd contre les 900 des États-Unis, tandis que les «utility» sont 1 450 contre les 3 000 américaines. La réalisation de l'idée d'aéromécanisation suppose une augmentation des avions de combat au lieu de ceux de transport, un pas en avant pour ce qui concerne l'opérativité avec n'importe quelle condition atmosphérique des avions et en particulier des systèmes pour la vision nocturne, l'introduction de plus valides systèmes d'autoprotection des avions.

La simulation comme instrument d'instruction militaire, par Ajmone Genzardi (p. 84).

Les techniques de la simulation (d'instruction et opérationnelle) sont présentées historiquement avec de précises références aux expériences déjà faites dans ce secteur à l'intérieur des États-Unis et de l'OTAN. Après de ça il y a une détaillée description du très grand travail de simulation qu'on a récemment fait à Civitavecchia, Cesano, Monte Romano et à Torre Veneri.

Cephalonie. Pour n'oublier pas, par Enrico Pino (p. 96).

La narration des faits d'armes se fonde sur les rapports des survivants de la Division «Acqui», gardés dans les archives du Bureau Historique de l'État-Major de l'Armée de Terre. Ce sont des souvenirs personnels qui, pour cette raison, ne sont pas considérés officiels, mais en même temps ils peuvent nous aider trouver une explication à ces tristes et glorieuses vicissitudes. Parmi les arguments plus intéressants l'Auteur souligne surtout: l'initiative du Général Gandin de consulter tous les Unités de la Division avant de prendre la décision finale; les repréailles allemandes; la tragédie de la Maison Rouge où beaucoup d'Officiers italiens ont été atteints dans leur dignité et

massacrés lâchement. Ce travail est intégré d'un reportage à propos de la visite du Président de la République.



Ein Blick auf das Mittelmeer, von Maurizio Coccia (S. 10).

In den Anrainerstaaten des Mittelmeeres besteht die Tendenz zur Schaffung einer strategischen Identität. Bei der Untersuchung der wichtigsten politischen Veränderungen an Beispielen wie Algerien, Marokko, Syrien, Jordanien und Israel lassen sich Anzeichen neuer Vorhaben erahnen, wie beispielsweise der Friedensschaffung auf der Grundlage von Einkommensumverteilung gegen Sicherheit, die irgendwann auch eine Zone des Freihandels und der Stabilität vorsehen. Es handelt sich um einen langen und beschwerlichen Weg, in dem Italien eine ausschlaggebende Rolle spielen könnte.

Operative Bereitschaft in UNO-Missionen, von Giulio Fraticelli (S. 28).

Die erste Erfolgsgarantie in Friedensmissionen unter Führung der UNO ist die operative Bereitschaft der Streitkräfte. Die Vereinten Nationen haben derzeit keine ständigen Streitkräfte, die sie schnell mobilisieren könnten und der Entscheidungsprozess, der zur Peacekeeping-Intervention führt, ist einer Reihe von Abläufen und Zuständigkeiten anvertraut, die die Reaktionszeiten oft in unerträglicher Weise verlängern. Es gibt allerdings einige Organe, die dafür zuständig wären, wie die SAS (Standby Arrangement System), eine Struktur, die militärische und zivile Beobachter hat; die SHIRBRIG (Standby High Readiness Brigade), ein Brigadekommando, das in etwa 15-30 Tagen einsatzfähig sein sollte. Diese beiden Strukturen sind jedoch bisher nicht in der Lage gewesen, tatsächlich einen schnellen und effizienten Eingriff zu gewährleisten.

USA. Die neuen Streitkräfte. Interview mit General Eric Shinseki, von Enrico Magnani (S. 38).

Die amerikanischen Streitkräfte haben einen radikalen Rationalisierungsprozess eingeleitet, um die Herausforderungen des neuen Jahrhunderts zu bestehen. Die wichtigsten Veränderungen betreffen den Bereich der Waffensysteme, der Ausbildung, der Logistik, der Zusammenarbeit zwischen verschiedenen Waffengattungen und der operativen Flexibilität.


Bulgarien: Die neuen Streitkräfte. Interview mit Generalleutnant Tencho Pavlov Dobrev, Kommandeur des Heeres, von Enrico Magnani (S. 46).

Der Generalleutnant Tencho Pavlov Dobrev, Chef der Landstreitkräfte Bulgariens, erläutert die wesentlichen Elemente des Reformprozesses, den das Heer seines Landes durchläuft. Der sogenannte «Plan 2004» sieht vier Gruppen von Eingriffen vor: Die Reorganisation der operativen und Kommandostrukturen; die technische Modernisierung von Ausrüstungen und Waffen; die Integration des Heeres mit der Zivilgesellschaft; die tatsächliche und effiziente Zusammenarbeit mit den NATO-Streitkräften. Vor allem auf diesen Aspekt konzentrieren sich insbesondere die hauptsächlichsten Anstrengungen im Lichte des bereits 1997 geäußerten und dann 1999 wiederholten Wunsches Bulgariens, Teil der Atlantischen Allianz zu werden.

Die nichtkonventionellen Waffen und der internationale Terrorismus, von Gianfranco Tracci und Ulderico Petresca (S. 54).

Es besteht die Gefahr, daß "nichtkonventionelle" Waffen heute auch bei anderen Gelegenheiten als bei bewaffneten Konflikten gebraucht werden. Ihre Zerstörungskraft, die sich ebenso schnell wie der wissenschaftliche Fortschritt entwickelt, hat bereits bei terroristischen Aktionen Verwendung gefunden und wird es vermutlich in immer stärkerem Maße finden. Diese Gefahr könnte sich mit schrecklichen Auswirkungen auf den Bereich der Biotechnologien ausdehnen: Vergiftung von Lebensmitteln, von Vieh und Wasser durch die Verwendung von biologischen Kampfstoffen oder Toxinen. Was soll man im Falle einer zunehmenden Gefahr der terroristischen Bedrohung

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tun? Der erste Schritt ist, die Formen der Bedrohung zu identifizieren, um dann in der Lage zu sein, im Rahmen der Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Regierungen vorbeugende und bekämpfende Maßnahmen gegen die gefährlichsten Szenarien in die Tat umzusetzen.

Der FINABEL-Ausschuss hat sich in Rom getroffen, von Mario Ruggiero (S. 59).

Es wird der Inhalt des 59. Treffens der Heeresstabschefs der Streitkräfte der FINABEL-Länder untersucht, das in Rom am 15. und 16. März diesen Jahres stattgefunden hat. Es wird knapp Bilanz gezogen, was die folgenden Punkte betrifft: die Zukunft der europäischen Verteidigung; die Rolle der verschiedenen Streitkräfte in den aktuellen Planspielen; die gemeinsame Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen der militärischen Ausbildung und der Schulung.

Südostasien, von Ornella Rota (S. 64).

In Kambodscha und Laos, auf den Philippinen, in Birma, Malaysia, Singapur und Indonesien gibt es, ohne dass es regelrechte Kriege gäbe, genug Gründe, um von einer "Asienkrise" zu sprechen. Ethnische Feindschaften, von Armut und sozialen Rivalitäten angefaßt, religiöse Intoleranz und politische Unbelehrbarkeit gehören dazu, sowie skrupellose Regierungen, die für Riesenprofite die Verbreitung von Verfolgung und Aufständen betreiben. Hunderttausende von Flüchtlingen sind ständig auf der Suche nach sicheren Zufluchtsorten, ohne dass internationale Konventionen zum Schutz von Flüchtlingen deren Grundrechte garantieren könnten.

Der Schild im Weltraum. Eine Bedrohung oder eine nukleare Abschreckungsmaßnahme?, von Massimo Amorosi (S. 70).

Der Weltraumschild der Vereinigten Staaten ist konzipiert worden, um das Land vor einer Raketenbedrohung seitens Russlands, Chinas oder Nordkoreas, des Irans und des Irak zu schützen. Das neue Verteidigungssystem ist jedoch nicht in der Lage, in effizienter Weise die «asymmetrischen» Bedrohungen zu bekämpfen, die der Terrorismus, biologische Kampfstoffe

oder Geheimdienst- und Spionageoperationen darstellen.

Die Luftwaffe in den Streitkräften von morgen. Tendenzen der Lehre und der Ordnung für den Einsatz im europäischen Kontext, von Giampaolo Giannetti (S. 78).

Europa möchte sich mit lufttransportablen motorisierten Bodentruppen ausstatten, die in der Lage sind, zusammen mit anderen Teilstreitkräften jeglicher Krisen- und Bedrohungssituation gewachsen zu sein. Doch der Weg dahin ist noch weit: Man muß nur daran denken, dass NATO-Europa und Kanada zusammen nur 230 schwere Transporthubschrauber besitzen, die USA 900, während nur 1 450 Utility-Flugzeuge 3 000 in den USA gegenüberstehen. Um wirklich ein Konzept von lufttransportablen motorisierten Bodentruppen zu realisieren, müssen mehr Transportflugzeuge angeschafft werden, die Allwettertauglichkeit der Flugzeuge und insbesondere die Nachtsichtsysteme verbessert sowie bessere Selbstschutzsysteme der Flugzeuge eingeführt werden.

Die Simulation als Ausbildungsmethode, von Ajmone Genzardi (S. 84).

Die (operativen und ausbildungsmäßigen) Simulationstechniken werden in historischer Perspektive mit detaillierten Bezügen auf die bereits im Bereich von USA und NATO gemachten Erfahrungen vorgestellt. Es folgt eine genaue Beschreibung der großen Simulationsarbeiten, die kürzlich auf den mittellitalienischen Standorten Civitavecchia, Cesano, Monte Romano und Torre Veneri stattgefunden haben.

Kephallenia. Gegen das Vergessen, von Enrico Pino (p. 96).

Die Schilderung der militärischen Ereignisse gründet auf den Berichten von Überlebenden der Division "Acqui", die beim historischen Archiv des Heeresstabs aufbewahrt sind. Es handelt sich um persönliche Erinnerungen, die als solche nicht offiziell, aber hilfreich sind, um eine Erklärung für diese gleichzeitig traurigen und ruhmreichen Ereignisse zu finden. Zu den Themen von größtem Interesse gehören: die

Initiative des Generals Gandin, alle Abteilungen der Division vor der endgültigen Entscheidung einzuschalten; die deutschen Repressalien; die Tragödie des sogenannten "roten Hauses", wo viele italienischen Offiziere in ihrer Würde verletzt und feige niedergemetzelt wurden. Dem Aufsatz ist ein aktueller Bericht zum Besuch des Staatspräsidenten angehängt.




Una mirada hacia el Mediterraneo, de Maurizio Coccia (p. 10).

En los Países de la costa mediterránea, hay una tendencia a construirse una identidad estratégica. Analizando los cambios políticos más significativos, gracias a los ejemplos de Algeria, Marruecco, Siria, Jordania y Israel, se pueden ver los señales de nuevos proyectos como la construcción de la paz fundada sobre la distribución de la riqueza en cambio de la seguridad, hasta prever una zona de libre cambio y estabilidad. Un camino largo y cansante en el que Italia puede asumir un papel determinante.

Rapidez operativa en las misiones ONU, de Giulio Fraticelli (p. 28).

La primera garantía de suceso por las misiones de paz bajo mando ONU es la viveza operativa de las fuerzas. Las Naciones Unidas están actualmente sin Fuerzas permanentes por mobilitar al toque, y el proceso decisonal que lleva a la intervención de «peace keeping» está en las manos de muchos pasajes y competencias que por la mayoría de las veces alargan en manera insostenible los tempos de reacción. Es verdad que hay unos organismos propuestos a estas necesidades, como: el SAS (Stand by Arrangement System), una estructura que junta



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observadores militares y civiles; la SHIRBRIG (Stand by High Readiness Brigade), un Mando Brigada preconstituido que tendría ser empezable en 15-30 días y por no más de seis meses. Pero estos hasta ahora no se demostraron capaces de asegurar intervenciones rápidas y eficaces.

El nuevo Ejército de los Estados Unidos. Entrevista con el General Eric Shinseki, de Enrico Magnani (p. 38).

El Ejército de los Estados Unidos empezó un proceso radical de racionalización para hacer cara a los desafíos del nuevo siglo. Las más importantes transformaciones son las de los sectores de los sistemas de arma, del adiestramiento, de la logística, de la cooperación entre fuerzas y de la flexibilidad operativa.

Bulgaria. El nuevo Ejército. Entrevista al Teniente General Tencho Pavlov Dobrev, Comandante de las Fuerzas Terrestres, de Enrico Magnani (p. 46).

El General Tencho Pavlov Dobrev, Jefe de las Fuerzas Terrestres búlgaras, ilustra los contenidos más importantes para el proceso de reforma que está interesando las fuerzas terrestres de su País. El así dicho «Plan 2004» comprende cuatro tipologías de intervención: la reorganización de las estructuras operativas y de Mando; la modernización tecnológica de los equipajes y de las armas; la integración del Ejército con la sociedad civil; la interoperabilidad efectiva con las fuerzas de OTAN. En este aspecto, en particular, se están concentrando los esfuerzos principales, considerada la voluntad de Bulgaria, ya dicha en el 1997 y confirmada en el 1999, para entrar en la Alianza Atlántica.

Las armas no convencionales y el terrorismo internacional, de Gianfranco Tracchi y Ulderico Petresca (p. 54).

Las armas no convencionales arriesgan ser usadas hoy también en escenarios diferentes de las guerras armadas. Sus capacidad destructiva, que viene igualándose con la investigación científica, ya encontró y encontrará una tera siempre más grande en las acciones terroristas. El riesgo puede extenderse, con consecuencias graves,

también en el sector de las biotecnologías: envenenamiento de los alimentos, de los animales y del agua con agentes biológicos y toxinas. ¿Que se tiene que hacer estando frente a la hipótesis de una «escalation» de la amenaza terrorística? El primer remedio es lo de identificar las formas de la amenaza para poner en ser en un cuadro de colaboración entregobiernos, medidas para prevenir y represivas para hacer frente a los escenarios más peligrosos.

Juntado a Roma el Comitato FINABEL, de Mario Ruggiero (p. 59).

Se examinan los contenidos de la 59ª reunión de los Jefes de Estado Mayor de los Ejércitos de los Países FINABEL, desarrollada en Roma el 15 y 16 de marzo 2001. Se hace también un balance sintético de la actividad desarrollada por el Organismo para: el futuro de la defensa europea; el rol de los Ejércitos en los actuales escenarios; la entreoperabilidad en los sectores del adiestramiento y de la formación.

El Sur-Este asiático, de Ornella Rota (p. 64).

En Camboya, Laos, Filipinas, Birmania, Malasia, Singapur y Indonesia, aunque no hay guerras difusas, existen muchas razones por hablar de una verdadera y propia «crisis asiática». Conflictos étnicos por pobreza y rivalidad sociales, intolerancias religiosas y iredentismos políticos, gobiernos sin escrúpulos que actúan por razones miliardarias, alimentan la difusión de persecuciones y guerras. Llegan a cienmil los escapados por la continua búsqueda de lugares más seguros, en la falta total de convenciones y protocolos internacionales que tutelen los derechos fundamentales de los refugiados.

El escudo espacial. ¿Una amenaza o un deterrido nuclear?, de Massimo Amorosi (p. 70).

El escudo espacial de los Estados Unidos se concibió para defender el País de la amenaza misilística por Rusia, China, Corea de Norte, Iran y Iraq. El nuevo sistema de defensa no parece pero en condición para contrastar en manera eficaz las amenazas «asimétricas» representadas por el terrorismo, por los ataques con armas biológicas y por las operaciones

de «intelligence» y espionaje.

Aviación en los Ejércitos de mañana. Tendencias doctrinales y del orden para el empleo en campo europeo, de Giampaolo Giannetti (p. 78).



Europa quiere dotarse de fuerzas aeromóviles/aeromecanizadas capaces de hacer frente, con los otros elementos de los Ejércitos y de las Fuerzas Armadas, cualquier situación de crisis y de amenaza. Pero el camino parece todavía muy largo: es suficiente solo pensar en que Europa de OTAN y Canada tienen 230 helicópteros para transporte pesado contra los 900 de los Estados Unidos, mientras los «utility» son 1 450 contra los 3 000 americanos. La realización del concepto de aeromecanización presupone una subida de los vehículos de combate en vez de los de transporte, un paso delante en la operatividad en todos los tiempos de los vehículos y en particular de los sistemas por la visión nocturna, la introducción de más válidos sistemas de autoprotección de los vehículos.

La simulación como instrumento de adiestramiento militar, de Ajmone Genzardi (p. 84).




Las técnicas de simulación (adiestrativa y operativa) se presentan históricamente con muchas referencias a las experiencias hechas en los Estados Unidos y en OTAN. Sigue una detallada descripción del grande trabajo desarrollado hace poco en Civitavecchia, Cesano, Monte Romano y Torre Veneri.

Cefalonia. Para no olvidar, de Enrico Pino (p. 112).

La narración de los hechos de arma se funda sobre las relaciones de los sobrevivientes de la División «Acqui», guardadas en el archivo del Departamento Histórico del Estado Mayor del Ejército. Son recuerdos personales que, por eso, no tienen carácter de oficialidad, pero nos pueden ayudar a encontrar una explicación a las tristes y gloriosas vicendas. Entre los argumentos más interesantes hay: la iniciativa del General Gandin de llamar todos los repartos de la División antes de tomar una decisión final; las guerrillas alemanas; la tragedia de la casa roja donde muchos Oficiales italianos fueron ofendidos en su dignidad y matados cobardemente. El trabajo se integra con un servicio de crónica de la visita del Presidente de la República.



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
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
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


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
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THE STABILIZATION OF THE BALKANS

The role of the military

by Carlo Cabigiosu *



The experience of the IFOR, SFOR and KFOR multinational forces, in the Balkans since 1995, has shown the importance of the military in fostering a dialogue among the parties, contributing to the reconstruction and the economic development of the region.

FEW HISTORICAL REMARKS

A mosaic of different national entities, ethnic groups, languages, religions and cultures makes up the Balkan peninsula which – since time immemorial – has been considered both as a bridge linking the West and the East and a sort of border between the Western and Islamic worlds. The rationale behind recent conflicts in that area is deeply rooted in its history.

Over the centuries, three national entities have left their mark on that area, namely the Bulgarians, the Turks and the Serbs.

The influence of the Bulgarian domination has been practically forgotten, while the impact of the Ottoman domination can still be felt. The Serb presence deeply affects the whole area.

Over time, the area has come under the rule of different military powers. The long lasting presence of each new military and administrative regime in the conquered areas resulted in the creation of niches and enclaves of non native ethnic groups, which continued to stay in the area even after a new military take-over. At the same time, due to political or military reasons, the free or forced migration of local peoples to different ethnic areas produced the same results. Owing to this situation of continued turmoil, the use of

force by Armed or Police Forces was perceived as the only solution to a crisis by the local population. This feeling was coupled with increasing disrespect for law and order, which at times was only considered as the enforcement of the oppressor's will.

As every citizen was expected to defend himself or take part in his own ethnic group military actions, irrespective of his age, wealth or even sex, an outright culture of violence was developed. The above mentioned historical events and mental attitudes, together with the concept of the people's Army imposed by Marshal Tito, resulted in an unrestricted access to weapons and fuelled interethnic hatred to an extent

unprecedented in Europe.

Besides the Bulgarian, Ottoman and Serb occupations, the Balkan peninsula came under the rule of Venice, the Austro-Hungarian empire, as well as Italy and Germany during World War II.

Even Albania, or better the Albanians, proud offspring of the Illirians, played a role in the area, but only for very short periods. The fact that they had been subdued for centuries and, ultimately, artificially divided by a series of international treaties over an area comprising five different countries, made them stand up for their rights as a minority group or even as the second largest ethnic community in Macedonia.

MARSHAL TITO PERIOD AND ITS AFTERMATHS

Even in recent years the role of the military remained unchanged.

Italian servicemen in a Bosnian school teach students how to recognize explosive devices.



At the end of World War II, Marshal Tito unified 6 republics and two autonomous provinces into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.


As leader of Yugoslavia for almost fifty years, he availed himself of the support of police and armed forces to quell any kind of opposition and repress all nationalistic claims with the use of force. His dictatorial regime allowed for keeping the Yugoslavian Federation united, but could not rule out the internal tensions fuelled by different national cultures.

From a psychological point of view, Tito exploited the idea of a possible external military threat as an element to enhance internal cohesion and the political concept of nonalignment as another effective means to build Yugoslavia national identity.

After his death, unsettled nationalistic contrasts burst out again, also due to a serious economic crisis and inequalities among the various regions in the country. The leaders of some republics of the Yugoslavian Federation used the armed and police forces to achieve a long cherished but never reached autonomy. Following the chain-disintegration of the country, the military changed their role and showed the overwhelming presence of the Serb component within their forces.

The collapse of Yugoslavia started in 1991 with the declarations of independence made by Slovenia and Croatia, which obtained their independence in a relatively short time, resorting to locally recruited police forces almost exclusively.

Another important event in the collapse of the Yugoslavian Federation took place in 1992, when also Bosnia started fighting for its independence. Here the situation was even



more difficult due to the heterogeneity of coexisting ethnic groups. This year marked the beginning of a period of new violent tensions and ethnic hatred.

New territorial disputes concurrently arose; namely, those between Croatia and Serbia on East Slavonia and on the Prevlaka peninsula, both followed by the intervention of the UN forces. The UNPROFOR mission, tasked with operating on the entire territory of the Yugoslavian Federation, was however authorized to resort to a use of force commensurate to the threat and for self-defense purposes only; thus, its mandate turned out to be too limited and unfit to cope with the situation. To solve this issue, a debate was

launched on the difference between the concept of neutrality and impartiality. The internal conflict in Bosnia went on for almost two years with terrible consequences; UN forces were not able to effectively counter the different factions, enforce peace and start the expected stabilization process in the region.

When the arrogant and provocative attitude of the Bosnian-Serb commanders translated into a direct attack on some UN elements of the French and British forces, Great Britain and France set up a Reaction Force, which rapidly and effectively marked a turning point in military operations. In the meantime, NATO, which had already taken



where Milosevich represented the Bosnian-Serbs, Izetbegovich the Bosnian-Muslims and Tujman the Bosnian-Croats.

This way, a Peace Treaty was reached among fighting parties and NATO was tasked with guaranteeing its implementation on December 21, 1995.

NATO IN THE BALKANS

The Dayton Treaty aimed at finding a solution to guarantee the unity of the Bosnia-Herzegovina region, but included a series of trade-off measures which are still heavily

Left.
"Bersaglieri" of the Garibaldi Brigade patrolling a road in Kosovo.

Below.
An Italian soldier on surveillance duty.



part in some military operations in support of UN forces over the Balkans and on the Adriatic sea, started an air campaign against the strongholds of the Serb military structure in Bosnia. Thus, NATO succeeded in persuading the Bosnian-Serbs to sit at the negotiating table at Dayton,

impacting on the present situation.

In fact, during this transition period a series of obstacles had to be overcome, stemming from the exchange of territories among different ethnic groups, the rigid cease-fire line which marked the boundaries among the three Bosnian ethnic

entities, the presence of an ethnically divided police force and of two Armies, the first representing the new Federation unifying Bosnian-Muslims and Bosnian-Croats, and the second representing the Serbska Republic. As a consequence, diplomats always had to firmly remind all parties involved to comply with the Dayton Treaty.

Within such a difficult framework, the NATO military machinery, called upon by the UN to intervene, was started successfully. It can be said that, from this moment on, the international military presence in the Balkans becomes pivotal in the stabilization process of the area. In December 1995, the IFOR mission launched the most important military operation in Europe since the end of World War II, where NATO played a central role.

For the first time, NATO was tasked with carrying out an "out of area" land operation, in a "joint and combined" environment with other PfP countries and non-NATO nations (Russia included), with a total strength of 55,000 troops.

For the first time in the history of the Balkans, a military intervention was carried out, not being the result of a territorial or economic expansionist policy. Moreover, the force deployed did not simply carry out an interposition role with limited rules of engagement and capabilities. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, NATO entered the Balkans with a robust force, capable of conducting all kinds of military operations and determined to enforce the articles of the Treaty, which the parties involved had pledged to abide by, but had violated in the past under similar circumstances.



A "Bersaglieri" corporal in Kosovo.

contributed to solving the crisis in Bosnia.

Milosevic's tyrannical attitude was counterbalanced by the pacific resistance staged by the moderate Kosovar leader Rugova, who set up a shadow cabinet and structures parallel to those imposed by Belgrade, as well as by the military reaction of the UCK, a clandestine military movement which aimed at freeing Kosovo from Belgrade's tyranny by resorting to guerrilla warfare.

In 1998, the situation worsened irreversibly when some Serb policemen were killed by the UCK and Serbia's special police units started ethnic cleansing operations with the support of the armed forces. Thus, the notorious paramilitary formations known as "Arkan's tigers" or the nationalistic group inspired by Seselj were given the green light to intervene. At this point, the need for an intervention by the international community was increasingly felt.

The unsuccessful peace Conference at Rambouillet and the international appeals to Milosevic were followed by atrocities committed by Serb paramilitary troops. The massive exodus of Kosovars to Albania and Macedonia, NATO air campaign, the entry of NATO land forces into Kosovo were preceded by retaliatory actions carried out by the Kosovar militia against Serb military and paramilitary units, which forced at least 100,000 Serbs to flee Kosovo.

NATO intervention in Kosovo, as in Bosnia, was aimed at enforcing a decision of the international community, the UN Resolution no.1244, in support of the human rights of the ethnic Albanian minority.

Said intervention was successful and all the articles of the Treaty were complied with, including the most critical and sensitive ones.

The Treaty has been gradually implemented and, today, NATO's presence is contributing to exerting a deterrent function; in fact, the Alliance is committed to guaranteeing that the ongoing implementation process be not hindered by internal reasons even though the soft points in the Dayton Treaty are still heavily impacting on the situation.

While the peace process went

on in Bosnia, the situation in Kosovo progressively worsened.

Since the beginning of the '90s, Milosevic had drastically reduced all access to public life to the ethnic Albanians, considering the strong pressure exerted by this majority ethnic group. He had also ruled out all rights and grants, which are usually bestowed on minorities in any democratic system. As early as 1995, the international community was fully aware of this critical situation. However, this issue was papered up, due to a diffused feeling of gratitude for Milosevic, who had

The UN Resolution no.1244 was far less detailed than the Dayton Treaty, but established conditions for the intervention of NATO troops in Kosovo similar to those set for the mission in Bosnia. Also in this case, their intervention has been of paramount importance to enforce their mandate and effectively start the stabilization process.

Similar to what had happened in Bosnia, a robust military force of about 45,000 men belonging to 39 nations was deployed in Kosovo. This force, capable of conducting traditional war operations, was credible enough to enforce the accords and keep peace.

Also in this case, it was clear that there were no other viable options and that the only way to guarantee the success of the operation was the deployment of a NATO land force. In fact, all diplomatic and humanitarian efforts had proved to be unsuccessful, like the operation carried out by the OSCE monitoring force deployed to Kosovo right ahead of the air campaign.

Unlike past experiences, the possibility of employing UN forces in Kosovo was not even taken into consideration.

NATO immediately assigned land force command to the ARRC, the rapid reaction corps which had operated extremely well in Bosnia.

What has been the key to the success of IFOR, SFOR and, later on, KFOR?

One of the main elements of success has been the effectiveness of the political and military concepts upon which the intervention was based.

As already said, both the Dayton Treaty and the UN Resolution no.1244 have been valuable reference documents for

commanders in the field. In Kosovo, it was necessary to integrate the UN Resolution with the Military Technical Agreement, as regards the military aspects of the mandate. The force Commander was directly called upon to draw up the above mentioned Agreement; it was possible, therefore, to specify its terms, in line with the requirements of the situation on the ground.


Another important element is the very structure of NATO, which is not only an effective military, but also a political organization

conducting operations aimed at reaching large scale humanitarian and military goals. It is also the only organization capable of sustaining a robust effort in the long term.

It is also for these reasons that the effectiveness of a possible UN intervention in this context would be very limited.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MILITARY OPTION

From a military point of view, NATO provided a wide range of options, proving to be highly



Italian servicemen socializing with civilians.

where all major Western countries are represented. Within this organization, the military is effectively supported by the political arm.

NATO member nations have strong interests in the area and are directly committed to solving regional problems, in order to avoid repercussions on their own territory.

It should be noted that NATO is the only organization capable of

flexible and capable of being combat ready in a short time, in order to carry out a wide range of multifaceted tasks.

NATO units were assigned many combat roles, both in Bosnia and Kosovo, and were ready to face threats posed by traditional military units and to perform peace enforcing, peace keeping, territorial control and stabilization tasks.

Soldiers were called upon to make up for the lack of administrative and institutional structures in the country where they were deployed. This meant

that they had to compensate for a shortage of police forces and, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, for a lack of basic infrastructure.

As regards this specific issue, NATO presence was aimed at controlling the territory, in coordination with local and international police forces. Excellent results were obtained in enforcing law and order in an area affected by a very high crime rate, as often happens in the aftermath of a war. To this aim, it is worth mentioning the precious support of a Carabinieri contingent, the so-called Multinational Security Unit

Italian soldiers has been particularly valuable. The Italian Air Force is responsible for air traffic control in the whole province. The new airport at Gjakova will allow for easing off the military air traffic at the Pristina airport, thus enhancing civilian air traffic and speeding up the economic development of the country. As regards the lines of communication, our engineers reopened the entire railway network in Kosovo, almost

An Italian patrol controlling a street in Sarajevo.



(MSU) which, in coordination with newly established international and Kosovar police forces, was capable of providing a remarkable contribution to the fight against crime, deeply affecting the political and economic life of the area in that particular phase.

The contribution of the military to the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, to speed the return to normality, is of paramount importance: they reopen roads, build and manage railway networks and airports. To this aim, the contribution of

completely demolished by the bomb attacks and acts of vandalism carried out by the Serbs in their retreat. Moreover, they manage the railway traffic and at the same time train local personnel.

As for the composition of the force, multinationality has contributed to enhancing effectiveness rather than limiting it. There is always something to learn from other nations' representatives and mutual relations allow for ruling out mistakes or making up for them. Notwithstanding different

national approaches both at training and cultural level, the results obtained are always remarkable.

Division or Brigade level command and control activities are assigned to pre-existing HQs, which often adapt to the need of integrating into their staff or Command groups some officers belonging to nations which contribute their forces to that particular large unit. This way, the action of command is given appropriate cohesion and also gathers consensus from lower level contingents.

So far, the command of a force is an issue which has been partially solved. The ARRC, some NATO Subregional Commands and the EUROCORPS, on one occasion, were the right answer for short time contingencies, but this issue should be given new solutions in the medium and long term, by establishing a second ARRC and other multinational HQs at Corps level.

Communication systems, however, together with tested procedures and highly trained personnel, have always allowed for reaching results generally considered as positive.

As already said, the intervention of modern and effective forces provides for making a wide range of operational and technical choices, ranging from air missions - as those carried out in Bosnia and even more massively in Kosovo - to attacks with armed helicopters - which were only planned but never performed in the case of Albania - and to the operations carried out by armored/light armored or light infantry units.

Another important element is intelligence. In fact, NATO, which concurrently conducts intelligence operations, is capable of controlling the

situation on the ground much better than international police forces, mainly in the first phases of operations, thanks to its more efficient organization and greater availability of means and infrastructure.

INSTABILITY AREAS

Present instability areas can be easily detected.

The situation is still uncertain in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the three national entities are not apparently following the path leading to a full and deeply accepted cooperation. The same applies to Croatia, where all territorial disputes with neighboring countries are still unsettled, even if recent political changes could positively and substantially modify the internal situation. To this aim, the importance of Croatia's participation in the NATO PfP project is not to be undervalued.

Serbia, too, is living a period of gradual internal transformation, following its 5 October revolution. After Kostunica came to power and the victory of the DOS at the 23 December elections was confirmed, several changes within the establishment are expected, which will deeply affect the armed and police forces, as regards their top level positions. The new President had to immediately address the issue of ethnic Albanian minorities in the south of Serbia. Ethnic Albanians living in the Presevo valley had long been treated by Milosevic as third or fourth class citizens, under a sort of apartheid regime with no medical and school structures, no support to local economy and no representatives even in local administrative bodies. To react against this situation, armed groups were created which

aimed at establishing a separate local entity, launching attacks on Yugoslavian police forces and trying to draw the attention of the international community on their plight. Their area of operations coincided with the Security Zone, as defined by the Military Technical Agreement signed at the end of the air campaign.

Consequently, KFOR was accused by Belgrade of being

Italian servicemen during the IFOR operation in Bosnia.



indirectly responsible for granting the guerrilla groups a sort of immunity; in fact, Yugoslavian authorities could intervene within an established 5 km strip, employing local police units equipped with light arms only, and not special police forces or army units. In particular, on November 21, 2000, when 4 Serb policemen were killed in the security zone of the Presevo valley, a serious crisis was about to be stirred up, with possible unpredictable repercussions. If Belgrade government had entered the security zone

without being authorized by NATO, it would have seriously violated an international agreement. If massively attacked, guerrilla groups would have asked and obtained support from their Albanian brothers in Kosovo and Macedonia, thus rekindling an ethnic conflict similar to the one in Kosovo, which opposed UCK guerrilla troops, Yugoslavian police forces and Army units. The rapid intervention of KFOR, in the role of facilitator, allowed for reaching a cease fire between the opposing parties in two days

and starting negotiations, satisfactorily concluded at the end of May 2001, both for the ethnic Albanian minority and the new Belgrade government. Now, the security zone is again under Serbia's sovereignty and a general amnesty has been granted to guerrilla groups. Thus, a pacific solution was found for a conflict which could have triggered a chain reaction, threatening the stability of the area.

As regards the other regions of the Balkans, Serbia still considers its precarious relations with



A "Centauro" heavy armoured car protecting a roadblock.

Montenegro as a further element of instability. The existence of the Federation is presently at risk and the difficult relations between the governments of the two countries might end up in a large scale crisis.

Moreover, the situation in Montenegro is uncertain, as dozens of thousands of ethnic Albanian citizens are still living north of Scutari and could resort to extremist actions.

A high number of ethnic Albanians live also in Macedonia, another country with a fragile political stability. So far, the risk of a final collapse of Macedonian central

government has been avoided, thanks to the participation in the government of a political party representing the ethnic Albanians. Thus, the threat posed by clandestine Albanian extremists, who had been carrying on paramilitary attacks on governmental forces since March 2001, has been defused.

The question is how long Macedonian Authorities will successfully control the situation, turning down all provocative and revanchist actions and implementing a number of internal reforms, aimed at supporting the ethnic

Albanian component; the latter, in fact, can no longer be considered as a minority group but, given its strength, should be regarded as a real community.

Albania is the last country plagued by continuous crises. It is difficult to make any forecast on the future of this nation where, as in Montenegro, a fragile and corrupt political system gives criminal organizations the freedom of movement necessary to develop unlawful lucrative activities.

There is not a single solution to the problems of this area, which is kept under close scrutiny by European countries, the USA and, obviously, Russia. providing these countries with economic support and integrating them into international political and assistance organizations is certainly necessary and rewarding, but also a robust international military presence could effectively contribute to giving a long term solution to these problems.

According to the mindset of these countries, those who have the upper hand are worthy of respect and succeed in obliging even the most destabilizing elements to take part in negotiations and discussions.

There is still a long way to go, though, and the presence of the military will be required for quite a long time. However, in most cases gaining time to carry on a negotiation may even be considered as a success. Moreover, no one can guarantee that the phase of instability in the Balkans is coming to an end. It is an area where disputes are ethnically based and new Kosovo-type conflicts are likely to be triggered, as the problem of

ethnic intermingling is far from being solved.

Being present in all possible crisis areas to anticipate all contingencies is to be preferred to intervening at the onset of a crisis.

Therefore, a balanced presence of forces connected to NATO, or, if necessary, to the UN, is to be maintained in the area.

The presence of logistic and rear line assets in Croatia, at Zagreb, Split and Ploce, is to be mentioned, together with the new US large base in Hungary, and Italian and other countries' forces in Albania. Moreover, Italy has been present in Albania since 1990 with Operations Pellicano 1 and 2 and, later on, with Operation Alba, in 1997.

There is the feeling that some of these countries are strongly asking for an international military presence. They are fully aware that if they accept a limitation in their absolute national sovereignty, good results will be attained in the long term.

CONCLUSIONS

The disadvantages of a

prolonged military presence in the area have already been dealt with, making particular reference to the fact that the presence of international military forces could slow down the assumption of full responsibility by local governments. The aim is to gain time in order to allow national political structures to settle all internal disputes and build democracy. It must also be stressed that all the problems of the area are strictly interconnected and cannot be easily solved separately. Conversely, solutions to ethnic, economic or territorial disputes can only stem from multilateral accords, with the support of supranational or international organizations.

The financial commitment required to keep NATO or other countries' military forces in the area must be considered as a kind of insurance policy, far less expensive than the effort made by NATO on the occasion of the air campaign carried out from

March to June 1999.

Operations in the Balkans have proved that the only way to enforce the agreements reached after a crisis or a conflict is to intervene under a strong mandate, employ a robust force and be determined to use it.

The multinational nature of military contingents has been key to the success of these operations. With their presence, the international community, Russia included, has sent a clear message to all opposing parties, thus effectively contributing to the stabilization of the area.

The success of military operations has always anticipated and contributed to the civil implementation of peace agreements. IFOR, SFOR and KFOR have remarkably supported the rehabilitation of civil and economic activities, also in strict cooperation with many international non governmental organizations. The role of the military in the Balkans has therefore been of paramount importance, to foster dialogue between opposing parties, support the rehabilitation and economic development process and consequently strengthen democracy in the area.

There is still a long way to go, but important steps forward have already been taken. It should be acknowledged that the goals achieved are the result of the self-sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of soldiers belonging to many different countries, who effectively and enthusiastically contributed to restoring normality and democracy in this troubled area.

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
**Lieutenant General,
Commander,
Joint Operational Command*



An Army AB-205 helicopter on flight over Bosnia.

The ASIAN Continent

Not even the most superficial observer can miss the alarming variety and complexity of the Asian scenery, a crossroads of infinite political and economic conflicts. A context of precarious security looms on everything, in the absence of fixed rules and stable democracies. The strategies deriving from the bipolar conception of world order are now obsolete because of the delicate intertwining of the political, diplomatic and economic relations of the present time.



by Maurizio Coccia*

The Asian Continent, if considered from a geographical point of view, can be divided into three main regions, extended horizontally in the northern, central and southern areas.

In this last region, comprising the continental shelves of Arabia and peninsular India, Arab countries - rife with oil and problems - are not marginalized as European observers may think.

In fact, their resources, authoritarian regimes, ethical and religious tenets put them fully in line with other equally hard-line Asian countries. Consequently, as regards security at large, it can be said that Asia is the cradle of a cultural, conceptual and deep-rooted opposition against the democratic values of the West, especially the USA.

Above.

View of Mt. Fujiyama, Japan.

Left.

The famous clay warriors of Xi'an, China.



Therefore the attention is increasingly focused on that region and its inspiring principles.

A previous article on the Arab world, the Mediterranean and the conflict between Israel and Palestine has recognized that these countries are governed by mindsets difficult to reconcile, as regards both internal and external matters; this situation cannot be overcome by makeshift and goodwill solutions, being the result of different visions inspiring opposing life styles.

In Asia there have been other cases where the actors involved have played an even more extreme role. Charismatic leaders and their people may still be called upon to make choices considered as bloodcurdling from a European political and social point of view.

During the Vietnam war, the Vietnamese proved that they could stand all kinds of sufferings, a fact which discouraged the Western world from resorting to the use of force in settling a crisis. Saddam Hussein belongs to Asia. In Nepal the recent tragic events involving the royal family, although immediately covered-up, showed that feudal-type regimes are still in force, only mitigated by centuries of British education to democracy,

It should not come as a surprise if the foreign policy adopted by the USA, to restore the power balance disrupted by regional strives, is often opposed by some countries in the area, giving rise to ethical resistance and suspicion feelings and to sometimes dangerous defensive actions.

A short description of the main Asian players now follows.


Today Turkey is the most dynamic country in the Middle East. It is undergoing a rapid development process based on its new geo-strategic function. In



the regional scenario Turkey, placed at the center of three crisis areas (Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus), can guard Russia and China's access points to the Caucasus. It is placed in a sensitive area bordering on three of the major Arab-Islamic countries in the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Syria). Being next to regions rich in energy resources, Turkey is the owner of water supplies coming from the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, which flow towards Syria and Iraq. Turkey's potentialities are further enhanced by its being a member of the Atlantic Alliance, while sharing the same religious background as that of most bordering countries.

UH-1 "Super Cobra" combat helicopters.

There is a long-standing dispute with Iran: democratic versus Islamic regimes, envisaging different government systems. Turkey has succeeded in gaining Western countries' support, also thanks to its geographical position, critical in countering the spiraling growth of illegal activities mainly linked to international drug trafficking. Heroin produced in Central Asia, chemical drugs developed in Russian labs and cocaine travelling from South America to the markets in Eastern Europe move along the routes



A typical street in Katmandu, Nepal.

crossing Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan.

The country follows a double track policy. Islamic Turkey interprets its relation with Europe as an occasion to enhance its modernization, democratization and secularization process, while the Arab world labels it as a symbol of colonization. Therefore, Turkey has established different relations with Europe/USA and the Arab world, which are completely separate, but can be exploited to fulfil national interests. In practice, Turkey has always kept a balanced position, trying not to interfere in the relations between the two sides and always willing to gain general consensus over its foreign policy.

Most of its past, present and future problems may therefore derive from this double-track foreign policy which cannot be easily coordinated.

The **Middle East** is a sub-system comprising the Countries of the Persian Gulf as well, where historical factors are still limiting all kinds of free development.

First of all, the temptation to adopt – even forcefully or sporadically - Western democratic and economic values is strongly opposed by religious, nationalist and sectarian interests, as well as by an ingrained resistance to change.

Then, the influence of the Israeli life-style has not succeeded in promoting peace in these countries, but on the contrary has stirred up rage and escalated the conflict.

Lastly, the supervising role played by the USA in the area, as the only referee for all regional players, has led America to be progressively involved in local events and find makeshift diplomatic solutions to all possible contingencies, to the detriment of their original commitment.

Russia, presently engaged in a difficult process of transition towards a form of government similar to that of the West, is – and will still be in the future - the cradle of new destabilizing factors.

It is an example not to be followed by neighboring countries and China as well.

There are power circles linked

to drug and weapons trafficking, which includes weapons of mass destruction as well. People take to the streets to ask for better life conditions, more independence, cost-effective management of resources and a wider say in public affairs.

Against this internal framework, Russia follows an international policy mainly aimed at playing an important role within the Western security organization and the European political and economic establishment, not to lose its past supremacy. In Asia, Russia focuses its attention on controlling the resources of Central Asia and on keeping its relation with China.

All in all, Russia's internal development will have wide repercussions on the future of Asia and its security system. In this transitional phase, there is little scope for optimism considering that Russia's foreign policy ambitions are as great as in the past and its more conciliating attitude is only due to the present difficult internal situation.

The disruption of the old regime has strengthened organized crime, instead of reinforcing the state organization. The latter seems to be increasingly undermined by a new and widespread profit-oriented mentality. Russia's historical and cultural heritage has been swept away by such a radical change, showing the negative repercussions of globalization.

Caucasus and Central Asia

Armenia, Azerbaidjan and Georgia belong to the first area, while Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan belong to the second. All these countries are subject to the external influence of China, Turkey, Afghanistan and Iran. Their precarious security situation is due to the fact that they are Russia's allies in the "near abroad", while they

are fulfilling about 25% of oil requirements of the USA, which is bilaterally engaged with all the countries of the region.

This area has always been a traditional route linking Asia and the Pacific to Europe, Russia and the Persian Gulf.

The region encompasses different ethnic groups and religions. Despite this heterogeneity, the above-mentioned nations are unified by the feeling of being encircled by superpowers and by the awareness of occupying a strategically relevant area.

Twelve years after the end of the cold war, this region still suffers from internal divisions and contradictions, preventing it from becoming a cohesive area system. Four main problems are still to be faced, i.e. the relations with powerful neighboring

conflicts and serious problems as well. They stem from ethnic groups, road networks, boundary disputes, a troubled past, a widespread habit to compromise, diffused corruption and almost officially authorized local abuses. This region is likely to become the Middle East of the future; in fact, it is equally rich in natural resources, which had a negative impact on the environment, where serious disasters occurred. A case in point is Lake Aral, where fishing and tourism activities were greatly impaired and caused a massive exodus from the countryside to the city.

The economic repercussion of globalization has had one positive side-effect at least. Major multinational oil companies are investing in the region, which is progressively becoming part of




countries, the sustainable and cost-effective development of natural resources, the transition to democracy and the difficult cohabitation of so many ethnic groups and religions.

This area, though rich in energy resources, is also plagued by wide interest

an international network with possible stabilizing effects. This way, all critical issues should be defused, thanks to constant external monitoring and crisis settlement activities.

India and Pakistan. During the cold war, regional powers reached an internal balance. Beijing



Above.
Israeli soldiers on patrol.

Left.
Monks of the Jokhang temple in Lhasa, Tibet.

helped Pakistan militarily, while Moscow supported New Delhi. The demise of the former USSR brought about the collapse of the pillar on which India had based its strategic and diplomatic architecture, in line with the Peace and Friendship Bilateral Treaty signed in 1971, against possible American or Chinese interventions.

India feels discriminated against by the USA and criticizes it for being more accommodating towards Pakistan and Israel. Thus India's nuclear power plays a unifying role both at national and regional levels and is considered as a tool to counterbalance the Chinese and Pakistani military might.

Pakistan is a monolithic block relying on its nationalism reinforced by strong religious tenets.

These Countries' forms of government cannot be

considered as fully democratic. They are mixed regimes where democracy must come to terms with deep and often contrasting traditions of religious and ethnic nature.

Poverty is rife. People's fear and pride feelings play a unifying role in the region. There are the prerequisites for the outburst of conflicts of all kinds. Religious beliefs and huge socioeconomic disparities rule out all possible efforts to directly involve the population in the development process. Foreign countries are focusing their attention on the area, being attracted by the low cost of labor. The result is a forceful imposition of Western-type open market rules which may have negative repercussions on the area.

China and Japan. The collapse of the Soviet Empire has taken China aback. In the bipolar era, the USA controlled the internal development of China from a distance only, ready to prevent it from expanding in the region or elsewhere. China, meanwhile, had already broken its ideological links with Russia and was willing to present itself as the supporter of a new non expansionist and non threatening communism. China's new stance allowed it to face its urgent internal problems in depth, in line with its international policy. This internal development required a limited number of resources only, as a political effort had not to be concurrently carried out at global or even regional level.

With the demise of the block-to-block system, China found itself isolated and obliged to play the role of a superpower, almost openly considered as a possible enemy of democracy.

In fact, in the post bipolar era, China has both stirred attention and fear, due to its leading role

as a superpower and its ideological development model, completely different from that of the West.

It is one of the major actors on the international stage being a standing member of the UN Security Council. China is developing relations with Japan while avoiding to be directly involved with the USA; this testifies to the effectiveness of its government's policy, aimed at establishing good economic relations with all countries and fostering development and peace to avoid new criticism. In short, China has ruled out all isolationist attitudes to establish good neighborly relations, while keeping an authoritative and detached stance.

Its authoritative role is widely recognized at a worldwide and regional level as well. In fact, China has not mollified or mitigated its positions by joining new Alliances, but has kept its autonomous and authoritative stance. It is one of the few countries which have not taken sides but have stood firm on their convictions, totally accepted by the East, much less by the West.

The situation is very different in Japan, a country which has established synergic relations with the USA, thus creating a positive balance between the two nations. Japan, however, is still one of the major Asian players capable of understanding the situation in the region and of making itself understood more than any other Western country. It has capitalized on the bipolar confrontation, which is at the origin of Asia's economic growth and deepest crisis as well. Actually, Japan's economy has had a great impact on its people's lifestyles and has become key much more than in the West.

China's foreseeable growth may

well obfuscate the economic leadership of Japan, whose political role has gained an increased importance. In fact, the latter is the only country the USA can rely on to counterbalance the ideological and socio-cultural development of China. Its military role has been rethought as well, to be in line with new international standards.

China and Japan have established relations that are pivotal to the development and the security of the region and will hopefully be further enhanced.


REGIONAL PROBLEMS

Asia is the hub of both the ambitions and fears of China, Japan, Russia, the European Community and the USA. In fact, it is the place where most of the nuclear peace and war installations of China, Russia, India, Pakistan, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and Indonesia are established. Some countries are not nuclear powers yet, but have nuclear capabilities.

In sum, in Asia the willingness to achieve a Western-type welfare goes side by side with the ideological principles inspiring many authoritarian regimes.

There are many players in the area which stand out for many reasons: China and Russia for their inherent power; Japan for its economy; Russia, Indonesia, the nations in Central Asia and in the Persian Gulf for their oil and raw materials ; India, Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia for their religion; Afghanistan and Iraq for their security threats, and so on.

Also the USA should be added to the list, as it has been keeping its military forces in the region since 1951, to safeguard its military alliance with Japan and



Partial view of Seoul, capital of South Korea.

South Korea and monitor all activities carried out to protect its national security.

As it can be noted, a wide range of problems affect the region.

The first issue is the **democratization process**, which is generally lacking behind in the area, where hierarchy-based societies and authoritative regimes are willingly accepted by a commonly shared mindset clashing with the globalization of commerce and a national outreach policy.

The lessons learned from last century's wars have validated pre-war government systems based on a strict internal and external control. The area is concurrently characterized by a modern economy and a high level of tolerance. The presence of different ethnic groups, religions and cultures does not escalate confrontation, but

fosters a spirit of peaceful cohabitation, thanks to Asian peoples' flair for commerce and traditional flexibility in their trading activities.

Reference model under crisis. Twelve years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the former communist countries have lost their ideological compass. The Chinese model, mainly focused on internal problems, cannot be easily exported. Economic growth greatly varies from one country to another, as regards its depth, pattern of development and volume of production.

There is competition over markets and resources. The USA carries out both import and export activities with Asia. The same is true for Japan and Europe, while Russia tries to make up for its losses.

The overall framework is both complex and multifaceted. There is the risk that the economy, the

only driving force in the region, may not rely on a background of common interests, a clear definition of powers and the mediating role played by area international organizations.

In fact, **international organizations** have not been able to perform the same reference and mediating role played in Europe. Their limited presence testifies to the extent of the problems still unsolved.

The Asean, whose members are China, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei and, since 1995, Vietnam, is not an eligible forum for dialogue, not being the guarantor of a common will in the field of security. Certainly, it cannot be compared to NATO. The same concept applies to the Apec (Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation) whose members, besides the above mentioned countries, are the USA, Canada, South Korea, Australia and New

Zealand with different membership status.

The history of Asia in an underlying element, which has allowed peoples to establish strong ethical and moral ties at regional, but not at international level. As a consequence, they have neither developed feelings of respect towards their neighbours, nor a sense of

The fact that Russia, suffering from a similar obsession, was invaded by the media, and not by tanks, has not produced visible results yet.

Old conflicts are still ongoing and have not found a commonly agreed solution to-date, as in the case of Cambodia and Thailand, South China Sea, and the territorial disputes in China,

hosts its holy cities.

The Iranian area is not of Arab origin and has a language of its own, while Arabic is spoken only in cultural environments. The history of the Persian Empire set the political background of Islam. Therefore, the Persian historical and ideological heritage has become the common foundation of the Arab-Islamic world. Iran was the gateway to Islam for Asian peoples, as in the case of the Turks coming from Eastern Asia. They first entered into contact with the Islamic world thanks to Iran and then became the political guide of Islam in the year 1000 AC, spreading it eastward to Central Asia regions and India and westward to Anatolia and some parts of Eastern Europe.

The Islamic culture links up several fragmented authoritarian regimes in a multifaceted



Above.

A typical market in Shigatse, Nepal.

Right.

Istanbul. The Blue Mosque.

belonging to a same regional entity.

Within a mostly authoritarian environment, deeply rooted territorial disputes are still ongoing, which do not simply stem from current political maneuvers. The integration of the region was delayed by the historical events which took place in former colonies. They had to struggle for their independence and were often opposed by hostile neighbors; thus, a confrontational attitude ruled out all cooperation efforts.

These countries, which have long endured several invasions and fought to extend their boundaries, are still obsessively focusing their attention on territorial issues, an attitude which can be greatly destabilizing.



Japan, Taiwan and Tibet.

The Islamic culture is widespread and deeply rooted, but not homogeneous even at its source. Asia encompasses all three areas which Islam draw its origin from: the Arabian, Iranian and Turkish regions, which exert their unifying or dividing power whenever a conflict arises.

The Arabian area, the most important one as regards both its extension and political role, has been the cradle of Islam and

framework and has also established a network of relations between Asia and Europe, which has never been put to the test in recent times. This system, allowing for free movement, connections and mutual recognition among peoples, is not less important than the geographic path crossing Central Asia. In this perspective, it can be said that Turkey's gateway has already been opened, but the path

behind it has to be traced yet.

The imbalance of powers in the region, the long-lasting repercussions of the communist advance and America's influence have heavily impacted on **security**, which is the most pressing and widely recognized problem.

The majority of future security problems will stem from Central and Eastern Asia. This situation is worsened by the fact that the USA is already deployed in the theater, which will prevent reliable external mediators from intervening, in the case of a regional conflict.

The strategic concepts behind all US choices are based on the assumption that national security profits from geographical isolation; therefore geopolitical relations are to be kept under strict control, as in the case of the Asia-Pacific area.

The US pragmatic stance and reluctance to adopt a more flexible approach in the region are thus explained.

America's present policy towards Asia is therefore in line with its international role as a guarantor of world-wide stability.

There is the will to forge a strong and stable community in the Asia-Pacific area, which will act alongside a peaceful, united and democratic Europe. The aim is to establish an international open market system for the XXI century, to the benefit of the world at large and the USA, which will keep its leading role as a global peace guarantor, fostering cooperation to face all security threats against its national interests.

As it can be noted, priority is given to national interests.

The Asian community, established in the Pacific after World War Two, gave origin to a series of bilateral treaties assigning a subordinate role to all Asian signatory countries.



The nature of the Mutual Security Treaty between the USA and Japan, imposed in return for ending the military occupation, has changed over time giving birth to a new transoceanic, political, economic and military entity including many other countries as well, where the role played by the USA and Japan has been reinforced.

Therefore, the situation explained above may disrupt regional balances and compel non-allied countries, such as China, to establish counterbalancing relations with other local actors in a climate of tension and insecurity.

Similar American security deployments to support South Korea and monitor the situation in Taiwan have greatly impacted on the policy adopted by North Korea and China and testify to the extent of America's direct involvement in the Asian region, which may trigger conflict and crisis situations.

Those envisaging a best case scenario do not rule out the possibility that North Korea may be gradually incorporated by South Korea and that China and the USA may find a peaceful, long lasting and

Tokio. Sumo wrestlers during a match of Japan's national sport.

mutually profitable agreement, within the framework of a reasonable freedom of action, where territorial issues play a less pivotal role than in the past.

To this aim, a prolonged cooperative and goodwill effort is required, more than a bilateral relationship based on mutual respect.

Some steps have already been taken, to the point that the latest American political initiatives toward China seem to range from a policy of restraint to a peaceful and cooperative involvement.

So far, the coexistence of these two different strategies has only made matters worse, by opposing the representatives of two clashing mentalities and raising the threshold of mutual suspicion.

Suffice it to say that in the Mutual Security Treaty between the USA and Japan, China is regarded as the reference enemy. Moreover, the American public strongly condemns some choices made by the Chinese government



The main gate of the Kiyomizudera temple in Kyoto.

and reacts accordingly, as in the case of human rights violations, the occupation of Tibet and Xinjiang, the sales of weapons and dual use technologies or the unilateral extension of territorial waters. China's reaction, in turn, deepens ingrained hostility feelings and rules out all possible cooperation efforts.

To better understand the relations between the USA and China, as well as the disappointment of the Chinese, it must be recalled that in the '90s the USA sold high-tech equipment to Taiwan, including 150 F-16 combat aircraft, to counterbalance the Chinese acquisition of 50 Su-27 aircraft from Russia. Concurrently, Taiwan purchased 60 Mirage combat aircraft from France and was engaged in the production of a national combat aircraft mainly made up of American parts. It is also worth recalling that the USA is planning the development of a theater missile defense system together with Japan and Taiwan.

This selective transfer of military power, raising concern among all the actors in the region, China included, has also

had a destabilizing effect in the Asia-Pacific area.

Moreover, the rationale behind such a huge security mobilization effort is still unclear; in fact, over the last twenty years China has registered an economic growth not followed by a similar increase in its military power, which has been on the decline since the 70's.

In 1978, When Deng Xiaoping came to power and a rapid internal reorganization process was launched to shift from a socialist-type centralized economy to a market oriented system, testifying China's priorities and the secondary role played by its military apparatus.

China's military stockpiles are still full of pre-1978 equipment, as part of the country's effort to become one of the main producers of conventional weapons, mainly based on Soviet projects of the 50's.

In the 90's, the production of major armament systems was practically stalled.

China has a limited capability of autonomously developing its military arsenal, even if there is

fear that it could militarily exploit dual use technologies. But these concerns are groundless; its few modernization efforts have recently been carried out through the procurement of foreign equipment only.

China's nuclear posture is very limited as compared to America's, to the point that the possibility of a new Warsaw Pact- type escalation is to be completely ruled out. The potential threat against the USA is based on 20 ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), armed with a single warhead and one nuclear submarine which has been kept inactive over the last few years.

The armed forces still enroll an exceedingly high number of personnel, whose costs have a negative impact on the defense budget, are detrimental to all modernization efforts and also prove that no offensive strategies are being developed.

Notwithstanding a 17.7% budgetary increase in 2001, China's overall capabilities are still strongly limited vis-à-vis its peacetime commitments over such a wide territory. China can defend its homeland only, a legitimate requirement given the number, capabilities, potentialities, claims and behaviors of its neighbors.


The level of arms sales has dropped significantly compared to the past, owing to the development of better trading relations in the region and the low standard of Chinese military equipment. In 1995, China's military sales were only 1/6, as compared to its exports in 1987/88 (Iran-Iraq war, large procurements by Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Thailand).

In short, China neither at

View of the Masmak fortress in Saudi Arabia.

present nor in the future will pose a military threat to the West similar to that waged by Soviet bloc countries in the bipolar era. Therefore, it cannot be considered as an aggressive and threatening nations like Iraq or North Korea, being also engaged in establishing regular commercial and political relations with the USA, its neighboring countries and the Western world. Moreover, it has shown a clear resolve to settle all problems stemming from its relations with Taiwan, India or Vietnam, in such a way as not to hinder progress and development in Asia. This same peaceful and cooperative attitude has raised concern among American strategists. In fact, China is following an iron-fist policy internally, which is strongly condemned by the Western world, while is projecting its large shadow externally over the Continent and the entire world, thanks to its people's migration flows and the control of third countries' economies.

The most worrying aspect is that the Chinese model, still based on the concepts of national unity and territorial extension, together with a strong internal control, may be projected abroad. The Chinese strongly support their choices and sovereignty, trying to defuse all possible tensions. Concurrently, there is not much leeway for mutual comprehension, as Western countries cannot interfere in the internal affairs of a nation governed by laws and habits very different from those of the West, especially in the case of a country as powerful as China. Western nations have never expressed in-depth criticism, as in the case of Taiwan and its



right to independence. Objections are only made in principle, not to hurt China's feelings and break all relations with it, as demonstrated by Tienanmen events and human rights violations, when China's internal issues and development problems were never directly addressed; other examples were the handing over of Hong Kong to China, which was considered as a defeat of democracy, and lastly Tibet and the Dalai Lama.

Once again, the economic factor is looked upon as a useful means to reconcile both values and behaviors.

Many analysts think that a new global conflict is taking place in the Far East, as the USA/USSR confrontation has been replaced by the economic, but equally generalized clash between the Western (the USA, Europe and their connections with Russia) and the Eastern world (Asia and Russia as well).

As a consequence, the role played by Russia is gaining new momentum. The ideological gap between China and the communist model has already been dealt with. Over the last five years, many important bilateral

cooperation agreements have been signed, but China is still on the alert; in fact, like many other countries in the world, it fears that a new imperialist drive may undermine all agreements and mutual relations. As a matter of fact, there are many Russias at the moment, i.e. Moscow's decisions do not always overlap with those taken by other CIS countries. Today China has a fresh chance to play a crucial role and impose its power. In the 60's, all projects and cooperation efforts between China and Russia, which had already been endorsed and partially launched, were scrapped. As a consequence, the decision taken by Russia brought about long years of stagnation. On the contrary, today it is Russia which offers its cooperation and China which sets both prices and conditions.

Once the ideological primacy of communism has been ruled out, relations have been established on an equal footing for the first time, at least in principle, on the occasion of Eltsin's visit to Beijing in 1992.

Russia and China are now aware that they belong to the

same Eurasian area and are envisaging a possible strategic cooperation, which will simply translate into the resumption of normal relations.

China wants an official recognition of its borders, minorities and trading relations. Russia, on the contrary, is eager to establish partnership ties only and take part in major Chinese projects concerning technology and armaments sales.

Under the present circumstances, an anti-Western alliance is unlikely to be set up for many reasons. In fact, the internal situation of both countries is very critical and time is not ripe yet for jointly drawing up such a far-reaching plan. The USA still does not give much leeway to these countries and has a hands-on attitude as regards their internal development. Today, both nations are unwilling to play a primary role at worldwide level, which would be the only reason to openly counter America's policy.

As things stand, Russia may hopefully cooperate in promoting better relations and enhancing mutual understanding between Europe and Asia, the Eastern and the Western world, to gather consensus on Western values and support the American pragmatic attitude, constantly aimed at peacefully enhancing development at global level.

The relations between Russia and Japan have not changed over time and are still based on territorial disputes concerning four islands in the Ohotsk sea. This situation is strongly conditioned by the fact that Japan is not only considered as a faithful partner of the USA, but also as a far-off part of the American mainland, not only from a logistic point of view, as stated by some American government sources.

Europe and Asia have established economic ties



mainly, while a mutual consensus has not been reached yet on internal and foreign policy matters.

The most rewarding aspect of this long-lasting and unilateral commitment is that the Western Europe's outreach to Eastern European countries is aimed at opening a land corridor up to Middle East Asia and the Caucasus. Commercial ties connecting countries with different scenarios and problems progressively translate into wider and deeper good neighborly relations.

FUTURE TRENDS

All strategic choices made by Asia are critical, being a theater where any possible mistake may have worldwide repercussions, so much so if we consider that Asia belongs to the Asia-Pacific strategic system, encompassing the majority of the human population, together with its aspirations and capabilities.

Today, a widespread feeling of fear and suspicion has brought about a silent mobilization on both sides. In the near future, a common effort should be made

to modify internal mindsets, leveraging on the power of the media and the use of technologies which fulfil both private and public users' requirements. The aim is to unify different peoples' needs and expectations.

This article has highlighted many different options which need to be put in practice only.

China has adopted a questionable position; in fact, its democratization process, not based on reliable foundations, will take a long time to be completed, as in the case of the Middle East. Concurrently, the USA still exerts a general and relatively legitimized control, over Asia mainly, thanks to its time-tested political, financial and military tools, aimed at discriminating those countries and areas which refuse to align with its concepts.

The democratization process in Asia should be stimulated and speeded up by revising the strict and obsolete strategies linked to the old world balance, largely based on bipolar concepts. To this aim, the Mutual Security Treaty between the USA and Japan should be replaced by a much larger forum founded on

Facing page.

Tel Aviv, Israel. A view of the beach.

Right.

The Great Mosque in Karachi, Pakistan.*

the common security of different regional actors, China and Russia mainly. As a consequence, military forces and their bases should be only employed within the framework of a new NATO-type alliance, and not to implement bilateral war agreements.

The establishment of a multilateral Asia-Pacific security system, the availability of a standing forum and a dedicated organization could play down present problems and allow for the development of mutual confidence-building measures, inspired by common goals and decisions.

Regular consultations would reasonably lead to drawing down all military apparatuses autonomously set up by nations to defend themselves. This effort could curb nuclear proliferation and armaments sales and allow for finding commonly agreed solutions to territorial disputes.

America's hegemonic role is questioned once again, in Asia, Europe and elsewhere, due to its policy more focused on national than international problems.

As a matter of fact, in a world where everyone pursue their particular interests, America would be ill-advised if it neglected its survival or subsistence needs to meet worldwide requirements. On the contrary, the USA should set up a new attractive reference model, capable of gathering the consensus of all the other peoples of the world. This system should be also tailored to adjust to regional requirements.

The groundwork would be thus set for the development of mutual confidence initiatives,

stemming from a clear resolve to find new types of cooperation also in the military sector.

A development effort, which is first priority in the present global scenario, is carried out in an unstable security framework, where threats are fuelled by suspicion and ignorance. Within this scenario, the USA may well decide not to pursue its national interests only and establish common cohabitation rules to reduce present cases of uncertainty and ambiguity.

The role to be played by America in the future has not been identified yet and nations still act on the spur of the moment trying not to cause irreversible damage.

As it has already been said, the USA still reacts to the instability of the Asia-Pacific theatre by adopting past containment systems, which stoke strong reactions against the democratic model and stir up nationalistic feelings. At the same time, America's proactive attitude has already gained an exceptional flexibility.

The success of all détente policies is dependent on the development of US internal affairs, both in China and in the

USA. Another Tiennamen or a possible crisis of American industrial lobbies could heavily impact on the present, unstable political, diplomatic and economic balance. To prevent those risks from occurring and establish a common security framework, the USA should not consider most of the actions carried out by China as autonomously decided hostile choices, but as a response to the initiatives commonly agreed by the USA, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea in Asia.


To dispel all suspicions, the need is felt for clear, simple ideas, plans and lines of action.

The difficult compromise reached in the region should not be considered as an end in itself, given the high number of actors involved, the extent of interests at stake and the accelerated rhythm of global relations.

To conclude, in dealing with Asia and the Middle East, the USA should ask the Western world to join in and not act as a single player. This cooperation may yield unexpected dividends.

□

** Major General (ret.)*





by Armando Novelli *

«OUT-OF-AREA» OPERATIONS

Concepts and organization

The end of the "bipolar" confrontation with its old balances has revived latent tensions which, at times, have led to regional crises. This implies new responsibilities for the western Countries, within both the Alliance and the international Organizations.

Today, the concept of security is not connected only to the defence of national integrity, but is conceived as a whole of preventive measures aimed at keeping international stability and at facing, in an appropriate and hopefully bloodless manner, any threat deriving from problems related to development and demographic growth.

Therefore, it is necessary to have on hand a projectable land instrument, adequate to the new requirements, with an updated Command and Control organization and diversified operational capabilities.



CHARACTERISTICS OF CROs (CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS)

The evolution described above has involved all the Western Countries.

NATO, in its Washington meeting of April 23, 1999, approved a new strategic concept, introducing the "non Article 5 **Crisis Response Operations**" as an integral part of the Alliance's "Crises Management", describing those operations as one of the three military missions envisaged, in addition to:

- *collective defence*, described in Art. 5 of the Treaty;
- *consultation and cooperation* (PfP, Membership Action Plan, NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO-Russia Military Cooperation).

These new concepts are dealt with in two documents of the Alliance:

- MC 400/2 - "MC GUIDANCE FOR THE MILITARY IMPLEMENTATION OF ALLIANCE STRATEGY";
- MC 327/2 - "NATO MILITARY POLICY FOR NON ARTICLE 5 CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS".

In these documents, CROs are described as multifunctional operations which include political, military and civil activities,



CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS

- PSO
- Exfiltration
- Support in case of disasters/humanitarian aid
- SAR (search and rescue)
- NEO (non-combatant evacuation operations)

MILITARY PARTICIPATION SUBJECT TO NATIONAL DECISION

conducted in order to guarantee the observance of international laws or the achievement of the Alliance's stated objectives, aimed at averting or solving conflicts and at managing all possible crises.

They can vary from **support operations**, carried out in connection with organizations, to **peace support operations**, and can also envisage combat actions.

In particular, those which envisage the **use of force for self-defence only**, can take the shape of:

- *exfiltration*;
- *aid to the population*, such as interventions in case of disaster or for humanitarian purposes;
- Search And Rescue;
- *non-combatant evacuation operations* (NEOs). Evacuation of nationals remains a national responsibility.

On the contrary, the operations which **imply the use of military force or the threat to use it** vary from *the application of sanctions or embargoes* to actual *military combat operations*.

Contrary to what occurs for Art.5 operations, in case of CROs contributions and military participation are always subject to

the decision of the national authorities.

It is worth mentioning that, meanwhile, NATO had already carried out its own structural revision, acquiring rapidly projectable Commands, capable of becoming multinational and of integrating elements from non-NATO Countries. Suffice it to mention, in particular, the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) or the ACE Mobile Force-Land (AMF-L).

As a matter of fact, the coalitions based on a large "international" participation appear to be more legitimated (as was the case for the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo).

The main reasons which advise even a great Power against operating by itself, despite its capability of doing it, are connected with the following considerations:

- *legitimation of the intervention* in the eyes of the international community;
- *saving of "valuable" assets* (helicopters, specialized units, logistic support, hospitals, special forces) and limitation of organizational costs (1);

- *sharing of the risks of human losses*, which are very possible in the conduct of CROs. These risks if shared with other Nations, are more easily accepted by the public opinion of each Country.

In addition, multinational Commands, besides establishing an active spirit of collaboration among the contributing Countries, as a matter of fact guarantee a form of mutual control and prevent the adoption of lines of actions not in accordance with the purpose or the mandate of the mission.

CROs POLITICO-STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Political control and strategic direction of these operations are within the province of the **UN Security Council**, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and international security.

At European regional level, these responsibilities can also be assumed by *OSCE* - the most important European security organization, to which also the US and Canada belong - that plays an essential role in promoting peace, stability, security in cooperation, as well as in furthering democracy and human rights in Europe.

It must be underlined that, according to UN procedures, when a regional or international crisis breaks out, the intervention of a military force is considered the **final act of an unsuccessful process of mediation**.

Through the UN, the international community can in fact take several initiatives (politico-diplomatic, economic, etc.) aimed at finding - first of all - a painless solution to the disputes among the Parties involved. Only if these actions fail, the UN can decide that a military intervention

is necessary as a last and often decisive resource, in order to bring the crisis to an end.

In these circumstances, the UN Security Council acts and decides according to the provisos of chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter.

In particular, **Chapter VI** assigns to the Security Council a **conciliatory function** (art.33) in order to contribute to the peaceful solution of international disputes, promoting, through recommendations, the agreement of the Parties.


The power of issuing "recommendations" is regulated by art. 36 and must take into account the procedures already adopted by the Parties.

Furthermore, art. 34 of chapter VI invests the Security Council with a generic **power of investigation**, which can lead to the decision of sending observation teams on the field, with the possible employment of military observers.

This chapter of the UN Charter includes some important initiatives listed as:

- **conflict prevention**;
- **peacemaking**;
- **humanitarian aid**.

Considering that each operation often requires the planning and



execution of all the activities mentioned above, the list is only indicative, and essentially points out the priority-activities performed within each operation.

In particular:


- **conflict prevention** includes many activities, from diplomatic initiatives to the preventive deployment of forces and its aim is to avoid that disputes degenerate into armed conflicts or that they spread out. *Prevention* needs a global strategy, defined and conducted at political level and is based, in particular, on the activity of anticipation, recognition and

control of the crises (the UNPREDEP in FYROM, 1995-99, is an example);

- **peacemaking** is a series of diplomatic actions, conducted after the beginning of a conflict, aimed at permitting a peaceful settlement of relations among the Parties. They can take the form of an offer of "good offices", mediation and conciliation, as well as that of diplomatic isolation or other forms of sanctions (an example is the WEU/Danube mission, 1993-96);
- **humanitarian aid** includes the activities carried out in order to relieve human sufferings, particularly in circumstances where the local Authorities are unable or unwilling to support and assist the population in an adequate manner. They can be conducted within a wider operation or as an independent undertaking. Although the humanitarian operations envisage, as a priority, the employment of civilian resources, their conduct can be entrusted to military organizations when the intervention takes place in



A sniper observes his sector, ready to react to hostile fire.



conflict areas requiring the adoption of security measures to protect the civilians assisted and/or the personnel engaged in the operation (examples: "Airone"/ Kurdistan, Iraq, 1991 and "Pellicano"/Albania, 1991-93).

The adoption of actual coercive actions, including international police operations, against or within a State, is regulated by **chapter VII** of the Charter.

In particular:

- article 40, in order to prevent a worsening of the situation, envisages that the Security Council can invite the parties to implement the temporary measures it considers necessary or desirable for the restoration of the normal situation. *Cease-fires* area cases in point;
- article 41 considers **measures** which do not imply the use of force and that the UN members should adopt towards the Nation

(or Nations) responsible for the crisis. They can include a total or partial break of economic relations, the interruption of railway, maritime, postal, telegraphic and radio communications, etc., and even the breaking-off of diplomatic relations;

- finally, article 42 says that if the Security Council deems the measures established by article 41 to be inadequate, it can undertake with air, naval or land forces, **any action considered necessary to keep or reestablish peace and international security** (these actions can include "demonstrations, blockades and other operations employing air, naval or land forces of the United Nations"). In other words, the matter concerns the legitimation of the intervention by a military force.

Unlike the sanctions envisaged by art. 41, which must be concretely adopted by member States upon request by the Security Council, the international-police actions included in art. 42 are clearly conceived, in the first place at least, as actions directly undertaken by the Security Council, employing armed contingents put at its disposal by the UN members.

The forms of intervention going under the general heading of **peace enforcement** are connected to this chapter, while **peacekeeping** and **peacebuilding** activities must be discussed separately.

Let's analyze them starting from the last two:

- **peacekeeping**: at the beginning it was considered, in general terms, as the intervention of an impartial third Party, operating under the guidance of an international body and aimed at containing, controlling and/or ending hostile activities between Nations or within them, where the use of force was not excluded



if necessary, in a context characterized by the agreement of the Parties concerned.

Today peacekeeping has assumed the characteristics of a low-intensity intervention, still with the agreement of the parties involved, where the use of force is not envisaged to achieve the objective of the mission, but rather to guarantee the self-defence of the units in the field.

It is therefore an intervention involving both Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and there is the idea of including it in a new "Chapter VI+".

According to this interpretation, the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo must be considered *peace enforcement* operations;

- **peacebuilding** is a type of intervention that can take place both after Chapter VI and *peace enforcement* operations. The definition applies to *post-conflict activities* aimed at detecting and supporting structures able to strengthen and make concrete political solutions that can prevent a return to the conflict. They imply measures that can build confidence and welfare and contribute to the economic reconstruction. Both military and civilians can be involved in these operations;
- **peace enforcement** operations aim at imposing a will, and envisage the employment of military formations based on a mandate authorizing the coercive use of force in order to restore peace and observance of international law.

These missions can take place in an environment normally characterized by the lack of a general consensus by the Parties involved. In these cases the impartiality of the intervention is very important. The use of force, considered possible, has to be contained and not aimed at destroying the opposing forces but only at achieving the objectives fixed by the Authority holding the

mandate. (The intervention in Korea/1950-53, the operation "Joint Endeavour"/Bosnia started in 1995 and "Joint Guardian"/Kosovo, started in 1999, are examples of *peace enforcement*).

We have seen how the CROs decision-making process develops at politico-strategic level, and how the Security Council legitimates, with an ad-hoc resolution, the use of military force.

This formal act is very important, in that it contains all the elements of the intervention, namely:

- **mandate;**
- **extent of the engagement;**
- **tasks;**
- **Rules of Engagement (RoE);**
- type of **subordination** to the UN.

The latter is an interesting and significant aspect, which permits to divide the operations into three groups:

- **operations under UN aegis**, where the United Nations only endorses the objectives of the operation, as in the case of Operation "Desert Storm" in the Gulf and the UNITAF mission in Somalia (1st phase, 1992-93);
- **operations under UN mandate**, where the United Nations asks a

Nation or a regional Organization to plan and conduct a mission. The UN, in this case, establishes the objectives and keeps the political direction of the operation. This was the case of operation "Alba" (Albania, 1997), where Italy was leader-Nation; INTERFET (East Timor, 1999-2000) with Australia as leader-Nation; IFOR-SFOR in Bosnia (started in 1995) and KFOR in Kosovo, FYROM and Albania (started in 1999), where NATO assumed the military leadership;

- **operations under UN command**, where the UN assumes the direct command of the operation, realizing on its own, on a multinational basis, the necessary command structures, as in UNIFIL (Southern Lebanon, started in 1978); UNPROFOR (Bosnia, 1992-95); UNOSOM (Somalia, 2nd phase, 1993-94), UNOMOZ (Mozambique, 1993-94), UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone, started in 1999).

COMMAND AND CONTROL IN CROs

Military operations always derive from national or international political power, which recognizes



DEVELOPMENT OF A MILITARY ACTIVITY

- 
- » **Technical-military evaluations**
 - » **Selection of possible intervention options**
 - » **C2 organization**
 - » **Selection of Leader Nation**
 - »

in them the most suitable way to realize its purposes (political objectives).

The Political Authority formulates a *mandate* and entrusts it to a *Force Commander*, who is tasked with planning and conducting the military operations necessary to implement the mandate through the employment of a military instrument.

The Operation Commander is granted a *Command Authority* adequate to the task.

The Command Authority, in its turn, is variously distributed, through the military structure, in the manner considered most appropriate for the effective operation of the command-and-control function.

The distribution scheme of the command authority represents the *Organization of Command and Control*, which in multinational operations is of fundamental importance.

In CROs, the political and military authorities of the participating Nations tend, in an open or dissembled manner, to keep a certain control over their Contingents, and to intervene in their conduct, particularly at critical moments.

Mainly concerned about the loss of human lives, and often pressed by emotional public opinions, these Authorities - having no detailed knowledge of the situation in the field and ignoring the attitude of the other Nations - start issuing orders suited to their own objectives, at a moment when, according to the principle of **singleness of command**, the *unifying* action of the multinational Force's Commander would be extremely important.

As a matter of fact, the national leaders detail their forces, but have a tendency to attribute to the Commander a limited authority over them.

The Command function is realized by entrusting the

Commanders with the organizational responsibilities which normally take the forms of Full Command, Operational Command, Operational Control, Tactical Command and Tactical Control, with the following levels of authority:

- **Full Command (FULLCOM).**

The authority and responsibility conferred to a Commander as regards training, preparation and employment of the units or organizations under his orders. It refers to all operational and logistic aspects and, as a rule, is only applied within the national Armed Forces. In the international environment, the term "Command" refers to a lower level of authority. As a consequence, in NATO and in other organizations/coalitions, **no Commander has Full Command over the forces assigned to him.**

- **Operational Command (OPCOM).** It corresponds to the authority granted to a Commander to:

- assign missions or tasks to subordinate Commanders;
- deploy units;
- reassign forces;
- keep or delegate OPCOM according to needs.

Per se, it does not include authority in the administrative and logistic sector.

- **Operational Control (OPCON).**

It is the authority, entrusted to a Commander, to:

- employ the forces allocated for the accomplishment of specific missions or tasks, normally limited as regards functions, time and space;
- deploy the units concerned;
- keep or delegate TACON of these units.

It does not include the authority to change the tasks for which the units have been assigned. It does not involve logistic and administrative actions.

- **Tactical Command (TACOM).** It corresponds to the authority to give tasks to the forces under his command in order to carry out the mission assigned by a higher-level Authority.

- **Tactical Control (TACON).** It is the authority, delegated to a Commander, to direct and control in detail, generally at local level, the actions and manoeuvres necessary to carry out the assigned missions or tasks.

It does not include the authority to assign new tasks or change the original ones.

In Peace Operations, OPCON

A "Centauro" heavy armoured-car patrolling a Bosnia road.



is the highest authority which is normally delegated.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

The rules of engagement, in the specific context of peace-support operations, are directives or orders issued by the Force Commander (after approval by a qualified politico-military Authority). The ROEs define the circumstances and the limits within which the forces can/must use their weapons. In particular, within NATO they are defined as "directives, issued by the military Authorities, specifying the circumstances and limits within which the forces can start and/or continue fighting against the opposing forces" (Pub AAP-6).

The rules of engagement assigned to a Contingent depend on:

- **legal framework** within which the intervention takes place (e.g. UN Resolution which originated the mission);
- **specific politico-military situation** in which the Force operates.

ROEs must be made known to all personnel of every category and rank and, in particular, they must be:

- clear, simple, understandable and univocal;
- aimed at containing the use of force (in other words they must avoid, as far as possible, escalations in the recourse to force), be absolutely impartial and adhere to the principle of self-defence;
- be drawn taking into account the principles of "limitation in the use of force", "self-defence" and "credibility".

The rules of engagement, at any rate, must clearly envisage:

- when and how to use weapons;
- what weapons can be used in different situations;
- what is the Authority empowered to decide, in case of need, the opening of fire or the movement



of the unit away from the assigned place (abandonment of a threatened position).

It is possible (and even advisable, when the situation is very uncertain) to consider several "conceivable rules of engagement" (envisaging, for instance, different levels of authority for deciding when to open fire), in order to face, with the necessary flexibility, dynamic and changing situations.

In this case, it is indispensable to define very clearly:

- the rules of engagement in force at all times;
- the Authority entitled to authorize changing the rules (or possibly the specific facts that can determine the automatic transition from one set of rules to another).

DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY ACTIVITY

In parallel with the initiatives of the international community, aimed at finding a political solution, the General Staffs, both national and international, start planning the military operation and, relying on the available elements, begin to study the

possible options, defining the command and control chain, the leader Nations and all that is necessary to start the operation.

Thus, as soon as the Security Council issues its resolution, the military contingents are practically ready to go into action.

In fact, the timeliness of the intervention is indispensable to show to the Parties the international resolve and the readiness of the units, with positive effects both for deterrence and for preventing the crisis from deteriorating.

As a rule, considering the uncertainty of the situation, especially in the initial phases, the contingents are prepared and equipped to face the worst case (high operational intensity), considering the possible need of having to impose peace on elements or factions unwilling to accept it.

On the other hand, considering the typical context of these operations, usually characterized by the lack of a credible government and international bodies capable of filling the power-gap resulting from the crisis, the tasks the military units are called to perform are often different



Controlling Mt Tubevic TV relay station.

emphasize, and often amplify, every incident along the way.

THE PHASES OF A MISSION

Although every Theatre has its characteristics, its own logic of action and its constraints, it seems nevertheless possible to single out three distinctive phases, in the development of every CRO.

The first one, purely military, is aimed at achieving a rapid control of the maritime, air and land space. During this phase, usually short, the units are heavily engaged in the execution of military tasks.

The second is a *transition* phase, longer and very unstable, which imposes the restoration of order and public safety. Military actions are still necessary, but other skills are also required. Nevertheless this period is not free from risks deriving, mainly, from a possible resumption of local tensions.

Stabilization is the third phase. It is characterized by a lesser level of tensions; its goal is to reconstruct a constitutional state and to gradually reestablish the State's sovereignty. This phase can last several years.

Little by little, the responsibilities assigned to the Armed Forces are transferred to the local Authorities.

It is important to note that after the initial phase of contact with an armed enemy, either military or paramilitary, the successive phases frequently lead to a permanent contact with helpless populations (who are often refugees returning to their territories and their homes) and to the gradual transfer

from the traditional ones and every operator must possess, besides his fighting capability, the skills necessary to play different and at times very delicate roles, such as those of diplomat, police officer, peace-maker, nurse or, generically, dispenser of aid.

Commanders have a particularly hard task, since they are required to operate taking into account a growing number of social, political, cultural, economic, environmental and humanitarian factors.

In fact, they are called to make

autonomous decisions which are not within their institutional province, and often have to work in contrast with local personages unduly trying to appropriate prerogatives not attributed to them by law.

For instance, in Kosovo the Brigade Commander played, among others the role of judicial authority when offences were committed, with the ensuing legal and personal problems.

And all this occurs in an environment that is under the attention of the media, which



The "Alpini" from the "Taurinense" Brigade are among the guardians of the peace in Sarajevo.

"Alpini" patrolling a Bosnian highway.

of responsibilities to the local Authorities. In these situations, CIMIC activities are particularly important, and *ad-hoc* cells are established within the Brigade Staffs.

PREPARATION OF THE FORCES

The preparation of the forces is of fundamental importance for the successful performance of a mission. It must be meant as *the complex of training activities indispensable for enabling the units to carry out their operational tasks* (2). These activities, which go on without interruption within an **operational cycle** (which I shall describe later), start before the employment (one of the cycle's phases) and continue throughout the mission, until the forces are withdrawn from the Theatre for their reconditioning (last phase of the operational cycle), in anticipation of a new engagement.

The training, in general, must reach three closely interrelated operational levels:

- the **first level** concerns all units, irrespective of their type, and envisages the achievement of the capability of conducting classic *war operations*, in defence of the national and the Allied Nations' territory (art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty);
- the **second level** is differentiated according to the "package" to which the units belong and refers to the activities necessary to give the forces the capability of conducting the operations envisaged – and envisageable – for carrying out the other two strategic missions, "presence



and surveillance" and "defence of the external interests and contribution to international security". The objectives are then pursued in accordance with the specific "capability package": from the defence of sensitive targets to the conduct of CROs;

- the **third level** orients the preparation of the units towards a specific operational plan (OPLAN) and concerns only the formations earmarked for intervention in a specific operation whose elements are well-known (mission, task, C2 organization, composition and

organization of the forces, area of responsibility, logistic support,...).

OPERATIONAL CYCLE

The operational cycle (3) of a unit is divided into four phases:

- **general preparation:** the "normal" situation and, therefore, the beginning of the operational cycle. During this period, the units reach their 1st- and 2nd-level preparation, and acquire the capabilities estimated for their force

Control of the territory by the "Taurinense" alpine units assigned to the SFOR peace-mission.





A 6616 Fiat-Iveco light armoured car of the "Taurinense" Brigade in Bosnia.

category (projection, reaction, presence and surveillance);

- **preparation following an Order of Operation:** the situation of the units designated for a specific mission, which must undergo a special preparation (3rd level) which enables them to carry out the task assigned. As regards out-of-area operations, this phase lasts about 4 months, during which the *task force* is completed with personnel, vehicles and weapon systems, and goes through the

necessary vaccination cycle. The formation also carries out amalgamation and training activities, readying itself for projection into the Theatre. It is not always possible to prepare the first Contingent according to these timeframes, but this must certainly be done as regards the forces designed for the successive rotations;

- **employment:** the duration of a unit's engagement in operations depends on the type of activity actually performed on the field (Level of operational stress) and

on the availability of resources (other commitments, availability of equivalent units). In principle, the interventions outside the national territories don't last longer than 4 months, considering the need/advantage of acquiring an adequate familiarity with the Theatre. The non-simultaneous introduction of units at different levels, must also permit a suitable period of overlapping between the Command of the Contingent and the HQ of the main manoeuvre-unit, in order to have always one of the fundamental elements with sufficient experience, thus avoiding critical interruptions in the conduct of the operations.

- **reconditioning after employment:** involves the development of activities aimed at bringing the unit back to its full operational effectiveness, and is connected with:

- psycho-physical recovery of personnel;
- special maintenance of systems, materials and equipment, replacement of materials damaged, deteriorated or delivered to other units in the Theatre;
- verification of the operational capabilities, if necessary through an adequate training period aimed at reacquiring the expected standard.

The duration of the reconditioning phase is not rigid, since it depends on the activities the unit must carry out in order to go back to its operational standard. In general, it lasts 4 or 5 months.

As a whole, at present the operational cycle of a Brigade HQ or Regiment lasts about 16 months (4 in the Theatre and 12 in the home-country).



"Alpini" in a training exercise.

THE TASK ORGANIZATION SYSTEM

The contingents engaged in CROs are normally organized according to the *task organization* concept, which envisages the incorporation of the higher-level units into the basic module (company) **depending on the operational requirement**, rather than on the basis of the organization adopted, in times of operational "non-employment" for preeminent administrative or training reasons.

They are modular and balanced units, where each component is capable of performing specific functions. Thus, the contingent can intervene in every mission envisaged by CROs, including those characterized by a high operational intensity (e.g. interposition).

This guarantees a remarkable flexibility of employment, in terms of both deterrence and reaction.

This criterion has been followed in the organization of contingents since 1995, and has permitted the Service to carry out important and simultaneous tasks during the transition phase of "professionalization" of the units.

At the present time, the availability of "ready forces" permits to apply the "task organization" criterion with higher flexibility, and to proceed gradually to the alignment of the Brigade HQs with their Regiments.

This measure will allow a unitary development of the various phases of the operational cycle, since it permits to realize a homogeneous series of activities and to pursue the same objectives, especially during the fundamental phase of "readying for employment". This will also enable the contingent



Commanders to ascertain, with an overall vision, the implementation of the training directives and the correct application/diffusion of the instructions issued by the higher Commands and, if necessary, to intervene in time with the necessary corrections.

Also important are the directing, inciting and controlling actions that the Brigade Commanders will be able to carry out, more incisively, in the garrison, especially as regards personnel. As a matter of fact, it will be possible to employ them "out-of-area",

together with the same units over which, on the national territory, they exercise their full command.

THE "MOUNTING HEADQUARTERS" FUNCTION

In case of operations outside the national territory or, on some occasions, even within the Country itself, the units designed for the interventions should be relieved of all the exacting and complex





TASK ORGANIZATION

Incorporation of units according to operational requirements

Modular structures able to carry out specific functions



HIGH FLEXIBILITY OF EMPLOYMENT

responsibilities which almost always require the involvement and coordination of several higher-level Bodies/Organizations, thus enabling them to concentrate, in a continuative manner, on the strictly operational aspects of the preparation (4).

This was solved through the institution of the "Mounting Headquarters"(5), an appropriate Command tasked with monitoring, for each contingent:

- **preparation and amalgamation;**

- **projection to the operations zone;**
- **support** during the mission.

The most important aspects of these phases are listed below.

Preparation and amalgamation

Preparation includes the *alert* phase and the successive conditioning in view of the employment.

During the warning phase, the

Task Force Command and the necessary units are designated, according to the mission (*Task Organization* principle).

This phase is followed by the conditioning for employment, which includes several, sometimes complex, activities, that must usually be carried out in very short periods of time.

In fact, it is a matter of:

- completing the equipment of Commands and units;
- assigning extra personnel, systems and materials not normally attached to the Commands/units destined to organize the *Task Force*, but which will be employed in the specific mission envisaged;
- carrying out a special maintenance of the equipment and, if necessary, complete the prescribed vaccinations;
- conducting a preventive reconnaissance of the operations zone and establishing the necessary contacts with the higher Commands;
- proceeding with the mission's amalgamation and training activities (peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian aid,...);
- working out a movement plan.

Projection to the Operations Zone

The projection into the Theatre includes the movements to the loading points and the successive embarkation and transfer to the operations zone.

In this phase, the *Mounting HQ* sets going and manages, possibly with the contribution of the other Services, the naval, aerial and railway points of embarkation (POEs) on the national territory, and coordinates the movements of the units from their garrisons or *mounting areas* to the POEs.

Support to the forces

During this phase, the *Mounting HQ* carries out all the activities



"MOUNTING HQ" FUNCTION

HIGHER COMMAND TASKED WITH:

- » **VERIFYING PREPARATION AND AMALGAMATION OF THE FORCES**
- » **ORGANIZING PROJECTION OF THE UNIT TO THE THEATRE**
- » **"SUPPORTING" THE FORCES IN THE THEATRE**

connected with manning and logistic support of the in-Theatre contingent, taking care, moreover, of the preparation of all personnel or units that could possibly be projected as reinforcements.

CONCLUSIONS

Clearly, the out-of-area operations are complex and



composite activities involving several levels of responsibility. The emphasis laid on the conceptual and organizational elements is meant as a guidance to the professionals, especially the younger ones, in order to enable them to have a clearer picture of the interrelations between all the parties concerned and the activities to be carried out.

This type of operations will involve and engage the Armed Forces of all the most advanced Countries for many years to come. This, nevertheless, should not give rise to the conviction that they are the final objectives of the modern military instruments.

The "War" operations pointed out by NATO at Art.5 of the Treaty remain the Alliance's main mission, and must continue to be a precise reference for the preparation of our units.

The reference to operational



Above.

A "Centauro" heavy armoured-car at an Italian checkpoint in Bosnia.

Left.

Italian serviceman in a firing exercise.

NOTES

(1) In particular, in the logistic sector the multinationality concept is widely put into practice with no serious problems, relying on the full cooperation of all contingents. The concept of "mutual aid" is remarkable in this regard, which does not mean that one confers all his available resources, but rather shares in the successful outcome of a given undertaking.

(2) Training of personnel and units, medical measures, acquisition, distribution, maintenance and replacement of systems, equipment and materials.

(3) "Planning directive for the preparation of the land forces and for the operational readiness of some components thereof". Army General Staff, Plans Office, November 24, 1998.


(4) Within NATO, the concept of "mounting" is defined as follows in AAP-6: "the whole of the preparation activities carried out in an appointed area before an operation". It includes the assembly, preparation and stay in the mounting area, transfer to the loading areas and the successive embarkation on ships, aircraft or motor vehicles, to reach the redeployment zones.

(5) "Directive for the preparation, redeployment and support of a Task Force in Operations". Army General Staff, Plans Office, August 11, 1999.

cycles made in the preceding paragraphs, underlines the point of view of our Service, according to which the first level of preparation of the units, irrespective of their type, must be the achievement of the capability of conducting classic war-operations.

The Army, today, allocates to this objective the most conspicuous part of its training budget and, precisely with a view to this, has developed a series of international agreements for the use of large ranges in Poland, Sweden, Lithuania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Egypt and Tunisia. All the Brigades of our Army have already been training there by turns during the last two years. □

**Major General,
Chief, Force Employment Division,
Army General Staff*



TO UNDERSTAND BOSNIA

by Giovanni Ridinò *

Bosnia appears today as a melting-pot of government and administrative structures, whose functioning and interconnections are difficult to understand for those who are not particularly interested in it for professional or study reasons or for mere cultural research.

I have therefore deemed convenient to outline a picture of the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina, through its administrative, institutional and

political aspects to allow the reader to understand the essential problems that face the Country and the international Community. I am going to deal with Bosnia-Herzegovina's political and administrative structures, mention the complexity of its various parties and focus on its political, economic and military situation, before concluding with some comments on the various more topical problems.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES

Let's start, first of all, with the introduction of the different flags that wave in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are three of them (Fig.1):

- the flag of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), which was imposed (as the currency - the convertible mark KM - the passport and the license plates) by the Civilian High Representative in BiH. The stars represent Europe, the triangle the

The political and administrative “geography” of Bosnia Herzegovina, soon after the Balkan war, is made up of many different ethnic, religious, administrative, political and military components. It is a difficult reality for a Country which longs for “modernity”, but still needs the support of the international Community.




Fig. 2

- three ethnic groups and the yellow colour represents the sun;
- the flag of the Srpska Republic (RS): the cross in the middle is

marked by four letters of the Cyrillic alphabet which sum up the motto: *Only Serbia will Save the Serbs*;

- the flag of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation: the shield represents the Bosnian fleur-de-lys, the Croatian draughtboard and the European flag.

Fig. 1

THE FLAGS



Bosnia Herzegovina



Federation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina



Srpska Republic

The administrative structures are rather complex and derive from the Accords of Dayton, signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, which have put an end to the war.

BiH is a single State, its capital is Sarajevo.

Its organization is formed by two distinct parts called “entities”: the Srpska Republic and the BiH Federation (Fig.2).

The BiH Federation assembles essentially two ethnic groups: The



Fig. 3

Bosnian-Moslems and the Bosnian-Croatians. Its capital is also Sarajevo.

The Srpska Republic is a very homogeneous entity from the ethnic viewpoint, almost exclusively peopled by Bosnian-Serbs. Its capital is Banja-Luka.

As regards religion: the Bosnians are Moslem, the Bosnian-Croatians are Roman Catholic and the Bosnian-Serbs are Christian Orthodox.

On the local plane, the two entities of Bosnia have the same structures they had before the war. The Country is divided into 155 municipalities or *opstinas*: 92 in the Federation and 63 in the SR. Each *opstina* is distinguished by a number and a name, generally that of the most important locality (Fig.3).

The size of an *opstina* is variable. The Dayton Accords, in 1995, have drawn a line of separation between the two entities of BiH. This line, the IEBL (Inter-Entity Boundary Line), crosses some *opstinas* and cuts them in two.

Thus we have witnessed, in 1995, the creation of new *opstinas* derived from that layout (Fig.3).

Within BiH, the Federation is divided into ten administrative cantons, each of which comprises




Fig. 4

several *opstinas* (Fig.4).

A particular case is represented by Mostar, which is the second city of BiH.

This includes seven municipalities: a "mixed" central zone, composed by both Bosnian-Moslems and Bosnian-Croatians, and six municipalities: three of Bosnian-Croatians and three of Bosnians (Fig.5). These are directed by a mayor and a council like any classic municipality.

The whole is headed by the Mostar City Council, the old

council of the city, elected with a proportional system, led by a mayor and a deputy-mayor, who stay in office for two years and belong to the two ethnic groups. Each year, the two representatives exchange their positions.

The Srpska Republic is more simple because it does not include cantons and is administratively made up by 63 municipalities (Fig.6).

Pale, the fief of Karadzic and the radical Serbs, was the old capital, sadly famous during the civil war. The moderate government of Mrs. Plavsic has transferred the capital in the fief of the moderates, to Banja Luka, in the western part of the Srpska Republic.

A particular attention must be given to the strategic position of Brcko. This city, which was under Serbian administration, has constituted itself, in March 2000, a neutral district connected with BiH.

Such decision has for a long time fueled the present political crisis in the SR, because the Entity is now cut in two.

THE LEGISLATIVE BODIES.

The legislative and executive

powers of BiH are similarly varied (Fig.7). In the SR, the people elect the legislative organs of every *opstina* and also, directly and with a proportional system, the 83 deputies of the "RSNA", the National Assembly of the SR. The voters elect also the President of the SR and their ethnic representative at the tripartite presidency of BiH.

In the BiH Federation the people elect directly the legislative organs of each *opstina* and of each canton, and the 140 deputies of the "Chamber of Representatives of the BiH Federation". Those elected at cantonal level, in their turn, elect 74 deputies (senators) to the "Chamber of Peoples". These two Chambers designate the President. The ethnic representatives of the tripartite Presidency are elected directly by the people.


At national level, the peoples of the SR and the BiH Federation elect their deputies to the "Chamber of Representatives of BiH"; 28 seats for the BiH Federation and 14 seats for the SR.

The senators elected to the "Chamber of Peoples" of the BiH Federation and, the Bosnian-Serbian deputies of the RSNA (National Assembly of SR) elect 5 deputies for each ethnic group (senators of BiH) to the "Chamber of the Peoples of BiH".

The electors were called to vote in November 2000 to designate the representatives to:

- the Chamber of Representatives of the Federation and to the cantonal assemblies;
- the Chamber of the Representatives of BiH;
- the Presidency and the National Assembly of the SR.

In 2002 they will be called again to vote for the tripartite Presidency. It should not be forgotten that, in April 2000, the same voters had been called to elect the municipal assemblies.



THE EXECUTIVE POWER

The governments of Bosnia, i.e. of the Federation (including the cantons and the municipalities) and of the SR, implement the principle of tripartition of responsibilities between the national government and the Entities (Fig.8).

The national government is responsible for foreign affairs, currency and finance, citizenship and emigration, communications and transports and also for the enforcement of the international

laws on crime.

The governments of the Entities are responsible for Defence (there are in fact different Armed Forces), for the Interior and Justice, for Refugees, for Education, Health, Agriculture and Trade.

It should be observed that the national government has no authority over the Entities.



The wide autonomy granted to the Entities permits to avoid contrapositions but, at the same time, fosters the separatist temptations of each side,

particularly as regards the SR.

This division of responsibilities among the governments risks to be jeopardized by the implementation of the new organization of the Cabinet of BiH voted in mid-April 2000 by the Chamber of Representatives.

The tripartite Presidency, which is at the head of the executive power of Bosnia, is being redefined after the elections of November 2000, the resignation of Izetbegovic and the ousting of the Bosnian-Croatian Ante Jelavic, ordered by the High Representative of the United Nations.

Also the Cabinet is tripartite (Fig.9).



At national level there are six ministries. All posts are triple. The Prime Minister is also in charge of a ministry with portfolio. The function of Prime Minister is assumed in turn by a Minister of each ethnic group.

The rotation occurs every eight months, together with the Presidency's.

The present government has been approved by the Chamber of the Representatives of Bosnia on 22 February 2001.

In detail, the division of the executive power in the Federation

can be summed up as follows (Fig.10):

- the Federation assembles two ethnic groups. The government posts are double, with the exception of two ministries "without portfolio", which have been created to guarantee a balance between Bosnian-Croatians and Bosnian-Moslems;
- all posts change the regular holder at the beginning of the year, according to the principle that governs the operation of the powers of Bosnia's central

government. The present Cabinet has been appointed on 1 January 2001;

- four ministries are officially located in Mostar.

This transfer is really only theoretical because only the Ministry of Education has recently started to settle in that city. In practice the contacts between the Minister and his deputy with the Institutions are carried out by phone, because the Institutions are often completely separate, both physically and ethnically.

At cantonal level, of the ten cantons of the Federation, four are governed by the Bosnians, three by the Bosnian-Croatians and three by mixed governments.

Among these, canton 9 (Sarajevo) has witnessed the overwhelming victory of a Moslem majority, but the government is mixed. There are two reasons for this:

- the capital of Bosnia cannot be controlled by a single ethnic group;
- the plurality of canton 9 prevents the Moslems from controlling completely the cantons of the Federation, for lack of an absolute majority.

Each canton has its own **government**, with a Governor, a




Fig. 9

Prime Minister and six Ministers.

If the canton is a mixed one, all the posts, including the Governor's and the Prime Minister's, are doubled by a Deputy-Minister's post held by a member of the other ethnic group. Every year the regular holder surrenders his post to his deputy.

The government of a canton has a large autonomy, except for defence.

The mixed cantons are liable to forms of instability, caused by the incessant switching of posts.

At *opstina* level there is the same structure with a Mayor, a President of the Town Council and a President of the Council of "Ministers".

As regards the Bosnian-Serbian executive power, the President of the Srpska Republic is supported by a Vice-President (Fig.11).

The government is led by a

Prime Minister and by four Deputy-Prime Ministers, who have also a specific function within the government.

The Prime Minister is appointed by the President and confirmed by the National Assembly of the SR, to which he must submit his government plan.

THE POLITICAL PARTIES

To synthesize the situation of the political parties in Bosnia is not an easy task. I shall try to review just a very small number of the 250 parties that have been inventoried up to now, without counting the alliances that form and dissolve at will in the municipal, cantonal, federal or national elections, but also between moderate and radicals, within this or that ethnic group, within an Entity or with


the neighbouring one (Fig.12).

There are four formations which dominate Bosnia's political environment:

- Izetbegovic's Bosnian SDA, within the KCDBiH coalition (or SCDBiH, according to which election): it is the powerful nationalist and religious party in power. Supported by the local Moslem notables, it preaches a unified and "multiethnic" Bosnia. It has only one leader, whose exit from the political scene could lead, in the short term, to forms of instability within the party itself.
- the Social Democratic Party of BiH (SDP BiH): it was born from the union, in February 1999, of the SDP of Lagumdžija with the SD BiH of Beslagic.

This new party preaches the unity and multiethnicity of Bosnia. The SDP considers itself

Fig. 10



the successor of the Social Democratic Party founded in 1909.

Before the war, it had 70,000 supporters. The fusion gave birth to the second party in the BiH's House of representatives, the only real opposition to SDA.

Kalinic's SDS (Serbian Democratic Party of the SR) is Karadzic's and Krajisnik's former party.

It has been holding a substantial majority for the past two years although it has been downsized after the victory of Plavsic and the SLOGA moderate formation. The SLOGA is a nationalist and conservative party and is very much present in the Pale, Rogatica, Visegrad regions. It favours the "frontality" of the IEBL; however its radical image has faded, although in the last

election it got encouraging results, and is now showing an at least apparent inclination to cooperate with the international Community. In any case, it remains the first Bosnian-Serbian party.

Jelavic's HDZ (Croatian Democratic Community) is the first Bosnian-Croatian party (there is an HDZ in Croatia as well). Omnipresent in the old Herceg-Bosna, it is now controlled by its Croatian counterpart, which has been headed by Tudjman until his death. The HDZ was founded in 1909 and, like the SDA and the SDS, is nationalist and conservative. Its influence is decreasing and it seems to be hesitating between the promotion of the third Entity and federalism.

A few notes seem to be appropriate in order to clarify some important bonds with


parties and coalitions of other neighbouring nations:

- almost all parties are ethnically homogeneous, even those which preach "multiethnicity";
- as regards Bosnians and Bosnian-Croatians, the first party is predominant and is often a radical formation. Only the SR has a strong opposition, even if it is very young.
- apparently the smaller parties are willing to join forces in order to oppose the large Bosnian and Bosnian-Croatian parties.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

Bosnia Herzegovina has entered the new millennium, but there are no indications of a rapid progression towards a moderate

Fig. 11



government. On the contrary, the same key-characters who took power after the war are still present in government positions, although sometimes in concealed forms. In the Srpska Republic, the attempt made by the moderates, brought to power by the international community, has miserably failed because of the ruinous results of their economic and social policy. The activation of the Institutions after the elections, has given the observers a pessimistic image of both the BiH and its future, instead of giving rise to favourable hopes.

In BiH, the Alliance for Change (AC) could, for the first time, represent an alternative to the monolithic wartime parties; however it must be noted that the AC is made up by many small parties and its capability of

keeping together its various allies while facing the most critical and difficult problems is going to be a very problematic and hard challenge. In this Country, the politicians have still to demonstrate clearly that their absolute priority is the interest of the people.

Four months after the elections, nearly all the institutions of both Bosnia Herzegovina and the Federation are installed, but their structure is questioned by the proposals of some political figures.

Two main tendencies are being discussed: strengthening of the central power or "decentralization" in favour of the constituting elements which would enjoy a significant autonomy.

The spirit of the Dayton Agreements, with the organization of BiH in two entities, clearly

favours the latter. The rediscussion of this initial decision has been causing, for several months, the instability of the fragile political balance.

Infringing the Dayton Agreements, the Bosnian-Croatian National Congress (HNS) wants to impose the constitutional equality of the three "peoples" of BiH, to whom the constitution guarantees their own space within the Federation.

The large majority of the Bosnian-Croatian political parties, representing 90% of the electoral vote, participated in the last congress, held on March 3rd. The public platform provides for a self-proclaimed Croatian government with executive, legislative and judicial powers.

Furthermore, the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ)



demands compliance with the following platform:

- reinstatement of the Bosnian-Croatian Deputies excluded by OSCE after the November 2000 election;
- annulment of all decisions made in the meantime by the Chambers of the Peoples of both the Federation and of BiH;
- respect by the international Community (High Representative in particular) of the Bosnian-Croatian people's will.

W. Petritsch, the High Representative in Bosnia, stated that the HDZ' attempt will bring about the ghettoization, isolation and ruin of the Croatian community.

Illegality, violations of the BiH's Constitution and infringements of the Dayton Agreements are facts. Nevertheless, the idea of another BiH including several smaller components with equal rights and responsibilities does not look as a completely incoherent basis for negotiations.

In BiH, the Bosnian-Croatians are juridically one of the three constituents of the Bosnian nation, but their living space, little by little, is more and more compromised.

To avoid rediscussing the Dayton Agreements, some provisos of which, after five years, do not seem to meet the present needs, it would be suitable to proceed to an agreed adaptation of some application modalities. This would permit to find a way-out from the present crisis.

W. Petritsch reacted the hard way, relieving Jalevic of his post as Deputy President of BiH, together with several other representatives of the HDZ.

This rough action could turn the Bosnian-Croatian deputies into martyrs and symbols of the Croatian cause, legitimizing the demands expressed on behalf of the Croatian people, uniting and mobilizing the Bosnian-Croatians and strengthening the radical elements.

Some statements by Gen. Jelic, Commander of the 1st Guard Corps, show that the plans and reactions capable of affecting the attitudes of the international Community have been studied by the civilian and military leaders.

Here one should remember the appraisal made by Jadranko Palic, Foreign Minister of BiH, who pointed out the Croatian intellectuals' collective dissatisfaction, which, in his

opinion, was deeper than could be perceived on the eve of the civil war.

In the Srpska Republic, Dragan Kalinic's SDS found its power base among the people, while Prime Minister Milorad Dodik was held responsible for the economic collapse of the SR.

Some hope can be perceived in the appointment of Mladen Ivanic as Chief of the future Government.

Despite the heavy financial burden, Ivanic must succeed in satisfying the international Community without deceiving the expectations of the Bosnian-Serbs, whose main concern is their living-standard.

As regards the international Community, the various organizations (OHR, UNMBiH, UNHCR, OSCE, plus several government- and non-government organizations) often operate in an uncoordinate manner, giving the impression that each one of them pursues its own objectives. This, on some occasions, has led to great mistakes in the employment of resources.

Coordination of efforts and ideas is not a trifling matter.

According to the best traditions, the military organizations present in Bosnia under SFOR's command appear to be the only well-structured and flexible instrument, capable of meeting the different challenges.

The SFOR servicemen often promote initiatives and projects aimed at achieving agreed-upon objectives and are, more and more, a valid and irreplaceable element of connection among the numerous institutions concerned.

THE ECONOMY

The economy is the only motor capable of producing the resources necessary to implement the reforms, support the people, rebuild the infrastructure, increase the employment, facilitate the return of the refugees and keep the

Facing page.

Italian servicemen teaching young Bosnians how to recognize mines, traps and explosive devices.

Right.

An Italian checkpoint in Bosnia Herzegovina.

young from leaving the Country. Bosnia needs help in order to attract foreign investors and change the outlook of the Bosnian Institutions towards market economy.

Many political parties do not function as they should. The power relations take money away from the Institutions and deprive of resources the Government and the people.

It is necessary to create a coordinated system of interventions, capable of transferring the resources invested by the numerous international organizations, including NGOs, to the realization of a great infrastructure and the development of communication systems, rather than distributing generalized aid, with results that are certainly not exciting. The post-war emergency has been largely overcome but is far from resolved.

Sometimes the many interventions of reconstruction have not reached a successful conclusion, in that the lawful owners have not been able to go back to their homes, owing to numerous factors, such as lack of work and of means of subsistence and fear of going back to an environment where they would belong to a minority (in the most concrete sense of the term), besides the fact that, after eight or nine years, the refugees may have acquired new interests, new friendships and new possibilities of facing everyday life.

The families, frustrated by the lack of a minimum of resources, must be given working and earning opportunities in order to enable them to rebuild their homes in a place that will be



chosen by them and not imposed by need or desperation.

The near future will be a troubled one. Growing groups of demonstrators are beginning to demand pay rises or salary arrears vis-à-vis a deteriorating economy. Many do not have a job and those who have one are not paid.

THE MILITARY SITUATION

Pressed as it is by political and economic reasons, Bosnia Herzegovina cannot keep the present structure of the Entities' Armed Forces. The military balance between the Bosnian-Serbian Army (VRS) and that of the Bosnian Federation (VF), made up by the Bosnian and Bosnian-Croatian components, remains within the agreed proportions. Both Armed Forces are undergoing a decrease of financial resources with consequent diminished operational and combat capabilities. Despite an apparent cooperation in a common defence policy, each Armed Force continues to see the other as a potential threat, owing to a mutual distrust dating back to the brutal civil war of 1992-1995. Bosnia

relies strongly on the Stabilization Forces (SFOR) for its security and stability. The Bosnian-Croatians continue to hold out against a complete integration within the Federal Army, afraid that the Bosnians could be dominant in all the integrated structures.

Furthermore, Croatia's continuous assistance in favour of the Bosnian-Croatian Entity in the Federal Army and that of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in favour of the VRS, albeit declining, complicate all efforts of unification.

The Bosnian-Serbs believe that the integration could threaten the existence of the Srpska Republic and prefer a complete demilitarization (as proposed by Gavrilko Antonic, a member of the National Assembly of the Srpska Republic) to any form of unification. A rapid and forced integration would, among other things, lead to the realization of a non-functional organization and to a kind of legitimization of the paramilitary forces that would certainly sprout in order to provide security to the respective ethnic factions.

In any case, the reduction of the Entities' Armed Forces is a real necessity and is connected with a



Armed Forces show a certain inclination to dialogue, but are absolutely inflexible (especially on the Serbian side) when it comes to constitute **unified Armed Forces**. The establishment of a multiethnic central Command appears possible, taking for granted that the single structures be divided according to the ethnic differences. Still today there are political discussions on whether the three Ministers of Defence should act and decide as a team or if each Minister should care for the Armed Forces of his ethnic group.

The recent 30% reduction, imposed by the international Community, was not received with great enthusiasm by the military, who wanted to keep the *status quo* in order to avoid the disbandment of several units.

Despite the financial aid and support to concrete projects by the World Bank, the military tried to the last to avoid these cuts, hinting at possible social disorders as a consequence of a rise in the already high rate of unemployment deriving from the discharge of the regular servicemen.

It must be stressed that although Bosnia is going through a dramatic economic crisis and the destructions caused by the war are a natural catastrophe of remarkable proportions, the military maintain that they should not be employed to help the Country in the reconstruction which, they insist, should be carried out by civilians. They also want a special daily allowance of about 25 DM, besides an insurance against possible incidents in which they may incur while clearing the mines they themselves had laid all over the territory.

At the same time, while complaining for the absolute lack

twofold order of factors:


- realization of numerically reduced Armed Forces, in line with the Country's economic capabilities, in order to ensure, on the one hand, a better mutual trust and, on the other, obtain savings that would be very useful for the economic recovery.
- gradual reduction of the SFOR Forces without jeopardizing their deterrent power.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to solve some basic problems which obstruct the road to a greater mutual trust.

BiH's defence and security policy

must be made clear, and a decision has to be made on the existence of the Armed Forces in a Country a little larger than an average Italian region. In short, the question is to decide if the **two** (but they are actually three) Armed Forces and the **three Ministries** of BiH should be maintained (also with the international Community's money) in order to defend Bosnia, or if they must be kept ready to defend themselves from threatening or aggressive actions that could come from an Entity within the Country itself.

The different components of the



Above.

An Italian soldier in Bosnia.

Left.

Bosnia. Italian patrol at a checkpoint.

Right.

Cooperation between Bosnian police and Italian troops.

of financial resources for the upkeep of men and materials, they go on training (especially the Serbs) on armoured vehicles, and immediately ask for fuel whenever they are called to intervene in favour of the civilian population.

According to the military's point of view, the reductions are a social problem that ought to be fought in every possible way, safeguarding the existence of all Units by making generalized cuts. Another shifty and unconvincing method is the transition of the Units to the "cadre" or "reserve" position. Nevertheless, it must be considered that the mobilization capability of Units and masses is well tested and very different from the way we understand it.

Furthermore, it will be necessary to discuss the number of the reserve "units" and the quantity of weapons stored in depots, in order to lower the threshold of a possible violence that could receive unlimited supplies from the storehouses of weapons, ammunition and explosives, whose number is out of proportion, compared to any reasonable defensive need.

In short, it seems appropriate to proceed, in the short term, to a further cut in the number of regulars, in order to reach a number of soldiers on duty in line with the standards of the western Nations and the real capabilities of the Country.

CONCLUSIONS

In Bosnia-Herzegovina there are not many architectural wounds that seem healed, while open and bleeding are all the wounds of unemployment, of an almost inexistent economy, of destroyed factories, of the political obtuseness of a great part of the



old men-in-power, who do not want to give up their nationalist radicalism.

A few external and internal events offer some opportunities and increase the prospects of a possible greater stability in the region, but the very changes occurred in the FRY and in Croatia, not yet completely consolidated, appear as a potential danger of further regional crises.

Bosnia has reached a decisive stage. It has a series of opportunities that could make the difference if it were to act promptly and appropriately.

For a real change in BiH, the international Community should change its attitude and have an aggressive approach to reconstruction, defining a **common strategy of intervention** and the **concentration of efforts** on certainly worthy objectives for the possible development of the Country.

If one continues to proceed in the same way, this opportunity will be lost and BiH will settle in a political *status quo*, with a worsening economy and with an international Community that continues to lose interest in it.

The moment could have come to reassess BiH's *end state*. The construction of a modern Country,

with the standards envisaged for the Nations of Western Europe seems now impossible. A more correct position could be that of considering BiH an emerging Country of Eastern Europe. This outlook would permit a more appropriate comparison for the assessment of the GNP, unemployment, government structures, law and order, etc. This is a plan that could be carried out in the medium term.

Unfortunately BiH shows its incapacity to realize by itself the very urgent political, economic and social changes. A symptom of it is that the media, even more than the normal citizens, request a "protectorate" for Bosnia Herzegovina.

The optimists place their hopes in new elections, which could really evidence the real winners.

In 2001, the government of BiH has to show the international Community and its own people that it has achieved significant results in the institutional, political, economic and social sectors.

According to many observers "it's now or never".

□

*Major General,
Military Commander
of Sicily*

DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY



by Gianfranco Tracci *

Despite the encouraging proliferation of disarmament Treaties, which guarantee new scenarios of peace and security after the Cold War, we now see a worrying recrudescence of threatening situations which endanger the level of detente labouriously reached in the last years. Governments must therefore make new efforts in view of a timely ratification and full enforcement of the Treaties.

THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF DISARMAMENT

Over the last 30 years, the international public has become aware that mass destruction weapons are putting both mankind and the environment at risk.

Many countries have therefore decided to reduce such risks and initiate complex and diverse negotiations aimed at drawing up ad hoc treaties and agreements providing for effective alternative solutions to a possible holocaust.

In the past, the lack of this type of accords was deeply perceived, but major results were obtained only after the end of the cold war, which allowed nations to defuse tensions and overcome their mutual distrust. The collapse of



Facing page.

A Leopard 1A5 on a Kosovo road.

Above.

A convoy of Leopard 1A5 tanks of the Italian contingent of KFOR in Kosovo.

Right.

An A129 "Mangusta" helicopter.



THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)

This Treaty, signed in 1990 after long years of negotiations between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, entered into force on November 9, 1992.

It was the first decisive step to drastically reduce the opposing forces in Europe and an important milestone for all disarmament treaties. During the cold war, Europe was at the centre of a bloc-to-bloc confrontation and stored a wide range of nuclear and conventional armaments. A possible crisis, triggered by wrong evaluations, could give rise to an armed conflict with unforeseeable consequences, also for the world at large.

Many things have changed in

the Berlin wall opened fresh possibilities of modifying the confrontation between the East and the West, built upon a force balance among the superpowers.

The new climate of détente established at international level allowed nations to open a dialogue based on common political views and economic interests, which enabled them to identify effective disarmament measures and enhance the global security framework.

Important results have been recently obtained, while new ones are at hand. They include the *Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe* (CFE) in 1990, recently updated; the *Chemical*

Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993; the *Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty* in 1996, the *Additional Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention*.

These basic documents will be the foundation upon which to build a credible disarmament and armaments control regime, tailored to guarantee a reliable security and peace framework for the future.

this last decade; old enemies meet and exchange observers, tasked with verifying compliance with the agreements, to avoid possible errors of judgement. Some nations, perceiving that they are no longer threatening one another, have established new friendship ties and re-discovered old historical links. The 1990 Treaty was updated in May 1997, in line with the new

political situation in Eastern European countries.

To date, more than 50,000 military assets have been destroyed, in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, and 10,000 more will be scrapped in the near future. Today, the military leaders of several European countries meet regularly and exchange visits. It should not come as a surprise to see Russian officers shopping in Rome's via Condotti, or Italian generals strolling around Moscow's Red Square.

The Paris Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)


The Paris Chemical Weapon Convention, signed in 1993, is one of those disarmament agreements which stemmed from better relations between the East and the West and from a climate of international détente.

This Convention is the first multilateral Treaty which is global in scope and verifiable through ad hoc international instruments. It was opened for signature on January 13, 1993 and became effective on April 29, 1997, i.e. 180 days after its 65th ratification. So far, 174 countries have signed it and 141 states parties have directly ratified or acceded to it.

Italy ratified the Convention by Law no. 496, dated November 18, 1997, further integrated by Law no. 93, dated April 4, 1997.

It has not been ratified yet by the following Mediterranean and Middle East countries: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Egypt and Israel; by North Korea in the Far East, as well as by the following nations in Equatorial Africa: Chad, Congo, Angola, Zambia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone and some others. States parties are engaged in enforcing the treaty worldwide.

The Convention is a unique international instrument, given



An M109-L self-propelled gun of the Italian contingent in Kosovo.

the complexity and scope of its implementation procedures. As a consequence, states parties have sometimes interpreted it differently and taken contrasting legislative measures at national level. This is why a constant diplomatic activity is being carried out by states parties in the Hague to harmonize their interpretation efforts and take common implementation measures.

In compliance with the Convention obligations, states parties are required to submit to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Hague regular declarations on their internal situation, which will be

subsequently verified through on-site inspections carried out by international inspectors belonging to the Organization. Moreover, if there are well-founded suspicions that the obligations set by the Convention have been violated, the Organization, upon request by states parties, may order more detailed challenge inspections in the territory of the country suspected of violating the Convention obligations.

The Convention forbids nations from developing, producing and employing chemical weapons and requires them to completely destroy their chemical weapon stockpiles by 2007.

The same Convention also establishes that all civil chemical plants be kept under international control; in fact, chemicals usually produced to



fulfil commercial requirements may be improperly employed by states parties for military purposes as well. Strict control is also exerted over the exports of chemicals to those countries which have not ratified the Convention yet; in fact, they are not obliged to comply with the Convention obligations and may employ the imported materials to produce chemical weapons.

To enforce the Convention, a Preparatory Commission was established at the Hague in 1993, which became the present Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in 1997. The OPCW Secretariat is presently made up of about 500 people, 200 of whom are inspectors who pay frequent visits to states parties to verify on the spot that local situations


comply with the Convention obligations.

To implement the Convention nationally, Italy passed a ratification law in 1995, which assigned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the responsibility of acting as National Authority. It should promote and coordinate the activities of other Ministries, receive declarations on the activities carried out by chemical industries, as established by the law, and regularly update the International Organization at the Hague on the situation.

The National Authority Office, established at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1997, avails itself of specialized personnel detached from other Ministries or externally contracted. They adequately arrange international inspection visits, escort and assist inspection personnel, analyze the

technical details of the declarations submitted by chemical industries, tackle technical issues under the Ministry's cognizance and liaise with chemical industries and other Ministries.

Italy possesses neither chemical weapons nor the plants to produce them. It is however destroying, under international supervision, a limited number of obsolete pre-1946 chemical weapons, generally recovered from the battlefields of World War I; in fact, it is worth recalling that chemical weapons were not employed in World War II. Whenever chemical devices are found on the national territory, the Ministry of the Interior tasks the Ministry of Defense to see to their destruction, which is usually carried out in had hoc plants at



Left.
Italian soldier on surveillance duty.

Below.
"Bersaglieri" at a checkpoint on a road in Kosovo.

Facing page.
The interior of the turret of an M109-L self-propelled gun.


chemical arsenal, many countries, Italy included, have planned a support and cooperation effort, to provide the materials or funds necessary for building the required plants. Reportedly, Russia should destroy 40,000 t. of chemical weapons at an estimated cost of \$6 billion at least.

Early in 2000, Italy signed a bilateral agreement with Russia, which was passed by the Senate

the NBC Materials Installation in Civitavecchia,

The OPCW started its inspection activities in Italy in 1997. To date, about 30 inspections have been carried out in military installations and civil chemical plants. Inspectors are always escorted by an adequate number of national personnel, comprising Police and National Authority representatives. No violations to the Convention have been reported so far; inspectors have always been satisfied with the way they have been received in Italy and with the cooperation offered by national personnel during their inspections. Our country is committed to fully implementing the Convention obligations and ensuring that the activities performed on the Italian territory be as transparent as possible.

Other countries, such as Russia and the USA, have declared that they own chemical weapons and have already started to destroy them, a process which will be completed in 2007, ten years since the entry into force of the Convention.



The USA has concretely initiated this process, while Russia is lagging behind due to its economic problems and the lack of weapon destruction plants capable of operating under safe conditions, to safeguard the local population and the environment.

To help Russia destroy its

and now is pending before the Chamber of Deputies. It provides for the allocation of L.15 billion to build a gasline necessary to power one Russian weapon destruction plant placed beyond the Ural Mountains. The same gasline will also be employed to provide a heating system to a

nearby built-up area. Other countries too, like Germany, have funded major works to upgrade several plants.

At international level, Italy is also engaged in convincing some Mediterranean countries, like Egypt, Libya and Lebanon, to ratify the Convention. Actually, if these nations join in, great progress will be made in ruling out the recourse to this kind of mass destruction weapons, to the advantage of the safety prospects of the region. In fact, the risk of a conflict outburst will be thus reduced. Moreover, the Convention implementation measures could also raise local people's life standards, by allowing signatory countries to apply a free trade regime to chemical agents used for farming purposes and some important pharmaceutical products presently prohibited by the Convention.

In conclusion, though the use of chemical weapons in future armed conflicts has been banned by the entry into force of the Convention, these weapons will be completely wiped out from the battlefield only when the Convention is universally ratified. However, given the high number of countries which have voluntarily renounced the use of these weapons, there is reason to believe that the risks connected with their presence have been greatly reduced.

Adequate preventive and protective measures should nevertheless be adopted, also taking into account that the Convention alone will not be able to prevent terrorist groups or non states parties from using chemical weapons.

In a long term perspective, the success of the Convention will depend on the degree of security and safety reached by each state party, as well as on the development of chemical industry and international cooperation.



THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)

The Convention, signed in London on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975, has so far been signed by 162 nations and ratified by 144 states parties.

The BWC has not set up a verification regime yet, similar to that of the CWC. For this reason, the Disarmament Conference in Geneva has tasked a special Ad Hoc Group with drawing up an Additional Protocol, providing for mandatory declarations and adequate verification measures,

in compliance with the guidelines set by the CWC.

Many countries hope that this Protocol will be approved by November 2001, on the occasion of the IV Session of the BWC Review Conference. On the contrary, other nations, the USA included, think that the approval of this Protocol is premature, as some critical issues are still at stake, such as mandatory declarations of defense installations, the minimum threshold of biological agents to declare and their allowed quantities, together with past programs, yearly inspection

ceilings, inspection procedures in cases of alleged use, etc.

Both Holland and Switzerland have stated their willingness to host the Headquarters of the future Organization in the Hague and Geneva respectively. The Dutch proposal would allow for establishing cooperation ties with the ORCW, while Geneva is home to the International Red Cross (IRC) and the World Health Organization (WHO).

THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT)

The Treaty is the outcome of a long and complex negotiating effort launched in the '50s to reduce the risks of environmental pollution as a fallout of nuclear tests.

In 1954, almost 10 years after the first nuclear test, some nations had suggested to discontinue all surface nuclear tests, being too polluting and hazardous for mankind. In 1963 the USSR, UK and US signed an agreement allowing for underground nuclear tests only.

Later on, to rule out possible risks stemming from the presence of an increased number of nuclear actors, a 150 kt limit was established as the maximum power allowed for underground experiments.

In 1994, new negotiations were tabled during the Disarmament Conference in Geneva to put a comprehensive ban on nuclear experiments. A Treaty was finally approved by the UN General Assembly in 1996. The document, open for signature on September 10, 1996, was signed by 160 nations and ratified by 66 states parties, Russia and all EU countries included.

Italy ratified the Treaty by Law no.484, dated December 15, 1998. The US, in turn, has not ratified it yet, but President Clinton, after a NO vote by the Congress in 1999, stated that the US would



abide by a unilateral moratorium and that the Administration would make every effort to ratify the Treaty.

This Treaty is a unique and pivotal instrument for exerting an effective and reliable control over nuclear tests; in fact, it forbids each state party from carrying out nuclear tests in any place under its jurisdiction or control. The Treaty will enter into force only after being ratified by all 44 nuclear power nations, India and Pakistan included.

Pending its entry into force, a Preparatory Commission was set up in Vienna at the end of 1996. It was tasked to take all necessary measures, including those for establishing a global network of sensors, capable of monitoring all events possibly triggered by nuclear tests, even if performed underground or underwater. The monitoring system will be made up of 321 seismic, radionuclide, infrasonic and hydroacoustic monitoring stations placed all around the world, which will be able to discriminate between natural events, like earthquakes, and nuclear tests. The data collected will be sent to an Operation Centre in Vienna,

which will transmit them in real time to all states parties. They, in turn, will assess these data and evaluate the repercussions of nuclear tests. This system, being very complex, will require both time and money to be completed, but will be fully operational before the Treaty enters into force. Meanwhile, it acts as a deterrent against possible violations, which are easily detected by the sensors already available.

In Italy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to perform the role of National Authority, as envisaged by the ratification law. The goal is to set up a nation-wide structure capable of receiving data from seismic events, occurred both internally and in the rest of the world, to identify possible nuclear explosions.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs intends to avail itself of the cooperation of national experts and of Agencies and Institutes which already carry out their activities in the above mentioned sectors, as the National Institute of Geophysics and Vulcanology, ENEA and ANPA.

The National Authority's technical structure, which will be

Facing page.

An operator at his radio-set during the mission in East Timor.

Right.

"Operation Joint Guardian": "Bersaglieri" on surveillance duty.


Below.

Paratroopers on patrol in east Timor.

operational in 2001, will allow for collecting data and assessing possible violations of the Treaty, to be evaluated also at international level.

CONCLUSIONS

The wide range of international Conventions and Treaties, already available or under completion, should allow open up more positive prospects for the future, as compared to some years ago. A new world is dawning, where the survival of mankind is no longer threatened by mass destruction weapons.



But things not always run smoothly; in fact, some events have recently occurred which have placed the very promising disarmament process at risk.

Actually, the above mentioned

process has been delayed by several factors, such as the nuclear tests carried out by France at Mururoa, to verify new nuclear systems; the experiments performed by India and

Pakistan, to show their respective nuclear capabilities; the missile programs of North Korea, which may revamp the arms race and the setting up of a missile defense system; the threats posed to the ABM by Russia; the statements by some Middle East countries to resort to the use of chemical or biological agents to settle possible local conflicts, etc.

In this framework, where inter-state relations are newly put at risk and a promising process of détente is delayed, international terrorism has taken centre stage: It poses a treat to major superpowers as well, obliging them to transfer large resources from other sectors to finance necessary prevention programs.


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**Brigadier General (ret.)*

THE «FORCE GENERATION» PROCESS

This expression is generally understood as “a staff process aimed at a detailed coordination in the selection of the multinational forces necessary for the mission”.

The increasingly frequent participation of NATO in these operations provides valid instruments for the comprehension of the characteristics and difficulties typical of the organization of a mission in support of peace.



by Roberto D'Alessandro

FOREWORD

One of the main problems faced during the initial phases of

all Peace Support Missions or, according to a new definition adopted within NATO, non-art.5 Crisis Response Operations (CROs, fig1) is the availability of forces to deploy in operations.

In fact, as regards CROs, nations are not “obliged” to commit their units to these missions, but participate on a voluntary basis, as opposed to Art.V operations (1). Therefore a process must be set up in order to define “who” (which nation or Alliance) shall commit the resources (Commands and units) necessary to carry out an operation.

This article will illustrate the development of the above-mentioned organizational process, highlighting the



difficulties inherent in this system and its connections with the planning phase of an operation.

THE "FORCE GENERATION" PROCESS

The "Force Generation" process, though not conceptually codified, is an activity very similar to that defined in MC 133/3 as "Force Activation" (2).

Without going into a detailed description of the several phases which, at national and international level, will lead to the decision of setting up a military force for a CRO, it is nevertheless necessary to recall the main "stages" along this course of action.

At the onset of a crisis (3), in parallel with the initiatives taken at international level to find a political solution to the controversies among the Parties involved, a planning process is also started in view of a military operation. National and international Staffs make the necessary technical-military evaluations, based on available situational data, start analyzing possible intervention options, plan the most suitable chain of Command and Control, identify the "lead" nation and prepare whatever is necessary to kickstart an operation.

This way, once the Security Council has issued an intervention resolution, military contingents are practically ready to deploy.

In fact, the timeliness of an action is crucial to show the international resolve and the units' readiness levels to the parties involved - with an inherent deterrent effect - and prevent a crisis from escalating.

This activity, though sometimes based on approximate information and situational data to be constantly updated, is very important as it allows the

CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS	Tab. A
CROs are defined as multipurpose operations, including political, military and civil activities, carried out in line with international laws or with the objectives established by the Alliance. They are aimed at preventing and settling conflicts and managing all possible crises as well.	
They may range from support operations performed in connection with civil organizations to Peace Support Operations (PSOs), and may also entail combat actions.	
In particular, CROs may envisage exfiltration and disaster rescue operations, as well as humanitarian, Search and Rescue (SAR) or non combatant evacuation interventions (the evacuation of nationals is to be carried out by each nation).	
Operations requiring the real or threatened use of military force include the imposition of sanctions, the enforcement of the embargo and real military operations as well.	
Taking into account that each theatre is characterized by different features, courses of action and limitations, it is however possible to identify three phases in the development of one CRO operation.	
• The first military phase is aimed at gaining control, as quickly as possible, over the sea, air and land space. During this stage, which usually does not last long, units are engaged in carrying out military tasks.	
• The second transitional phase, which is longer and more unstable, requires troops to restore public order and security. In this phase, besides military actions which are still necessary, other skills are also involved. At this time unexpected obstacles are represented by the possible risk that local tensions may suddenly be rekindled.	
• The third stabilization phase, in which a conflict has reached a lower level of violence, aims at restoring a state organization based on the rule of law and democratic governance. This phase may last several years.	
The tasks assigned to the Armed Forces will be progressively handed over to local authorities.	

Commands concerned to start the force preparation phase in advance and gain time - a critical factor - in view of the decision to take part in a mission.

In essence, several options are analyzed at different levels (Brigade, Regiment etc.), based on the availability of forces and their long-term commitment, taking into account possible restrictions/limitations (for

instance, the statement of the highest Command authority delegated to the multinational force Commander, the employment of valuable assets, national restrictions, etc)

As a rule, given the uncertainty of a situation, mainly in its initial phases, contingents are prepared and equipped to face worst-case scenarios (high intensity of operations) and ready to enforce



An AH-64 "Apache" helicopter.

peace on armed elements or factions unwilling to comply.

In a typical environment, where an operation is usually carried out, often there are no reliable state organizations or international agencies capable of filling the power gap which usually follows a crisis. Therefore, military units are often called upon to carry out non traditional tasks; commanders and their staffs, besides performing the "combat" function, must also be skilled enough to take on different and sometimes very sensitive roles and, in turn, act as diplomatic

Fig.1

Force Generation Process



Legenda:

SOR: Statement Of Requirements; JFC: Joint Force Commander; ACTWARN: Activation Warning; ACTREQ: Activation Request; ACTORD: Activation Order; FORCEPREP: Force Preparation.

«FORCE GENERATION» WITHIN NATO

The "force Generation" process encompasses 8 phases.

1st phase: Once political authorities (NAC -North Atlantic Council) have formalized the decision to intervene, the Operation Commander (SACEUR) issues a directive to the designated Force Commander (JFC-Joint Force Commander), which comprises the guidelines to define the Concept of Operations, together with a draft SOR (Statement of Requirements – see fig.4), listing the capabilities necessary to perform a specific mission.

These data, after being analyzed, they are presented to the Operation Command (SHAPE – Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe);

2nd phase: upon authorization by NAC, SHAPE sends a Force Warning Message (ACTWARN-Activation Warning), which is a first official document to inform both Allied Regional Commands (RC South and RC North for the ACE area) and nations of the need to set up a force. This message describes the mission and its time schedule for the further development of the process (date of the "Force Generation" Conference, date of the SOR etc.);

3rd phase: SHAPE distributes a first draft SOR and establishes formal relations with nations (through their Senior National Representatives operating at the "Strategic Command" –SC). Nations may reply by making a preliminary proposal, as regards their force contribution, so that the SC may gradually get a picture of the situation;

4th phase: SHAPE, being duly authorized by NAC, issues a Force Request (ACTREQ –Activation Request), to inquire about nations' force availability, as established in the SOR;

5th phase: SHAPE may convene a "Force Generation Conference" (FGC), usually chaired by the Deputy SACEUR, gathering the representatives of troop contributing countries, as well as those of the designated Force Command and of the subordinated "Component Commands". The FGC may be preceded by official statements, aimed at ruling out possible inconsistencies in the SOR and by bilateral or multilateral meetings;

6th phase: based on the outcome of the FGC and in reply to the ACTORD, nations make their formal force contribution proposals through a "FORCEPREP" (Force Preparation), a document which details the type and number of forces made available by each nation for the operation (with possible employment restrictions);

7th phase: SHAPE may convene a "Force Balancing Conference" to make up for some shortcomings resulting from the FGC; At the end of said "adjustment", an amended version of the SOR is issued, detailing nations' official force contribution levels;

8th phase: subject to NAC authorization, SHAPE issues an ACTORD. It is an official act which:

- starts the process of assigning national units to the Force Commander through the ToA (Transfer of Authority);
- authorizes unit deployment;
- allows for the allocation of NATO common funds.

The responsibility of deploying transferring units from their home base usually lies with each nation. The Theatre Commander (JFC) initially exerts TACON (before the ToA and during the force redeployment phase) to coordinate unit movements in the theatre.

Only at a later stage - upon the conferment of the ToA which usually coincides with the assignment of the AoR to the units concerned – the JFC will be authorized by nations to exert the established command authority (usually OPCON) over his forces.



A "Lagunare" in amphibious-warfare training.

representatives, policemen, mediators, nurses or more generally aid workers.

This process, which starts at the onset of a crisis and lasts until a political decision to intervene is taken, requires the full commitment of the national Staffs and Operational Commands concerned, which must update/implement different "options", based on the changes occurring in the international scenario and on the consequent national policies.

Once a document guaranteeing the "international legitimacy" of a military intervention in a CRO (which usually is a Security Council Resolution for the United Nations) has been issued and the Regional Organization tasked with "leading" a mission has been identified, national options are to be harmonized with the force

requirements established by the Force Commander (or Strategic Commander) at international level.

The "Force Generation" process is thus started, which may be

defined as a "a process carried out at staff level to coordinate in detail, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the composition of the multinational forces necessary to carry out a mission, based on the evaluation of the Force Commander".

To clarify the development of this process, reference will be made to NATO, because it is a widely known organization and has conducted the most recent CROs.

Figure 2 and 3 illustrate the "conceptual" development of this process.

Owing to political and operational requirements, this process seldom follows the phases as scheduled; some of them are often overlapped or scrapped, mainly when a crisis degenerates and the pressure from the international public increases.

A typical case in point was NATO intervention in Kosovo. Forces were already partially deployed in FYROM for previous operations connected with the crisis in the region. This way, an ACTORD (Activation Order) was immediately issued, when a "Military Technical Agreement" was signed by the Parties.

Statement Of Requirements (SOR)						
Version X		Statement Of Requirements for OPLAN XXXXX			XX Dec 00	
Serial	Requirement	Specific Capabilities & Locations	Suggested Source	Number of personnel	Offers	Remarks and caveats
1	Force HQ	Includes J1-J9 staff	Separate CE (Crisis Establishment)	750		
2	EW/SIGINT Coy	Ground Based EW	NATO	50		
3	NBC Bn	NBC defence	MN (Multinational)	140		
4	Manovre Bn	Mech Inf (3 x man coys)	NATO	650		
5	Manouvre Bn	Mech Inf (3 x man coys)	MN	650		

This table gives an example of a SOR, employed to list units/capabilities necessary to carry out a mission. In particular, the column:

- "Requirement" identifies the need;
- "Specific Capability" identifies units' specific aspects (capabilities required and level);
- "Suggested Source" indicates possible nations/organizations which are requested to contribute their forces;
- "Number of personnel" indicates units' personnel numbers;
- "Offers" specifies offers made by some countries
- "Remarks and caveats" identifies possible restrictions to the employment of assets.

Fig.2

Fig.3

Long Term Sustainment Concept for CRO

Fasi



(*) International Organizations / Non Governmental Organization.

A "Regional Force Conference" was subsequently held in July 1999 (one month after the deployment in Kosovo) to harmonize the Alliance engagement in the Balkans.

In essence, this is an extremely flexible process, which does not end with the identification of the units necessary to the JFC to initially carry out a mission, but continues over time, in parallel with the changes brought about by the development of a mission (as was the case for IFOR and SFOR) or by a nation's unilateral decision to withdraw its units. A most recent example of this was given by Portugal, which after two years of engagement, withdrew its Battalion, employed in Kosovo within the Italian-led MBNW, in order to face the operational requirements in EAST TIMOR, considered as more demanding from a national viewpoint. Unexpected events may also occur, which will completely change the general framework on the ground (opening of a new theatre).

It goes without saying that, when force reductions are limited as in the above mentioned case, a solution is found through bilateral

or multilateral agreements. In all other instances, a more complex process must be envisaged, as in the case of a shift from one mission to another, resulting in a controlled reduction/balance of forces, or of a "sudden" and significant shortage of units.

PRESENT DIFFICULTIES

The examples explained above have highlighted one of the

system's main problems: nations' inadequacy to sustain their effort over time. This is obviously linked to the availability of units to be deployed in operations through "sustainable" shifts (4). As regards the Italian Army, its readiness level has been tailored to the "highest engagement option" provided for by the "Army Operational Concept" (5). If these limits are exceeded, units are subject to a higher "operational stress" and, over time, there is the risk of a downturn in the number of those who voluntarily apply to join the Army, given the excessive burden of their tasks (this risk has already been run by some countries with high level military forces).

To rule out this risk, the Alliance has launched a study to regulate

Fig.4

Long Term Sustainment Concept for CRO

Esigenze



Legenda:

HRF: High Readiness Force; FLR: Forces at Lower Readiness; «CORE»: nucleo base.

long term engagements in CROs (fig.5 and 6). This study, mainly centered on Theatre Commands, establishes that units should resort to "outsourcing", i.e. entrusting civil organizations/agencies with the responsibility of providing services previously carried out by military elements, which can thus concentrate on operational tasks.

Certain types of units, however, cannot be replaced, in particular Combat Support and Combat Service Support units, which do

Crisis Establishment (CE) HQ XFOR
J3/5/7

Fig.5

CE NO	JOB TITLE	RA NK	SV C	N/ NN	XFOR 2	EOT	XFOR 3	REMARKS	COR- E
KVW 001	CHIEF	OF-4	A	N	SP	30-apr-05	IT		
KVW 002	SO OPS	OF-3	A	N	IT	30-apr-05	GR		
KVW 003	SO PLANS	OF-2	A	N	IT	TBD	IT		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

J3 AIR

CE NO	JOB TITLE	RA NK	SV C	N/ NN	XFOR 2	EOT	XFOR 3	REMARKS	COR- E
KVW 001	CHIEF J3 AIR	OF-3	F	N	IT	30-apr-05	IT		
KVW 002	HEL OPS OFFR	OF-2	F	N	TU	30-mar-05	TU		
KVW 004	HELICOPTER TASKER	OF-6	F	N	TU	30-mar-05	TU		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

not always meet forces' requirements, at the end of each "process".

To "oblige" nations to also commit their valuable assets (helicopters, Command and Control facilities, Special Forces, Engineer units, intelligence and logistic assets, etc), usually employed for satisfying national contingents' priority support requirements, nations' participation is evaluated by SHAPE, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in order to assign top level positions within the Force HQ, during the so-called "Manning Conference" (fig.7 shows a specimen of the "format" used for "Crisis Establishment").

On these occasions, besides the adoption of the "vertical slice" concept (assignment of a number of positions commensurate with the number of the forces engaged in operations), the "quality" of the units made available to a Force allows nations to ask for top ranking and very rewarding positions.

But this instrument is only partially effective; in fact it cannot replace the system of

allocating top-level positions among nations (from the rank of colonel to that of Lieutenant General), established by bilateral agreements endorsed at political and military level.

Another element reducing the effectiveness of the above-mentioned system is the level of integration of units belonging to non-NATO nations. Although there is a strong political will to employ these forces (owing to the above-mentioned shortage of personnel and to a consequent wider international support to the operation), there are still some critical issues which delay their employment, among which:

- the funding of the initiative: generally non-NATO nations have to bear the costs of their troop deployments. To reduce these costs, they increasingly resort to signing bilateral agreements with some NATO nations, to be logistically and sometimes also financially supported;
- the interoperability of these units with NATO forces. To rule out all possible "troubles", the units made available have to

undergo ad hoc training to reach the same operational standards as NATO troops. At the end of this activity, which requires long training times, these units are usually "certified" by the nation willing to employ them. The integration however, is never complete; in fact, there are limitations (access to highly sensitive information mainly) which reduce the effectiveness of said cooperation.

Allied Authorities constantly focus their attention on these issues and there is hope that these difficulties will be overcome in the near future.

The restrictions posed by nations to the employment of their troops are another important obstacle to the effectiveness of the system. This issue, directly impacting on the Force Commander's capability to carry out his mission, causes the NAC to frequently call upon nations to lift these restrictions and/or ask for more forces.

THE "LESSONS LEARNED"

The Alliance's constant participation in CROs has brought about an increasing development of this "process", from which the following conclusions may be drawn:

- the importance of the time factor. Owing to operational requirements, generally forces should be immediately available on the ground, after the adoption of a political decision to intervene;
- the role played by politics is always greater than expected. This element is exploited not only by NATO bodies, but also by contributing countries, which usually privilege national priorities rather than those of the Coalition;
- the need to evaluate the feasibility of a mission over the long, medium term. The availability of a sufficient

number of Commands and units for planning sustainable employment shifts is therefore of critical importance, to allow a force to keep its 'initial effectiveness;

- the lack of a standard solution, as regards "Force Generation", which should be considered as a very flexible process, capable of adapting to all contingencies;
- the importance of a clear definition of "End State." (6)

In sum, this is an extremely versatile and articulated process, whose effectiveness is limited by international criteria of military participation, which are subject to national decisions.

The knowledge of these international mechanisms, which is of primary importance for professional personnel, is also critical for those who are increasingly called upon to operate in international structures.

□

* Lt. Col. Roberto D'Alessandro, Chief, 1st Section, Plans and Current Operations Office

NOTES

(1) "Art.5 Operations" are those envisaged by Art.5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for the mutual support of all Alliance nations, when a deliberate attack is waged against their territory (*"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently agree that, if such armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Art.5 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council*

has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

(2) The MC 133/3 ("Procedures for the approval, promulgation and implementation of operational planning documents of Major Nato Commanders") establishes the guidelines for developing NATO's operational planning and details the procedures for the activation and subsequent deployment of forces earmarked for operations. The document defined the concept of "Force Activation" as the process by which the forces required by the OPLAN are activated and deployed. The responsibility of such activation rests with the "NATO Strategic Command" concerned, after a "Force Activation Directive" is issued by the NAC. The "Force Activation" process generally starts before the approval of the OPLAN and may coincide with the validation of the CONOP (Concept Of Operations).

(3) The term "crisis" does not have an official definition. However, according to the terminology currently in use, a crisis is defined as *"a national or international situation in which the values, interests or primary objectives of the*

A patrol of raiders of the "Col Moschin" 9th Regiment.

Parties concerned are under threat"


(4) As regards the Italian Army, its policy envisages that units should be deployed to the theatre on a "4 month shift" basis (a 4 month shift in the theatre and at least 12 months at home).

(5) The "Army Operational Concept" establishes that the Italian Army should be ready to deploy:

- one Division level contingent (2 Brigades plus support units), which is both flexible (employment on 1 or 2 theatres with different operational and environmental features) and sustainable over time (4 month shifts);
- another contingent to be engaged in a mission more limited both in strength (Battle Group) and time (Brigade engaged for not more than six months)

(6) Conditions which determine the success of an operation and must guide all planning activities from the beginning to the end. They are usually illustrated by the directives issued at strategic/operational level. (Military glossary-Army, 1998).





by Livio Ciancarella*
and Andrea Di Stasio**

THE «FRIULI» AIRMObILE BRIGADE Exercise «Challenge 2001»



Air mobility gives the land troops engaged in combat an additional dimension. It should not be confused with air movement "tout court", since it is an integral part of the battle. This doctrinal assumption was concretely tested in "Challenge 2001", an exercise recently carried out at the Foce Reno range.

"The commanders of the air-assault units fight exploiting every opportunity; they fly and march to the sound of arms, always ready to seize every occasion to destroy the enemy".

US ARMY, FM-71-100-3

The first airmobile unit of the Italian Army was born on April 30, 2000.

It was a simple transformation of the "Friuli" Mechanized Brigade into an Airmobile Brigade: much had still to be done in order to complete the metamorphosis.

The Brigade existed, and so did the men, since many Light Aviation units had been disbanded; sure, there were problems, but the real concern was the "airmobile mentality", which was nonexistent; it was necessary to construct it, to create it little by little, making use of the knowledge of the

armies of other countries which were ahead of us.

Training was another problem: *"still today, concepts like air mobility and air mechanization, the opportunities they offer and even the "aeronautical" specifications of the equipment, don't seem to have been fully digested by the land commanders".*

An operation is called "airmobile" when the fighting forces, with their equipment, manoeuvre over the battlefield employing their aircraft, in order to engage in combat on the ground.

If one goes into details, this definition, simple and explanatory at first sight, infers functional implications deriving from important conceptual, organizational and executive problems, such as Command and Control (C2), requests, tasking, communications, air space control and, last but not least, the activities concerning planning and joint coordination.

An airmobile manoeuvre is in fact the result of the synergy of intents expressed through the mix of the helicopter component and infantry (often represented by elite units), which does not develop with the pure juxtaposition of transport/fire and land units; this would actually be a simple transport by helicopter, with results similar to those achievable by employing trucks.

Air mobility, on the contrary, is the effect of a constant and integrated interaction between land-manoeuver and third-dimension manoeuvre, and is the outcome of a succession of experiences, procedures, command and mutual-knowledge bonds which are not easily improvised.

An airmobile infantryman must be used to fight at the rhythm marked by the helicopters. He must be able to exploit the rapidity of the movements, the

FIRST AXIOM ON AIR MOBILITY

Tab. 1

SQUAD + HELICOPTER = AIR MOBILITY

SECOND AXIOM ON AIR MOBILITY

Tab. 2

JOINT PLANNING
EFFICIENT C2
PREVENTIVE INFO PREPARATION
JOINT PRACTICAL TESTS
EFFICIENT EQUIPMENT
EFFECTIVE TRAINING
CAPABILITY OF AIRSPACE CONT

} = AIR MOBILITY

effectiveness of the aircraft's fire, the assured informative and explorative support.

The axioms of air mobility are shown at tables 1 and 2.

Innovations and their process need time to be "digested at all levels". (Riccardo Niccoli).

In our country we start by studying the theory in all its aspects and producing the first definitions of an airmobile operation; the doctrine is then adjusted to the new operational scenarios.

Our Army lays much emphasis on the role of helicopters in the modern operational theatres. This shows that, at last, the importance of an airmobile force has been understood, together with the fact that it is a fundamental resource for an Army which wants to be credible in present-day scenarios.

In the defence of external interests and international security, it represents one of the most modern and effective land instruments for a strategy of active prevention. It is a strategy where the binomial "rapidity/power" counts, because a timely military presence can have a politico-strategic effect much higher than that of a massive but tardy intervention.

Considering the scenarios envisaged by the new defence model, major airmobile units can provide the possibility of operating within a multinational NATO action with remarkable rapidity and firepower.

The deterrent effect of a major unit capable of redeploying at legs of 100-200 kilometers, keeping a high tactical and operational mobility on any theatre of the Alliance, is certainly considerable. It can provide the local armoured or motorized defence forces with a



Pilots of the Army Air Cavalry.

highly sophisticated fire-and-manoeuve element.

Therefore, air mobility gives an additional dimension to the land troops directly engaged in the battle, and must not be confused with the air movement, which does not require tactical integrity and immediate entrance into the battle.

Air mobility is an integral part of the land battle, and provides the Commanders with a decisive instrument for striking at the enemy's weak points (flanks, rear echelons, C2, logistic units, etc.), irrespective of the terrain.

In other words, a FINABEL report defines it as *"the use of the air space close to the ground, in order to achieve a decisive effect in operations, thanks to the employment of forces capable of being projected and of acting without being hampered by obstacles"*.

Thus, it is certainly not convenient to employ the airmobile formations as infantry units or equivalent troops; it is true that their employment can be ruthless, brutal and massive, but it is necessarily limited to short periods at time (suffice it to remember the fate of the British paratroopers at Arnhem during Operation "Market-Garden").

What, then, should a unit be able to do, in order to call itself "airmobile"?

It must be capable of performing the following tasks:

- information/counterinformation, information-search missions, through the infiltration of specific units;
- armed actions against:
 - enemy units, either autonomously or in support of land forces;
 - poorly protected objectives deep into the enemy deployment;
 - enemy air threat (airplanes, helicopters);
- support and assistance, such as:

TRAINING THE AIRMOBILE UNITS

This subject could be discussed on another occasion, but it seems appropriate to give it a particular space here.

Any unit can try to train in air mobility, but what makes the difference is the degree of specialization achieved and what it is capable of expressing.

Airmobile units cannot be improvised, and the units able to do everything in every field are chimerical.

But when a unit is called to conduct an operation which includes some of the aspects we have described, and can do it without great conceptual and organizational efforts, then it can be considered airmobile in every respect.

This means to have a know-how sufficient to express a massive capability, at short notice, in a complex environment and for a certainly limited-time task.

The individual and unit capabilities needed for an airmobile operation cannot be developed immediately before the mission.

If it is not possible to have permanent airmobile units, there should be at least units earmarked for this type of employment.

To this end, a training process has been studied by the 7th Regiment, with the coordination of the "Friuli" Airmobile Brigade, and special modules for the constitution of airmobile units have been tested. The testing process was both theoretical and practical, and was jointly carried out by the 66th Infantry Regiment, the 187th Paratroop Regiment and the 7th "Vega" Cavalry Regiment.

In particular, the training cycle includes the application of three modules, specifically studied and realized for:

- infantry and paratroop units (1st module);
- Air Cavalry pilots (2nd module);
- Commanders of airmobile units (3rd module).

Through this approach, the airmobile know-how and capabilities acquired by each component are integrated and implemented in the execution of the various tactical actions.

The training programme lasts 14 weeks, and includes:

- 560 classes, 336 of which practical;
- 44 flight-hours on attack and multirole helicopters, considered sufficient in relation to the established objective;
- 4 intermediate-verification exercises.

Training is carried out taking for granted the technical/tactical capabilities of the infantry and paratroop units, and considering the airmobile capability as an additional capability to be achieved through:

- theoretic activities directed towards:
 - the acquisition of the basic concepts of airmobility and, in particular, the conception, organization and conduct of the airmobile missions;
 - the knowledge of stanags and ATPs;
- practical activities oriented towards:
 - knowledge of the aircraft;
 - organization of the landing zone;
 - planning, organization and conduct of the missions.

The practical activity has permitted to verify the validity of the training modules. Considering the lessons learned and the controls carried out, a critical review of the approach has been made, in order to work out a new programme, better suited to the requirements and fixed goals.

Clearly, this training is still experimental, and represents the starting point for the creation of airmobile units and of a real airmobile capability.

We believe that a very high specialization of the units will give good results provided that we ensure sufficient resources and an environment of mutual cooperation to a team assembled for a clear purpose.

THE FUTURE OF AIR CAVALRY ACCORDING TO THE US ARMY

AVIATION VISION – Fort Rucker USA

Air Cavalry will be the most important force of the 21st Century, providing combat, combat support and logistic support capabilities throughout the whole spectrum of multidimensional cooperation.

Its inherent flexibility, superior manoeuvre and combat effectiveness will influence future battles in all their dimensions.

The Air Cavalrymen, highly motivated, equipped with modern systems and trained to reach a first-class professionalism, will provide the Commanders at all levels with a tremendous increase in lethality, together with the necessary leadership to face the technologic revolution of the digitized battlefield and the capability of achieving final victory.

- delivery of fire and coordination of fire sources;
- tactical transport of units and formations whose manoeuvre is hampered by the terrain, or logistic and medical transport;
- search and rescue of isolated soldiers and crews, also in hostile areas;
- command, meant either as capability of managing the

mission or as support to the command function.

Air mobility will also be the winning arm in the hypothetical digitized scenarios of the next century (see table 3).

The most serious disadvantage is represented by the fact that a unit of this kind cannot hold the ground for a long time. Furthermore, it is sensitive to weather conditions and to the enemy capability of air defence (antiaircraft and self-defence).

CHARACTERISTICS OF AN AIRMOBILE UNIT

Up to now, we have seen that air mobility implies the employment of helicopter formations and land forces, put together for the performance of the same task.

As we said, the simultaneous employment of these forces, whose complexity increases in proportion to their size and range of action, cannot prescind from an adequate Command-and-Control organization.

As a matter of fact, the success of an airmobile operation depends on the unit Commander's possibility of managing all his assets in the various phases of the action, relying on a precise and efficient C2 structure, capable of monitoring all the forces, at the incessant pace imposed by an operation of this kind.

The size and capabilities of the instrument is another problem to be tackled.

In fact, the force can vary, in both dimensions and operational capabilities, going from a small number of transport helicopters and combat units acting together, to an imposing formation, with transport and combat helicopters,



A Paratrooper patrolling a built-up area.



Two AB-412s flying at very low altitude during a landing exercise.

operating with other forces at manoeuvre level.

It is possible to have an idea of the dimension of an airmobile unit by considering what can be transported with one wave; therefore it is reasonable to assume that, at tactical level, the minimum size should be that of a battalion-level combat group (with no logistic support), to be employed in a low/medium intensity environment, without the "a-priori" exclusion of a high-intensity setting.

As regards the aptitude and capacity of the units to perform this kind of tasks, we can say that there is no problem; the only thing to keep in mind is that the forces must have a "light infantry" mentality.

Even the paratrooper units, which apparently are the most suited to this employment, must undergo a specific training similar to that of any infantry unit; also in their case it will be necessary to "demolish" the atavistic habit of employing the helicopter just as another means of transport. They must become convinced that this weapon system can contribute, better than any other, to the achievement of success.

This said, another cliché must be refuted. Some, when discussing air mobility, think that air cavalry has acquired a new component (airmobile infantry), while others believe that the infantrymen have received new vehicles (helicopters).

Both concepts are wrong: a unit, to be considered airmobile, must be made up of infantry and helicopters, on equivalent and equally important levels but

necessarily different as regards specialization (let's think, paradoxically, of pilots jumping to the ground and infantrymen at the controls of a helicopter...); the unit must operate under the orders of an impartial leader (infantryman or air-cavalryman; this, strangely enough, is not important), must act jointly and in a chaos of tactical, technical and procedural aspects.


It is clear that, in such a unit (regardless of its level) the actors are not only the infantrymen and the air-cavalrymen, but fully and directly include a staff capable of expertly planning and managing that kind of operations.

And this is not easy at all.

Those who want a concrete evidence of this, should take a look at the following aspects, which are all to be considered in airmobile operations: control of the air space; mission planning; mission control; coordination

Tab. 4

COMMAND RELATIONS



with the antiaircraft defence, the Air Force, the land Major Units, the units flown over; airmobile logistics, SAR/CSAR/JCSAR procedures; employment of the air armament-systems; calculation of the air loading systems, flight-security procedures; conduct of information analyses with aeronautical aspects; EW, EPM; flying crews' training, also in NBC environments; elusive manoeuvres; self-protection and survivability; establishment of bridgeheads; evacuation by air; aircraft guidance from the ground;

night vision, etc... Is that enough?

PROCEDURES

The procedural aspect can be discussed covering three specific sectors only: command relations, control of the air space and planning of an airmobile mission.

Command relations

ATP41 (A) *Airmobile Operations* defines the main roles and the relations between

the responsible operators: it is sufficient to copy!

The main authorities are (table 4):

- the Commander of the Air Force (AFC): he is responsible for planning and executing the operation, and is normally a land commander availing himself of an air cavalry staff, but the opposite could also be true. He is the connecting link of the special branches, to which he sends orders and directives, while controlling them;
- the Controller of the mission (AMC): he is responsible for the units, is subordinate to the AFC, and plans and cooperates with the LUC;
- the Commander of the lifted units (LUC): he is responsible for the lifted units, is subordinate to the AFC, and plans and cooperates with the AMC.

Air space control

This very delicate and complex sector includes two aspects, both essential for the AFC:

- air space control proper, aimed at knowing who, where and how is flying and whether he is friend or foe, in order to authorize the flight over certain areas or possibly order the destruction of the aircraft;
- control of the flying units, in order to know what they are doing and where the helicopters in a given mission are engaged, to monitor their operation and obtain updated information.

It is important to point out that, on this subject, there are often misunderstandings caused by the same word: for the Air Force and its pilots, control is what is described in the first



A Leopard 1A5 and an Air Cavalry helicopter in a training area.



An A-129 "Mangusta" (foreground) and an AB-412 during an exercise.

case, while the land units refer to the second case.

It is certainly very important to avoid this kind of misinterpretations.

Planning a mission

The planning of an airmobile operation involves all the authorities described above, and is carried out following the check-lists specified in ATP41 and ATP49.

This enables all the specialists involved to plan their activities without forgetting important details, as well as to make their difficulties timely known to others concerned.

In practice, the operators proceed by inverted phases, i.e.

in an order opposite to the actual conduct of the mission (action on the objective, landing, air movement, embarkation, muster).

This is easy to say, but difficult to do. To achieve the required automaticity, it is necessary to try and try again, and this is mostly staff work.

OPERATION "CHALLENGE 2001"

"Practice makes perfect" is an English expression that should be fully shared and, in fact, we have started to meet the challenge through the first airmobile exercises (Manta 2000 and Challenge 2001), and this is why



An AB-412 shortly before landing.



A volunteer armed with a Beretta AR 70/90 submachine gun.

the latter was given that name. The exercise took place on February 20 at the Foce Reno range.

The presence of Lt.Gen. Ardito, Land Forces Commander, confirmed the importance of the event. The operational frame perfectly fitted an airmobile operation, the scenario was that of an extremely flexible peace operation (PSO).

In Military Operations Other

Than War (MOOTWs), the timely concentration in a particular area of a substantial combat power is often necessary.

The enemy forces or factions generally have in hand technologically modest weapons, flanked, sometimes, by modern and effective systems, such as MAN-PAD.

The "Friuli" Brigade is a reserve of the multinational stabilization force's Command: this is the most appropriate role for an airmobile force oriented to intervene, either autonomously to clear up crisis

situations or to reinforce threatened or fighting friendly units. It is necessary to use its firepower or its simple (so to say) deterrence capability, ensured by the very presence of the attack helicopters.

The purpose of the exercise was obvious: to ascertain the attainment of the capability of conceiving, organizing and conducting an airmobile operation.

It was necessary to verify the training level of the flying crews of the 7th Air Cavalry "Vega" Regiment and the paratroop platoon of the 187th Regiment, who were the real leading actors in the exercise.

It was necessary, quoting again that English expression, to look for "perfection".

"Challenge 2001" was a blank, two-sided exercise; its theme was the execution of a raid by an airmobile reinforced platoon, with the task of neutralizing the base of the rebels' actions, in order to deprive of the necessary leading command the hostile forces present at the embarkment and disembarkment (SPOD/SPOE) port of Ravenna, thus increasing the credibility of the peace force.

As regards the operational concept, suffice it to think of Kosovo or Bosnia and of the stabilization force therein, translate the whole to Emilia-Romagna, Italy, change the names, for instance, of the Srpska Republic and FBiH, and the picture is complete.

The particular situation stems from the mission analysis and the decision-making process of planning, where one of the decisive points is the control of the port of Ravenna to secure the flow of humanitarian aid and supplies to the Peace Force. But the Romagnese rebels attack and occupy the port, in order to:

- favour and accelerate the political process of independence of the Violet State in the South;



An AB-205 and an A-129 "Mangusta" of the Air Cavalry flying over a river.

- stress their refusal of an intervention by the multinational Peace Force;
 - block, by controlling the port of Ravenna, the flow of humanitarian aid and of supplies to the Peace Force.
- The base from which their

leader operates is located at Foce Reno, near Casale Ronconi (centre of gravity).

The negotiations conducted by the Peace Force responsible for the divisional sector (MND-NE) come to nothing, and the Force Command, after more bloody actions against some units of the Division, decides to carry out an action of force, to show the resolution of the Alliance

and implement the UN resolution, engaging the reserve airmobile Brigade with the task of:

- enjoining the implementation of the measures envisaged by the peace plan;
- regaining the free use of the port.

Furthermore the Force Commander decides to employ an airmobile platoon in a preventive action, in order to neutralize the base from which the terrorist actions are conducted and to deprive the rebels present on the SPOD/SPOE of their leaders.

The exercise itself was divided in three phases:

- air movement;
- raid;
- exfiltration.

The air movement was a tactical flight, in its three different forms:



An Italian serviceman in his position during an exercise.



A Paratroop NCO on surveillance duty.

- low altitude (50ft/250ft);
- over obstacles (5 m above the obstacles along the route);
- among several obstacles, as the airmobile platoon approaches the objective.

During the movement, the formation adopted different configurations, according to the tactical requirements or to better face possible threats by hostile forces.

Owing to their specific characteristics, the "left scalar" and the "left stagger column" formations were selected.

The former, in fact, permits to fire on the left flank without safety restrictions, and easy changes of formations; the latter, more suitable in poor visibility, does not require

large landing areas and makes possible the preventive division of the unit into several groups.

The second phase - the raid - enhanced the role of the platoon leader as commander of the airmobile force and real "conductor" of the whole operation. Starting with the planning phase he was the leading actor; whose task was the coordination of all the activities between the land and air components, in order to establish logistic priorities, landing areas, limits of the aircraft and all that was necessary for the conduct of the operation.

In short, only if the airmobile commander succeeds in "harmonizing" and integrating

the two components, the mission can be successful.

The third phase - exfiltration - was just the rounding off of the whole operation.

The platoon's airmobile action has shown:

- extreme mobility, which achieved the surprise effect by preventing the enemy forces from moving away in time to avoid interception;
- flexibility of employment, which permitted to adapt to any change in the situation in a very short time;
- high firepower, through the employment of armed helicopters;
- optimal stealthiness: the airmobile formations attacked the objective in an unpredictable and discreet manner.

Besides, its rapid-projection capability of the information-gathering and fire-support means (EA helicopters) gave the airmobile platoon the possibility of assuming the control of the area of interest in an extremely short time.

The attack was rapid, brutal and massive. The die is cast, and there we are at last!

Obviously, there will be difficulties; they are innate in the accomplishment of any project, but they must be rationally tackled and solved, exalting the good results achieved. Air mobility is a precious resource for the credible and modern future of our Army.

We must go forward, now that the static attrition has been removed.

□

**Major,
7th «Vega» Regiment
**Captain,
7th «Vega» Regiment*



Above.
An Air Cavalry A-129 "Mangusta" helicopter.




Left.
An AB-412 flying over an helicopter-parking area.

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UKRAINE THE NEW ARMY



by Enrico Magnani *

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PETRO IVANOVYCH SHUL'IAK DEPUTY DEFENCE MINISTER AND COMMANDER OF THE LAND TROOPS

General, Ukraine has been an independent nation since 1991. The Army is going through a development phase, and the readers of our magazine would like to know the situation of the Land Troops and the prospects for their future development.

The Army is at the Nation's service at all times. Therefore, since the first days of its birth, the independent Ukrainian State has been carrying out a very precise work, in order to

strengthen its Armed Forces, of which the Land Troops are the essential part.

The Army's main tasks consist in ensuring the inviolability of the borders, the territorial integrity of the Country, the execution of the international commitments for the maintenance of peace and international security.

In 1997, the President of Ukraine and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces approved the "National Programme of Training and



Development of the Armed Forces", which envisages the creation of forces that, albeit not very numerous, must be, at the same time, powerful and mobile.

On the basis of this document the "Programme for the Development of the Ukrainian

By 2005 Ukraine will have mobile, multifunctional and professional forces, ready to be projected for international peace missions. It is an ambitious goal, and the Army is actively working with a view to acquire an active role in the construction of the "Europe of Defence".



"Land Troops" has been worked out. This project has been studied considering, above all, the Nation's economic capabilities, and its main objective is the establishment of a mobile, multifunctional, well-sized, balanced, well-armed and well trained instrument, in line

with the directives of the parliamentary assemblies.

At the same time, the reform of the Army's completion system goes on, together with the improvement of the management system. At the start of this process, in 1992, the number of land soldiers inherited from the

Soviet Army decreased from 700,000 to 400,000, and now they are only 120,000.

The course is long and complex, but I can already mention some good results. We moved from the Military Districts (High Commands, often combined) to the operational



Above.
A Mig29 of the Air Force.

Right.
Two MI24V helicopters taking off.



Commands, which are the strategic Commands of our new Armed Forces. Another success is the beginning of the creation of a new operational Unit, according to the principle of the "rapid reaction forces". In the Course of this programme, we are also introducing a military system of the Brigade/battalion type.

Furthermore, an important decision has been made as regards the training of personnel. In this sense, the reform of the Military Academies is almost completed. A training school for junior specialists has been founded, on the basis of the "Training Centre", also known as "Desna". In conformity with the Programme, a gradual transition to a contractual completion is under way.

I see our future Land Troops as a highly professional, non-

numerous formation, equipped with modern weapons.

What is the role of the Land Troops within the national community? Are they an element of national cohesion and solidarity?

History teaches us that the Slavic peoples settled in the best lands of the world following the routes of military campaigns, battles and major wars. For example, the second World War tormented our land twice. Perhaps this is the price we have

to pay for the beautiful Country that was given to us by God. Probably, it was precisely our tragic and bloody history that convinced our people that the defence of the Motherland is the most honoured duty. The Army, since ancient times, has always been, for our society, an example of courage, loyalty and victory, an element of unity and national solidarity.

Considering the number of our Land Troops, we can confidently say that they have a considerable influence on the education of our youth as well as on our society at large.



Ukraine is so important for NATO that the Alliance has established a special relationship with Kiev. What is the Army's perception of "Partnership for Peace"?

On February 8, 1994, Ukraine -



Artillerymen on training.

the first Country to do so among the Eastern Countries - signed the framework Document of "Partnership for Peace", and on May 25 submitted its introduction Document.

On September 14, 1995, at the NATO HQ, in Brussels, the ceremony of official approval of the first individual Partnership Programme was held. On July 19, 1996, the Atlantic Council, with the participation of Ukraine according to the "16+1" formula, approved the individual Programme of Partnership between Ukraine and NATO for the period 1996-1998.

These new relations are developing in a very dynamic way, especially thanks to the fact that we consider the programme very important for the general structure of stability and security in Europe. In fact, we are convinced that it is a fundamental element for the future development and practical improvement of NATO's relations with the Countries of the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council and with other OSCE members, in the sector of defence, military cooperation and peace support

operations. Our Country cannot keep out of this process.

The approval of the "Partnership for Peace" programme was a correct and timely step, which avoided new "lines of division" and favoured the strengthening of stability and security in Europe, and will become an important mechanism for cooperation towards peace.

It is also very important that equal chances be given to all participants and, at the same time, that each partner be allowed to manage its relations with NATO according to its own interests and capabilities.

The main priority-lines of cooperation between our Land Troops and NATO, within the "Individual Partnership-Programme", derive from the tasks we are preparing to tackle.

It is therefore necessary to know the terminology and procedures of the Alliance, to study the planning and organization methods of the exercises and to prepare the Armed Forces to participate in

"Partnership for Peace".

All these measures foster the development of stable relations with NATO members and partner Countries and directly strengthen the external guarantees for Ukraine's national security.

In this cooperation, the Land Troops Command sees the future possibility of enlarging the geography of our Armed Forces's participation in international peace-operations as well as in Joint Military Tactical Forces capable of conducting peace operations and of preventing the occurrence of crisis situations. Furthermore, cooperation with NATO includes a joint activity of construction of prototypes of new weapons (assembled also in Ukraine) as well as maintenance and modernization of the existing systems.

Besides, an active participation favours the formation of a certain experience in the conduct of joint operations with the UN peace contingents and under the NATO aegis. For us, the most important factor is the possibility of providing our servicemen with a preparation meeting all the necessary requirements. As a matter of fact, from 1992 to 2000, about 9000 servicemen have served with the Ukrainian peace Contingent.

Next to the PFP initiatives, Ukraine is very active in regional cooperation projects, such as the constitution of a mixed battalion with Poland and the establishment of military agreements within the Black Sea Community. Are there any other regional initiatives?

Our policy is oriented to the solution of the disputes among Nations through peaceful



actions. This is why an important part of the national Programme for the development of the Armed Forces is devoted to cooperation issues.

The Programme envisages cooperation not only with our neighbours, but also with all the other Countries in the world, in order to guarantee peace and security for all. Our policy of regional cooperation with the Countries of the Black Sea region is very active.

Moreover, since almost every year the Tyssa and Stryl rivers cause a lot of problems, we had the idea of creating the Ukrainian - Rumanian - Hungarian "Tyssa" engineering Unit, which will shortly be capable of dealing with the damages caused by natural disasters in the area.

Some months ago, Ukraine sent troops to the UN force in southern Lebanon and, at the same time, is conducting other peace operations. What lessons have you learned from these numerous interventions?

Our participation in peace operations started back in 1992 in the former Yugoslavia. In this period we have gained experience in the conduct of international peace-operations. The main events in which our military participated were aimed at restoring the functionality of the essential infrastructure in Yugoslavia and Angola. Therefore today we have a remarkable experience in assisting the victims of conflicts.

In recent years the Land Troops Command increased its employment of the Aviation in peace operations in different parts of the world. The number of these participations shows a remarkable increase in the tasks performed by our pilots.

Our Aviation was employed for the first time in a peace operation in July 1995, when the 15th Helicopter Unit, with only three aircraft, was introduced in Yugoslavia.

Our airmen proved to be high-level professionals. Already the following year, in Eastern

Stowing ammunition before an exercise.

Slavonia, two new squadrons, with 12 helicopters, were assigned to the UN Peace Forces. Their tasks were: transporting the UN special Contingent and its loads; reconnoitering and patrolling the division area; medical evacuation and search/rescue activities.

On the whole, from the beginning of the mission, approximately 5000 flights have been carried out, for a total of 5000 flight ours.

In June 1999, Ukraine participated in the peace operation in Kosovo with the 14th Unit, equipped with four Mi-5 helicopters.

Today the Unit is stationed at the USAF Bondstil Base, and continues to perform its tasks. The average flying time of Crew Commanders is 145 hours. Obviously, we cannot yet reach these results at our permanent bases.

The positive results achieved with the employment of helicopters of the Land Troops' Aviation led the UN administration to propose the participation of our helicopter Units in the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In this way, the Army Aviation's participation in peace operations permits to keep the proper technical level and, besides, improves the training standards of the pilots engaged in day and night missions in different weather conditions.

Some years ago the Army constituted the "Steel" Division, a special formation from which it draws the Units to be employed in "out of area" peace operations. Could you tell us something about this Major Unit?



The question is not completely correct, probably because of the Unit's name. The "Steel" Division has a long and glorious history. It received its honoured name in 1918, during the civil war. The Division acted successfully also in WWII.

This Unit jealously keeps the military traditions of the previous generations, but it is a normal mechanized Division with a typical role and a typical organization. It is included in the Army system, and enjoys a very high consideration for its military preparation. It was not specifically trained for peace missions, but is located near the well-known Training Centre for International Peace Forces, within the Yavoriv Range. Some units of this Division participated in peace exercises as well as in the "Peace Shield" international ones. This could be the reason for the imprecise description of the "Steel" Division as a special Unit for peace operations.

Next to the Armed Forces,

Ukraine has a National Guard and a Frontier Guard. What are the relations between these two organizations and the Army?

The National Guard, in compliance with a Presidential Decree, has been disbanded and partially incorporated into the Army. The Frontier Guard, on the contrary, continues to perform its functions. Together with the Army, it is responsible for the defence of our borders. Furthermore, we have joint tasks in territorial defence. In case of problems, the Army and the Frontier Guard are ready to help each other.

In general, at the moment of the reduction of the 700,000-strong Soviet Army located on the Ukrainian territory, many servicemen moved to other military structures of the State. So, we often meet former colleagues also among the frontier guards. Therefore, we can say that ours is not a working relation only.



Above.
A T80UD tank employed by the Land Troops.

Right.
A Ukrainian serviceman during the peace-mission in Bosnia.

The Armies' professionalization favours the creation of a new space for the development of a military structure in Europe: there is the on-contract military service, and at the same time the number of conscripts is decreasing. How is this problem tackled in Ukraine?

There is no doubt that everything must be done by professionals. The higher the professional training, the stronger the Army. This factor has a remarkable influence on the military structure and its optimization, not only in Europe but all over the world.

In the years following our independence, our objectives were reformed, in the direction of a better functional structure,



and the foundations were laid down for Armed Forces corresponding to the requirements of today.

The realization of the objectives listed in the "National Programme of Training and Development of the Armed

Forces" will be a fact by the end of 2005.

At the moment, the completion of the Armed Forces takes place on the basis of a mixed principle, which envisages both conscription and on-contract service.

The number of on-contract personnel is now about 30% of the total force.

In this phase, the most appropriate solution is the development of the present completion system (the mixed one), with a successive transition to a professional Army with long-term contracts.

In the initial phase, the professional soldiers are used to complete the units which employ the most sophisticated weapon systems. In the future, according to experience and experiments, as well as to feasibility studies, most Army

Units will be manned by on-contract personnel. By the end of 2005, the Armed Forces should have adopted the contractual system. It is a long and difficult process, but the majority of our citizens is in favour of the change.



A/A "Strila 10" missile vehicle.

As a consequence of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has inherited a strong defence industry. What is its present situation?

With the end of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited about one third of its defence industry: 700 firms and 139 research-organizations and groups, which deal exclusively with military productions. But our Country does not need such a large industry. The government, therefore, decided to convert some of the plants.

Today, with a skillful reform based on the scientific and technical productive potential, it is still possible to organize a world-level competitive production. The elements of the reform were: the high level of the scientific knowledge, both fundamental and applied; scientific research and designing in the sector of weapon construction and military technique; high technology, both defence-oriented and dual; highly

qualified - and relatively cheap - labour force.

Besides, the defence industry has kept, and is developing, some sectors whose products meet the international requirements. For example, the missile and satellite sector and the construction of transport and military aircraft.

Furthermore the T-80 UD and T-84 tanks successfully compete on the international market. Our Country is a world leader in the production of navigation systems, self-aligning heads for surface-to-air missiles, radio-technical control stations, artillery audiometric systems, sophisticated management systems, radio relays, radiotechnical and radioelectronic warfare equipment, aircraft and missile alignment systems. The electronic and optical sectors are also well developed.

In conclusion, I believe that at this moment our industry is capable of producing most modern and technical armaments, either autonomously or in cooperation with our partners. The existence of a powerful repair-base for the renewal of the main types of weapons, together with a high military technique, enables us not only to be well prepared, but also to carry out a thorough modernization.

□

** Journalist*

Colonel General Petro Ivanovych Shul'iak was born in Korshev on March 29, 1945.

After his civilian education, he attended the multibranch Military School in Kiev, and was Platoon Leader in 1967 and Company Commander in 1971.

From 1972 to 1975, he attended the Military Academy, and became Regimental Chief of Staff and Regiment Commander. Chief of Staff of a Division from 1984 to 1986, he attended the General Staff Academy, and in 1988 was appointed Commander of a Division.

From 1991 to 1998, Gen. Shul'iak held the high positions of Branch Commander, Military Region Commander and Army Commander.

Since September 1998, he has been Deputy Defence Minister and Commander of the Land Forces.


He has been awarded the Order of the Red Star and the Order of Bohdan Khmelnyts'kyi, 3rd Degree.

Col.Gen. Shul'iak is married and has two sons.

FINLAND

THE NEW ARMY

by Enrico Magnani *

A photograph of a Finnish Leopard 2 tank in a forest at dusk. The tank is positioned in the middle ground, facing right, and is firing a laser-guided missile. A bright laser beam is visible extending from the tank's gun towards the right edge of the frame. The foreground is filled with tall, dry grass and some green shrubs. The background shows a line of trees under a hazy, blue-tinted sky.

**Interview with Major General
Ilkka Eemeli Kylä-Harakka
Chief of Staff of the Finnish Army**

The Finnish Army is engaged in several peacekeeping operations, but its primary duty is to defend the national territory. Therefore, it is structured and organized to operate in the difficult arctic environment. In the following interview, Major General Ilkka Eemeli Kylä Harakka, Army Chief of Staff, discusses with us these and other subjects.




General, could you summarize, for the readers of "Rivista Militare", the present situation of the Finnish Army and its future prospects?

The Finnish Armed Forces are oriented towards territorial defence, and their organization takes many elements into account: geopolitical position, war experience, extension of the national territory, political support and, above all, availability of funds. The main objective of our defence is to maintain the control of the strategically important areas and, by taking advantage of the size of our territory, delay and wear out the aggressor in order to defeat him, with superior forces, at a place of our choice. For geographic and practical reasons, the Army has a primary responsibility for this kind of defence.

The Army's strength amounts to about 380,000 men, i.e. 75% of the total manpower of the Armed Forces (500,000). The bulk of the Army is formed at the moment of mobilization, and is armed and equipped with materials stored in various parts of the Country. In peacetime its units work mostly as training centres, but are always ready to become operational on mobilization.

The operational forces consist of two armoured Brigades, three reinforced "Jaeger" Brigades



Training with snow tracked-vehicles.

(rapidly deployable, also called "2005" Brigades) and six "Jaeger" Brigades. Local defence is ensured by eleven light-infantry, defensive-type Brigades, and by a number of smaller units (battalions and "ranger" companies). On the whole, we have twenty-two Brigades.

The Army is divided into several Branches whose units can organically belong to the Brigades or put together according to need. The Branches are: Infantry (which includes the armoured troops), Field and A/A Artillery, Engineers, Communications and Logistics.

After the Cold War many western Armies started important restructuring programmes, in order to adjust their organization to the changed politico-strategic international scenario. What measures have been taken by the Finnish Army in order to face the new challenges?

Our defensive plans against a possible attack have been studied on the basis of three assumptions. The first takes into consideration pressures and threats with a limited use of force.

The second considers a strategic attack by surprise, aimed at paralyzing and occupying the

strategic objectives, subjugating the Country's political leadership. In the third case, our plans imagine a large-scale offensive, with the intention of occupying strategic areas or using our territory as a base against other Countries. The first two assumptions are the most likely, but the third one cannot be ruled out. Therefore, keeping in mind that we must defend the whole of our territory, we must have a strong and numerous Army. This reflects on Commands and Forces, as well as on the principle of general conscription.

Despite all this, by 2008 the total strength of our Armed Forces will go down from 540,000 to 430,000. Most reductions will take place within the Army. This is why the number of our Brigades went down from 27 to 22. For the moment, this must be considered the lowest limit.

Considering the possible materialization of unforeseeable threats, we are also working at the transformation of 3 Brigades into ready-deployment Units, capable of facing any kind of situation.

Furthermore, we are improving our capabilities in crisis management within the international commitments and equipping and training a ready-employment Brigade which,

with some of its components, has already participated in operations in Kosovo.

Could the creation of rapid-reaction Units, the new doctrine of employment and the acquisition of last-generation weapon systems be seen as a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) within the Finnish Army?

Finland is a small nation and, with its limited resources, cannot make any revolution in its Armed Forces, particularly if we consider the size of the Army. Therefore we must rely on long-term planning, not necessarily aiming at "the best", but rather at the "good enough".

The development of our Brigades did not start from nil: we have had an increase in firepower, mobility and protection of the existing Units. This, on the other hand, does not have a negative influence on the value of the other troops to be employed in the special conditions of terrain and climate of our Country. In short, those who want everything could very likely end up with nothing. This is a dilemma which does not concern the small countries alone.

It would be wrong to appraise Finland's military capabilities considering only its Army. Air Defence is a very important element, and the Finnish Air Force is probably one of the most modern in Europe. The Navy is well suited to the requirements of the Country. Our defensive capability results from the collective work of the three Services, and must be evaluated as a whole.

What are the most important programmes recently completed or about to be realized by the Army?

As I said, the cornerstone of the Army's development is the

strengthening of the three rapid-reaction Brigades. The relative programmes are hinged on firepower, mobility and survivability of the units. On this basis, we are acquiring "smart" munitions, AMOS mortars, APC (PASI) platforms and IFV CV-90s, and testing medium-range air defence systems. The infantry units have been provided with Finnish-made night-vision equipment, "SPIKE" antitank missiles, field radios and a UAV system have been acquired. Other programmes under way envisage the improvement of our C4IS systems. The "Nordic Support Helicopter Programme" (NSHP) falls within this picture. A final decision on this programme will be made next summer, with the probable acquisition of fifteen or twenty helicopters. To offset the reduction in the number of armoured Brigades, we think of acquiring a certain number of combat helicopters. A political debate is now in progress and a decision is expected soon.

The structure of the Armed Forces is based on a relatively small number of professionals and an important component of



conscripts and reserves. Considering the general European trend towards fully professional forces, what is the attitude of the Finnish Government?

Conscription is essential for our defence. Each year about 27,000 elements (including a number of women volunteers) carry out their military duty. This is equal to 80% of the total male yield of each annual contingent. The operational efficiency is assured through refresher courses held every five years for the most important jobs with a yearly attendance of approximately 30,000 servicemen. In this way we achieve the result of having the necessary high number of reservists at a reasonable cost. The conscription Army is highly regarded, due to our history and our war experience. Finland is a very large Country with a relatively small population, and can meet its military requirements only in the way I have just described. It would be impossible to defend ourselves only with professional forces.

The Air Force and the Navy include a good number of professionals. As a matter of fact, as I said, there is not a single policy: we must decide what is best on the basis of resources and needs.

Finland must be defended by the Finns. We have no obligations outside our borders, nor any guarantee of external aid in case of need. We must defend ourselves on land, in the sky and at sea, and can keep a credible force only with general conscription.


Finland has a vast and long experience in peacekeeping operations under the UN aegis,

Above.

A Finnish infantryman training in a snowy environment.

Left.

An infantryman training in a forest-area.



and participates in NATO-led multinational Forces in ex-Yugoslavia. What lessons have been learned from these missions?

We have learned very useful lessons from the peacekeeping UN missions and our recent engagements in IFOR, SFOR and KFOR. The constitution of multinational forces offers to Countries like Finland, which don't belong to military alliances, the opportunity of participating in crisis-management operations. At present we have an infantry battalion in Lebanon, a mechanized battalion in Kosovo, a CIMIC company in Bosnia, and several groups of observers in different places.

In the future our Armed Forces will be capable of undertaking greater responsibilities in crisis management. To this end, in 1996 we started the training of rapid deployment forces, in order to set up an operational unit to be employed in case of international crises. Its first elements are now working with KFOR. In Bosnia and Kosovo we have seen that the problems caused by the differences in language and culture, as well as those deriving from different materials and procedures, can be overcome. It became also clear



Above.
Gunnery in a training range.

Right.
An AMOS armoured car armed with a two-barrel gun.

Facing page.
An armoured personal carrier and some small warships.



that, by employing its men and equipment in Peacekeeping Operations, Finland not only does not lose anything but, on the contrary, its troops acquire a higher value for the defence of the Nation.

What is Finland's evaluation and perception of the Partnership for Peace Programme?

We believe that Partnership for Peace is a very important programme. PARP (Planning And Revision Programme) is a very effective guide for the forces earmarked for employment in crisis management operations. The participation in PfP improves our capability of military cooperation, strengthens our international status and enhances our operational readiness. In PfP, Finland makes its technical know-how available to other Countries and NATO, and participates in many seminars,

exercises, studies and working groups.

Are there still good reasons to remain neutral, after the changes occurred on the politico-strategic international scene?

"Neutral" is not the right word. After joining the European Union and the participation in many Peace Support operations, Finland can say that it is not neutral, but only against war and in favour of peace. We belong to the Western community and share its work and hopes. And this has been true for a long time.

Probably your question refers to the possibility of our Country joining NATO. We are essential component of the Western community, but not a military

ally. We stick to a credible national defence on our own.

In December 1999, in Helsinki, the European Council made an important step forward towards the institution of a European defence-architecture. What will be Finland's contribution to this structure?

Based on our population, the Finnish share in a European Force could consist of about 800 men, i.e. the strength of our battalion in

KFOR: this will be better specified during the actual subdivision of the forces within the EU. In practice, Finland's participation will be proportionate to our contribution to the UN and to PfP. This means, I believe, about 1500 men. I am sure that Finland will be capable of fulfilling its obligations.

Also the Nordic Cooperation is very important for us. At present, it aims mostly at crisis management, and I hope we shall be able to contribute a self-sufficient Brigade within "Nordic Frame".

Finland shares a very long border line with Russia. Does the Army cooperate with the police forces and the Frontier Guard in order to keep safe and stable this



give a definitive answer. Those systems will probably be partially replaced by combat helicopters, at least at Brigade and Corps level. The results of the relevant studies will be known by the end of 2010.

Your Army has a great tradition about operations on snowy and marshy terrain, with relatively small and highly trained units. What is the present situation and what is the future outlook for those special and elite forces?

We don't regard our arctic troops as "special forces", but only troops trained and equipped for operations in their normal environment. They can fight in the adverse conditions of weather and terrain which are typical of the whole Finnish territory.

In difficult scenarios like the northern one, logistics plays a fundamental role in guaranteeing a constant flow of supplies to the units. How will the new trends, such as extreme mobility in operations and growing sophistication of the systems, influence the logistic doctrine?

As a matter of fact, in the Arctic region logistics is more difficult than in other areas. Therefore our support units and the whole logistic chain are trained and equipped for operations in Lapland and other difficult regions of our Country. I can say that the Finnish Army has an excellent logistic organization, capable of operating in all situations.

□

** Journalist*

border? Do you think this task, albeit not strictly military, could be one of the future missions of the Armed Forces?

The Police and the Frontier Guard are subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. In wartime, the Frontier Guardsmen can be incorporated within the Armed Forces. Cooperation between the Army and these organizations is constant, but in peacetime we work under different commands and with different tasks. As a matter of fact the Army has a decidedly military role, even though it can carry out different types of missions if necessary.

What is the weight of the armoured and mechanized forces in your Army?

The Finnish territory is full of forests and lakes: what role do armoured combat and transport vehicles have in this kind of environment?

The armoured and mechanized forces continue to have an important role in the Army and are the spearhead of our defence. In particular, as regards the mechanized troops, I have already mentioned the "2005" Brigades.

As regards the second part of the question, it is still too early to

Major General Ilkka Eemeli Kylä-Harakka was born in Loimaa on January 21, 1946.

From 1966 to 1969 he attended the Military Academy, and after his commission was assigned to the Pohjanmaa Artillery Regiment.

From 1974 to 1979 he attended the Artillery School and the War College and later served, until 1989, at the Army General Command.

Promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, he was appointed Director of the University Section of the Artillery School and of the Training Section for the General Command.

In 1992, with the rank of Colonel, he was appointed Principal Secretary of the Defence Council, and held this position until 1994, when, with the same rank, he assumed the command of a Brigade.

Promoted to Brigadier General in 1998, he held - in that order - the positions of Chief of Staff, Western Command and Chief, War Materials, at the Defence General Staff.

In 2001 he has been appointed Chief of Staff of the Army.

Maj.Gen. Ilkka Eemeli Kylä-Harakka is married and has two sons.



THE «NORTHERN DIMENSION» OF EUROPE

by Ornella Rota*



For a number of reasons, going from the European Union's enlargement process to the space-shield issue and from the relations with Russia to the need of strengthening both security and cooperation, Northern Europe is now acquiring a growing importance.

Actually, this evolution could already be expected when Finland and Sweden joined the EU: both Countries, militarily nonaligned and crucial for the balances of the northern region, are very close to Russia for geographical and historical reasons.



SWEDEN

SWEDEN is a constitutional monarchy with a unicameral Parliament.

During the XVII century, Sweden succeeded in expanding its territories, thanks to its expansionist policy towards the Baltic region; in the following century, however, this trend came to an end, as the Swedish territorial area was substantially reduced. In the XIX century the country fought against Napoleon and Denmark, from which it took Norway in 1814; from then onward, Sweden has constantly followed a policy of peace and neutrality. Also Norway's independence was reached peacefully in 1905. During the two World Wars, Sweden succeeded in keeping a neutral stance and safeguarding its independence.



Its 9 million inhabitants live over an area of 449,964 sq km and have a per capita income of US \$26,210. The nation has a high urbanization rate, with a large number of elderly people. Wooded areas cover about 60% of the territory, which is poor in fuel products. Nuclear plants fulfill about 50% of all power requirements.

The economy, which relies on high-tech sectors and metal and steel industries applying cutting edge technologies, is governed by a special type of capitalism, where profits are largely distributed by the government through an efficient levy mechanism and one of the best welfare systems in the world.

This model was supported by the social democratic governments which were almost uninterruptedly in power from the late '30s to 1991. However, such model, increasingly opposed since the '80s, has undergone some changes to be in line with the systems adopted by other European countries governed by conservative parties.

FINLAND

FINLAND is a Parliamentary republic with a unicameral Parliament.

Shortly after the Russian Bolshevik Revolution, Finland declared its independence in 1919 and extended its boundaries towards Karelia and the North, with the support of German troops. In 1939, attacked by the Soviet Union, it succeeded in defending its national sovereignty, but lost the territories conquered after its declaration of independence. Since that time, Finland has been militarily neutral and maintained good neighborly relations with the former Soviet Union, as well as constant cooperation ties with Scandinavian nations and Western Europe.



It has a population of about 5 million inhabitants, extends over an area of 338,145 sq km, and has a per capita income of US \$ 24,790. Its economy is mainly based on logging industries and activities. Electronics and telecommunications are other sectors of interest.

The nation was severely hit by the economic recession in the early 90's and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since 1995, after entering the EU, Finland has started to recover its economy and balance its budget. Its unemployment rate, however, is still high (11% in 1999). Over 50% of its exports are towards EU countries and almost 60% of its imports come from the same area. Finland is one of the eleven Euro-zone countries. According to the organization "Transparency International", this nation ranks second among the least corrupted countries.

Finland, Sweden and Denmark, together with Norway and Iceland to a lesser extent, allowed Europe to no longer perceive them as far-away countries pursuing their particular objectives. The European region has thus been reshaped as follows: a Southern part centered on the Mediterranean Sea, a Northern part bordering on both the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic Ocean and a wide Central area comprising France, Germany and Eastern European Countries. These three areas follow different but equally coherent policies.

The newly established cooperation between Northern

Countries and Europe had immediate positive repercussions, especially as regards the relations with Moscow, being mainly focussed on security issues which could not be solved bilaterally.

The "Northern Dimension" initiative, officially presented in 1997, is mainly aimed at reinforcing EU's foreign policy in the region and its relations with Russia, in view of integrating it into the democratic and free market system. The ultimate goal is to play down all frictions in the area and wipe out dividing lines. To this end, ad hoc policies should be adopted to bridge the gap between different life

standards, bring down all hurdles restricting free trade and investments, foster economic cooperation, stability, safety and human rights, as well as democracy and the rule of law. The "Northern Dimension" includes national security issues as well. As stated in a document drawn up in 1999 by the Committee for Foreign Affairs, Security and Defense Policies of the EU Parliament, "this concept has a very wide scope, which goes beyond military affairs only". The initiative takes into account issues such as natural resources, environment, control of boundary lines, development of transport

Finland. A view of Helsinki and its Cathedral.

and enhancement of energy infrastructure. Due attention is also paid to the fight against organized crime, immigration and political asylum, cooperation in scientific research and health sectors, development of human resources and educational systems, protection at work and measures to give citizens an increasingly wider say.

In Finland, the Northern Dimension is largely supported by the press media and mildly accepted by opposition parties. Positive reactions are recorded in other Northern countries as well, although with some reservations.

A debate is still going on as regards the geographic extension of the area. In Finland's view, it comprises the five Northern nations, the Baltic countries, Russia's North-West area with the Kaliningrad exclave, Poland, Germany – Belarus and Northern Scotland included. To underline their Atlantic allegiance, the Finns stress the importance of strengthening their cooperation with the USA and Canada; in fact, these two countries are very active in Northern Europe at diplomatic level. Helsinki no longer fears being attacked by Moscow, but still sees it as a




threat, in particular as regards its relations with the Baltic countries. Therefore, the cornerstones of Finland foreign policy are the development of the EU-Russia relations on the one hand, and EU enlargement, to include Baltic states, on the other.

Since the end of the cold war, Denmark has shifted from a

marginal to a more central role, within the EU political scenario. It has therefore become more proactive and has taken part in many bilateral and multilateral projects.

The Northern Dimension is not always at the centre of the debates on the EU and the interests of Baltic Sea countries. In fact, many organizations and companies, both private and public, have already set up a cooperation network, similar to that envisaged by the Finns. Copenhagen seems mainly engaged in enhancing the relations between Russia and the West. It does not perceive Moscow as a threat, as these two countries have never been enemies, given their historical friendship ties.


From the Swedish point of view, the Northern Dimension, previously limited to five



Sweden. A partial view of the Stockholm archipelago.

DENMARK

DENMARK is a constitutional monarchy with a unicameral Parliament, which appoints a Committee for commercial affairs, to supervise EU-related governmental activities. This Committee is the only one in Europe to issue mandatory instructions to Danish ministers, in the performance of their functions within the EU Council.



Denmark has a population of over 5 million inhabitants, an area of 43,095 sq km, a per capita income of US \$34,890. It entered the EU in 1973 and became immediately aware of the importance of the Community as an outlet for its agricultural produce. In 1993, Denmark signed the Maastricht Treaty, only after introducing some opt-out clauses, allowing it to back out from the Monetary and Economic Union and from other more advanced integration initiatives. In fact, thanks to this opt-out option, in 2000 it refused to enter the "Euro-zone", following an ad hoc referendum.

Danish mistrustful feelings towards Europe stem from an ancestral fear of the Germans and the awareness of the superiority of the Danish way of life. In fact, the country cannot forget that in 1864 it had to give up the most fertile part of its territory, amounting to 1/3 of its homeland, to Prussia, and that it was invaded by the Nazis during World War II. In Denmark, there is an efficient welfare system, a close cooperation among executive, legislative and judiciary powers, and a habit of carrying out crystal-clear affairs, which make this country one of the least corrupted nations in the world, according to the organization "Transparency International".

NORWAY

NORWAY is a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral Parliament. It is not a EU member, as this option was rejected by two referendums, held in 1972 and 1994.

Norway's history was first connected with that of the Vikings, and then with the events which took place in Denmark and Sweden. These nations established several political partnerships with Norway, which almost always played a subordinate role.



In the XIX century, a national cultural renaissance took place, allowing the country to definitively reach an independent status, together with a high level of democracy and welfare, in the XX Century.

A population of about 4,5 million lives over an area of 323,758 sq km and has a per capita income of US \$36,100. The economy relies on oil resources, whose price is unfortunately linked to the ups and downs of the world markets and whose supplies are limited.

ICELAND

ICELAND is a Parliamentary republic and is not a EU member. A population of about 300,000 inhabitants (82% of whom are connected through the Internet) lives over an area of 102,819 sq km and has a per capita income of US\$ 28,010.



The country was first occupied by the Norwegians, who, in 930, established there the oldest Legislative Assembly in Europe. Then, it came under the Danish power and became independent in 1918. The economy relies on fisheries, encompassing both export and industrial activities.

Northern countries only, presently encompasses new cooperation initiatives with the Baltic region, the Barents Sea included.

The Swedish government is convinced that the area should not be considered as sealed off and adopt isolated initiatives. In fact, security, an issue not to be dealt separately in Europe, is to be reinforced everywhere. Under this perspective, Stockholm is convinced that putting off EU's outreach to the East would be dangerous, fully subscribes to the

socio-economic initiatives suggested by the Northern Dimension and reinstates the need for transferring both know-how and resources to former Warsaw Pact countries, the Baltic nations especially.

This area is likely to become one of the most developed regions in Europe, for the following reasons: lack of conflicts, wide range of initiatives jointly taken by international and supranational organizations and a growth rate which has been on

the increase since the end of the Cold War.

Russia is the focal point of both EU and Northern Dimension policies. In fact, it is a nation which need to be constantly updated on the progress of all initiatives, reassured that its interests are not under threat and urged to establish new relations and cooperation initiatives.

Moscow, however, considers the countries which share its borders or are pivotal to the control of the Baltic region as being more

strategically important than the whole Northern area. This is why Russia does not fully endorse the concept of a Northern "bloc", as well as that of a Europe extended as far as its borders. On the contrary, the establishment of such a wide area is strongly supported by George W. Bush, who fosters the idea of an enlarged EU under the NATO umbrella, encompassing Russia as well.


This approach is also based on the fact that the EU is setting up a Rapid Reaction Army of its own (60,000 men), separable but not separate from NATO.

The EU has pledged to enlarge to almost all former USSR European countries, including Poland, which is very close to the USA.



Above.
Finland. The Uspenski Cathedral in Helsinki.

Left.
Denmark. Early morning in Copenhagen.



An issue of great concern is the setting up of a new missile defense system, considering that Iceland should host one of its main connection centres.

This system - initially designed to counter the so-called rogue countries, in order to avoid destroying the whole world, in the case one of them should use atomic warhead missiles - is opposed by the Northern states. In fact, they evaluate this risk as far-fetched and, in line with their past history, fear the resumption of an arms race. The Northern diplomacy has always made every effort to play down all tensions, enforce human rights, promote dialogue and find compromise solutions. Olaf Palme and Hammarskjöld, both UN Secretary generals and Swedish, were murdered because they believed in this policy.

□

**Journalist,
Contributor to "La Stampa"*

A new challenge for satellite telecommunications

SICRAL

by Emanuela D'Alessio *



Outer space is an unquestionably important strategic sector for the economy and the sustainable development of society, where the most advanced and innovative technologies are experimented and applied; it is an infinite and precious resource, where international competition is measured and developed.

A competition based on the excellence of products and services (in terms of cost, easy operation and flexibility), on the high specialization of technology and products, on the plurality of investors and on the interest of the financial markets for the enterprises operating in space.

THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF SPACE FOR DEFENCE

The strategic consequence of space is even more evident when it comes to Defence. The experience made in the Gulf, at the beginning of the '90s has shown, probably for the first time, that the space component



The satellite launched on February 8 from the Kourou space station, in French Guyana, enabled the Armed Forces to make a fundamental leap forward in the sector of communications.

The system ensures the transition from the traditional structure, aimed at supporting the operational units in a static context, to a most advanced one, characterized by very wide geographical theatres, whose essential elements are flexibility, rapid reaction, transmission speed and a very high level of interoperability.

is essential in the conduct of land, naval and air operations, as well as in the politico-strategic management of a crisis. On that occasion, satellites turned out to be decisive not only for long-distance communications with the home Country, but in the field as well; for reconnaissance, both electronic and visual, which

was necessary, among other things, for the effective application of precision fire from distant air and naval platforms; for meteorology and cartography; for early warning about air/land operations and missile attacks; for positioning of land, air and naval units in practically unknown areas.

In the military employment of satellites for military purposes, the critical part is not represented so much by the satellite-platforms themselves, but rather by their segments on the ground, the decoding of signals from space, their timely diffusion to the users and their integration with the other information originating from land and air sensors. In other words, a satellite cannot guarantee, by itself, the efficacy and efficiency of a military mission, but must be integrated with an adequate segment on the ground. This is even more essential in operations conducted far from the national territory, where there is no infrastructure on the ground and cartographic supports are not available.

Therefore, artificial satellites, with their manifold uses in more and more different missions, are a very important resource for a new military policy of defence and security.

Satellites permit to de-territorialize the observation and telecommunication means, which is a fundamental aspect, particularly when, in the area, there is no land infrastructure and territorial control (as in the Gulf War). Satellites therefore become primary instruments for the management of crises, for the command-and-Control systems of the intervention forces, for the verifications of the accords for arms reduction and strategic stability, as well as for the function of politico-strategic intelligence. Furthermore, they facilitate the prepositioning and operation of telecommunication and sensing systems without sovereignty problems with other countries. Besides, they are the only means capable of performing certain tasks, such as, for instance, early warning about enemy missiles, or support functions like meteorology, cartography, positioning and navigation.

The question of the use of space by the Italian Armed Forces in order to effectively meet the security requirements of our Country, was posed for the first time in the early '90s, when the New Defence Model (prepared in 1991 and updated in 1993 and 1995) started to take shape. Among the various missions of the Armed Forces, renewed and reorganized according to the tasks emerging from the new politico-strategic international situation, the observation and control mission stood out among all others, since it was necessary to control the implementation of the disarmament and cooperation treaties (reduction of weapon systems, ascertainment of the absence of threats, verification of removal and destruction of chemical arsenals, control of the downsizing to a half of strategic nuclear weapons).

At the same time, the observation of the Earth from space was made indispensable by the constitution of the civil-protection and environment security services (Law 225/1992), which envisaged a functional coordination among the public administrations entrusted with sectorial responsibilities (sea, land and protected areas' defence).

The Defence organization, with a remarkable planning and programming effort, devised a Military Space Plan which, already in the early '90s, envisaged a set of programmes, with particular reference to remote sensing and telecommunications, capable of meeting the various operational requirements.

Suffice it to mention Helios 1, an optical satellite whose operational life will end in 2003-2004. The "post-Helios" is now in the finishing phase. Another satellite is SICRAL (Italian Satellite for Classified Communication and Warning),

put into orbit last February 8. We shall discuss it in detail later in this article.

The Military Space Plan, although representing a remarkable rationalization effort of the military space sector, presented some weak points, which even today, ten years after its elaboration, have not been completely overcome. Essentially the Plan's critical aspects were: insufficient financial resources for space (1% of the Defence budget, equal to about 200 billion ITL a year, compared to France's 700 billion); scarce integration among the various Services, which, in case of budget reductions, penalized precisely the joint programmes such as the space ones, not adequately supported by the contractual "weight" of the individual Service Staffs; the absence of institutional coordination of the users, despite the evident interdependence between the spacecraft and their land segments, which can meet both civilian and military requirements; poor evaluation of the use of satellites in anti-missile defence, early warning included.

After more than ten years, some of those weak points have been eliminated. The much-wanted reform of the High Ranks, confirmed by Law 25/1997, restructured the command and decision-making chain, and tried to overcome the fragmentation of responsibilities, emphasizing the joint character of the military instrument, made more and more indispensable by the present strategic and operational scenarios.

The SICRAL satellite-telecommunication system will be fully operational shortly, and is a concrete example of realization of a "joint" programme, capable of meeting the requirements of

the national Armed Forces as a whole.

SICRAL


It is essential to have telecommunications capable of covering the reference operational scenario and of integrating the traditional systems, in order to permit bi-directional connections between commands and central organizations, as well as with the operational assets in any area of operations.

SICRAL, a military telecommunication satellite, launched from the Kourou (French Guyana) space station on February 8 with the Ariane IV carrier, has given the Armed Forces the possibility of making a fundamental leap forward in the telecommunication sector. In fact, the system guarantees the transformation of military telecommunications - a complex and crucial element of Command and Control - from a traditional organization aimed at supporting the operational units in a static context within the national borders, to a modern instrument, operating in very large geographical theatres where flexibility, reaction, organization, transmission speed, survivability and high interoperability are essential.

The realization of SICRAL was an important challenge for Defence and the national industry, both from the technological and the planning point of view.

As a matter of fact, it represents the first fully Italian experience of defence-industry collaboration for the realization of a highly sophisticated tool capable of providing our Armed Forces with an extremely advanced telecommunication system.

Furthermore, SICRAL is the first example of a turnkey closed



The satellite in the anechoic chamber, for compatibility, transmission and reception tests.

contract. It included all the components (satellite, terminals, control centre) produced for Defence by the national industry, within the SITAB Consortium.

The programme started in 1980, with the approval of the

research and development project by the Chiefs of Staff. In 1995 a turnkey contract for the complete system was signed with the SITAB Consortium (*Alenia Spazio, Fiat Avio and Telespazio*). An additional document, signed in 1998-1999, envisaged the acquisition of a second satellite (SICRAL 2) which, in view of the successful launching of

SICRAL 1, will be employed with a different payload, to meet further requirements of Defence and other Government administrations, including some civilian ones. The additional act, furthermore, envisages: the study of the requirements for a GBS (Global Broadcasting System) in the second vehicle; the improvement of the system's



SHF and EHF ground antennas.

interoperability with the NATO forces (in particular US, France and the United Kingdom); the acquisition of a telemetric station in S-band as a back up, to be installed at the Fucino (*Telespazio*) Space Centre, in order to improve the survivability of the system.

The total amount of the contract, including the additional deed, is approximately 900 billion ITL.

THE SYSTEM'S FRAMEWORK

The SICRAL satellite-system consists of a space segment and a land segment.

The former is a 2500 k geostationary satellite, at an altitude of 36,000 km on the vertical of the Congo (16.2° East). The satellite's platform is similar to Italsat's, with a payload of about 450 k; its transponders operate on EHF, SHF and UHF bands, and ensure an optimal coverage of the areas of interest (national territory, Europe, North Africa, Middle

East as far as the Persian Gulf). Besides, a mobile spot-antenna, mechanically adjustable, ensures the coverage of a circular/elliptic area with a diameter of about 2500 km in any part of the visible emisphère. With these characteristics, SICRAL can connect fixed and mobile users which could not be reached otherwise, both within the national territory and outside, establishing real communication nets which, albeit completely autonomous, are always under national control.

Furthermore, another orbit is envisaged for SICRAL 2, which could also meet mixed requirements, i.e. military and civilian ones.

The land segment consists of a management/control Centre of satellite communications and a number of terminals (over 100 at present) assigned to the Army, Air Force and Navy.

The management/control Centre, located at Vigna di Valle (Bracciano) is the heart of the system, and gives the Italian Armed Forces a full operational autonomy in the utilization and management of resources. Vigna di Valle, in fact, controls missions,

satellites and networks. The Centre receives, through the Defence General Staff, the requests for the satellite-connections necessary for supporting the Armed Forces' operational activities. Then, still based on DGS directives, and according to predefined priorities, the available resources are allotted to the users. Finally, the Vigna di Valle Centre monitors and manages the orbiting satellites.

The terminals adopted for SICRAL are of different types: fixed, transportable, vehicular, avionic and naval. This permits the optimal use of the satellite resources. One of the system's most significant characteristics is its capability of adapting the available resources to the needs of the moment. The satellite's payload and terminals can therefore be adjusted according to the type and number of connections required and to the different geographic areas.

The telecommunication services provided by the system are: voice, data transmission and slow video, while there are three types of telecommunication networks for specific requirements.



The FDMS-PAMA (Frequency Division Multiple Access - Pre Assigned Multiple Access) network can provide a permanent connection between two user areas (e.g. national and out-of-area) by bundling different communications on a single satellite-carrier wave. Each of the two user-areas depends on a fixed or transportable station (SHF or EHF).

The SCPC-DAMA (Single Channel Per Carrier - Demand Assignment Multiple Access) network provides a connection between individual users through the satellite-transmission/reception of a carrier-wave assigned upon request. Each user can have a terminal, either on his own or in common with others (SHF or EHF).

The TDMA-DAMA (Time Division Multiple Access - Demand Assignment Multiple Access) network provides a connection between individual mobile users and a fixed net, through the time-division access to a satellite-carrier wave assigned on request. The mobile user has an assigned terminal (UHF) and the fixed net depends on a fixed or

transportable station (SHF or EHF).

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

As we mentioned, the SICRAL system was realized by the SITAB industrial consortium, formed by the main national industries of the space sector.

Alenia Spazio, the consortium's main contractor, with its 70% participation, coordinated the activity of about 150 firms engaged in the programme. It took care of the planning, realization and integration of the satellite and its components (platform, payload, antennas) as well as of the telecommunications with the radio stations of the mission's and the satellite's control Centres. Finally, being responsible for the system as a whole, *Alenia Spazio*, through the Vigna di Valle management and control Centre, plans and manages all satellite connections according to the requirements of the various users. *Fiat Avio*, whose participation is 20%, is responsible for the launching service, the propelling system


The SICRAL satellite in a geostationary orbit.

and some ground installations. Furthermore, it constructed the motors for the separation of the stages of the Ariane IV, which put the satellite into orbit.

Finally, *Telespazio*, with a 10% participation, is entrusted with four functions, crucial for the Centre's full operation: controlling the satellite, monitoring/checking telecommunication nets, controlling possible radioelectric interferences on the frequency bands, protecting channels and optimizing land and satellite assets. Extremely important, furthermore, was the role of *Telespazio* through its Fucino space centre, during LEOP (Launch and Early Orbit Phase), the critical range of command-and-control phases which goes from the release of the satellite by the launcher to the moment of its final and correct position into orbit.

SICRAL FOR THE ARMY

We have already underlined the strategic importance, for the



Armed Forces as a whole, of an autonomous communications system, flexible and reliable, capable of assuring long-distance connections. These characteristics are even more important for a Force such as the Army, which is continuously and directly engaged in operations outside the national borders, often in isolated and impervious areas, where satellite communications are very effective and efficient.

Therefore SICRAL offers, to the Army in particular, a great opportunity for the final overcoming of the land communication systems, which are particularly burdensome as regards number of sets and personnel.

SICRAL's services will permit the Army to carry out more effectively the numerous out-of-area missions assigned to our Service. In particular, the contingents deployed in the Balkans with NATO, the UN or any other supernational or regional organization, will be better connected among themselves and with the mother country.

Furthermore, the high level of integration with similar systems will permit to establish new

forces, suitably equipped, within the future European defence structures, as well as to develop training activities outside the national territory.

SICRAL can also be employed within our borders by units on training or engaged in non strictly military operations (public order, civil protection), and to make up for possible failures in the land-communication system.

POSSIBLE CIVILIAN USES OF SICRAL

The possible civilian applications of the system deserve a special mention. SICRAL came into being as a military system, to meet special requirements of Defence. However, its importance for the entire Country must be underlined, since financial resources, operational know-how and administrative assets have been put to use for its realization, together with remarkable industrial resources. This led to seriously consider involving other bodies and institutions, in order to study

possible enlargements of the system, capable of meeting further requirements, such as public order, civil defence, navigation and telemedicine.

In civil defence, for instance, the satellite platform can be employed for emergency connections with rescue teams in case of disasters; it can contribute to the implementation of monitoring nets (in floods, landslides, seismic phenomena, volcanic eruptions), gathering and distributing data; it can ensure the access to data banks and the diffusion of information on the territory.

Furthermore, the system can perform precision-location services. In fact, the data of the national network can be broadcast in order to improve the GPS system's performance in a given area. This service can be applied in support of the management of land, naval and air units, through the location and positioning of assets and personnel equipped with commercial GPS systems, to be used in cases where the employment of military GPS receivers is not possible or necessary. SICRAL can also support the activities of cartographic survey.

As regards the integrated services, the system can ensure the remote management of logistics, through the integration of the satellite communications means; it can guarantee the remote control of vehicles transporting dangerous materials, and manage possible alarm situations; it can support the planning of interventions and territorial control, making use if its possibility of interconnection with the different data bases of the various Administrations (Police, Foresters Corps) sharing geographic, environmental and territorial information.

Other applications are also possible in telemedicine, through the remote management of normal prophylaxis and

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Details of the satellite in the anechoic chamber.


diagnosis activities, as well as medical emergencies. The system can also facilitate the diffusion of medical information, also in case of emergency operations, making remote diagnoses possible, thanks to the transmission of data and images.

Finally, SICRAL could support the operations of drones, which are very effective in situations, both military and civilian, where the employment of other systems (piloted aircraft, satellites) is economically inconvenient, too dangerous or impossible. The need to operate also outside the national territory and in large areas makes the space element all-important, since it can guarantee the continuity of the drone's operation, even beyond the line of sight.

Thus, the dual employment of SICRAL does not seem impossible or unthinkable. It is also evident that further, non strictly military applications, will have to be considered only with reference to SICRAL 2, since the satellite now into orbit is fully engaged in meeting purely military needs.

SICRAL 2 is therefore a strategically important opportunity, which should not be underestimated by the Defence administration (which could use the investments in a more profitable manner, thus obtaining a more flexible and secure system, with greater transmission capabilities), by the possible civilian users (who could avail themselves of an already tested and controlled system), by the industrial system (which could put to good use, and improve, the technological, managerial and economic capabilities developed in the realization of SICRAL 1).

By doing so, the industries



would acquire an image of high knowledge and competitiveness. Indeed, Italy as a whole should be greatly interested in the project, since its development could give the Country great prestige and a substantial economic return.

These last considerations take us back to ten years ago, for a more general comment. It was already evident, at that time, that it was necessary to coordinate the public demand for a system of observation of the Earth based on the application of space and

satellite technology. A system capable of meeting, at the same time, civilian and military requirements. The institutional coordination of users could avoid duplications, activate joint financial support by different Ministries, identify priorities in planning and in defining the technical/operational characteristics, for the realization of "dual-use" multifunction space programmes.

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** Expert on Industrial Relations*

THE HEROES OF MASADA

HISTORY AND LEGEND

by Paolo Feniello*



The recruits of some special units of the Israeli Army pledge loyalty to their Country with the words: "Masada shall not fall again". The name of this natural fortress is the symbol of the Jewish resistance against the Roman occupation and remains a precise reference to the determination of today's Israel to defend its national identity. That stronghold in the Judean desert, in 73 A.D., witnessed the tragic end of the last action of the Zealots who, unwilling to renounce their freedom, proudly preferred to kill themselves.

The stronghold of Masada, stands solitary on the southwest of the Dead Sea, on rugged ground. Three narrow valleys, to the east, south and southwest, isolate this natural element of limited extension. To the north the ground is equally inaccessible. The summit, shaped like a rhombus with diagonals of different length, is almost flat and has only two accesses, to the east and west; two paths that climb the slope from the bottom of the valleys, winding along rocks and gorges. The diagonal in the meridian sense measures 630 m and the one in the equatorial sense measures 260 m. The path of the eastern side, almost a serpentine, is particularly difficult, while that on the western slope is very steep, especially in the stretch adjacent to the rock wall.

Within one century (30 B.C. - 73 A.D.) Masada experiences three moments of glory.

In 36 B.C., Herod the Great, King of Judea, chooses this secluded and inaccessible place to build his retreat, equipping it moreover with all the conveniences worthy of a royal residence. He fears a rebellion of his people, opposed to the friendship established between the Jewish King and the Romans,

who already in 63 B.C. had made those territories tributary to Rome. The fear is further increased by the possibility that the triumvir Mark Antony may agree to Cleopatra's proposals to expand her sovereignty over Palestine.

Herod builds on the rock a small royal palace near the western access, a villa on the northern spur; a thermal edifice, deposits for great quantities of victuals, supplies and weapons, a ritual bath for purifications, completing everything with the construction of a casemate wall 5.5 m. high, on the superior edge of the rock (two walls 4 m. apart and including 110 rooms) and equipped with 38 towers, for a total length of 1300 m.


As is known, Antony did not hand over Judea to the Egyptian Queen and Herod avoided the danger of a revolt.

As time passes the Roman yoke becomes more and more oppressive, igniting the revolt led mainly by the Zealots.

The Romans, perfectly aware of the tactical importance of the stronghold, occupy it and leave a garrison there.

One side of the special medal coined by the Government of Israel.





Aerial view of Masada from the south. The whitish spur on the western slope was used by the X Legio for the attack against the rock. In the background, the Dead Sea.

The rebellion mounts like a tidal wave in a crescendo of episodes that culminate in the revolt of 66 A.D.. The Zealots, with the aim of making it a place of resistance to the death, annihilate the Roman garrison through deceit and take possession of the stronghold. The reaction of General Vespasian and the operations led by his son Titus, who puts down the Jewish resistance on the whole territory, destroying the Temple of Jerusalem and enslaving thousands of Jews, are well known.

The indomitable pride of the Zealots, resolute to keep the flame of anti-Roman resistance alive, has by now only one sanctuary: the impregnable fortress of Masada, where 960 people, including women, old men and children, live in the hope of rekindling, also in other centres of the Country, the determination to oppose the foreign occupation.

The difficulties of taking possession of the entire territory grant some respite to the Zealots

of Masada who, for three years (70-73 A.D.) live undisturbed while improving the resistance capabilities of their eagle's nest with reinforcement works and the construction of a defensive apparatus.

Meanwhile, Procurator Bassus passes away and is succeeded by Flavius Silva who, realizing that Masada is the sole centre of anti-Roman resistance, gathers all his forces and decides to destroy that maniple of rebels, by laying siege to the fortress commanded by Eleazar Ben Yair (1).

The enterprise is not easy, owing to the higher position of the defenders and the difficulty of the accesses to the rock. The desert natural environment and the distance of victuals and water sources make it even worse. The siege must develop in a rather short stretch of time, because by June it becomes impossible to live in the region.

As already mentioned, the access to the fortress is possible only by proceeding along a rock spur resembling a rather narrow alluvial cone, covered with

detritus, developing for about 300 m., to gain an altitude of 75 m..The slope, initially rather slight, becomes prohibitive - as is natural - in the vicinity of the point of access to the summit of the fortress, reaching a gradient of almost 50%.

Gen. Silva's concept of action is very simple and has no alternatives. Considering that the whole world knows that Judea was conquered already three years before; that the rebels must be prevented from escaping, to avoid their rekindling the hope of a revived resistance; that the operations must be concluded before the month of June; and, last, that the only point of access to conquer the position is the western one, he decides to:

- build a circumvallation wall, with observation towers every 100 m., all around the rock, for a length of 3500 m., in order to prevent the rebels from escaping;
- deploy the eight camps of the Legion, after due consideration, along the perimeter of the circumvallation wall, to control the ways of escape (2);
- attack the western access to the fortress with a robust tower equipped with a battering-ram for demolishing the casemate wall, after softening the gradient of the rock spur - where the western path is climbing - by means of gravel fillings.

The imposing size of the construction of the siege works and the modification of the incline of the ramp of access leave no doubts about the fact that also a few thousands of unwilling prisoners were forced to participate in the enterprise.

The technical problem relevant

Map of Masada and its surroundings, with the position of the various camps and the circumvallation wall.

to the modification of the incline of the embankment doubtlessly presents some inconveniences if Silva, once the filling is completed, must order a second phase of works in order to permit the movement of those who have to transport the materials for the construction of the tower and the launch machines.

At last an embankment 25 m.wide is realized, taking the material from a small hill in the vicinity(3).


In order to prevent the filling material from subsiding under the pressure of the load, the sides of the rock spur are reinforced with big trunks fixed into the ground (4).

The Roman engineers build - at a little distance from the walls - a wooden tower of about 25 m., completely lined on the outside with a metal sheet, in order to avoid that the incendiary darts of the defence may damage it.

The tower is equipped with a powerful battering-ram and machines for launching darts and stones.

During the construction of the tower the besieged try, again and again, to launch stones (5), employing suitable machines, but the violence of the legionaries' attack, supported by an efficient covering fire, nullifies any defensive action (6). The battering-ram repeatedly hits the casemate wall and finally opens a breach.

The defenders, nevertheless, during the night hurriedly build a second wall inside the crumbled one, putting together big trunks fixed deep into the ground, securing them to other trunks placed horizontally, thinking that the battering-ram could not overcome the elasticity of the construction. The idea is good and, for a moment, successful.




But Silva, aware of the countermeasure of the besieged, orders to carry out a dense launching of incendiary darts. The burning of the wall at the beginning turns out to be sorrowful for the legionaries, because the wind that blows from the east prevents them from exploiting the success immediately. But within a short time the wind changes its direction and burns the wooden structure to ashes, preventing the defenders from taking any further countermeasure (7). The breach is now open, but the legionaries cannot continue their work because the night is falling. Anyway, fearing escapes from the fortress, they reinforce the surveillance along the entire perimeter of the circumvallation wall.

Historian Flavius Josephus gives the following description of that dramatic moment: *"...Nevertheless, Eleazar Ben Yair did not think to escape for a single moment, neither would he have permitted anyone to try to get away. When he saw that the wall*

they had built was collapsing in fire, having no other way to give a clear proof of courage, explaining to his men what the conquerors would do to them, to their children and wives, he consulted with them about the project of a collective death before the arrival of the legionaries (8). Albeit after some hesitations, all are agreed and the plan is carried out.

The Romans expect a counterattack by the defenders at dawn. After some delay, they put on their armour and throw some bridges from the summit of the tower towards the breach and prepare for the assault, but, when they enter the fortress, they see no living soul. The silence is broken only by the crackling of the fires started by the defenders before killing themselves. During the reconnaissance of the place they run into some survivors, who tell them what has happened. The legionaries are not pleased to see the dramatic end of the Zealots; on the contrary, they are filled with deep admiration for the men



Reconstruction of a ram-equip tower: (I and II Century A.D.).

large number of finds - which were well preserved owing to the desert climate of the site, far from inhabited places - leaves no doubts on the veracity of the narration.

The news of Masada's fall, addressed only to the Emperor, in Rome had no celebrations and there is no mention of it in the annals of the time. Coins with the inscription "JUDAEA CAPTA" had already been circulating for three years.

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NOTES

(1) From this moment we must follow the narration made by historian Flavius Josephus, a former member of the Judaic resistance, who had gone over to the Romans as interpreter. "The Judaic War", his most important work, is not devoid of contradictions and inaccuracies; nevertheless his account of the capture of Masada has been confirmed during the archaeological excavations carried out in 1963-1964 and directed by Yigael Yadin, professor of archaeology at the University of Jerusalem.

(2) The position, eccentric as regards the normal travelling roads, has facilitated the preservation of the

who, in immovable contempt of death, have chosen such a dramatic end and remain perplexed thinking that, while their demanding effort has been unable to make a single victim, the pride and the high sense of

liberty of the Zealots has caused a great number of deaths.

The account of Flavius Josephus - as regards particularly the tragic end of the Zealots - excites the reader's incredulity. But the examinations made on a

Metal spearheads found near a Zealot warrior.


eight encampments (two large and six small ones), so that, seen from the top of the rock, they look as if they had just been abandoned. The importance of these structures, remarkable from the viewpoint of military history, has proved equally great from the archaeological point of view. The remains found during the excavations have permitted to establish even the place of origin of the tradesmen that followed the troops and the place of production of the pottery used at that time. The encampment where the command post of general Silva was located, to the west of the fortress (one of the two large camps), measured 118 m. by 145 m. and was divided in four sectors by the two roads (*via praetoria* and *via principalis*) which, intersecting at a right angle at the centre of the encampment, led to the four gates (*praetoria*, *decumana*, *principalis dextra* and *principalis sinistra*), equipped with security and control devices (*claviculae*). It has been possible to survey all the elements constituting the camp (command post, mess, assembly square, etc.). The two large encampments hosted the X Legion (approx. 6000 men), the small ones the auxiliary troops (about 3000 men).

(3) Even at present the slope appears of a whitish colour, because the hill that was levelled to use its material consisted of white rock.

(4) Still visible.

(5) Of the dimension of a large cluster of grapes.

(6) At this point, it is interesting to note the digression of historian Flavius Josephus, who remembers, as analogy, the crucial moment of the attack to the walls of Jerusalem: *the machines launched stones weighing one talent (about 30 kg) ...the Judeans were able to observe their arrival, because they were white and because*




the noise of the machines at the moment of launching acted as forewarning. As a consequence, the sentinels sitting on the towers warned their companions, shouting: "the stone is coming", and those who were on its trajectory stooped down on the floor. But the Romans, having noticed that,

became invisible and killed many defenders.

(7) The suddenness in which in that desert and mountainous area the wind changes its direction was noticed also during the excavations campaign of 1963.

(8) Flavius Josephus continues: *...therefore he gathered the most*



Romans soldiers (Rome, Palazzo della Cancelleria).



One of the most stirring finds in the 1963-1964 excavation campaign: the braids of a young woman, whose skeleton was found close to the remains of a warrior and a child.


courageous of his companions and incited them to adopt the solution he had matured, saying: "...I cannot consider this situation other than a favour that the Lord has granted us, that is, to die courageously and in a state of freedom, an opportunity that has not been given to the other compatriots that were captured unexpectedly. It is certain that we will be taken within one day, but this is the right occasion to die gloriously. This is what our enemies cannot in any way prevent us from doing, even if they very much want to take us alive. Neither can we think of resisting any longer, nor of beating them".

Having some of those present manifested some perplexity about the extreme solution proposed, Eleazar

resumes his exhortation speaking of the immortality of the soul and emphasizing once more the sufferings to which their relatives would be subjected if they were captured. At the end, silence dominates the assembly. Then, all of a sudden, as if prompted by an irrepressible impulse of the spirit, all agree and hurry to join their families. After a long farewell embrace to their relatives, they extinguish with the sword their innocent lives, fully convinced that death is better than the loss of freedom and of the sufferings inflicted to the slaves. Once this sad task is completed, the heads of the families gather all their belongings in a heap and set them afire. Ten of them, drawn by lot, are to kill all the others; one of the ten is drawn to kill his nine companions, with the pledge to inflict himself the same destiny. These are Flavius Josephus' words.



To this carnage, occurred on the

15th day of the month of Nisan (the day after Passover - the first of April) of 73 A.D., survived only two women and five children, who, at the beginning of the dramatic conclusion, had found refuge in a cave.



Roman arms (I Century A.D.).

SUMMARY SOMMAIRE INHALT RESUMEN



La stabilisation des Balkans, par Carlo Cabigiosu (p. 2).

Les derniers conflits en Bosnie et au Kosovo ont mis en évidence le rôle primordial de l'OTAN, directement engagée sur le théâtre balkanique dans le cadre d'une intervention militaire qui, pour la première fois depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, n'a pas été l'aboutissement d'une politique expansionniste mais plutôt le fruit d'une volonté commune de maintenir la paix. L'expérience acquise au cours de ces dernières années à travers l'action des forces multinationales IFOR, SFOR et KFOR témoigne de l'importance du rôle joué par les militaires en vue du maintien de la paix et du développement de la démocratie. Les régions où persistent les dangers et l'instabilité sont encore nombreuses: Bosnie-Herzégovine, Serbie, Macédoine, Albanie. Les aides financières et l'intégration au sein des structures internationales représentent, à long terme, une réponse valable à l'instabilité. Toutefois, une présence militaire internationale solide demeure fondamentale.

Le Continent Asie, par Maurizio Coccia (p. 12).

C'est en Asie que se concentre la plus grande partie de la population mondiale. Ce continent est caractérisé par une multiplicité d'acteurs différents et parfois contradictoires: le pétrole de la Russie, de l'Indonésie et du Golfe persique, la religiosité de la Turquie et de l'Arabie Saoudite, les défis en matière de sûreté que représentent l'Afghanistan et l'Irak, le pouvoir économique du Japon, les difficultés liées au processus de transformation de la Chine, les disputes territoriales entre l'Inde et le Pakistan, les contradictions et les conflits engendrés par la culture islamique. Dans un tel contexte, les Etats-Unis, sont présents dans la région. Un kaléidoscope de situations qui constituent une menace pour la paix et la sûreté de la planète.

Les opérations «hors de zone». Éléments conceptuels et d'organisation, par Armando Novelli (p. 24).

L'OTAN, dans deux documents essentiels, a parlé de la gestion des crises comme un nouvel élément qu'on doit considérer à

côté de la défense collective (art. 5 du Traité), et ça implique un difficile processus de décision à niveau politique-stratégique. De ça est née l'exigence de créer un instrument révisité pour ce qui concerne l'organisation de Commandement et Contrôle et doté de nettes capacités de projection rapide dans le Théâtre.

Pour comprendre la Bosnie, par Giovanni Ridinò (p. 38).

Deux entités: la République Srpska (RS) et la Fédération de la Bosnie Herzégovine (BiH). Trois ethnies et religions: les bosnes-serbes chrétiens orthodoxes; les bosniaques musulmans et les bosne-croates catholiques romains. 155 municipalités (Opstines) et 10 Cantons administratives. Trois Chambres législatives. Un Gouvernement nationale et deux Gouvernements des entités. Une Présidence partagée en trois (trois Présidents pour les trois ethnies). 250 partis politiques. Forces Armées séparées. Ça, synthétiquement, la complexité «géographique» politique et administrative de la Bosnie Herzégovine, au lendemain des Accords de Dayton, signés à Paris en 1995.

Le désarmement et la sûreté nationale, par Gianfranco Tracci (p. 50).

La fin de la guerre froide et la chute du mur de Berlin ont permis de jeter les nouvelles bases d'un climat international de détente. Aussi d'importants résultats ont-ils été atteints en matière de: traités et conventions internationaux, réduction des forces conventionnelles (1990), interdiction des armes chimiques (1993), bannissement des expériences nucléaires (1996). L'engagement de l'Italie en vue d'étendre la ratification des conventions en matière d'armes chimiques au plus grand nombre possible de pays a été significatif.

Le processus de «génération des forces», par Roberto d'Alessandro (p. 58).

En parcourant les principales étapes qui caractérisent l'organisation d'une mission de soutien de la paix (ou CRO - Crisis Response Operations) on peut analyser notamment les différentes procédures visant à la préparation des forces destinées aux missions dont il est question. Les CRO sont des opérations multifonctionnelles prévoyant des activités politiques, militaires et civiles réalisées en vue de la prévention et de la résolution des conflits. Toute CRO se heurte dans sa phase préliminaire aux difficultés que comporte un engagement à long terme et aux contraintes imposées par chaque nation quant à l'emploi des unités disponibles. La prolifération de ces processus témoigne de l'importance du facteur temps, du rôle de la politique, du besoin d'évaluer la

faisabilité de l'intervention, du manque de solutions prédéfinies et de la nécessité de s'adapter aux différentes situations.

La Brigade aéromobile «Friuli». Manoeuvre Challenge 2001, par Livio Ciancarella et Andrea Di Stasio (p. 66).

La 1ère Unité aéromobile de l'Armée de Terre italienne naît le 30 Avril 2000 de la transformation de la Brigade mécanisée «Friuli». Dès ce temps là on a poursuivi d'importants résultats à niveau de doctrine et d'instruction militaire, en s'inspirant aussi aux expériences des Armées de Terre d'autres Pays. Sur cette ligne se placent les manoeuvres aéromobiles «Manta 2000» et «Challenge 2001». Celle-ci il y a eue le dernier 20 Février au Polygone de Foce di Reno, avec le but de vérifier les capacités de conception, d'organisation et de conduite d'une action aéromobile.


Ukraine, la nouvelle Armée de Terre. Interview au Général Petro Ivanovych Shul'iak, Vice-Ministre de la Défense et Commandant des Troupes de Terre, par Enrico Magnani (p. 78).

Depuis 1997 on a mis à exécution un processus de transformation ayant comme son objectif la création de Troupes de Terre ukrainiennes mobiles, polifonctionnelles, balancées, peu nombreuses, bien armées et professionnellement préparées. Les autres points stratégiques du «Programme de l'État de développement des Forces Armées» sont: la valorisation des rapports avec l'OTAN; le développement des projets de coopération régionale; la participation active aux opérations «hors de zone». Dans 2005 on devrait compléter la transformation, sur une base contractuelle, du service, en garantissant des Forces Armées exclusivement professionnelles.

Finlande. La nouvelle Armée de Terre - Interview au

Général Ilkka Eemeli Kylä-Harukka, par Enrico Magnani (p. 86).

L'Armée de Terre représente 75% des Forces armées finlandaises et constitue essentiellement une force de mobilisation. Elle comprend l'Infanterie, l'Artillerie, le Génie, les Transmissions et la Logistique et compte vingt-deux brigades, dont trois seulement sont des brigades d'engagement rapide. Bien qu'elle ne soit pas membre de l'OTAN, la Finlande participe au partenariat pour le maintien de la paix dans les Balkans et au Liban. La Finlande ne manque pas cependant d'accorder une importance toute particulière à la défense du territoire national, un souci qu'elle partage avec la Suède et la Norvège dans le cadre de la coopération nordique.



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La «Dimension Nord» de l'Europe, par Ornella Rota (p. 92).

Le Danemark, la Suède, la Finlande, la Norvège et l'Islande sont appelés à jouer un rôle primordial pour l'avenir de l'Union européenne. Les principaux thèmes sur lesquels se penchent les diplomates concernent le processus d'élargissement de l'Union européenne, le projet du bouclier spatial des Etats-Unis et les rapports avec la Russie. Et c'est justement à Moscou que surgissent les perplexités majeures quant à l'élargissement de l'Europe jusqu'aux frontières russes, tandis qu'une importance stratégique est accordée à tous les pays qui jouent un rôle décisif dans le contrôle des pays baltes.

Le SICRAL. Une nouvelle défi pour les télécommunications satellitaires, par Emanuela D'Alessio (p. 98).

Le satellite pour télécommunications militaires SICRAL, lancé en orbite le dernier 8 Février de la Guyane française, permet à nos Forces Armées d'avoir à disposition un système de télécommunications qui garantit la satisfaction des exigences imposées des nouveaux théâtres opérationnels, géographiquement très étendus, tels que la flexibilité, la rapidité de réaction et d'organisation, la vitesse de transmission, la capacité de survivance et l'élévé niveau d'interopérabilité. L'architecture de ce système est composée du satellite en orbite géostationnaire, d'un Centre de gestion et de contrôle des télécommunications satellitaires, qui se trouve à Vigna di Valle, et d'outre 100 computers en dotation aux nombreuses Unités des trois Forces Armées.

Les héros de Masada. L'histoire, la légende, par Paolo Feniello (p. 106).

En 70 après Jésus Christ, 960 Zélotes, parmi lesquels il y avait des vieux, des femmes et des enfants, se protègent dans la forteresse de Masada, en plein désert judaïque, pour résister aux Romains et pour garder en vie, dans cette région, la petite flamme de l'opposition aux envahisseurs. Une situation intolérable que le Général Flavio Silva, Commandant de la Xème Legion «Fretensis», décide de briser sans laisser aucun survivant. Pour cette raison on réalise de grandes oeuvres pour la démolition et l'on installe des machines pour le lance des dardes et des pierres. La réaction zélate est faible et sans influence. Lorsqu'on a décidé l'attaque, les légionnaires romains ouvrent des passages dans les murs et mettent les feux. Mais lorsqu'ils pénètrent à l'intérieur de la forteresse, avec un très grand étonnement, ils découvrent de n'avoir pas la possibilité de se réjouir de ça, si par hasard d'admirer une chose: par ne perdre pas leur liberté les Zélotes se sont suicidés.



Die Stabilisierung des Balkans, von Carlo Cabigiosu (s. 2).

Wenn man die Etappen des letzten Konflikts in Bosnien und im Kosovo Revue passieren lässt, fällt die herausstechende Rolle der NATO auf, die direkt auf dem Balkan in einer Militärintervention engagiert war, die zum ersten Mal nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg nicht von einer Politik der Territorialexpansion, sondern vom Willen, den Frieden wiederherzustellen, hervorgerufen gewesen ist. Die Erfahrung der letzten Jahre, mit dem Eingriff der multinationalen Kräfte IFOR, SFOR und KFOR hat deutlich gemacht, wie die Rolle der Soldaten ausschlaggebend für die Wiederherstellung des Friedens und die Entwicklung der Demokratie gewesen ist. Gegend, in denen Instabilität herrscht, gibt es noch viele und die Lage ist nicht ungefährlich: Bosnien-Herzegowina, Serbien, Mazedonien, Montenegro, Albanien. Wirtschaftliche Unterstützung und Integration der internationalen Strukturen stellen gültige langfristige Antworten auf die Instabilität, doch eine solide internationale Militärpräsenz bleibt grundlegend.

Kontinent Asien, von Maurizio Coccia (s. 12).

In Asien konzentriert sich die Mehrheit der Weltbevölkerung. Die Schlüsselfiguren sind viele, und sie haben verschiedene und oft widersprüchliche Eigenschaften. Es gibt das Erdöl und die Rohstoffe Russlands, Indonesiens und des persischen Golfs; Saudi-Arabien und die Türkei sind stark religiös gekennzeichnet; es gibt die Sicherheitsherausforderungen Afghanistans und des Irak; die Wirtschaftsmacht Japans und der schwierige Transformationsprozess Chinas; es gibt die andauernden Territorialstreitigkeiten zwischen Indien und Pakistan; es gibt die Gegensätze und die Konflikte, die von der islamischen Kultur herrühren. In einem so vielfältigen Kontext Vereinigten Staaten die in Asien aktiv sind. Ein Kaleidoskop von Situationen, die die Sicherheit und den Frieden der Welt bedrohen.

«Out-of-area» - Operationen: Konzept und Organisation, von Armando Novelli (s. 24).

Die NATO hat der Kollektivverteidigung in zwei grundlegenden Dokumenten das internationale Krisenmanagement als neues

Element beigeordnet (Art.5 des NATO-Vertrages). Dies bedeutet einen nicht gerade einfachen Entscheidungsprozess auf politisch-strategischer Ebene. Daher erwuchs das Bedürfnis, ein neues, überholtes Konzept in der Organisation von Kommando und Kontrolle zu schaffen, das die Fähigkeit zur schnellen Projektion auf neue Schauplätze hat.

Um Bosnien zu verstehen, von Giovanni Ridinò (s. 38).

Zwei staatliche Einheiten: die Serbische Republik (RS) und die Föderation Bosnien-Herzegowina (BiH). Drei Ethnien und Religionen: Die christlich-orthodoxen bosnischen Serben, die muslimischen Bosniaken und die römisch-katholischen bosnischen Kroaten. 155 Gemeinden (Opstine) und zehn Verwaltungsbezirke. Drei Parlamente. Eine nationale Regierung und zwei Regierungen der Teilbereiche. Drei Präsidenten, einen pro ethnisch-religiöser Gruppe. 250 politische Parteien. Dies ist zusammengefasst, die komplexe politische und administrative Geographie von Bosnien-Herzegowina nach dem Dayton-Abkommen, dass 1995 in Paris unterzeichnet wurde.


Abrüstung und internationale Sicherheit, von Gianfranco Tracchi (s. 50).

Mit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges und dem Fall der Berliner Mauer haben sich neue Perspektiven eröffnet für die Schaffung eines internationalen Klimas, das von der Entspannung inspiriert ist. Wichtige Ergebnisse sind erreicht worden, und zwar, was Abkommen und Konventionen zur Abrüstung, Reduktion der konventionellen Streitkräfte (1990), Verbot chemischer Waffen (1993), totalem Atomteststopp (1996) betreffen. Bedeutend ist das Engagement Italiens gewesen, um die Ratifizierung der Chemiewaffenkonvention soweit wie möglich auf andere Länder zu erweitern.

Der Prozess der «Schaffung von Einsatzkräften», von Roberto d'Alessandro (s. 58).

Wenn man die wichtigsten Schritte der Organisation einer friedensunterstützenden Mission (oder CRO - Crisis Response Operations) analysiert, dann kommen besonders die Vorgänge für die Bereitstellung einer Friedensmission zum Vorschein. Die CRO sind multifunktionelle Operationen, die politische, militärische und zivile Aktivitäten einschließen, die zur Vorbeugung und zur Lösung von Konflikten durchgeführt werden. Die vorbereitende Phase einer jeden CRO stellt einige Probleme dar, die mit den Schwierigkeiten, über einen längeren Zeitraum die Verpflichtungen zu erfüllen und mit den Beschränkungen, die jedes Land dem Einsatz verfügbarer Einheiten auferlegt, zusammenhängen. Die immer häufigere

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Entwicklung dieser «Prozesse» erlaubt es, signifikante Lehren über die Bedeutung des Zeitfaktors, den Einfluss der Politik, die Notwendigkeit, die Durchführbarkeit eines Einsatzes, das Fehlen vorbestimmter Lösungen und die Notwendigkeit der Anpassung an die jeweilige Situation, daraus zu ziehen.

Die Luftlandebrigade «Friuli». Manöver Challenge 2001, von Livio Ciancarella und Andrea Di Stasio (s. 66).

Die 1. Luftlandebrigade der italienischen Streitkräfte ist am 30. April 2000 aus der Verwandlung der mechanisierten Brigade «Friuli» entstanden. Seitdem sind wichtige Ergebnisse in Theorie und praktischer Ausbildung erreicht worden, indem man sich auch an den Erfahrungen anderer Länder orientiert hat. In diesem Zusammenhang sind die Luftlandemanöver «Manta 2000» und «Challenge 2001» zu sehen. Letzteres hat am 20. Februar auf dem Truppenübungsplatz Foce di Reno stattgefunden. Ziel war es, die Fähigkeit zur Konzeption, Organisation und Durchführung einer Luftlandeaktion zu überprüfen.

Ukraine: Die neuen Streitkräfte. Interview mit General Petro Ivanovych Shul'jak, Verteidigungsvize-minister und Heereskommandeur, von Enrico Magnani (s. 78).

Seit 1997 ist ein mwandlungsprozess im Gange, der als Ziel die Schaffung mobiler ukrainischer Bodentruppen hat, die multifunktional, ausgewogen, nicht zu zahlreich, gut bewaffnet und professionell ausgebildet sein sollen. Weitere strategische Punkte des «staatlichen Programms zur Entwicklung der Streitkräfte» sind: Die Verstärkung der Beziehungen zur NATO, die Entwicklung von Projekten der regionalen Kooperation, die Teilnahme an «Out-of-area»-Operationen. Bis 2005 müsste die Umwandlung des Wehrdienstes in ein Vertragsverhältnis abgeschlossen sein, so dass dann nur noch Zeit- und Berufssoldaten im Dienst sein werden.

Finnland: Das neue Heer. Interview mit Generalmajor Ilkka Eemeli Kylä-Harakka, von Enrico Magnani (s. 86).

Das Heer stellt 75% der finnischen Streitkräfte dar und teilt sich in Infanterie, Artillerie, Pioniere, Fernmelder und Logistik auf. Von den 22 Brigaden sind drei in Einsatzbereitschaft. Finnland ist zwar kein NATO-Mitglied, doch ist es Teil der "Partnership for Peace" und leistet seinen Beitrag sowohl auf dem Balkan als auch im Libanon. Besondere Bedeutung hat jedoch die Verteidigung des Territoriums, ein Problem, das sie mit Schweden und Norwegen im Rahmen der nordischen Zusammenarbeit teilen.

Die «Nord-Dimension» Europas, von Ornella Rota (s. 92).

Dänemark, Schweden, Finnland, Norwegen und Island sind dabei, eine ausschlaggebende Rolle für die Zukunft der Europäischen Union zu spielen. Die hauptsächlichsten Fragen, auf die sich die Diplomatie konzentriert, betreffen den Prozess der Erweiterung der EU, das Projekt des «Weltraumschildes» in den Vereinigten Staaten und die Beziehungen zu Russland. Und gerade in Moskau gibt es einiges Stimrunzeln einem vereinten Europa gegenüber, das bis an die russische Grenze reicht, während diesen Ländern eine strategische Bedeutung beigemessen wird, die wichtig für die Kontrolle der Ostsee sind. Die «Dimension Nord» Europas zielt vorwiegend darauf ab, die Außenpolitik der EU und die Beziehungen zu Russland zu stärken, um die weiterhin bestehenden vielfältigen Ursachen von Reibungen zu reduzieren.

SICRAL. Eine neue Herausforderung für Satellitentelekommunikation, von Emanuela D'Alessio (s. 98).

Der am 8. Februar des Jahres von Französisch-Guyana aus in seine Umlaufbahn geschossene Satellit für militärische Kommunikation SICRAL ermöglicht es unseren Streitkräften, über ein Telekommunikationssystem zu verfügen, das die Befriedigung der Bedürfnisse, die aus den neuen, geographisch recht weiträumigen Operationsschauplätzen erwachsen. Diese Bedürfnisse sind Flexibilität, Reaktions- und Organisationsschnelligkeit, Übertragungsgeschwindigkeit, Überlebensfähigkeit und ein starke Interoperabilität der verschiedenen Teilstreitkräfte und Waffengattungen. Das System besteht aus dem Satelliten in geostationärer Umlaufbahn, aus einem Kontrollzentrum der Satellitenkommunikation und aus mehr als 100 Terminals bei den verschiedenen Einheiten der drei Teilstreitkräfte.

Die Helden von Masada. Geschichte und Legende, von Paolo Feniello (s. 106).

Im Jahre 70 n. Chr. verschanzten sich 960 Zeloten, darunter Alte, Frauen und Kinder in der Feste Masada mitten in der Wüste Judäas, um den Römern zu widerstehen und um in der Region dem Invasionsheer Widerstand zu leisten. Dies war für die Römer eine unerträgliche Lage, die General Flavius Silva, Kommandant der 10. Legion «Fretensis» zu unterbinden beschloss, ohne Gefangene zu machen. Es wurden große Belagerungsaufwendungen getroffen und Maschinen zu Pfeil- und Steinwurf aufgestellt. Die Verteidigung der Zeloten war schwach. Da der Angriff entschlossen war, schlugen die römischen Legionäre Breschen in die Mauern und warfen Brandpfeile. Aber

als sie in die Feste eindrangen, entdeckten sie mit Erstaunen und Bewunderung: um nicht zu verlieren, hatten sich die Zeloten den Tod gegeben.




La estabilización de los Balcanes, por Carlo Cabigiosu (p. 2).

En las distintas etapas de los últimos conflictos en Bosnia y Kosovo, destaca el papel fundamental de la OTAN con su participación directa en una intervención militar, en el teatro balcánico, que por vez primera después de la segunda guerra mundial, no se origina en una política expansionista, sino en la voluntad de mantener la paz. La experiencia adquirida en estos últimos años con la actuación de las fuerzas multinacionales IFOR, SFOR y KFOR demuestra lo determinante que fue el papel desempeñado por los militares en el mantenimiento de la paz y el desarrollo de la democracia. Las áreas de inestabilidad donde persisten peligros son aún numerosas: Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania. Las ayudas económicas y la integración en las estructuras internacionales contribuyen, a largo plazo, al recobro de la estabilidad, pero sigue resultando fundamental una sólida presencia militar de carácter internacional.

El Continente Asia, por Maurizio Coccia (p. 12).

En Asia, donde se concentra la mayor parte de la población mundial, los protagonistas son múltiples y presentan características distintas y contradictorias: el petróleo y las materias primas de Rusia, de Indonesia y del Golfo Pérsico; la marcada identidad religiosa de Turquía y Arabia Saudí; los desafíos a la seguridad representados por Afganistán e Iraq; el poder económico de Japón y el difícil proceso de transformación de China; las disputas territoriales entre la India y Pakistán; las contradicciones y los conflictos generados por la cultura islámica. En semejante contexto, cobra particular importancia el papel de los Estados Unidos, presentes en el área asiática. Es éste un calidoscopio de situaciones que hacen peligrar la seguridad y la paz de nuestro planeta.



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Las operaciones «fuera área». Elementos conceptuales y organizativos, por Armando Novelli (p. 24).

OTAN, en dos documentos importantes, puso la gestión de las crisis como nuevo elemento de considerarse, al lado de la defensa colectiva (art. 5 del Tratado), que implica un proceso decisional no simple a nivel político-estratégico. De eso nació la exigencia por poner en ser uno instrumento revisto en la organización de Mando y Control; dotado de marcadas capacidades de proyección rápida en Teatro.

Para entender Bosnia, por Giovanni Ridinò (p. 38).

Dos entidades: la República Srpska (RS) y la Federación de Bosnia Erzegovina (BiH). Tres etnias y religiones: los bosno-serbos cristianos ortodoxos; los bosniacos musulmanos y los bosno-croatos católicos romanos. 155 municipalidades (Opstinas) y 10 Rincónes administrativos. Tres Cámaras legislativas. Un Gobierno nacional y dos Gobiernos de las entidades. Una Presidencia repartida en tres (tres Presidentes por las tres etnias). 250 partidos políticos. Fuerzas Armadas separadas. Esa, resumiendo, la complexa «geografía» política y administrativa de Bosnia Erzegovina el día después de los Acordes de Dayton, firmados en París en 1995.

El desarme y la seguridad internacional, por Gianfranco Tracci (p. 50).

El fin de la guerra fría y la caída del muro de Berlín sentaron nuevas bases para la instauración de un clima internacional de distensión. Se lograron importantes resultados en materia de: tratados y convenciones sobre el desarme; reducción de las fuerzas convencionales (1990); prohibición de armas químicas (1993); interdicción de los experimentos nucleares (1996). En este contexto, Italia desempeñó un papel fundamental para extender al mayor número posible de países la ratificación de la convención en materia de armas químicas.

El proceso de «generación de las fuerzas», por Roberto d'Alessandro (p. 58).

Recorriendo las principales etapas de la organización de una misión de apoyo a la paz o CRO (Crisis Response Operations) se analizan en particular los procedimientos necesarios para la preparación de las fuerzas destinadas a dicha misión. Las CRO son operaciones multifuncionales que abarcan actividades políticas, militares y civiles llevadas a cabo para la prevención y solución de conflictos. Los problemas que suelen plantearse en la fase preliminar de cada CRO se deben a la dificultad de cumplir a largo plazo los compromisos asumidos; así como a las condicionantes impuestas por cada nación en cuanto al empleo de las unidades puestas a disposición. La multiplicación de estos «procesos» a lo largo del tiempo es

aleccionadora de la importancia del factor tiempo, de la influencia de la política, de la necesidad de evaluar la factibilidad de la intervención, de la falta de soluciones predefinidas y de la necesidad de adaptarse a la situación del momento.

La Brigada aeromóvil «Friuli». Entrenamiento Challenge 2001, por Livio Ciancarella y Andrea Di Stasio (p. 66).

La 1ª Unidad aeromóvil del Ejército italiano nace el 30 de Abril de 2000 por la transformación de la Brigada mecanizada «Friuli». Desde entonces, importantes resultados se consiguieron a nivel doctrinal y adiestrativo, inspirándose también por las experiencias de los Ejércitos de otros Países. Sobre esta línea se colocan los entrenamientos aeromóviles «Manta 2000» y «Challenge 2001». Está última se desarrolló el 20 de Febrero en el polígono de Foce di Reno, con el objetivo de verificar las capacidades de concepción, organización y conducta de una acción aeromóvil.

Ucraina, el nuevo Ejército. Entrevista al General Petro Ivanovych Shul'ia, Vice Ministro de la Defensa y Comandante de las Tropas de Terrestres, por Enrico Magnani (p. 78).

Del 1997 hay un proceso de transformación que tiene como objetivo la creación de Tropas Terrestres ucrainas móviles, polifuncionales, balanceadas, poco numerosas, bien armadas y profesionalmente preparadas. Otros puntos estratégicos del «Programa estatal de desarrollo de las Fuerzas Armadas» son: el potenciamiento de los reportes con OTAN; el desarrollo de proyectos de cooperación regional; la participación activa a las operaciones «fuera área». Para el 2005 se tendría que terminar la transformación, con base contractual, de la milí, garantizando Fuerzas Armadas solo profesionales.

Finlandia: el nuevo Ejército de Tierra. Entrevista con el General Ilkka Eemeli Kylä-Harukka, por Enrico Magnani (p. 86).

El Ejército de Tierra representa el 75% de las Fuerzas armadas finlandesas y constituye esencialmente una fuerza de movilización. Está integrado por la Infantería, la Artillería, el Cuerpo de Ingenieros, las Transmisiones y la Logística. Sólo tres de las veintidós Brigadas se consideran de empleo rápido. Aun no siendo miembro de la OTAN, Finlandia participa en el partenariado por la paz, tanto en los Balcanes como en el Líbano. Asimismo, reviste particular importancia para Finlandia la defensa del territorio, una preocupación que comparte con Suecia y Noruega en el marco de la cooperación nórdica.

La «Dimensión Norte» de Europa, por Ornella Rota (p. 92).



Dinamarca, Suecia, Finlandia, Noruega e Islandia están destinadas a desempeñar un papel determinante para el futuro de la Unión Europea. El proceso de ensanchamiento de la Unión Europea, el proyecto del escudo especial de los Estados Unidos y las relaciones con Rusia son los temas principales en los que se están centrando las diplomacias. Y es precisamente en Moscú donde surgen las mayores perplejidades en lo que se refiere al ensanchamiento de Europa hasta las fronteras rusas, mientras que se le atribuye una importancia estratégica a todos aquellos países que resultan determinantes para el control del Báltico. La «dimensión norte» de Europa pretende prioritariamente fortalecer la política exterior de la Unión Europea y las relaciones con Rusia, con el fin de reducir las innumerables causas de conflicto que aún existen.

El SICRAL. Una nueva disfida por las telecomunicaciones satelitares, por Emanuela D'Alessio (p. 98).







El satélite para telecomunicaciones militares SICRAL, lanzado en órbita el 8 de Febrero pasado por Guyana francesa consiente a las nuestras Fuerzas Armadas de disponer de un sistema de telecomunicaciones que garantiza de satisfacer de las exigencias impuestas por los nuevos teatros operativos, geográficamente muy extendidos, como la flexibilidad, la rapidez de reacción y de organización, la velocidad de transmisión, la capacidad de sobrevivir y el alto nivel de interoperabilidad. La arquitectura del sistema está compuesta por el satélite en órbita geoestacionaria, por un Centro de gestión y control de las telecomunicaciones satelitares, ubicado en Vigna di Valle, y por otras 100 terminales en dotación a las varias Unidades de las Tres Fuerzas Armadas.

Los héroes de Masada. La historia, la leyenda, por Paolo Feniello (p. 106).

En 70 d.C., 960 Celotes, entre los cuales había viejos, mujeres y niños, se refugiaron en la fortaleza de Masada, en pleno desierto judaico, para resistir a los Romanos y mantener en vida en la región la pequeña llama de la oposición al invasor. Una situación intolerable que el General Flavio Silva, Comandante de la X Legión «Fretensis», decide de reprimir sin dejar algunos sobrevivientes. Por eso son realizadas imponentes obras por la demolición y instaladas máquinas para lanzar flechas y piedras. La reacción celota es débil y ininfluyente. Decidido el ataque. Los legionarios romanos abren algunos pasajes en los muros y se esfuerzan por incendiar todo lo que encuentran. Pero cuando ellos entran en la fortaleza, con grande estupor, los romanos descubren de no tener nada por lo que alegrarse, si acaso hay una cosa por admirar: para no perder la libertad los Celotes se son suicidados.



THE EDITORIAL STYLE OF RIVISTA MILITARE



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